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Synopsis 
 
In 2008, nearly half of Africa’s civil wars were ‘low-capability’, that is, conflicts 
without the tanks, artillery and jet-aircraft we associate with modern warfare. 
Although depictions of teenagers with AK-47s stealing aid supplies, looting diamonds 
and brutalising civilians are popular, we know little about the logic of combat in 
places such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Somalia. This thesis advances our 
knowledge by articulating a theory of military strategy in low-capability civil wars. I 
argue that low-capability civil wars are defensive wars. Due to the inability of 
governments and insurgents to conduct offensive operations, the costs of capturing 
territory are far greater than holding it. Based on this theory, I predict that economic 
geography structures where battles are fought and when foreign states intervene in 
low-capability civil wars. Results from a quantitative analysis of African civil wars 
from 1960-2008 and a case study of the Liberian civil war show that the incidence 
and concentration of fighting around ‘point resources’, especially capital cities, is 
higher in low-capability civil wars when compared to the more familiar 
‘conventional’ and ‘guerrilla’ civil wars. Foreign states also time their deployments 
with decisive battles over economically valuable areas in low-capability warfare, a 
pattern not observed in conventional or guerrilla warfare. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: Military Strategy, Economic 
Geography and Low-capability Warfare 
 
On August 6th 2010, as the final words were put to this thesis, Al-Shabaab insurgents 
withdrew from positions in Mogadishu they had occupied for nearly four years.  The 
Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and an African Union peacekeeping 
force (AMISOM), whom Al-Shabaab had been fighting for control of the city, 
cautiously moved into the vacated areas.1 The withdrawal was strange and surprised 
some observers. Al-Shabaab controls most of Southern Somalia and had besieged the 
TFG and AMISOM in a small enclave near the presidential palace. Surely Al-
Shabaab were on the verge of victory? What was the reason for what one 
spokesperson described as a ‘change of tactics’ from the positional defence of 
territory in Mogadishu to a guerilla war in the countryside? 2 As Richard Lough 
observed, ‘retreat from the Somali capital Mogadishu signals an acceptance that it 
cannot militarily defeat a government propped up by foreign muscle and firepower’.3
 
  
Somalia’s TFG and AMISOM successfully utilised a military strategy dating back to 
Pericles and Frederick the Great that, according to the findings of this thesis, is 
commonly deployed in Africa’s low-capability civil wars. This strategy is what 
military historian Hans Delbruck described as the ‘strategy of exhaustion’.   
Ernest Hemmingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls opens with the protagonist, Robert 
Jordan, encamped with Republican guerillas in the forests of the Sierra de 
Guadarrama mountains. Jordan is an American in Spain during the civil war, fighting 
as part of the ‘international brigades’. Hemmingway’s novel follows Jordan as he and 
a handful of local peasants prepare to sabotage a bridge held by Franco’s army. Much 
of Jordan’s experience is typical of guerilla warfare – the hiding, the waiting, the 
ever-present threat of detection and capture, and the assault – brief and violent. At one 
                                                 
1 “Somalia:  Al-Shabaab Rebels Leave Mogadishu”, BBC News, 6 August 2011, available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14430283, last accessed 20 August 2011 
2 Richard Lough, “Update 3 – Somali Government Declares Islamist Rebellion Defeated”, Reuters 
News, August 6, 2011, available from 
http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL6E7J601H20110806?pageNumber=3&virtualBra
ndChannel=0, last accessed 20 August 2011 
3 Ibid 
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point in the novel, however, from inside a cave, Jordan recalls a decisively different 
form of battle:  
 
‘the fascists had attacked and we had stopped them on that slope in the gray rocks, the scrub pines and 
the gorse of the Guadarrama hillsides. We had held along the road under the bombing from the planes 
and the shelling when they had brought their artillery up and those who were left at the end of that day 
had counterattacked and driven them back’.4
 
 
These two images - of the silent, pensive guerrilla and the battalion charging across an 
open field through artillery and rifle fire - dominate our understanding of warfare in 
civil war. Striking in their contrast, these images reflect a traditional distinction 
between ‘guerrilla’ and ‘conventional’ warfare.  
 
By the mid 1990s, however, what appeared to be a ‘new’ form of warfare had 
emerged, popularised in films such as Black Hawk Down and Blood Diamond. Instead 
of the peasant guerilla or the uniformed infantryman, war was the object of badly 
organised teenagers in Reebok pumps toting AK-47s, stealing aid supplies, looting 
diamonds and brutalising civilians. Warfare in Somalia, Liberia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Haiti and Georgia seemed to defy the existing frames of reference 
and more closely resembled a A Clockwork Orange writ-large than the ordered 
battlefields of the Spanish of American civil wars. Indeed this ‘new’ form of warfare 
attracted a proliferation of labels including, ‘new-old’, ‘primitive’, ‘pre-modern’, 
‘criminal’, and ‘post-modern’, usually coupled with the assertion that modern 
conflicts were incomprehensible within existing, Clausewitzian, military theory, if 
indeed they could be labeled ‘wars’ at all. 5
 
  
Conventional and guerrilla warfare boast of a long theoretical heritage. Prominent 
among these figures is the work of Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian soldier and author 
who lived in the 18th and 19th centuries. Clausewitz contended that organised violence 
in war was, at least in part, purposive and directed towards political goals. He 
famously claimed that war ‘was the continuation of politics by other means’ and 
observed that a rival’s capacity to use organised violence must be disabled before 
                                                 
4 Ernest Hemmingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls (New York: Scribner, 2002) Pg 252. 
5 One the earliest proponents of the ‘new wars’ thesis was Mary Kaldor. See Mary Kaldor, New and 
Old Wars (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
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political preferences can be imposed. Military strategies are directed towards 
disarming the enemy and are, in a substantive way, rational. Choices of when, where 
and how to fight are designed to maximise the chances of realising political goals, 
based upon the information available to a commander at the time. As such, the logic 
of organised violence was sufficiently apprehensible for Clausewitz to form testable, 
and broadly scientific, theories of military strategy in war. Through this simple 
framework we understand the logic of battle well - armchair strategists can 
reconstruct why Napoleon lost at Waterloo or why the Viet Cong attacked at Long 
Tan. But the apparent fluidity and chaos of warfare after the Cold War has defied, for 
the most part, a similar understanding of ‘the strategies and tactics’ utilised in 
Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone.6 Research is generally at a loss when explaining 
the rationale behind fighting in much of the ‘third world’ and especially in Africa. 
Two arguments have muddied the waters: (1) that the logic of ‘new wars’ is alien to 
the works of Clausewitz and (2) that ‘new’ forms of warfare are fundamentally 
illogical, with opportunism, caprice and drug-induced rage in place of strategy.7
 
  
Mary Kaldor, for example, argued that, unlike the organised and disciplined national 
armies of 19th and 20th century Europe, the ‘new wars’, waged by ethnically 
motivated paramilitary organisations, defy Clausewitz’s framework. Kaldor’s work 
focused on the Bosnian civil war and she concluded that any distinction between the 
military, the state and a population is simply irrelevant when analysing ‘armies’ 
whose very raison d’etre is not to fight other ‘armies’ but ‘cleanse’ territory by 
sowing fear and terror.8 She writes that ‘if war is still perceived in Clausewitzian 
terms then the new warfare is incomprehensible except in terms of ‘anarchy’ or 
‘primitivism’.9 Kaldor’s is not the only research arguing that ‘new wars’ slip through 
the clutches of traditional strategic theory. Donald Snow states that ‘new-old’ wars 
are ‘apolitical and self-justifying’ marked by ‘chaos, savagery and pointlessness’10
                                                 
6 Jan Angstrom, 'Introduction: Debating the Nature of Modern War,' in Rethinking the Nature of War, 
ed. Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), Pg 3. 
 
7 For a review of this literature, see ibid,  Pg 7. 
8 Kaldor, New and Old Wars  Pg 9. 
9 Mary Kaldor, 'Introduction,' in Restructuring the Global Military Sector: New Wars, ed. Mary Kaldor 
and Basker Vashee (New York: Pinter, 2000), Pg 19. 
10 Donald Snow, Distant Thunder: Patterns of Conflict in the Developing World (New York: M.E 
Sharpe, 1997) Pg 129. 
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with an ‘absence of clear military objectives’.11 Van-Creveld states that much of the 
‘new war’ is ‘elemental’ in a ‘Hobbesian sense’ and represents an end in itself rather 
than a means to political objectives.12 For Enzensberger, ‘what gives today’s civil 
wars a new and terrifying slant is the fact that they are waged without stakes on either 
side, that they are wars about nothing at all’.13 John Keegan, in his history of warfare, 
argued that ‘primitive wars’ ‘are fed by passions and rancours that do not yield to 
rational measures of persuasion or control: they are apolitical to a degree for which 
Clausewitz made little allowance’.14 Munkler argues that ‘to exaggerate a little: the 
new wars conduct themselves; those who take part in them are conducted’.15
 
 Holsti 
states the proposition most clearly: 
‘The symbolic manifestations of war transformation are clear: in wars of the ‘third kind’ there are no 
fronts, no campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honours, no points d’appui, and no 
respect for the territorial limits of states. There are no set strategies and tactics. Innovation, surprise and 
unpredictability are necessaries and virtues. The weak must rely on guile, and often crime, to raise 
funds for bombings, assassinations and massacres.’16
 
 
If these claims are true, then there is no use developing a theory of military strategy in 
‘new wars’, at least not with recourse to Clausewitz’s framework of war as a 
‘continuation of politics by other means’. Where there is no ‘rationality’ there can be 
no strategy. Battles will come and go with the desires of individual commanders and 
be directed towards myriad shifting goals, limiting scholars to observation and 
commentary. These views, however, have come under increasing criticism. Mueller 
argues that the ‘irrationality’ of actors in Rwanda and Bosnia is overstated and these 
conflicts were fought by quite ‘conventional’ armies.17
                                                 
11 Donald Snow, Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1996) Pg 106-07. 
 Smith writes that, ‘the fact is 
that all war, be it ‘low intensity’ or otherwise, is inherently the same and can therefore 
be understood, in its entirety, within a paradigm in which war is an extension of 
12 Martin Van-Creveld, The Transformation of War (Toronto: Free Press, 1991) Pg 157. 
13 Enzenberger, as cited in Kalevi Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) Pg 30, Emphasis in Original. 
14 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993) Pg 58. 
15 Herfried Munkler, The New Wars (Oxford: Polity, 2005) Pg 33. 
16 Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War  Pg 36. 
17 John Mueller, 'The Banality of Ethnic War,' International Security 25, no. 1 (2000). 
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policy, where the act of violence is intended to fulfill our will.’18 It is not the ‘nature’ 
of war that varies, Smith argues, but the tactics, a point I take up in more detail in 
Chapter 2.19 Isabelle Duyvesteyn noted large numbers of organised fighters engaged 
in pitched battles in Somalia and Liberia observing a distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants. 20  Like Smith, Duyvesteyn argues that considering sub-state 
actors as military organisations capable of strategic thinking is not an enormous 
conceptual leap. 21 According to her research, ‘both warlords and bandits can use 
military strategies, such as irregular or conventional war’. 22  Munkler argues that 
Europe’s Thirty Years War and Hans Delbruck’s ‘strategy of exhaustion’ bear 
similarities to the conduct of ‘new wars’. He noted that in some circumstances 
ravaging an enemy’s resource base is a more effective strategy than seeking the 
annihilation of their forces and that ‘new wars’ should not be conflated with 
irrationality on this account.23 Munkler’s observation is a crucial one, and something I 
expend and develop upon in Chapter 2. Researchers also tend to ignore that foreign 
states play a decisive role in ‘new wars’, as was the case in Somalia and Sierra Leone. 
Are these actors ‘irrational’ too? Can we understand their actions as ‘a continuation of 
politics by other means’? Indeed, Kaldor implies that we can as foreign states 
continue to perceive new wars in ‘Clausewitzian terms’.24
 
 What then is it about sub-
state military organisations that renders them so alien to the same understanding? 
Downplaying the capacity of military theory to understand ‘new wars’ has the net 
effect of stripping researchers of the very tools capable of rendering it comprehensible 
and observations that ‘new wars’ are not so alien to the classic military strategists and 
providing thoughtful, but fragmented connections to this theory, does not go far 
enough. We still have no theory capable of explaining the differences in strategy that 
seem to so clearly demarcate fighting in Somalia during the 1990s from Spain in the 
                                                 
18 M.L.R Smith, 'Strategy in an Age of Low-Intensity Warfare,' in Rethinking the Nature of War, ed. 
Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), Pg 49. 
19 Ibid,  Pg 50. 
20 Isabell Duyvesteyn, 'The Concept of Conventional War and Armed Conflict in Collapsed States,' in 
Rethinking the Nature of War, ed. Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesten (New York: Frank Cass, 
2005), Pg 78. 
21 See also Errol Henderson and J. Singer, '"New Wars" and Rumours of "New Wars",' International 
Interactions 28, no. 2 (2002). 
22 Duyvesteyn, 'The Concept of Conventional War and Armed Conflict in Collapsed States,' Pg 66. 
23 Munkler, The New Wars  Pg 36. 
24 Kaldor, 'Introduction,' Pg 19. 
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1930s. Nor do we have a theory capable of producing testable, and comparative, 
hypotheses. 
 
Only recently, in the work of Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, along with Adam 
Lockyer, have researchers systematically considered the strategy and tactics of what I 
label ‘low-capability’ warfare. Kalyvas agrees that ‘new wars’ defy a dichotomy 
between ‘conventional’ and ‘guerrilla’ warfare but contends that little is ‘new’ about 
them. Emphasising the ‘newness’ of warfare since the end of the Cold War obscures 
continuity in the motivations, finance and tactics of actors in civil war. Moreover, 
claims of the novelty and criminality of contemporary civil war tend to be based on 
journalistic accounts that ‘quote uncritically city dwellers and members of pro-
governmental organisations’ with interests in representing dissenters as bandits and 
outlaws. 25  Like Kalyvas, Brzoska argues that the ‘new wars’ concept lacks 
methodological rigor.26 How can we identify a ‘new war’? Do we code a ‘new war’ 
based upon the methods of fighting, the motivations of combatants, or the year a 
conflict started? Without answers to these questions the comparative study of ‘new 
wars’ is destined to rely upon selective evidence from a heterogeneous collection of 
cases.27
 
  
Kalyvas and Balcells show that ‘new’ warfare is actually what they call ‘symmetric 
non-conventional warfare’ (SNC) and distinct from conventional and guerrilla 
warfare. Contrary to the ‘new wars’ thesis, SNC warfare dates back to medieval 
Europe,28 was uncommon during the Cold War, and re-emerged with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union. Lockyer adopts this tripartite division 
into what he labels ‘conventional’, ‘guerrilla’ and ‘irregular’ warfare.29
                                                 
25 Stathis Kalyvas, '"New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?,' World Politics 54, no. 1 
(2001): Pg 104. 
 In this thesis I 
label as ‘low-capability warfare’ what Kalyvas and Balcells called ‘symmetric non-
26 Michael Brzoska, 'The New Wars Discourse in Germany,' Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 1 
(2004): Pg 107. 
27 One study has used the end of the Cold War to code ‘new wars’. See Erik Melander, Magnus Oberg, 
and Jonathan Hall, 'Are 'New Wars' More Atrocious? Battle Severity, Civilians Killed and Forced 
Migration Before and After the End of the Cold War,' European Journal of International Relations 15, 
no. 3 (2009). 
28 See Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, 'International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How 
the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,' American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 
(2010). 
29 See Adam Lockyer, 'The Dynamics of Warfare in Civil War,' Civil Wars 12, no. 1&2 (2010). 
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conventional warfare’ and Lockyer ‘irregular warfare’. While the three labels are 
analytically interchangeable, I believe low-capability warfare to be the most accurate. 
As this thesis shows further on, ‘symmetric non-conventional warfare’ is, in an 
important sense, ‘conventional’, while ‘irregular’ warfare is easily confused with 
‘guerrilla’ warfare.  
 
Low-capability warfare is distinguished from conventional and guerrilla warfare by 
the relative military capabilities available to governments and insurgents and the 
resultant empirical patterns of combat. Both governments and insurgents have ‘high’ 
capabilities in conventional warfare. For Kalyvas and Balcells this means the ability 
to deploy heavy weapons in battle, especially mobile armour and heavy artillery. 
Discernible front lines and major ‘set piece battles’ are the empirical ‘fingerprints’ of 
conventional warfare. 30  When military capabilities are unbalanced, that is, the 
government wields a superiority in conventional warfare that rebels cannot match, 
guerrilla warfare results. Clashes tend towards difficult terrain, rural areas and border 
sanctuaries from which rebels can harass government forces and retreat to relative 
safety. Low-capability warfare emerges when both the government and the 
insurgency can deploy only small or light arms, ranging from revolvers to automatic 
weapons, mobile anti-tank devices and mortars.31 ‘Unmistakable’ front lines (usually 
in the form of roadblocks) combined with a ‘confused’ and fluid pattern of fighting 
are the empirical hallmarks of low-capability warfare.32
 
  
Developing replicable coding criteria capable of demarcating conventional and 
guerrilla warfare from low-capability warfare is an important advance and opens the 
way to testing hypotheses embedded in the ‘new wars’ literature. However, our ability 
to generate new hypotheses is limited by the paucity of theory on military strategy in 
low-capability civil wars. Both Lockyer and Kalyvas and Balcells claim to advance 
such a theory. Kalyvas and Balcells argue that ‘the relative balance of power between 
contending forces determines the war-fighting strategies of the respective sides’ and 
state that a lack of mobile armour and heavy artillery explains the divergent military 
                                                 
30 Kalyvas and Balcells, 'International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold 
War Shaped Internal Conflict,' Pg 419. 
31 For a definition of ‘small arms’ see the 'Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small 
Arms,' United Nations 27 August (1997): Point 26. 
32 Lockyer, 'The Dynamics of Warfare in Civil War,' Pg 93-94. 
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tactics and strategy deployed in low-capability conflicts.33 However, the authors are 
more successful in articulating how the balance of power connects with military 
strategy to produce empirical patterns in guerrilla and conventional warfare than they 
are with low-capability warfare. We see guerilla warfare, for example, because in 
some circumstances, a rebellion is too weak to openly fight the government (balance 
of power) so they disband into small and lightly armed groups and make use of 
difficult terrain to negate the government’s advantage in conventional warfare 
(strategy). As such, fighting tends towards rural areas (empirics).34
 
 When it comes to 
‘low-capability warfare’, however, the authors provide vignettes from Congo-
Brazzaville and Somalia describing the ‘confused’ pattern of fighting but little 
explanation of what strategy links the ‘low’ military capabilities of actors with the 
‘confused’ fighting. Put somewhat crudely, Kalyvas and Balcells provide the bread 
for the sandwich but not the meat.  
Lockyer states that there are two ‘principles’ of low-capability ‘strategy’. Both 
government and insurgent actors attempt to ‘capture territory and avoid battles of 
annihilation’ in offense, while they ‘attempt to hold and defend territory and 
population’ in defence. 35 Urban warfare is likened to ‘severe gang violence’ and 
‘confused street battles’. Rural offensives resemble ‘trickles’ as belligerents advance 
along a path of least resistance.36 The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra 
Leone is instructive: ‘the RUF captured territory through a third form of offensive 
strategy, that is, capturing territory and asserting its control over populations by 
advancing into unprotected space’. 37  Empirically, a proliferation of ‘weak fixed’ 
fortifications, especially roadblocks, create the aforementioned ‘unmistakable 
frontlines’.38
 
 
Yet, there is little guidance as to why or when belligerents attempt to capture territory 
and avoid battles of annihilation nor as to why and when belligerents choose to defend 
                                                 
33 Kalyvas and Balcells, 'International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold 
War Shaped Internal Conflict,' Pg 416. Emphasis mine. 
34 Ibid,  Pg 418. 
35 Adam Lockyer, 'Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous resources 
on the course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts' (University of Sydney, 2009) Pg 65. 
36 Ibid,  Pg 66. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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territory. While it is tempting to say that ‘moving into unprotected space’ is an 
offensive strategy the more important factor seems to be the retreat of the defending 
actor. In the example of Sierra Leone, the question seems not to be why the RUF 
would move into towns that the government abandoned (of course they would, unless 
they suspected an ambush) but why the government would retreat in the first place? 
Moreover, there is a contradiction here. If the dominant defensive strategy is to 
protect territory and population how can a ‘trickling’ pattern, based on the retreat of 
government soldiers, be observed? Why are some areas left unprotected whilst others 
are defended? If, as Jomni argued, strategy reflects decisions of ‘where, when and 
how to move’ military forces,39
 
 then a theory of strategy that cannot account for this 
variation is deficient. Without an understanding of why belligerents avoid battles of 
annihilation or adopt positional defence we cannot say where and when they will 
behave in this way. Indeed, we cannot say much more than that belligerents will 
‘avoid battles of annihilation’ in offense and ‘sometimes retreat and sometimes 
defend’ in defence, which really, is not a theory of strategy but a series of empirical 
observations.  
We are left with a puzzle. While there are empirical regularities to the conduct of low-
capability warfare, we have no theory to explain them. Moreover, the existing patterns 
seem contradictory. What explains the division between urban and rural operations 
observed by Lockyer? How can we have unmistakable front lines and ‘trickling’ 
patterns at the same time? What is the logic that underpins where and when 
belligerents in low-capability warfare choose to fight and how does this differ from 
conventional and guerrilla warfare? It is to this puzzle that the present thesis 
contributes. My main contention is that the military strategies of domestic and foreign 
actors in low-capability warfare are deeply influenced by the economic geography of 
a conflicted state. This argument is based upon a simple conjecture: resources matter 
because low-capability conflicts are defensive. Capturing territory is more costly than 
holding it when poorly organised belligerents arm themselves with light weapons. 
Actors utilise what Hans Delbruck called a ‘strategy of exhaustion’ to exploit the 
advantages of defensive warfare, deny resources to rivals and obtain the best 
bargaining position in peace negotiations. Empirically, I predict that economic 
                                                 
39 John Shy, 'Jomini,' in Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter 
Paret (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), Pg 168. 
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geography plays a powerful role in structuring where governments and insurgents 
choose to fight and when foreign states choose to intervene. Fighting in low capability 
warfare gravitates towards economically valuable areas, 40
 
 and, as they do, the 
incentives increase for foreign states to leverage their military advantage in a pitched 
battle over a shared objective and play kingmaker in future political negotiations.   
Strategy in low-capability warfare contrasts with strategy in conventional and guerilla 
warfare. An enemy’s offensive military capabilities, rather than economic resources, 
are the target of military operations in conventional warfare. As Thomas Schelling 
observed, only after the ‘power to capture’ is eliminated can political and economic 
objectives be realised.41 Or, as Kaldor puts it, ‘the aim has to be disarmament of the 
opponent in order to achieve the political objective, otherwise there is always a 
danger of counter-attack’.42
 
 Oil reserves, agricultural land or a foreign capital may be 
the end-goal, but so long as an enemy retains a capacity to re-capture territory, the 
focus of operations must be the enemy’s army. Fighting does not correlate well with 
economic geography in these circumstances. As pitched battles are no more or less 
likely near valuable resources, the timing of deployment is unrelated to economic 
geography in conventional warfare. Insurgents are outgunned in guerrilla warfare and 
the government can, in most cases, protect its most economically valuable areas. 
‘Counter-insurgency’ in a foreign country is costly and, unless for the highest 
geopolitical objectives, I predict that foreign intervention in guerrilla warfare is both 
unlikely and unrelated to the economic geography of a conflicted state.  
As such, the thesis speaks to two further bodies of literature: the role of economic 
geography in civil war and the motivations of foreign interveners. Each of these 
research clusters is discussed in the following section.  
 
  
                                                 
40 See Phillipe Le-Billion, 'The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts,' 
Political Geography 20, no. 5 (2001): Pg 570. 
41 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) Chapter 1, "The 
Diplomacy of Violence". 
42 Kaldor, New and Old Wars  Pg 23. 
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Economic Geography and Civil War 
 
Scholars have hinted at a link between low military capabilities, economic variables 
and military outcomes. When the British Department for International Development 
describes ‘factional wars’ (including those in Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone), for 
example, it implicitly links ‘low-tech’ wars to economics: 
 
‘Factional wars are fluid by nature. There is rarely a defined front line and fighting is frequently 
opportunistic rather than strategic. Warfare is low-tech and small arms are the main weapons. Such 
wars are not costly and can easily be sustained without external support. Frequently these conflicts 
move rapidly from the original cause to revolve around the exploitation of commercial, mineral and 
natural resources’.43
 
 
Kaldor and Duffield assert that rebels in ‘new wars’ can plug-in to the globalised 
economy in a way that was impossible during the Cold War.44 What Duffield terms 
‘network wars’ are contests over the ‘networks to realise wealth and provision 
violence’.45 Newman argues that ‘new wars’ ‘give rise to competition over natural 
resources and illegal commercial entrepreneurship.’46 David Keen has argued that 
‘economic violence’ (that is, violence in pursuit of economic gain) is most likely in 
‘weak states’.47 Keen, like Kaldor and Duffield, points to the end of the Cold War as 
marking a paradigm shift in the relationship between economics and violence. 
Rebellions now ‘resort to brutality in a bid to... de-populate resource-rich areas’ in the 
absence of superpower support.48
                                                 
43  Department for International Development, 'The Causes of Conflict in Africa,' Consultation 
Document, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department of Defence, no. March (2001): Point 15, 
"Factional Warfare". 
 Some studies argue that changing objectives rather 
than changing strategies explain the salience of economics to organised violence after 
the Cold War. ‘Ideologically’ motivated rebels cultivated popular support during the 
Cold War while rebellions motivated by greed, profit or short-term gains eschew and 
44 See also Mats Berdal, 'How "New" are "New Wars"? Global Economic Change and the Study of 
Civil War,' Global Governance, no. 9 (2003): Pg 488. Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New 
Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (New York: Zed Books, 2001) Pg 183. 
45 Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security  Pg 190. 
46 Edward Newman, 'The 'New Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed,' Security Dialogue 
35, no. 2 (2004): Pg 175. 
47 David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Papers (New York: Oxford 
University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998) Pg 25. 
48 Ibid,  Pg 34. 
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abuse local communities after it. According to the Small Arms Survey, the National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) shifted from a long-term to a 
short-term gains-seeking rebellion with the end of the Cold War, a change that 
apparently explains their increasing willingness to fight over diamond-mining areas.49
 
  
Although an interesting link between economic geography and conflict geography in 
‘low-tech’ warfare or ‘new wars’ is identified by the literature, hypotheses have not 
been formalised, nor integrated with a theory of strategy and empirically tested.50 
Research into the economics of civil wars has focused primarily on how natural 
resources motivate and finance rebellion, rather than how their spatial distribution 
structures patterns of fighting.51 Nonetheless a recent body of literature, much of it 
from the Centre for the Study of Civil War at Uppsala University, considers how the 
spatial distribution of economic resources affects a number of military outcomes. 
Philipe le Billion has consistently advocated for a geographically sensitive approach 
to the study of economics and war, as have Buhaug and Lujala.52 In a seminal article 
published in 2002, Buhaug and Gates established links between the presence of 
natural resources and the size of a conflict zone (measured as the proportion of a 
country embroiled in fighting) and between the objectives of a rebellion (whether or 
not the aim was to secede from a larger country) and the distance at which fighting 
occurred form the capital.53
                                                 
49 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War (Geneva: Oxford, 2005) Pg 192-94. 
 Buhaug and Gates’s study sparked a raft of further and 
more sophisticated investigation. Raleigh and Hegre looked at whether population 
50 Berdal, 'How "New" are "New Wars"? Global Economic Change and the Study of Civil War,' Pg 
487. Michael Ross, 'How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,' 
International Organization 58, no. 1 (2004): Pg 36. 
51 See, for example, Paivi Lujala, 'Deadly Combat over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, 
and the Severity of Armed Conflict,' Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 1 (2009), Michael Ross, 
'What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?,' Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 
(2004). Lujaja, Rod and Thieme have found that hydrocarbons increase the length of conflicts over 
control of the state, but not of secessionist conflicts. Pavi Lujala, Jan Ketil Rod, and Nadja Thieme, 
'Fighting Over Oil: Introducing a New Dataset,' Conflict Management and Peace Science 24, no. 3 
(2007): Pg 254. Ross finds that oil increases the chances of a separatist conflict by increasing the value 
of sovereignty to a dissenting group. Michael Ross, 'A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds and Civil War,' 
Annual Review of Political Science, no. 9 (2006): Pg 289. Diamonds and Forest Resources have also 
been specifically analysed. Siri Camilla Aas Rustad et al., 'Foliage and Fighting: Forest Resources and 
the Onset, Duration and Location of Civil War,' Political Geography 27, no. 9 (2008). 
52 Phillip Le-Billion, 'Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000,' 
African Affairs 100, no. 398 (2001), Le-Billion, 'The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and 
Armed Conflicts.' Halvard Buhaug and Paivi Lujala, 'Accounting for Scale: Measuring geography in 
quantitative studies of civil war,' Political Geography, no. 24 (2005). 
53 Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates, 'The Geography of Civil War,' The Journal of Peace Research 39, 
no. 4 (2002): Pg 431. 
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clusters correlate with battle agglomerations. Using the Armed Conflict Location 
Event Dataset (ACLED, discussed in Chapter 3) the authors found that areas of high 
population density experience more armed conflict events than areas with dispersed 
populations, partly, they argue, because these areas ‘are particularly valuable for both 
rebels and the government’. 54  Cities solve coordination problems and provide a 
condensed source of recruits and ‘taxation’ revenue. Despite this promising analysis 
and innovative use of geographically disaggregated data, the sample was restricted to 
Central Africa and did not factor military variables into the analysis. Of the 8 conflicts 
analysed only 1 was predominantly a low-capability conflict (Congo-Brazzaville). 
Problems inherent in the ACLED database including large differentials in cross-case 
coverage and urban bias may also have influenced the results. In a similar analysis of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Ostby, Nordas and Rod found that absolute and relative poverty 
within regions increased the chances of fighting in that area. 55 Hegre, Ostby and 
Raleigh found the opposite – that richer areas were more likely to experience fighting. 
Their study, however, was restricted to the Liberian civil war and the authors 
acknowledge that a balance of power in favour of the rebels loosened the strategic 
constraints normally faced by insurgents and likely accounts for this finding. 56 
Buhaug et al conducted a global study of conflict outbreak with high resolution grid 
cells and found that ‘pockets of higher relative wealth within very poor countries are 
more likely to see conflict outbreaks’.57 The authors, however, did not examine the 
geographical scope/incidence of conflict. Buhaug, Lujala and Gates find that conflicts 
fought far from the capital city are likely to last longer, while conflicts over resources 
are shorter.58
                                                 
54  Clionadh Raleigh and Havard Hegre, 'Population Size, Concentration, and Civil War: A 
Geographically Disaggregated Analysis,' Political Geography 28, no. 4 (2009): Pg 227. Earlier 
research also suggested a strong link between population distribution and the risk of civil war events. 
Clionadh Raleigh and Henrik Urdal, 'Climate Change, Environmental Degredation and Armed 
Conflict,' Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007). 
 Ross hypothesised that natural resources might lead to higher intensity 
55 Gurun Ostby, Ragnhild Nordas, and Jan Ketil Rod, 'Regional Inequalities and Civil Conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa,' International Studies Quarterly 53 (2009): Pg 320. 
56 H Hegre, G Ostby, and C Raleigh, 'Poverty and Civil War Events: A Disaggregated Study of 
Liberia,' Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (2009): Pg 604. 
57 Halvard Buhaug et al., 'It's the Local Economy, Stupid! Geographic Wealth Dispersion and Conflict 
Outbreak Location,' Journal of Conflict Resolution Online First, no. 23 May (2011): Pg 21. The authors 
also found that conflicts were more likely to break out near to the capital – a somewhat surprising 
finding given the common image of warfare emerging in peripheral regions.  
58 See Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Paivi Lujala, 'Geography, Rebel Capability and the Duration 
of Civil Conflict,' Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (2009). Buhaug also finds that warfare is 
likely to begin further from the capital in stronger regimes. See Halvard Buhaug, 'Dude, Where's My 
Conflict? LSG, Relative Strength and the Location of Civil War,' Conflict Management and Peace 
Science 27, no. 2 (2010). 
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conflicts as belligerents engage in ‘resource wars’, an idea that finds some support in 
relation to diamonds and hydrocarbon resources located inside a conflict zone. 59 
Buhaug and Rod (2006) provide the empirical study closest to the aims of this thesis. 
By dividing the African continent into 100km by 100km grids the authors found that 
separatist conflicts were more likely to be fought far from the capital in areas with 
poor road networks, close to an international border and away from resources. 
Conflicts over control of the state, however, were more likely to be fought near to the 
capital, around diamond deposits and in areas with a developed road network.60
 
 Their 
analysis is suggestive that different ‘types’ of conflict may be influenced in different 
ways by the underlying economic geography. 
Whilst these studies point us towards a connection between economic geography and 
the location of fighting in civil war, none have yet examined whether this pattern is 
more salient in different types of ‘warfare’. Indeed the reported findings are 
somewhat contradictory. In some studies wealthier areas are more likely to be 
subjected to combat, whilst in others, poor areas are. What accounts for this variation? 
Why might areas of relative wealth be more likely to experience fighting in Liberia, 
but less likely in Africa taken more broadly?  In addition, there are some wars that are 
neither motivated by, nor are their military operations structured by, economics. As 
Herbst cites, it is problematic to think that a desire to loot South Africa’s diamonds 
motivated Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress. In some rebellions, 
economics simply do not appear to structure the fighting, such as in contemporary 
Niger, or Mali. Finally, as Angstrom points out ‘why, if economics are that important, 
is fighting often fierce around symbols of national power such as the capital city or 
the presidential palace?’61
  
 Clearly economics are more salient in some circumstances 
than others, but research has not established what those circumstances are.  
                                                 
59 Ross, 'How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,' Pg 46., 
Lujala, 'Deadly Combat over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed 
Conflict,' Pg 67. 
60 Halvard Buhaug and Jan Ketil Rod, 'Local Determinants of African Civil Wars, 1970-2001,' Political 
Geography 25, no. 3 (2006): Pg 17. 
61 Angstrom, 'Introduction: Debating the Nature of Modern War,' Pg 12. 
Chapter One - Introduction 
 16 
 
Foreign Intervention 
 
Finally, the thesis argues that foreign actors are sensitive to warfare types when 
considering deployment in a civil war. Insofar as different ‘types’ of warfare exhibit 
different spatial patterns of fighting, and domestic belligerents adopt different 
strategies, the timing and strategy of foreign interveners will also differ. There is a 
substantial body of research into foreign intervention in civil wars.62 Studies have 
examined the effects of intervention63 and there exists a large body of case study and 
prescriptive literature, particularly since the end of the Cold War. 64  A small but 
growing number of quantitative researchers focus on the causes of intervention in 
internal conflict – of primary interest here.65
 
  
                                                 
62  For a general review of the literature see Patrick Regan, 'Interventions into Civil Wars: A 
Retrospective Survey with Prospective Ideas,' Civil Wars 12, no. 4 (2010). 
63  With the general finding that interventions, especially ‘balanced interventions’ where one 
intervention attracts a counter-intervention, prolong conflict. Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew Enterline, 
and Kyle Joyce, 'Third Party Intervention and the Civil War Process,' Journal of Peace Research 45, 
no. 3 (2008), Matthew Krain, 'International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides,' 
International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (2005), Jeffery Pickering and Emizet Kisangani, 'Political, 
Economic, and Social Consequences of Foreign Military Intervention,' Political Research Quarterly 
59, no. 3 (2006), Patrick Regan, 'Third Party Intervention and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts,' The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002), Clayton Thyne, 'Third Party Intervention and the 
Duration of Civil Wars: The Role of Unobserved Factors,' International Studies Association 
Conference, San Francisco, March 26-29  (2008). Aysegul Aydin and Patrick Regan, 'Networks of 
Third-Party Interveners and Civil War Duration,' European Journal of International Relations Online 
First, no. June 10 (2011), Karl R. DeRouen(Jr) and David Sobek, 'The Dynamics of Civil War Duration 
and Outcome,' Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004), Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, 
'External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars,' World Bank Development Research Group 
Policy Research Working Paper no. 2433 (2000), T.David Mason, Jospeh Wiengarten, and Patrick 
Fett, 'Win, Lose or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars,' Political Research Quarterly 52, no. 
2 (1999). Recent studies also suggest that rebels factor the probability of a foreign intervention into 
their decision to rebel, thus influencing the onset of civil war and genocide. See Kristian Gleditsch, 
'Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,' Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 33 (2007), Alan J 
Kuperman, 'The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,' International 
Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2008). 
64 Robert Rotberg, 'The Failure and Collapse of Nation States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,' in 
When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), William Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of 
Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 
65 Regan argues that “at the core, there is a relative paucity of broadly cross-national research into 
interventions into civil wars, relative in the sense that this type of policy option does not get the 
intellectual attention that, say, the onset of civil war does’. Regan, 'Interventions into Civil Wars: A 
Retrospective Survey with Prospective Ideas,' Pg 467. 
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International media and domestic institutions,66  ex-colonial relationships and alliance 
patterns have been found to influence the probability of military intervention,67 as 
have past relations of amity or enmity.68 So too, the material power of an intervener69  
and the proximity to a target70 alter the proclivity to intervene. Findings suggest that 
ethnic affinities increase the probability of cross-border intervention71 and differently 
structured international systems affect the frequency and objectives of intervention.72 
More recently, researchers have incorporated strategic elements, examining the role 
of geopolitical rivalries,73 alliance dynamics and74 previous deployments.75 Kathman 
has argued that foreign states are careful to consider the potential for regional 
contagion when deciding to intervene.76
 
  
Dynamic and time-variant aspects of conflict processes have not received the same 
attention. Battle intensity and humanitarian concerns receive the most sustained 
                                                 
66 Charles Kegley and Margaret Hermann, 'Putting Military Intervention into the Democratic Peace,' 
Comparative Political Studies 30, no. 1 (1997), Piers Robinson, The CNN effect: the myth of news 
foreign policy and intervention (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
67  Douglas Lemke and Patrick Regan, 'Intervention as Influence,' in The Scourge of War: New 
extensions on an old problem, ed. Paul Diehl (University of Michigan Press: Michigan, 2004), Pg 156. 
68 Jordan Miller, 'External Military Intervention in Civil Wars: A Quanttitative Study of the Initiation 
and Escalation of Third-Party State Interventions,' in Annual meeting of the The Midwest Political 
Science Association (Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois: All Academic, 2008). 
69 Frederic Pearson, Robert Baumann, and Jeffrey Pickering, 'Military Intervention and Realpolitik,' in 
Reconstructing Realpolitik, ed. Frank Wayman and Paul Diehl (Michigan: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994). 
70 C.R Mitchell, 'Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties,' International Studies Quarterly 
14, no. 2 (1970), Frederic S Pearson, 'Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention,' The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 18, no. 3 (1974). Deepa Khosla, 'Third World States as Interveners in 
Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for regional and International Security,' Third World Quarterly 20, no. 6 
(1999). 
71 David Carment, 'The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory,' 
Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 2 (1993). 
72 Kris Pence, 'Outside Intervention in Civil Wars: Reconsidering the Timing of External Intervention,' 
Indiana University Available From: http://www.indiana.edu/~iupolsci/gradcv/kgpence/outsideinter.pdf 
(2007), Gregory Raymond and Charles Kegley Jr, 'Long Cycles and Internationalized Civil War,' The 
Journal of Politics 49, no. 2 (1987), Patrick Regan, 'Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in 
Internal Conflicts,' The Journal of Politics 60, no. 3 (1998), Patrick Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign 
Powers: Outside Intervention in Intra-State Conflict (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2002). 
73 Michael G. Findley and Tze Kwang Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An 
Actor Centric Approach,' The Journal of Politics 68, no. 4 (2006), Stephen Gent, 'External Threats and 
Military Intervention: The United States and the Caribbean Basin,' Peace Economics, Peace Science 
and Public Policy 16, no. 1 (2010). 
74 Stephen Gent, 'Strange Bedfellows: The Strategic Dynamics of Major Power Military Intervention,' 
Journal of Politics 69, no. 4 (2007). 
75 Aysegul Aydin, 'Where do States Go? Strategy in Civil War Intervention,' Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 27, no. 1 (2010). 
76 Jacob D Kathman, 'Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention,' Journal of 
Conflict Resolution Published online July 7, 2011 (2011). 
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focus.77 More recently, Gent has shown that foreign states time their intervention for 
maximum impact by waiting until rebels and governments reach a rough military 
parity.78 Kaw is perhaps the only author to test how changes in the geography of 
fighting provoke intervention. In her research it was found that threats to major cities 
and economic and political centres tended to provoke Soviet intervention. 79
 
 Kaw 
limited her sample to the Soviet Union, however, and included both inter-state and 
intra-state conflicts.  
From the United Fruit Company in Guatemala to the ‘coltan’ of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, economics appears to play a powerful role in motivating foreign 
intervention. 80  Hans Morgenthau wrote in 1967 that natural resources provided 
incentives to meddle in another’s internal affairs.81 Michael Ross, in his investigation 
of the causal mechanisms linking natural resources with the onset and intensity of 
civil wars, came to the same conclusion. 82  Yet, Findely and Mitchell recently 
observed that ‘with few exceptions... extant research ignores that role of economic 
factors, especially natural resources’.83 They argue that lootable resources (such as 
diamonds and gold) are associated with the onset of intervention because states desire 
access to them, either to offset the costs of deployment, gain access to a profitable 
market or protect an existing one.84
                                                 
77 Karen Rasler, 'Internationalzied Civil War:  A Dynamic Analysis of the Syrian Intervention in 
Lebanon,' The Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 3 (1983), Regan, 'Choosing to Intervene: Outside 
Interventions in Internal Conflicts.', Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in 
Intra-State Conflict. 
 Fordham observed that ‘most recent quantitative 
analyses of intervention do not include economic variables at all’ and finds that while 
security concerns typically explain the United States’s (US) deployments in foreign 
78  Stephen E Gent, 'Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil 
Conflicts,' International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008). 
79 Marita Kaw, 'Predicting Soviet Military Intervention,' Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 3 
(1989): Pg 410. 
80 See, for example: Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
and Other forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo,  (New York: The United Nations, 
2001). 
81 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 
1967) Pg 80-88. 
82 See Ross, 'How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases.' 
83 Michael Findley and Ashley Anne Mitchell, 'Lootable Resources and Third-Party Intervention into 
Civil Wars,' Unpublished Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University 
(2011): Pg 2. For some early studies into the role of resources see John Van Wingen and Herbert 
Tillema, 'British Military Intervention after World War II: Militance in a Second-Rank Power,' Journal 
of Peace Research 17, no. 4 (1980). Frederic Pearson and Robert Baumann, 'International Military 
Intervention in Sub-Saharan African Subsystems,' Journal of Political and Military Sociology 17 
(1989). 
84 Findley and Mitchell, 'Lootable Resources and Third-Party Intervention into Civil Wars,' Pg 4. 
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wars, the definition of a security threat is mediated by the pattern of extending 
security guarantees to trading states. 85 Yoon has suggested that valuable resource 
endowments increase the ‘expected gains’ for foreign states.86 An earlier study found 
that higher levels of imports, exports and foreign investment did not increase the 
chances of US intervention in third world internal wars.87
 
  
There are a number of problems with the existing literature. ‘Economics’ is 
conceptualised primarily as inter-state trade or the presence of natural resources, 
reflecting the interest of scholars in the profits to be obtained from intervention. 
Scholarship has not examined whether the proximity of fighting to resources 
influences the probability of intervention, nor whether economic variables are more 
important in a sub-set of conflicts. Firstly, it is unlikely that states use internal 
rebellions as a ‘cover’ for their financial interests when rebels are not actually fighting 
in the areas that resources are located. It is hard to imagine Uganda supporting a 
rebellion fighting the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on the Atlantic coast. 
Secondly, the costs of intervention, and therefore the net profits available to foreign 
actors vary with different ‘types’ of warfare. No amount of coltan will offset the costs 
of keeping a large mechanised army fighting in a foreign country for months or years 
on end. Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DRC, for example, (often held up as the 
paragon of an opportunistic, greed motivated foreign adventure) spent $US 200 
million in the first two years of its deployment (a figure compounded by the fact that 
Zimbabwe had to pay for imports in $US, the cost of which skyrocketed at the 
Zimbabwean dollar became virtually worthless), further crippling an already free-
falling economy.88 Michael Nest argues that in this ‘most likely’ of cases, a desire to 
access DRC’s resources did not motivate the original deployment and Zimbabwe’s 
financial returns from the intervention were very modest. 89
                                                 
85 Bejnamin O. Fordham, 'Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American 
Intervention,' International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008): Pg 738, 40. 
 Lower-capability 
86  See, Mi Yung Yoon, 'Explaining African Military Interventions,' in Annual meeting of the 
International Studies Association (Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada: 2004). Mi 
Yung Yoon, 'Internal Conflicts and Cross-Border Military Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
Post Cold War Era,' Journal of Political and Military Sociology 33, no. 2 (2005): Pg 281. 
87 Mi Yung Yoon, 'Explaining U.S Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989,' The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 4 (1997): Pg 590. 
88 Sandra J Maclean, 'Mugabe at War: The Political Economy of Conflict in Zimbabwe,' Third World 
Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2002): Pg 522. 
89 Michael Nest, 'Ambitiions, Profits and Loss: Zimbabwean Economic Involvement in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo,' African Affairs 100, no. 400 (2001). 
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conflicts, when compared to conventional warfare, may offer higher profits due to the 
lower deployment costs. That said, the study of economics and intervention has 
placed too much emphasis on profits and not enough on strategy.  States do not have 
to profit directly from resources for them to play a primary role in motivating 
intervention. Insofar as resources increase the ability of a rival to wage war they are 
of interest to foreign countries. If, by protecting key sources of revenue to an allied 
party, a foreign state increases the chances of their side winning, then there is a 
strategic motivation to intervene when these resources are threatened. As I aim to 
show in the forthcoming chapters, the incentive to defend valuable resources from 
rival military organisations, be they rebels or governments, is especially high in the 
defensively skewed, low-capability civil wars.  
 
Summary and Outline of the Thesis 
 
Recent research has taken the important step of moving from ambiguous labels and 
concepts to replicable coding criteria for what this thesis labels ‘low-capability 
warfare’. Our knowledge of military strategy in low-capability warfare, however, 
remains limited, and the ability to explain empirical patterns and predict new 
relationships is truncated. Conspicuous among these relationships is a hypothesised 
differential in the role that economics plays in structuring where and when fighting 
occurs in ‘weak states’, ‘new wars’ or ‘network wars’. At present, the connection is 
undertheorised and untested empirically. Despite the importance of international 
actors in ‘new wars’ we do not yet understand whether and how the strategies of 
foreign actors differ, if at all, when compared to the modern traditional or ‘old’ 
images of conventional and guerrilla warfare. The preceding literature review has left 
us with a number of puzzles. What military strategies are belligerents like to deploy in 
low-capability warfare? How do these strategies differ, if at all, from those of 
conventional and guerilla warfare? Are economic variables more likely to feature in 
the strategies of poorly armed and organised belligerents, and why? Does the 
hypothesized link between low-tech warfare and fighting over economically valuable 
areas hold up to empirical scrutiny?  Do foreign actors intervene differently in low-
capability warfare?  
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The remainder of the thesis investigates these questions. Chapter 2 outlines a theory 
of military strategy in low-capability warfare. In an environment bereft of heavy 
weapons where belligerents have a poor capacity to organise and supply soldiers,  
light automatic and semi-automatic weapons enable the effective defense of small 
land areas, even for a vastly outnumbered military actor. Positional defense of 
economically valuable sites (where an opponent has the greatest incentive to attack) 
with the intent of denying resources to a rival whilst luring them into a conventional 
battle for which they are ill-equipped is a utility maximising strategy in this context. 
Foreign states hold a ‘trump card’ in low-capability warfare – the capacity for 
conventional offense – that is most effective when domestic actors commit to open, 
conventional warfare. When fighting converges on valuable areas in low-capability 
warfare, this opens the window for foreign states to play their trump card.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodological advantages of testing these hypotheses within 
the sample of African civil wars. Africa’s economic history and geography allows the 
researcher to hold the spatial distribution of resources ‘constant’ whilst varying the 
type of warfare. Capital cities are a crucial ‘point resource’ for many African rulers 
and hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 are recast with reference to Africa’s capitals. 
Specifically, Chapter 3 predicts that Africa’s capitals are at a higher risk of 
experiencing fighting in low-capability warfare when compared to conventional and 
guerrilla warfare. Fighting also concentrates around Africa’s capitals and correlates 
well with the economic geography of the state experiencing low-capability warfare. 
Chapter 3 also predicts that the probability of foreign states deploying soldiers in low-
capability warfare is systematically related to the distance of fighting from the capital 
city – a relationship not expected in conventional or guerrilla warfare. As a sample of 
civil wars Africa is a ‘hard test’ for the theory and minimises the effects of intra-
cluster correlation. Chapter 3 then details the methodology utilised in Chapters 4-7 
and justifies the use of logistic and OLS regression. Specification of dependent, 
independent and control variables are included in this section. 
 
Chapter 4 shows that low-capability warfare is roughly six times more likely to 
experience fighting in the capital, other variables, including the number of military 
personnel, being equal. A replication of Buhaug and Rod’s 2006 study shows that 
regions near to Africa’s capitals are more likely to experience fighting in low-
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capability warfare – a relationship absent in conventional and guerrilla warfare. With 
caveats, Chapter 5 demonstrates that low-capability warfare experiences a higher 
proportion of fighting in the centre of power when compared to conventional and 
guerrilla warfare. Visual analysis reveals that the correlation between economic 
geography and clusters of fighting is higher in low-capability warfare when compared 
with conventional and guerrilla warfare. Chapter 6 finds that the distance of fighting 
from Africa’s capitals is powerfully related to the chances of foreign intervention in 
the sample of low-capability conflicts. Intervention in guerrilla and conventional 
warfare, motivated primarily by geopolitical rivalries and alliance commitments, 
shows no systematic tendency towards the capital city. 
 
Chapter 7 investigates the plausibility of causal mechanisms linking economic 
geography, conflict geography and foreign intervention with a ‘most likely’ case of 
the Liberian civil war. President Samuel Doe and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) 
relied heavily on a ‘strategy of exhaustion’ to defend Monrovia from the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Doe’s decision to fall back and defend the capital 
was made in response to his perceptions of the low organisational and material 
capability of the NPFL and the central importance of Monrovia in the war-aims of the 
NPFL. Nigeria deployed as the ‘battle for Monrovia’ unfolded, believing that a small 
conventional force could expel the NPFL from Monrovia, defend the city, and allow 
Nigeria to hold the ‘trump card’ in peace negotiations.  
 
Taken together, the thesis shows that economics and military strategy are intimately 
connected in low-capability warfare. Economics shapes where and when combatants 
in a civil war will engage in battle and strategic decisions at the domestic level have 
profound implications for military decisions at the international level.  
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Military Strategy in Low-capability Warfare 
 
This chapter outlines a theory of military strategy in low-capability warfare. When 
governments and insurgents lack the organisational and logistical capacity to  
coordinate the ‘thrusts’ and manoeuvres familiar to conventional warfare and are 
armed with light automatic weapons, the advantages of defence eclipse those of 
offense. Defending a position is easier than capturing it. A ‘strategy of exhaustion’ 
structured around areas of high economic value exploits the attritional advantages of 
defence and denies resources to an opponent with pressing needs to recruit and arm 
soldiers. Fighting is more likely to occur and concentrate around valuable locations as 
a result. Foreign actors prefer to deploy during conventional battles and as such are 
sensitive to the geography of conflict. Fighting over resources is a trigger for foreign 
intervention in low-capability warfare, but not in guerrilla or conventional warfare.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. ‘Economic geography’ is defined as the spatial 
distribution of resources valuable to a military campaign. Any theory of military 
strategy is built upon distinctions between warfare, strategy and tactics. As Kalyvas 
explains, ‘a proper analysis of civil war onset and dynamics requires a focus on the 
interaction of rebel and state strategies (and their underlying capacities)’. 1
                                                 
1 Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, 'International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End 
of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,' American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010): Pg 
416. 
 
Accordingly, I define warfare as the empirical pattern of fighting in a civil war. 
‘Types’ of warfare are the product of military strategies selected by individual 
commanders. Choices of strategy are informed by the tactical options available to 
commanders and their perceptions of the enemy’s tactical options. Put simply, 
strategies are a function of relative capability. I argue that there are four ‘ideal type’ 
tactical options: conventional offense, conventional defence, irregular offense and 
irregular defence. Using this typology and Kalyvas’s theory of ‘warfare types’ I 
identify four dominant strategies in civil war. A ‘strategy of annihilation’ targets the 
enemy’s offensive military capacity with a combination of conventional offensive and 
defensive tactics. ‘Counter-guerrilla’ (or counter-insurgency) strategy is a modified 
version of the strategy of annihilation. A guerrilla strategy relies on irregular offense 
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and defence. A ‘strategy of exhaustion’ makes use of conventional defensive tactics 
and irregular offensive tactics and is prevalent in low-capability warfare. With this 
fourfold division I develop hypotheses connecting the location of fighting and triggers 
of foreign intervention with economic geography, especially high value to space 
areas, or ‘point resources’.  
 
Economic Geography 
 
Economic geography is defined as the spatial distribution of resources valuable to 
belligerents in a civil war.2 Valuable resources are those that the improve military 
position of either the government or insurgency. Commodities capable of increasing 
recruitment or loyalty and procuring weapons are valuable in this regard. Natural 
resources are one way in which the value of a location is increased. As authors such 
as le Billion and David Keen have documented, natural resources were crucial to the 
survival of insurgencies in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Angola.3 Gems, 
cannabis, opium and even future mining concessions4 can be exchanged for weapons 
or used to induce defection and recruit soldiers. 5 Governments too, especially in 
Africa, sometimes rely upon the sale of natural resources to recruit, train and arm the 
military. Natural resources are not distributed evenly within a country and some 
locations are more valuable than others.6
                                                 
2 Gordon L. Clark, Maryann P. Feldman, and Meric S. Gertler, The Oxford Handbook of Economic 
Geography (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) Pg 4. 
 Non-natural resources also shape ‘economic 
geography’. Major cities, ports, airports and trading hubs offer substantial 
opportunities for resource accumulation. Trade between cities and the countryside can 
be ‘taxed’. Concentrations of people offer the potential of high returns and low 
3 See, Paul Collier, 'Doing Well out of War,' Paper Prepared for Conference on Economic Agendas in 
Civil Wars, London, April 26-27  (1999), David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil 
Wars, Adelphi Papers (New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1998), Phillip Le-Billion, 'Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 
1975-2000,' African Affairs 100, no. 398 (2001), Phillipe Le-Billion, 'The Political Ecology of War: 
Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts,' Political Geography 20, no. 5 (2001). 
4 As the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) did in 1997. 
5 Jeffrey Herbst, 'Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa,' Journal of African 
Economies 9, no. 3 (2000). 
6 Although, until recently, country-level studies of civil war onset have assumed that natural resources 
are uniformly distributed. The original ‘greed’ vs ‘grievance’  studies made this assumption with a 
proxy of primary commodity exports divided by GDP. See, for example, Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler, 'On Economic Causes of Civil War,' Oxford Economic Papers, no. 50 (1998): Pg 568, Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa,' The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002): Pg 19, James D Fearon, 'Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War,' 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): Pg 489. 
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collection costs as city-dwellers tend to be wealthier and their higher density lowers 
the infrastructural costs of physically collecting revenue. Looting wealthy areas is a 
commonly used method for ‘paying’ soldiers. For example, Charles Taylor’s 1996 
offensive in Monrovia was labelled ‘Operation Pay Yourself’. 7  Humanitarian aid 
unloaded at airports such as Juba in Southern Sudan or sea ports such as Mogadishu 
or Monrovia were important revenue sources for fighters in those countries.8 Even the 
cultural representation of territory can enhance its economic value to belligerents in a 
civil war.9
 
 In Chapter 3, I show that the social construction of capital cities as the 
repository of sovereignty allows organisations physically controlling that territory to 
cash in, quite literally, on the resources available to ‘states’ playing the ‘game’ of 
international relations. Each country has an economic geography that includes its 
natural resource endowments, population concentrations and social representations of 
territory.  
Warfare 
 
 ‘Warfare’ is the empirical pattern of combat observed over a given spatial and 
temporal domain.10 As the introduction briefly discussed, Kalyvas has identified three 
‘types’ of warfare in civil wars: conventional, guerrilla and what he labels symmetric 
non-conventional warfare, but I will label ‘low-capability warfare’. 11  Put another 
way, three combat patterns are distinct enough to facilitate categorisation. According 
to Kalyvas and Balcells, different forms of warfare emerge depending upon the 
comparative ‘technology of rebellion’ available to belligerents – specifically the 
ability and willingness to deploy heavy artillery and armour.12
                                                 
7 Victor A.B Davies, 'Sierra Leone: An Ironic Tragedy,' Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3 (2000): 
Pg 360. 
 When a rebellion is 
8 See, for example, the account provided by Richard Dowden in Richard Dowden, Africa: Altered 
States, Ordinary Miracles (London: Portobello Books, 2009) Pg 172. 
9  Neil M. Coe, Philip F. Kelly, and Henry W.C Yeung, Economic Geography: A Contemporary 
Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007) Pg 17. 
10 While Kalyvas does not actually define ‘warfare’ in “Warfare in Civil Wars”, when describing his 
three types of warfare, he focuses on the empirical patterns such as face to face battles and their 
absence. Stathis Kalyvas, 'Warfare in Civil Wars,' in Rethinking the Nature of War, ed. Isabelle 
Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (Abingdton: Frank Cass, 2005), Pg 90. 
11 As was argued in the Introduction to this thesis, low capability warfare is a more accurate label. 
Symmetric non-conventional warfare is, in an important way, ‘conventional’. Scholars working with 
Kalyvas’s theory and in the field of ‘new wars’ generally agree that the distinguishing feature of such 
wars is the low-military capabilities at the disposal of belligerents.  
12 Kalyvas, 'Warfare in Civil Wars,' Pg 91. 
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able to challenge the state with heavy armour and artillery, conventional warfare 
results and is identifiable by its clear front lines, fortifications and ‘set-piece 
battles’.13 Examples include the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970 and the Spanish civil 
war. When governments have a monopoly of conventional firepower, insurgents often 
choose speed, stealth, harassment, surprise and sabotage to wear down the 
government, what we commonly know as guerrilla warfare.14  Guerrilla warfare (or 
irregular warfare) can be identified by a lack of set-piece battles, no front lines and a 
profligacy of hit-and-run attacks, usually in rural areas.15 Conflicts in El Salvador 
(1979-1991) and Nepal (1996-2006) are illustrative. When both the government and 
rebellion are ‘unable (or, in a few cases, unwilling) to deploy an organised military 
response against poorly equipped insurgents’ ‘low-capability warfare’ results. 
Examples include Lebanon in 1958, Cyprus in 1963 and Liberia from 1989-2003.16 
Kalyvas and Balcells argue that ‘low capability warfare’ was uncommon during the 
Cold War due to vast amounts of heavy weaponry doled out to allies of the Soviet 
Union and the United States. Warfare was pushed up into the ‘conventional’ and 
‘guerrilla’ categories with the ready availability of conventional weapons. Instances 
of low-capability warfare were more frequent as the flow of heavy weapons declined 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union (see Chapter 3). Low-capability warfare is 
identifiable by a lack of set-piece battles but the presence of front lines (usually in the 
form of ‘roadblocks’).17 Keen notes that in Liberia ‘warlords avoided pitched battles 
and concentrated instead on stealing from civilians, recruiting followers partly by 
promising them profit’. 18 In Congo-Brazzaville, Liberia and Sierra Leone ‘clashes 
tend[ed] to break off before one side sustain[ed] heavy casualties’. 19
 
 Figure 2.1 
locates low-capability warfare in relation to conventional and guerrilla warfare. 
                                                 
13 Ibid,  Pg 90. 
14 Kalyvas and Balcells, 'International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold 
War Shaped Internal Conflict,' Pg 418 - 19. 
15 Kalyvas, 'Warfare in Civil Wars,' Pg 91. 
16 Adam Lockyer, 'The Dynamics of Warfare in Civil War,' Civil Wars 12, no. 1 (2010): Pg 98., 
Kalyvas, 'Warfare in Civil Wars,' Pg 91. See also Stathis Kalyvas, 'Civil Wars,' in The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Boix and Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
17 Lockyer, 'The Dynamics of Warfare in Civil War,' Pg 93-94. 
18 Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars  Pg 28. 
19 Adam Lockyer, 'Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous resources 
on the course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts' (University of Sydney, 2009) Pg 66. 
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Figure 2.1 - Types of Warfare in Civil War20
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What then, causes types of ‘warfare’? What generates the divergent patterns of 
fighting in civil wars? While the relative ‘technology of rebellion’ might help us 
predict what types of warfare will emerge it tells us little about why divergent 
empirical patterns emerge, and, in turn, what other patterns we might expect to see. 
Warfare is caused by the confluence of strategy selected by multiple commanders.21 
Different empirical patterns emerge because belligerents choose different military 
strategies. ‘Conventional’ warfare emerges when two actors choose strategies based 
on force concentration. Front lines form because both actors choose to concentrate at 
a particular location. During the First World War, front lines stabilised in the north 
east of France. Following a month-long offensive through Belgium, the advancing 
Germans inadvertently split near the town of Marne and the retreating French and 
British troops saw an opportunity to attack the German flanks. As the French and 
British counter-attacked, the Germans dug in, believing they could hold their existing 
territorial gains.22
                                                 
20 Kalyvas and Balcells, 'International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold 
War Shaped Internal Conflict,' Pg 418. 
 Joint decisions of Germany, Britain and France ‘caused’ front lines 
to solidify near Marne. ‘Guerrilla’ warfare emerges because (usually) insurgencies 
21 Or, as Lockyer writes, is ‘a function of the strategies employed by the contending belligerents’. 
Lockyer, 'The Dynamics of Warfare in Civil War,' Pg 91. 
22 Annika Mombauer, 'The Battle of the Marne: Myth and Reality of Germany's "Fateful Battle",' The 
Historian 68, no. 4 (2006): Pg 751. 
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adopt a strategy of force dispersion. Concentrating for a conventional battle in the 
face of superior firepower will, in the vast majority of cases, end in annihilation. 
Empirically we see few front lines and a proliferation of ‘hit and run’ attacks. But 
what military strategies ‘cause’ low-capability warfare? Why do we see few face to 
face confrontations but ‘unmistakable’ front lines? Clearly the answer to this question 
turns on what purposes military strategies serve and how they are composed.  
 
Civil wars emerge in a ‘domestic bargaining environment’ where a government and a 
sub-state group disagree over policy.23 Combatants may dispute the political status of 
an ethnic group, the ideological posture of the government, or, more typically, the 
distribution of state resources. Often it is a combination. General Okujwu led a 
rebellion to separate ‘Biafra’ from the Federal Republic of Nigeria and create a new 
state for the mainly Igbo people of the region in 1967. 24 The distribution of oil 
revenues, however, was central to the rebellion. 25  Even the most ‘nihilistic’ of 
insurgencies have some policy issue at stake. The RUF in Sierra Leone, the epitome 
of apparently senseless rage and violence represented, in part, a backlash against a 
distribution of state revenues (primarily from diamond sales) that excluded sections of 
the country, especially the rural poor in the south and east.26 That the leaders of the 
RUF wished pocket and distribute those revenues themselves, to ‘feed at the trough’ 
as Bayart argued, does not change the fact that a political disagreement lay at the 
centre of the rebellion.27
 
  
Combat is a calculated gamble to improve one’s bargaining position.28
                                                 
23  Stephen E Gent, 'Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil 
Conflicts,' International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008).. A number of studies conceptualise civil wars in 
this way. Mason and Fett, for example, borrowed Wittman’s bargaining model of inter-state wars and 
adapted it to intra-state conflicts. Other studies have made use of this model. See T.David Mason, 
Jospeh Wiengarten, and Patrick Fett, 'Win, Lose or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars,' 
Political Research Quarterly 52, no. 2 (1999). and Karl R. DeRouen(Jr) and David Sobek, 'The 
Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome,' Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004). 
 By inflicting 
casualties, capturing strategic points or communicating resolve, organised and 
24 Guy Arnold, Africa: A Modern History (London: Atlantic Books, 2006) Pg 203. 
25 John de St. Jorre, The Brother's War: Biafra and Nigeria (Boston MA: Houghton Miflin, 1972) Pg 
138. 
26 Foday Sankoh claimed that “pattern of raping the countryside to feed the greed and caprice of the 
Freetown elite” motivated his rebellion. Alfred B. Zack-Williams, 'Sierra Leone: The Political 
Economy of Civil War, 1991-1998,' Third World Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1999): 145-48. 
27 Jean-Francios Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (Cambridge: Polity, 2009). 
28 Scott Wolford, Dan Reiter, and Clifford J. Carrubba, 'Information, Commitment and War,' Journal of 
Conflict Resolution  (2011): Pg 5. 
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purposive violence is the primary means through which political objectives are 
realised in wartime. Clausewitz wrote that war is ‘an act of force to compel our 
enemy to do our will’ and that ‘policy’ ‘will permeate all military operations and in so 
far as their violent nature will admit it, will have continuous influence on them’.29 
With absolute military victory comes the power to impose policy on the vanquished. 
Actors seek battlefield gains to maximise concessions in a peace deal where absolute 
victory is not possible, recalling Mao’s famous dictum of ‘talk/fight, talk/fight’.30 
Settling for greater access to resources rather than complete control is common.31 
Although the RUF sought to oust the government from Freetown, its leader, Foday 
Sankoh, settled for an appointment as chairman of Sierra Leone’s diamond 
commission.32 An insurgency seeking political independence might wish for complete 
separation but settle for a degree of political autonomy, as occurred during the first 
Sudanese civil war in 1972.33
 
  
Strategy is the ‘calculated’ part of the gamble - a decision-maker’s recipe for victory. 
Colin Gray argues that strategy is ‘the bridge that relates military power to political 
purpose’34 and Fruhling that strategies are ‘theories about victory’.35 Such a definition 
has etymological legitimacy, as the greek strategos or strategiea can mean ‘a 
campaign, generalship or the general’s office’.36
 
  
 
 
                                                 
29 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: Penguin, 1982) Pg 101. 
30 De Rouen Jr and Sobek argue that some insurgencies do not initiate rebellion with military victory in 
mind, but make continued fighting so costly for the government that they sue for peace  Cunningham, 
Mason and Fett argue that the willingness of actors to concede on policy outcomes is largely a function 
of the ability to inflict costs (presently and into the future) and change the balance of power. See, for 
example, James Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War,' International Organization 49, no. 3 
(1995). DeRouen(Jr) and Sobek, 'The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome,' Pg 306. Mason, 
Wiengarten, and Fett, 'Win, Lose or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars,' Pg 550. 
31 Gent, 'Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts.'  
32 Dowden, Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles  Pg 304. 
33 Barbara Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,' International Organization 51, no. 3 
(1997): Pg 355. Walter points out that settlements in civil wars are unlikely when compared to inter-
state wars because of the inability for participants to make credible commitments. In her argument, 
Third-party guarantors account for much of the stability of negotiated settlements. See also, Roy 
Licklider, 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,' The American 
Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (1995). 
34 Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) Pg 7. See also Stephan 
Fruhling, 'Offense and Defense in Strategy,' Comparative Strategy 28, no. 5 (2009): Pg 463. 
35 Fruhling, 'Offense and Defense in Strategy,' Pg 464. 
36 Martin Van-Creveld, The Transformation of War (Toronto: Free Press, 1991) Pg 95. 
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Tactics 
 
If strategy is the recipe, what are the ingredients? Fruhling argues that strategies are 
constructed from the ‘bottom-up’ with military systems (capabilities) and tactics at its 
base.37 Lieber concurs, arguing that ‘the feasibility of strategic offense and defence 
depends on the success of operational and tactical offense and defense’.38 Clausewitz 
stated that ‘all strategic planning rests on tactical success alone… this is in all cases 
the fundamental basis for the decision.’39 Tactics are defined as the use of soldiers in 
individual battles. As Duyvesteyn highlights, although guerrilla warfare is commonly 
understood as a ‘strategy’ it ‘signifies a tactic of war’.40 Quincy Wright states that 
‘the management of military operations in direct contact with the enemy in order to 
win battles is called “tactics”’41 and the US Marine ‘Warfighting’ field manual that 
‘in war, tactics focus on the application of combat power to defeat an enemy force in 
combat at a particular time and place’.42
 
  
‘Combat power’ can be applied in four ‘ideal’ ways falling along two dimensions. 
Firstly, tactics are either conventional or irregular emphasising force concentration or 
dispersion respectively. Secondly, tactics are either offensive or defensive, 
emphasising manoeuvre or immobility. Military decision makers combine these 
tactical categories in varying quantities, places and times to form military strategies. 
Figure 2.2 outlines these relationships. The following section looks in more detail at 
each category and the requirements for their deployment.  
  
                                                 
37 Fruhling, 'Offense and Defense in Strategy,' Pg 464. 
38 Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International 
Security,' International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): Pg 74. It should be noted that this thesis sidelines the 
‘operational’ level of war. ‘Operations’ refer to campaigns, often in different theatres. Many of the 
low-capability civil wars discussed here have just one campaign and one theatre. For simplicity, what 
is usually a threefold distinction had been collapsed into two: strategy and tactics. See Stephen Biddle, 
'Strategy in War,' PS: Political Science and Politics 40, no. 3 (2007). 
39 As cited in Hugh Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) Pg 128. 
40 Isabell Duyvesteyn, 'The Concept of Conventional War and Armed Conflict in Collapsed States,' in 
Rethinking the Nature of War, ed. Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesten (New York: Frank Cass, 
2005), Pg 68. 
41 Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) Pg 291. 
42 U.S Marine Corps, Warfighting (Washington D.C: Department of the Navy, 1997) Pg 32. 
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Figure 2.2 The Relationship Between Tactics and Strategy 
 
 
 
Conventional Offense and Defence 
 
Conventional tactics, in general, rely on force concentration. As Venturinus 
articulated in the 18th century, ‘the art of the commander consists of manoeuvring his 
forces in such a way as to concentrate the largest number of men at the decisive 
point’.43 Quincy Wright stated that ‘operations of war have always had the object of 
concentrating a greater military force than the enemy at a given point, the control of 
which is regarded as important’.44 Force concentration, force economy, simplicity, 
manoeuvre, and surprise are principles expounded in US military doctrine today.45 
Both World Wars, and many interstate wars were dominated by the use of 
conventional tactics, although, as Smith points out, even during these wars, irregular 
tactics were deployed as well.46
 
  
                                                 
43 As cited in, Van-Creveld, The Transformation of War  Pg 95. 
44 Wright, A Study of War  Pg 310. 
45 Corps, Warfighting. 
46 M.L.R Smith, 'Strategy in an Age of Low-Intensity Warfare,' in Rethinking the Nature of War, ed. 
Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (New York: Frank Cass, 2005). 
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Conventional offense directs concentrations of firepower at the enemy’s weak-points, 
usually labelled ‘pushes’ or ‘thrusts’ to break front lines and expose logistic and 
communications networks.47 Blitzkrieg, the pincer movement, and encirclement are 
all examples of conventional offensive tactics. Napoleon was an expert at tying down 
part of an enemy’s force in one location while he attacked at another, usually the 
flank closest to communications. 48  Tricking the enemy into dispersion where the 
attacker will concentrate is a common tactic. For example, in 371 B.C at the battle of 
Leuctra the Theban Commander Epaminodas loaded his left hand flank with forty-
eight ranks of phalanx, as compared to the traditional eight in Greek military doctrine. 
The phalanx ‘crashed’ through the left flank and Sparta ‘suffered the heaviest defeat 
in their history’.49
 
  
Mobility is a necessary condition for offense. As Glaser and Kaufmann argue ‘only 
offense inherently requires mobility; a force that cannot move cannot attack, and a 
defender that can hold its positions need not move’. 50 Jervis concludes that ‘any 
forces that for various reasons fight well only within their own soil in effect lack 
mobility and are therefore defensive’. 51 Proponents of the offense/defence balance 
theory in International Relations argue that some technological developments, 
especially in mobility, have enhanced the relative power of the tactical offense. 
Advancements enabling the evasion or destruction of fortifications feature heavily in 
Van Evera’s catalogue of factors enhancing the offense. 52
 
 So too, command and 
logistical capacity is necessary for offense. Van Creveld writes that: 
‘before a commander can even start thinking of manoeuvring and giving battle, of marching this way 
and that, of penetrating, enveloping, encircling, of annihilating and wearing down, in short of putting 
                                                 
47 Lockyer, 'Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous resources on the 
course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts'  Pg 60. The US Army Field Manual for 
Operations states that offensive operations seek to ‘seize, retain and exploit the initiative’. F-M 3-0 
Operations,  (Washington D.C: Department of the Army, 2001) Para 4-13. 
48 Smith, 'Strategy in an Age of Low-Intensity Warfare.' 
49 Van-Creveld, The Transformation of War  Pg 114. 
50 Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What is the Offense/Defence Balance and Can we Measure 
it?,' International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): Pg 62. 
51 Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,' World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): Pg 204. 
52 Motorised armour used during the Second World War allowed for rapid strikes at weak-points in an 
enemies lines. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1999) Pg 160. 
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into practice the whole rigormorale of strategy, he has – or ought – make sure of his ability to supply 
his soldiers’.53
 
  
Conventional defence inverts conventional offense. Instead of predicting where the 
enemy is weak and striking there, defence aims to predict where the enemy will 
gather their strength and concentrate there. As Clausewitz writes, ‘what is defence in 
conception? The warding off a blow. What is then its characteristic sign? The state of 
expectancy or of waiting for this blow… by this sign alone can the defensive be 
distinguished from the offensive in war’. 54  As Tarr argues, defence is the 
concentration of military force in anticipation of an assault ‘to repel attack, to protect 
people and property, and to minimise damage by the attacker’.55 Quincy Wright states 
that ‘the defensive depends upon the best means of dealing with the enemy’s 
offensive’. 56
 
 The use of fortifications and static structures (such as trenches) are 
commonly associated with defensive tactics.  
Material and organisational requirements for conventional defence are less demanding 
than conventional offense.57 Communications and logistical lines are more compact 
and difficult to break. Defenders have time on their side, and ‘holding on to 
something is easier and requires less effort than taking it away’. 58 Or, as Robert 
Jordan, the protagonist from Hemmingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls, put it, ‘it is 
one thing to hold positions. It is another thing to attack positions and take them and it 
is something very different to manoeuvre an army in the field’.59
                                                 
53 Martin Van-Creveld, Supplying War: Logistic from Wallenstein to Patton (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) Pg 1. Forward positions can improve logistics and reduce the ‘loss of strength 
gradient’ associated with the logistical difficulties of moving armed forces long distances. Kieran 
Webb, 'The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient,' 
Comparative Strategy 26, no. 4 (2007): Pg 296-97. 
 Effective defence 
can be conducted without high levels of coordination between units (although defence 
is certainly enhanced by effective coordination). Once soldiers are entrenched in 
fortifications, little further manoeuvre is required. Fewer resources are expended upon 
54 Clausewitz as cited in Jack S Levy, 'The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A 
Theoretical and Historical Analysis,' International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 (1984). 
55 David Tarr, 'Defense as Strategy: A Conceptual Analysis,' in National Security Strategy: Choices 
and Limits, ed. J. Cimbala (New York: Praeger, 1983), Pg 217-35. 
56 Wright, A Study of War  Pg 314. 
57 Chris Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 
1990) Pg 15. 
58 Van-Creveld, The Transformation of War  Pg 111. 
59 Ernest Hemmingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls (New York: Scribner, 2002) Pg 250. 
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transport and logistics as supply lines contract. As Jervis has pointed out, advancing 
armies usually consist of ‘soft’ targets and lack fortification, meaning defensive 
tactics can be successful without heavy weapons. This is especially the case where the 
adversary also lacks heavy weapons and armour. A war waged primarily with small 
arms is likely to favour the defender, other things being equal.  
 
 
Irregular Offense and Defence 
 
Irregular tactics utilise force dispersion. Offensive operations are small-scale and fast. 
Defensive concentrations are avoided to minimise the chances of single, decisive 
defeats. Irregular tactics have prevailed in over half of civil wars since 194660 such 
that scholars have conflated intra-state war with guerrilla war.61 Like conventional 
tactics, irregular tactics are ‘as old as warfare itself’ and have been theorised for many 
years.62 Lawrence of Arabia, Mao Zedong and Che Guevera were pillars in the theory 
of insurgency, and the ideas go back as far as Sun Tsu.63
 
  
Irregular offense involves small-scale attacks on concentrations of enemy soldiers, 
infrastructure, or civilians with highly mobile units. Che Guevara, for example, 
described how hit and run tactics can be used to sabotage garrisons, lines of 
communication and infrastructure.64  Attacks, spread widely and sustained over time,  
wear down the opposition by imposing costs upon its military and economic 
infrastructure and creating the perception that, unless concessions are agreed to, the 
costs will continue to be imposed. 65 Griffiths writes that ‘the mind of the enemy and 
the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance than the bodies of his 
troops’. 66
                                                 
60 Kalyvas and Balcells, 'International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold 
War Shaped Internal Conflict,' Pg 423. 
 Conspicuous terror has long been tactic in guerrilla warfare. Insurgents 
rarely control population centres and atrocity is one means of cowing populations and 
61 See Michael Brzoska, 'The New Wars Discourse in Germany,' Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 1 
(2004). 
62 United States Department of the Army, The U.S Army/Marine Corps Counter-Insurgency Field 
Manual (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007) Pg 1-2. 
63 Martin Van-Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought (London: Cassell, 2000) Pg 205. 
64 Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997) Pg 58-60. 
65 Kalyvas, 'Warfare in Civil Wars,' Pg 92., Van-Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought  
Pg 208. 
66 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2000) Pg 53. 
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inducing defection (mass killing is also related to counter-insurgency).67 Kalyvas has 
shown that both insurgent and government actors made strategic use of atrocities in 
Algeria, Greece and Vietnam.68
 
 
Not all armies can conduct irregular offense. Conventional offense requires a balance 
of fragmentation into smaller units for tactical flexibility with the ability to centralise 
control of those units. A commander cannot conduct conventional offensive 
manoeuvres without the capacity to direct multiple units towards a single point in 
time and space. Irregular offense maximises on the tactical flexibility at the expense 
of centralised control and seeks to exploit the differential in adaptability. Mao Zedong 
stated that: 
 
‘In guerrilla warfare, small units acting independently play the principal role, and there must be no 
excessive interference with their activities. In orthodox warfare, particularly in a moving situation, a 
certain degree of initiative is accorded to subordinates, but in principle, command is centralised. This is 
done because all units and all supporting arms in all districts must coordinate to the highest degree. In 
the case of guerrilla warfare, this is not only undesirable, it is impossible’.69
 
 
Small, independent units have lower logistical requirements. Guerrillas are generally 
parasitic on government stocks, local populations and where available, foreign 
patrons, for recruits, foodstuffs, weapons and ammunition. Theft from government 
arms depots, for example, is a common method of procurement. Rumour has it that 
Malian rebels from the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad staged their 
first raid with a single Kalashnikov. As more weapons were looted from government 
stocks, their ability to attack larger garrisons with heavy and more sophisticated 
weaponry increased.70 Mao wrote that guerrillas must depend ‘for their sustenance 
primarily upon what the locality affords’71
                                                 
67 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). See also Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, '"Draining the Sea": Mass 
Killing and Guerrilla Warfare,' International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004). Matthew Krain, 'State 
Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides,' Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 41, no. 3 (1997). 
 and ‘we have a claim on the output of the 
68 Stathis Kalyvas, 'Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria,' Rationality and Society 
11, no. 3 (1999). Stathis Kalyvas and Matthew Kocher, 'The Dynamics of Violence in Vietnam: An 
Analysis of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES),' Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 3 (2009). 
69 Samuel Griffiths, 'Introduction,' in On Guerrilla Warfare (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 
2000), Pg 25. 
70 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War (Geneva: Oxford, 2005) Pg 187. 
71 Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare  Pg 51. 
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arsenals of London as well as Hanyang, and what is more, it is to be delivered to us 
by the enemy’s own transport corps. This is the sober truth, not a joke’.72
 
 
Retreat and dispersion are the hallmarks of irregular defensive tactics. Mao wrote that 
‘there is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing 
comparable to the fixed, passive defence that characterises orthodox war’73 and ‘in 
general, guerrilla units disperse to operate’.74 Various descriptions of guerrillas as 
‘gas-like’ or ‘cloud-like’ emphasise the importance of stealth and dispersion. 75 
Irregular defence requires that there be some place that soldiers can disperse without 
being overrun by the superior military strength of their opponent. Rough terrain such 
as mountains and jungles restrict the ability to concentrate soldiers, armour and 
artillery and neutralise tactical advantages in open warfare. The Chinese Communists 
found refuge from Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist army in the loess caves of Pao An in 
1933.76 An Afghani Taliban commander asserted that ‘our military tactic is to control 
a district centre, kill the government soldiers there, and withdraw to our mountainous 
strongholds, where it would be very difficult for the government to pursue us’.77 
Border sanctuaries serve the same purpose. Seth Jones found that external support, 
especially from across the border in Pakistan, was fundamental to the survival and 
success of insurgencies in Afghanistan since 1979.78 North Vietnamese support was 
crucial to insurgents in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Ethiopian and Ugandan 
support sustained the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Southern 
Sudan, while South African assistance allowed UNITA to challenge the Angolan 
government for decades. As Laitin and Fearon argue ‘insurgency is favoured by rough 
terrain, rebels with local knowledge of the population superior to the government’s 
and a large population. All three aid rebels in hiding from superior government forces. 
Foreign base camps, financial support and training also favour insurgency’.79
 
 
                                                 
72 As cited in Griffiths, 'Introduction,' Pg 24. 
73 Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare  Pg 52. 
74 Ibid,  Pg 102. 
75 Van-Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought  Pg 208. 
76 Griffiths, 'Introduction,' Pg 18-19. 
77 Seth Jones, Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008) Pg 51. 
78 See generally, ibid. 
79 James Fearon and David Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,' American Political Science 
Review 97, no. 1 (2003): Pg 75. 
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In summary, military theory has established four rough tactical categories. 
‘Conventional offense’ involves judicious force concentration and manoeuvre where 
‘Conventional defence’ combines force concentration with immobility, often assisted 
by trenches, bunkers and fortification. ‘Irregular offense’ utilises fragmented but 
constant sabotage, ambush and ‘terrorist’ attacks. This is usually, although not always 
as we will see, combined with ‘irregular defence’: the use of rugged terrain, 
sympathetic populations and dispersion to minimise casualties and make it difficult 
for the enemy to strike a decisive blow. Figure 2.3 outlines these categories.  
 
Figure 2.3 – A Typology of Military Tactics 
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Strategies are dynamic and change over time. For example, Mao’s three-stage 
‘guerrilla strategy’ envisaged a transformation of tactics over time and space in 
response to perceived changes in relative military capabilities. The ‘first stage’ of 
Mao’s recipe for expelling the Japanese from China in the 1930s involved the use of 
irregular offensive and irregular defensive tactics. China could not hope to match the 
conventional strength of the Japanese army and were therefore required to disperse 
and harass. Mao foresaw, however, that at some point during the ‘first phase’ of 
guerrilla operations the Japanese would overextend in China’s vast territory. He 
wrote: 
 
‘the enemy will be forced to fix certain terminal points to his strategic offensive, owing to his shortage 
of troops and our firm resistance and upon reaching them he will stop his strategic offensive and enter 
the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas’.80
 
 
                                                 
80 Mao Tse-Tung, 'On Protracted Warfare,' Marxists.org  (1938): Point 37. 
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As Japan’s relative offensive capacity declined with stretching supply and front lines 
the tactical emphasis would shift from conventional offense to conventional defence. 
At this point Mao articulated a tactical change from the ‘strategic defensive’ to the 
‘strategic stalemate’ where Chinese troops would engage in ‘frontal defence against 
the enemy’ in combination with widespread guerrilla offensives. 81  China could 
concentrate on ‘consolidating’ its territory and ‘systematically improve[ing] fighting 
techniques [and] reform the armed forces’. Like Japan, however, the Chinese 
guerrillas were ‘not yet adequately equipped technically’82 and lacked the capacity for 
conventional offense, so Mao argued that irregular tactics should dominate in attack. 
Mao saw this ‘strategic stalemate’ as the most destructive period of a war. While both 
sides are capable of holding their respective territories, in the ‘guerrilla contested 
zones’ violence would be unrelenting. In the final phase, when China had created a 
conventional army with offensive capacity in excess of Japan’s defensive capacity the 
‘strategic offensive’ would liberate occupied Chinese cities. 83  Put another way 
insurgents utilise a strategy involving a staged tactical metamorphosis from irregular 
offense and irregular defence to irregular offense and conventional defence and 
finally to conventional offense and conventional defence. Transitions are to made in 
response to changes in relative military capabilities. Transition from stage one to 
stage two could only be made when Japan’s conventional offensive capacity was 
stretched, otherwise static defences would be overwhelmed. Transition from stage 
two to stage three could only take place when the Chinese developed a conventional 
offensive capacity capable of challenging the Japanese. Recent scholarship has 
suggested that, in reality, insurgencies have grave difficulties overcoming the 
‘poverty trap’ involved in transitioning through these stages, but the theory of 
‘revolutionary war’ elucidates the utility of understanding strategies as tactical 
combinations over time and space.84
 
 
If these are the ‘ingredients’ of military strategy, what determines when they are used, 
and in what quantities? What variables influence whether a commander will rely more 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid,  Point 38. 
84 That said, Mao was cognizant of the requirement for international assistance when transitioning from 
a guerrilla to a conventional armed force. For a discussion of the ‘poverty trap’ and civil war see 
Lockyer, 'Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous resources on the 
course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts'  Pg 121.  
Chapter Two – Military Strategy in Low-capability Warfare 
 39 
heavily on conventional or irregular tactics, or a mix? As Mao’s illustration 
suggested, relative military capabilities, understood as functions of the 
aforementioned typology of tactics are the crucial factor in this equation.  
 
Capacity for conventional offense and defence, whilst improved by aspects such as 
firepower, logistics and coordination, is ultimately a relative concept. Even a poorly 
organised government armed only with light automatic weapons will calculate that it 
possesses a substantial offensive (and defensive) capacity when facing off against a 
rebellion armed only with spears and rocks.85
  
 For the sake of simplicity, however, let 
us imagine that there are two types of military organisation: those armed only with 
light automatic weapons (such as AK-47, or Automat Kalashnikova 1947, assault 
rifles) and those with the capacity to organise and deploy heavy artillery and mobile 
armour. Also assume that one side does not vastly outnumber the other. Figure 2.4 
details the dominant military strategy for governments and insurgents based upon the 
balance of capabilities between those actors. When both sides have the capacity to 
coordinate and deploy armour and artillery a ‘strategy of annihilation’ is likely. To 
win the war, each side must eliminate the opponent’s conventional offensive capacity. 
When one side possesses only light weapons and their opponent can deploy armour 
and artillery a guerrilla/counter-guerrilla strategy is adopted and the empirical 
characteristics of guerrilla warfare emerge. When the state and an insurgency cannot 
deploy heavy weapons the dominant strategy is one of  ‘exhaustion’. As I argue in the 
following section, the defensive advantages of automatic weapons against 
disorganised and light armed opponents fighting in the open are so great that a 
strategy of annihilation will likely result in the annihilation of the party adopting it.  
Instead, belligerents scramble to hold the most valuable sites, exploit the advantages 
of defence in those zones and sue for the best peace deal possible. Each of these 
strategies is discussed in more detail below, taking note of what role economic 
geography is expected to play in the operations of domestic actors and foreign states.  
                                                 
85 Thankyou to Associate Professor Ben Goldsmith for highlighting the relativity of offensive capacity. 
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Figure 2.4 – Dominant Military Strategies by Relative Capabilities 
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Strategy of Exhaustion and Low-Capability Warfare 
 
Low capability warfare is, at first sight, a paradox. Towns and villages exchanging 
hands with ‘dizzying rapidity’86 and front lines that ‘could shift fifty or one hundred 
kilometres in a day’ 87
 
 give the impression of a fundamentally offensive war. 
However, the important strategic decisions are defensive. Hans Delbruck argued that 
military history and theory had focused on the uses of organised violence for 
disabling an enemy’s fighting ability, or what he called a ‘strategy of annihilation’, at 
the expense of a second strategy, the ‘strategy of exhaustion’. Exhausting the enemy 
through attrition and positional defence in areas of high value to a rival for the ends 
of, not absolute victory, but a favourable political settlement is the essence of this 
strategy. On the one hand, the difference between a strategy of annihilation and a 
strategy of exhaustion is one of objectives. Destroying an opponent’s army is the 
object of ‘annihilation’ whilst ‘exhaustion’ seeks the more modest goal of forcing 
concessions at the negotiating table. Delbruck wrote that:  
                                                 
86 For one description of the fighting in Sierra Leone, see Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: 
The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone (London: Hurst, 2005) Pg 79. 
87 United Nations Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS), Study on Governance in Gedo Region, 
(Nairobi: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 1998), Pg 75, As Cited in Lockyer Pg 93 
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‘one may not so much place his hopes on completely defeating the enemy as on wearing him out and 
exhausting him by blows and destruction of all kinds to the extent that in the end he prefers to accept 
the conditions of the victor, which in this case must always show a certain moderation’.88
 
  
Yet, there is a fundamental tactical difference between the strategy of annihilation and 
the strategy of exhaustion. A strategy of exhaustion relies more heavily, indeed, in 
some cases, exclusively, on defensive tactics, whist, as is discussed further on, the 
strategy of annihilation combines conventional offensive and defensive tactics in 
more even quantities. Many scholars have observed the connection between 
‘exhaustion’ and defensive tactics. Clausewitz saw that in some circumstances, 
especially when an opponent loses attacking strength over distance (as is the case with 
the logistically limited armies) ‘the remaining force is just enough to maintain a 
defence and wait for peace’.89 According to Van Creveld, a defensive strategy cannot 
achieve outright military victory but hope to ‘win by attrition: that is he can hope to 
hold out, husbanding his forces and using such opportunities to inflict losses until the 
other side gives up’. 90 Craig writes that this ‘limited warfare’ was adopted when 
‘annihilation was impossible, either because the political aims or political tensions 
involved in the war were small or because the military means were inadequate to 
accomplish annihilation’.91
 
  
Exhaustion is most likely to be adopted when the advantages of defence eclipse those 
of offense. That is, a strategy of exhaustion has higher expected utility when the costs 
of capturing territory are much greater than the costs of holding it, or, as Delbruck 
noted ‘in view of the strength of the tactical defence’.92
                                                 
88 Hans Delbruck, History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History: Volume 4, The 
Modern Era (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985) Pg 294. 
 Delbruck made precisely this 
point in his History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History. 
During the Middle Ages ‘the power of the defence grew vis-à-vis the offense’ and 
‘princes as well as cities were concerned with insuring their own security with 
89 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War: The Complete Edition (Brooklyn: Brownstone, 2009) Pg 365. 
90 Van-Creveld, The Transformation of War  Pg 111. 
91 Gordon Craig, 'Delbruck: The Military Historian,' in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli 
to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), Pg 341. 
92 Delbruck, History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History: Volume 4, The 
Modern Era  Pg 297. 
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fortifications’.93
 
 He saw, for example, that a strategy of exhaustion was useful against 
the limited logistics of the Swiss infantry in the 16th century: 
‘When the Swiss descended from their mountains into the surrounding regions, they naturally had no 
other principle than to seek out the enemy as fast as possible and to attack and defeat him. But this very 
same principle could be turned against them. It was known that they always wished to return home 
soon; it was also always difficult for national leaders to obtain the pay for them over a long period. 
Therefore, if one succeeded in avoiding their attack and outlasting them in unassailable positions, one 
could hope to win the campaign without risks and without battle’.94
 
 
Delbruck argued that during the Thirty Years Wars ‘strategy’ was determined by ‘the 
numerous fortified cites and the armies that were always numerically weak in 
comparison to the large areas involved’.95 He goes on to write that the armies of this 
period were ‘too small, too awkward in their tactics, and too unreliable in their 
composition to be able to carry out the basic principles [of annihilation] in their 
conduct of war. They stood fast in front of positions that were impregnable for their 
tactics’. 96 He describes how Frederick the Great relied upon a positional defence 
when ‘the strategic attack was not capable of dominating the situation forcefully and 
continuously in one move’. 97 Pericles abandoned the Athenian countryside to the 
Peloponnesian-Boeotian League and retreated back to Athens from which he relied 
upon a kind of, naval, irregular offense – ‘landing first here and then there and 
suddenly appearing, bringing to the enemy in the countryside the same or even greater 
destruction than the enemy was accomplishing in Attica’.98 Craig goes on to note that 
‘in certain periods of history, because of political factors or the smallness of armies, it 
[exhaustion] has been the only form of strategy that could be employed.’99
                                                 
93 Hans Delbruck, History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History: Volume 3, The 
Middle Ages (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982) Pg 324. 
 Munkler 
argues that a strategy of exhaustion was adopted in the Thirty Years War because ‘it 
was seldom possible to seize the enemy’s strongholds, castles and walled cities, the 
94 It should be noted that when Delbruck writes of commanders avoiding battle, he usually means 
avoiding commitment to a pitched, offensive battle. Holding out in fortifications does not count as 
making battle in his view. Delbruck, History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political 
History: Volume 4, The Modern Era  Pg 294-95. 
95 Ibid,  Pg 298. 
96 Ibid,  Pg 421. 
97 Ibid,  Pg 305. 
98 Hans Delbruck, A History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History: Volume 1, 
Antiquity (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975) Pg 136. 
99 Craig, 'Delbruck: The Military Historian,' Pg 342. 
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aim was to devastate the countryside by attacking villages and burning down 
farms.’ 100  Indeed Delbruck noted that a strategy of exhaustion can be especially 
effective in conflicts where recruitment is based upon economic incentives. As he 
writes, ‘the wars with mercenary armies are in the most outstanding sense economic 
wars, for the armies have no basis at all but the economic one. From Machiavelli to 
Frederick, therefore, we hear the repeated saying that he who has the last taler in his 
pocket wins the war’.101
 
  
Domestic Actors in Low-Capability Warfare 
 
Annihilation is difficult in low-capability warfare. Somewhat ironically, small and 
weak government and insurgent actors, most vulnerable to swift destruction, are the 
least capable of inflicting it.  Light and small arms such as automatic rifles, mortars, 
land mines, grenades, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and handguns are 
preponderant. 102 Small arms are widely available and cheap. Michael Klare wrote in 
2004 that ‘while a new tank can cost $1 to $2 million and a new jet fighter costs $25 
million or more, perfectly useable surplus AK-47 assault rifles can be obtained in 
many parts of the world for as little as $15’.103 More commonly, AK-47 rifles sell for 
between $100 and $400.104 Human Rights Watch recorded that Al-Shabaab insurgents 
were armed with ‘60, 80, 81, or 82mm mortars, rocket propelled grenades, B-10 
recoilless rifles, Zu-23 and Zu-50 anti aircraft guns, and various other small arms’.105 
Mark Huband observed that the NPFL, attempting to oust President Samuel Doe from 
his stronghold in Monrovia, were armed with AK-47s and 1944 and 1945 vintage 
Beretta sub-machine guns. 106
                                                 
100 Herfried Munkler, The New Wars (Oxford: Polity, 2005) Pg 35. 
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commanders observed that Lebanese rebels were ‘lightly armed’.107 The ‘Ninjas’, a 
militia group in the 1997 Congo-Brazzaville war ‘lacked arms and equipment’.108 
Research by the Small Arms Survey describes how, during a rebellion against the 
Presidency of Charles Taylor in Liberia from 2000-2003, ‘both government and rebel 
forces relied extensively on light weapons’ including light and medium machine guns, 
Chinese-made AK-47s, and RPGs’. 109  Rebels from the Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) possessed ‘a wide variety of small arms and 
light weapons, from AK-47 assault rifles and M16 rifles to DSHK 12.7 mm heavy 
machine guns and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles’.110 In the Central African Republic 
the relatively well armed Presidential Guard units of successive rulers have ‘tended to 
be outfitted with Kalashnikov assault rifles, AA-52 light machine guns, and rocket 
propelled grenades’.111
 
 
Chief of the Prussian military staff, Helmuth von Moltke observed the defensive 
advantages of light, rapid-fire weapons in 1865 when he wrote that ‘the attack of a 
position is becoming notably more difficult’.112 Lieber writes that ‘in the age of the 
breech-loading rifle, no combination of bravery or superior numbers could overcome 
the problem of attacking frontally over open ground’.113 Twentieth century advances 
in small arms, especially the mass production of light, cheap, sub-machine guns such 
as the AK-47 are likely, other things being equal, to have increased the capacity to 
defend territory. Light and small arms, machine guns, automatic weapons, mines, and 
mortars are all anti-personnel weapons, that is, they are most effective against massed 
infantry. An AK-47 assault rifle can fire up to 600 rounds per minute, a rate 
comparable to mounted machine guns used in the First World War.114
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and about 400m for semi-automatic fire).115 As Kahaner writes ‘even the youngest 
boys barely able to hold the rifle could spray bullets and hit a human target’.116
 
 These 
weapons are most effective in ambushes and positional defence against a lightly 
armed frontal assault. Portability and high rate of fire at close range allow assailants 
to surprise and quickly annihilate small body of soldiers. However, it is exceedingly 
difficult to capture a defended position (especially, as we will see, when the capacity 
for coordination and logistics are low) given the volume of fire that automatic 
weapons can deliver.  
Charles Taylor’s fortunes in the Liberian civil wars (1989-1996, 2000-2003) briefly 
illustrate this point. When he invaded with the NPFL on Christmas eve 1989 (see 
Chapter 8 for a more detailed analysis of this conflict) Taylor attacked ‘unprotected 
towns instead of fighting government forces head-on’.117 His tactic was successful in 
the countryside, which the government (armed also with light automatic weapons) 
chose not to defend. Talyor, however, encountered serious difficulties when attacking 
the fixed positions around Monrovia and his assault stalled. Seven years later Taylor 
was sworn in as President of Liberia. By 2000 he was facing a Guinean-sponsored 
rebellion in the north west. LURD rebels used the same tactics as Taylor and faced 
the same difficulties. Armed primarily with automatic weapons, RPGs and mortars, 
LURD enjoyed initial successes in the countryside but had grave difficulties ousting 
President Taylor from his fortified positions in Monrovia. Although Taylor’s military 
capabilities had deteriorated due to his policy of ‘keeping the Liberian military 
fractured and divided, making him unable to mount an appropriate defence’118
 
 he was 
successfully able to defend the city’s outskirts. Itano observes that: 
‘Neither side appeared to have the military capacity to take and hold any of the three bridges  [that link 
central Monrovia to the northern suburbs] and it seemed the bulk of the fighting was conducted by 
poorly trained teenage and child soldiers, many stoned and drunk, shooting across the bridges’.119
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Instead of a frontal assault, LURD resorted to indiscriminate mortar attacks on the 
capital to force the resignation of Taylor.120 Without the intervention of troops from 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in August 2003 ‘the 
stalemate could have lasted indefinitely’.121
 
 Throughout the conflict LURD rebels and 
government soldiers seemed unwilling (or perhaps unable) to frontally assault 
defended positions. Displays of superior firepower rather overrunning the enemy 
tended to decide the outcome of battles. Brabazon described a typical encounter as 
follows:  
‘Contacts are always initiated with RPG-7 grenades, fired with limited collateral effect but inflicting 
substantial psychological damage, and followed by PKM and AKM [PK and AK machine gun] fire. 
Neither government forces nor LURD fighters will initiate major contacts without a substantial number 
of RPG grenades. Major fire-fights directed against defended positions usually last for a maximum of 
four hours before one side either succeeds or has to withdraw to replenish ammunition… Major battles 
fought at close quarters will typically yield no more than a dozen casualties in total’.122
 
 
Offensive or defensive advantages conferred by improvements in firepower can be 
mitigated by improvements in logistics and coordination. As Van Creveld writes, 
‘creating the greatest war-making potential involved more than mobilising all 
available resources: above all else, it was an exercise in meshing those resources with 
each other until they formed a single, coherent whole’.123 Cohen notes that the radio 
is as important as the ‘superior armour, guns or engines’ when explaining the success 
of German Panzer divisions against the French in World War Two. 124 Offensive 
advantages of mobile armour so successfully exploited by the Wehrmacht in Poland 
during 1939 and France in 1940 were muted by the end of World War Two as the 
Allies and Axis powers successfully learned to use armoured divisions in defence.125 
Israel deployed tanks in defensive formations during the 1973 conflict over the Golan 
Heights.126
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military campaign to drive the genocidal Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR) out of 
Kigali and across the border into the Democratic Republic of Congo ‘with an arsenal 
composed merely of mortars, rocket propelled grenades, and, primarily, what one 
American arms specialist described to me [Philip Gourevitch] as ‘piece of shit’ 
second hand Kalashnikovs’. 127  Paul Kagame, leader of the RPF, stated that ‘the 
problem isn’t the equipment… the problem is the men behind it’.128
 
 Indeed the RPF 
gained a reputation when fighting in the DRC for both extreme brutality, and the 
effective use of well coordinated, but lightly armed, units in conventional assaults, 
especially when compared with their Ugandan allies who deployed large numbers of 
tanks and heavy artillery. Lieber argues that improvements in tactical coordination, 
not in firepower, were able to overcome the defensive advantages of machine guns 
during the First World War. He writes: 
‘it was the German army’s decision in 1917 to introduce new “infiltration tactics” that provided a real 
tactical solution to the stalemate of trench warfare. These tactics called for a brief surprise artillery 
bombardment aimed at disrupting narrow weak points in the enemy line, followed by the quick 
penetration by small independent groups of storm troops who were to bypass points of strong 
resistance and advance as far as possible. The Germans employed infiltration tactics with great success 
in late 1917 and, especially, in the spring of 1918 with the famous Ludendorff offensives’.129
 
 
So too, logistical capacity can even the playing field. Historically, requisition and 
foraging have sustained soldiers on campaign. Even Napoleon, noted for his advances 
in logistical capacity130 wrote ‘to know how to draw supplies of all kinds from the 
country you occupy… makes up the large part of the art of war’. 131  Foraging, 
however, restricted manoeuvres to major towns and rivers where supplies were 
obtainable from markets or large quantities of foodstuffs and ammunition could be 
easily transported. Sieges required enormous logistical ‘tails’ as the surrounding 
countryside was quickly exhausted.132
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1560 in Europe can be partly explained by the difficulties in supplying soldiers for 
long periods in distant lands.133 Improvements in logistics increased the mobility, 
reach, and endurance of fighting bodies, and insofar as they have, increased the 
offensive capacity of armies. Introduction of the magazine system in the 16th and 17th 
centuries, for example, afforded advancing armies a ‘certain freedom to choose the 
direction of their movement’.134 Palmer argues that Republican France’s construction 
of a professional ‘requisition’ corps that accompanied the advancing soldiers 
constituted a ‘revolution’ and explains much of France’s military success during the 
late 18th and early 19th century. 135
 
 Railroads were a major advance in logistical 
capacity, allowing commanders to deploy and re-deploy thousands of soldiers and 
their supplies over long distances.  
However, it is precisely in the areas of coordination and logistics that combatants in 
low-capability warfare are deficient. Although Kalyvas focuses on the available 
weaponry, there is a high correlation with poor organisational and logistical capacity. 
Holsti argues that ‘rather than highly organised armed forces based on strict command 
hierarchy, [new] wars are fought by loosely knit groups of regulars, irregulars, cells, 
and not infrequently by locally based warlords under little or no central authority’.136 
The Small Arms Survey noted that in Liberia, Cote d’Iviore and Sierra Leone ‘only 
infrequently, are fighters persuaded or coerced into launching large-scale assaults on 
government troops to procure or defend territory’.137 The ‘Coyoces’ in Brazzaville, 
according to Bassanguissa-Ganga, ‘lacked a really effective organisation and 
logistical supply’ and had received only ‘basic’ military training.138 The ‘Mambas’ 
had only ‘one weeks training before being sent into battle’.139 The ‘Cobras’ were 
prone to fracture because ‘each Cobra recruit recognised only the authority of his 
immediate patron rather than the wider hierarchy’.140
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own militias to invade enemy positions since many militiamen had only an imperfect 
knowledge of the city’.141 In Lebanon, during 1958, insurgents were ‘dispersed into 
bands’ of between 400 and 2000 soldiers and ‘there was no central leadership… each 
group owed its loyalty only to its individual leader’.142 The United Nations noted in 
Somalia that ‘supply-lines were ad-hoc to non-existent, relying mostly on looting’.143
 
 
Vinci notes of Somalian armed groups that: 
‘the militias have a relatively decentralised power structure. This is partially because of the nature of 
the clan system, in which there is little application of discipline in the Western sense… ambushes are 
the most common form of attacks since they demand that the militia be brought together for only a 
short period and promise looting after the attack’.144
 
  
Van de Walle notes that children, commonly used as soldiers in low-capability 
warfare, can be ‘devastating’ in ambushes but ‘do not understand conventional 
military strategy and tend to treat war like a street game’.145
 
  
Governments that fight civil wars with light and small arms also tend to lack 
coordination and logistics. As Lock describes ‘the logistical capabilities of [African] 
national armed forces often do not cover the entire territory’. 146  Soldiers of the 
Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) were, in 1991, ‘under-equipped 
and poorly-trained or were not motivated enough for a decisive battle’.147 ‘Runners’ 
were used instead of radios to co-ordinate attacks.148
 
 One aid worker interviewed by 
David Keen stated that: 
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‘The rebels sent a message saying that they would attack Kailahun on Holy Saturday… We thought the 
army would quell it. But soldiers told us they had only four rounds [of ammunition] and were fleeing to 
Guinea’.149
 
 
According to Gberie, a recruitment drive in Sierra Leone in the early 1990s ‘produced 
little more than a uniformed rabble which acted and looked much like the rag-tag 
rebels they were sent to fight’.150 Brigadier Richards of the United Kingdom, when he 
arrived in Freetown in May 2000, noted that the RSLMF had ‘appalling logistic and 
communications problems’ and ‘needed to be rebuilt into a manoeuvre force that 
could confront the RUF directly’.151
 
  
Many governments deliberately excoriate the organisational coherence and logistical 
capacity of their armed forces to reduce the probability of coups. By the late 1980s 
President Siad Barre of Somalia ‘viewed the officers [of the army] as either his 
personal clients or as his personal foes’152 and commenced a program of ‘divide and 
rule’, installing military officers based on ethnic-kinship rather than competence.153 
An elite paramilitary core of Mareehaans and Darod, especially the Hangash (military 
intelligence), the Darbarjebinta (military counterintelligence) and the ‘red berets’ 
(military police) backstopped Barre’s regime.154 Charles Taylor, leader of the NPFL, 
pursued precisely the same strategy by creating a multitude of paramilitaries 
including: the Special Security Unit, Security Operations Division, ‘Demon Force’, 
Joint Security Forces, National Bureau of Investigation, Anti-terrorist Brigade, Anti-
terrorist Unit and ‘Charlie’s Angels’.155 Similar patterns are observable in Congo-
Brazzaville,156 Sudan,157 Zaire/DRC and the Central African Republic.158
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Defensive advantages of light automatic weapons will dominate where organisational 
and logistical capacities are also low.159
 
 Low-capability warfare fits this description 
well. Delbruck’s ‘strategy of exhaustion’ is more useful to combatants than a strategy 
of annihilation or a counter-insurgency campaign. Armed forces will suffer heavy 
losses when attempting to capture fixed positions and counter-insurgency, as Thom 
writes, is a tall order for any army, let alone the least capable of them: 
 ‘aggressive, multiple field operations with little short term payoff that must be sustained over long 
periods of time to achieve the ultimate goal. This requires good logistic support, mobility, maintenance, 
training in small unit tactics, good leadership, especially at the junior officer and NCO [non-
commissioned officer] levels, and an ability to integrate military intelligence with field operations’.160
 
  
It is in these areas of command, control and supply that belligerents in low-capability 
warfare are deficient. Governments and insurgents obtain more utility by holding 
areas of high bargaining value and waiting for a peace deal than seeking out and 
destroying the enemy’s military forces. Johnson saw that a similar calculation 
underwrote strategy in early modern Europe: 
 
‘Because of the nature of armies of that time [prior to the French Revolution] – their mercenary 
character and dependence on magazines for supply for instance – for practical reasons it was simply 
not possible for commanders to launch them on campaigns of annihilation’.161
 
 
Already, we can begin to make sense of existing empirical observations. Actors 
fortify positions and set up front lines, because, based upon an assessment of the 
adversary’s poor offensive capacity and their own capacity to defend positions against 
frontal assaults, this is an effective way of controlling territory. Sustained and 
decisive set-piece battles, however, are rare because neither side possesses the 
capacity to break their opponent’s front lines. The ‘trickling’ strategy identified by 
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Lockyer is not a strategy in its own right, it is a product of (usually) government 
actors retreating and leaving territory unoccupied for the insurgency to control.  
 
The crucial strategic decision for commanders in low capability warfare is ‘which 
ones [pieces of territory] to neglect and which ones to select.’162 Economic geography 
plays a fundamental role in this decision. Areas of high economic value to space, or 
what Le Billion describes as point resources, are cost effective locations for positional 
defence.163
 
 Minerals, oil and some alluvial diamond deposits are examples of point 
resources. Connections with international trading networks and symbolic values also 
render ports and capital cities as ‘point resources’. There are three reasons why point 
resources are likely sites for fortification and defence. Firstly, holding areas of 
economic value opens the possibility (this is not always realised) of exploiting that 
resource for finance and weapons. Money can purchase the loyalty of soldiers and 
buy cheap weapons on the international market. Vinci notes that, in Somalia: 
‘in the absence of economic incentives, such fighters [warlord militias] may move their loyalty to 
another patron, set up an economic enterprise of their own, or even rebel against the patron. As one aid 
worker put it, “all is well if the militias are getting paid… if not, they would run, setting up their own 
checkpoints etc”. Consequently, the reliance on economic incentives deepens a reliance on sustainable 
resource exploitation’.164
 
 
This goes for government soldiers as well. Like insurgents, governments can purchase 
cheap weapons and create incentives for fealty. As Reno notes in Zaire/DRC, 
‘independent commanders have used the lack of patronage as an excuse to oblige 
disgruntled soldiers to pursue private interests’.165 Russell found that defection from 
the military is a key variable determining the effectiveness of insurgent groups.166
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Secondly, a ‘strategy of exhaustion’ is largely a strategy of denial. Even if resources 
cannot be directly converted into military capacity, blocking this opportunity to a rival 
will pay off when they are dependent upon material incentives to recruit and maintain 
soldiers in the field. Research has shown that allegiance in poorly trained and poorly 
disciplined military organisations, where armies lack an espirit de corps or 
institutionalised loyalty, is often a function of the ability to pay and resource 
soldiers. 167  As Herbst identifies, economic incentives are most effective in wars 
against ‘weak states’ and a strategy centered on denying economic opportunities to a 
rival is most likely to be effective in this context. Insurgents of the ANC or the 
Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) could not credibly promise their 
followers immediate financial rewards when fighting the minority-ruled South 
African or Rhodesian states. A capable military opponent is simply able to keep 
resource-rich areas out of reach. Ideology and indoctrination are more effective in 
circumstances where rebels will be required to endure years of hardship, suffering 
and, possibly, death. 168  In contrast, lower combat demands and more credible 
commitments enable weaker insurgencies fighting weaker states to rely upon material 
reward for recruitment and reduce defection rates. So too, Claire Metelits argues that 
fighting over resources is strategic and rational and weaker rebel groups are more 
likely to fight over resources to ensure their survival.169
 
 Like the enemies of the Swiss 
infantry in the 16th century, holding out in impregnable positions while the opponent 
is starved of resources can bring victory through attrition, in this case, financial 
attrition.  
Finally, defending point resources offers the best chance of exploiting defensive 
advantages and imposing unacceptable costs upon a rival. A strategy of exhaustion is 
most likely to ‘exhaust’ if soldiers defend an area where the enemy is likely to attack. 
At heart, ‘exhaustion’ involves denying someone else what they want most and, as 
such, requires knowledge of what the enemy wants and what is the most effective way 
of getting it. For the aforementioned reasons, both sides have incentives to control 
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areas of high value to space and defending these regions affords best chances of 
inflicting casualties in a defensive battle.  
 
This observation lies at the heart of strategy in low-capability warfare. Governments 
are in a strong initial position. They nominally control a country’s territory and may 
select the areas to fall back and defend. Holding the country’s most valuable sites, 
knowing full well that an insurgency must endure a high, and perhaps unacceptable, 
rate of attrition to capture them, increases the government’s chances of survival and 
obtaining concessions in a peace deal. Conventional defensive tactics will prevail in 
areas of high economic value to space, or point resources. Outside of these areas, 
belligerents rely upon irregular offense and defence in an attempt to inflict casualties 
whist avoiding pitched battles over areas of secondary importance.  
 
Foreign Actors in Low-Capability Warfare 
 
When (if at all) to intervene in a dynamic civil war process is a key strategic decision 
for foreign actors. Stephen Gent, for example, has shown that intervention occurs 
when the balance of power between governments and insurgents is roughly even. An 
injection of exogenous force has the greatest marginal impact on the outcome of a war 
at this point. 170
 
 Foreign states, in most cases, possess a superior capability for 
conventional offense when compared to combatants in low-capability warfare. 
National armies are, usually, designed to fight other, heavily armed, national armies, 
not ‘rag-tag’ militias and a small injection of firepower can be decisive. Herbert 
Howe, discussing the effectiveness of the private security firm Executive Outcomes in 
Angola and Sierra Leone states that: 
‘A small but highly skilled force may tilt the balance of power in domestic wars by acting as a ‘force 
multiplier’ for existing assets. This is especially true in many third-world conflicts, where the 
insurgents lack significant military strength and a defining ideology… A limited amount of reliable air 
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closer to even). See, Gent, 'Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil 
Conflicts,' Pg 718. 
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support (transport, reconnaissance or combat) is surprisingly cost-effective, given most insurgencies 
lack of counter fire’.171
 
 
However, conventional offense works best against an opponent committed to fighting 
in the open. While heavy weapons, armour and air support can be devastating against 
an exposed and concentrated low-tech army, these assets are comparatively weak 
when deployed against an opponent utilising irregular tactics. Max Boot argues that 
America’s technological advantage ‘decreases considerably when its troops have to 
deploy for peacekeeping or counter-insurgency operations which leave them exposed 
to low-tech ambushes’.172
 
 Foreign states, therefore, will be sensitive to the tactics 
employed by domestic belligerents in a civil war. Foreign states are deterred from 
intervention when insurgents (and governments) deploy irregular tactics as the 
advantage in conventional offense cannot be fully realised. When domestic actors 
commit to open warfare, foreign states will be tempted to use their conventional 
offensive capabilities to inflict a decisive defeat upon their rival. Recall that the 
previous section predicted a spatial differentiation of tactics in low-capability warfare. 
In areas far from ‘point resources’ fighting is dominated by irregular tactics while 
combatants are more likely to use conventional tactics in battles over point resources. 
Insofar as this is true, foreign states will exhibit a preference for intervention as 
fighting approaches point resources and the probability of a pitched, conventional, 
battle increases. Indeed, foreign states can infer from the presence of a pitched battle 
in low-capability warfare that the object of fighting is of high value to both sides. 
Recall that in low-capability warfare, belligerents have incentives to avoid pitched 
battles. The payoffs for capturing a piece of territory must be substantial in order to 
offset the higher costs associated with attacking a fixed position when defending 
actors have an advantage. Deploying soldiers when domestic combatants commit to a 
battle over ‘point resources’ in low-capability warfare offers outside states the chance 
to inflict a decisive defeat upon their rival party and hold a section of territory 
valuable to both sides. Domestic actors will have extreme difficulty re-capturing these 
areas and be forced to the negotiating table where the intervening country can play 
‘kingmaker’.   
                                                 
171 Herbert Howe, 'Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes,' 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 36, no. 2 (1998): Pg 331. 
172 Max Boot, 'The Paradox of Military Technology,' The New Atlantis, no. Fall (2006): Pg 15. 
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Open warfare also reveals information about the relative warfighting strength and 
resolve of both sides. U.S intervention in the Dominican Republic, for example, 
responded to ‘the ebb and flow of rebel fortunes’ as the battle of Santo Domingo 
unfolded.173 British decision-makers observing the Biafran war in Nigeria hesitated to 
act ‘until the military situation became clarified’ at the battle of Ore in September-
October 1967 where it became clear that the Nigerian Federal Government could win 
on its own and that arms and finance would do the job.174 Cuba intervened with 
nearly 20,000 soldiers in the Ethiopian civil war after the Battle of Harar where 
Ethiopia showed it could defend cities from the Somali National Army (SNA) but 
would have difficulty expelling the SNA alone. 175 When actors in low-capability 
warfare demonstrate their inability to conduct sophisticated offensive manoeuvres and 
deploy heavy firepower, foreign states can assume that the short-term costs and risks 
associated with any deployment will be low. Once a position is captured the 
likelihood of being outmanoeuvred and suffering catastrophic losses is minimal. 
Admiral Jeremiah of the United States Army observed that in Somalia ‘the security 
problems consisted of ‘technicals’ [pick-up trucks with automatic weapons mounted 
on them] and marauding teenagers, none a match for organised ground troops’.176 US 
Ambassador Edward Perkin stated that ‘a clear show of force and a demonstrable 
willingness to use it should be pressed on the “smallest bully on the block”’.177
 
  
We should observe, therefore, that foreign states prefer deployment when their rival 
in a civil war commits to a conventional battle. If, as the preceding analysis of battle-
dynamics suggested, pitched battles in low-capability warfare gravitate towards high-
value to space areas then we can predict that the probability of foreign intervention 
increases as fighting gets closer to these locations.  
 
In summary, belligerents in low-capability warfare utilise a ‘strategy of exhaustion’ 
based upon the use of conventional defensive tactics around point resources and 
                                                 
173 John Quigley, The Ruses for War: American Interventionism since World War Ii (New York: 
Prometheus, 2007) Pg 15 
174 John Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War: 1967-1970 (New Jersey: 
Princeton, 1977) Pg 78. 
175 Gebru Tareke, “The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited,” The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 33, no. 3 (2000): Pg 661. 
176 Walter S Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia (Washington D.C: Joint History Office, Office of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005) Pg 11. 
177 Ibid,  Pg 15. 
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irregular offensive and defensive tactics outside of these areas. Point resources are 
attractive locations for conventional defensive tactics as a rival has the highest 
incentives to capture them. The spatial differentiation of tactics in low-capability 
warfare produces distinct empirical patterns. Fighting is more likely to occur and 
concentrate around economically valuable areas whilst dispersed fighting will prevail 
elsewhere. Foreign states time their interventions with fighting over economically 
valuable territory to exploit advantages in conventional warfare and play ‘kingmaker’. 
Figure 2.5 summarises the tactical profile of a ‘strategy of exhaustion’ used in low-
capability warfare and the predicted relationships between economic geography and 
the actions of domestic and foreign actors.  
 
Figure 2.5 – Strategic Profile and Predictions, Low-Capability Warfare 
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Strategy of Annihilation and Conventional Warfare 
 
Governments and insurgents have the capacity to deploy heavy weapons in 
conventional warfare. Positional defence alone is predictable and the concentrated 
force is vulnerable to the offensive capabilities, especially the heavy artillery and air-
power, of a rival. Eliminating or disarming the threat posed by an enemy’s 
conventional offensive capacity is the overriding objective in conventional warfare 
and even if goals are fixed points (such as a piece of territory or a fortification) the 
risk to those positions posed by heavy weapons and mobile armour must be 
minimised.178
                                                 
178 Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas  Pg 95. 
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Hans Delbruck argued that where belligerents possess a high level of offensive 
capacity, the dominant strategy is of ‘annihilation’. Battles are directed towards 
neutralising the enemy’s capacity to make war. Delbruck is worth quoting at length 
on this point: 
 
‘The natural principle of strategy is… assembling one’s forces, seeking out the enemy’s main force, 
defeating it, and following up the victory until the loser subjects himself to the will of the victor and 
accepts his conditions, in the most extreme case even to the point of occupying the entire enemy 
country… This then, and not a geographical point, an area, a city, a position, or a depot, is the object of 
attack. If one side has succeeded, as the result of a great tactical victory, in destroying the enemy armed 
forces physically and spiritually to such an extent that they can fight no longer, the victor extends his as 
broadly as he considers appropriate for his political purpose’.179
 
  
Moran writes that victory in conventional warfare ‘cannot be gained by pushing the 
enemy around, or even by pushing him away. It requires that his powers of resistance 
be broken and disorganised, so that he confronts the possibility that, at some point in 
the future, he may become defenceless.’180 Clausewitz, for example, wrote that ‘if the 
forces are destroyed – in other words, overcome and incapable of further resistance – 
the country is automatically lost. On the other hand, loss of the country does not 
automatically entail destruction of the forces; they can evacuate the country of their 
own accord, in order to reconquer it more easily later on’.181 As an example of the 
‘strategy of annihilation’, in the Six Day War of 1967, Israel, left just 2% of its air 
force at home to defend against a possible attack by Syria and Jordan, while it 
concentrated its 98% firepower on Egypt.182
                                                 
179 Delbruck, History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History: Volume 4, The 
Modern Era  Pg 422. 
 Once Egypt was defeated, Israel then 
concentrated its forces against Syria and Jordan. Insofar as it is the capacity to deploy, 
manoeuvre and supply heavy weapons and concentrations of soldiers that constitutes 
a threat, it is these capabilities that must be neutralised. Through a combination of 
conventional defensive and offensive tactics a ‘strategy of annihilation’ aims to 
180 Daniel Moran, 'Geography and Strategy,' in Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction 
to Strategic Studies, ed. John Baylis, James J Wirtz, and Colin S Gray (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), Pg 127. 
181 As cited in Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas  Pg 135. 
182 Van-Creveld, The Transformation of War  Pg 113. 
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outmanoeuvre an opponent, strike with an overwhelming concentration of force, and 
alter the balance of capabilities such that a threat is no longer posed.183
 
  
As Delbruck stated, we would not expect economic geography to structure the pattern 
of fighting in conventional warfare. The very predictability of defending valuable 
areas makes this strategy dangerous when facing an opponent with offensive capacity. 
Capturing a vital resource, such as when the German army drove to the oil-fields of 
the Caucuses in 1941, may be an objective, but in order to capture those resources an 
opposing army must be defeated. As Van Creveld writes, the ‘shortest line [to an 
objective] is also the most likely one, and therefore, filled with the carcasses of those 
who take it. The shortest line is where our opponent will concentrate his forces, thus 
turning it into the longest one and frustrating our plans’.184 When Napoleon possessed 
a large army, it was this army, not Paris that defined, when the war was ‘finished’. 
Indeed Clausewitz specifically links his ‘centre of gravity’ in war to the strength of 
the belligerents. He writes that ‘In 1814... even the capture of Paris would not have 
mattered if Bonaparte still had a sizeable army behind him, but the fact his army had 
been largely eliminated, the capture of Paris settled everything in 1814 and 1815’.185 
Interestingly, Clausewitz saw capital cities, a key feature of any state’s economic 
geography, as the ‘centre of gravity’ in internal wars due to the lower military 
capabilities at the disposal of belligerents.186
 
  
Where both sides possess a capacity for conventional offense, the location of fighting 
will be driven by many diverse factors: physical, rather than economic geography, 
insofar as it restricts or enables a body of force to manoeuvre and concentrate 
firepower.  Valleys and mountain passes limit manoeuvreability and speed, exposing 
ground troops to ambush. Roads and bridges are crucial to the movement of 
mechanised armies. Major battles occurred near the cities of Faya-Largeau in northern 
Chad and Jijiga in eastern Ethiopia, in part, because of their status as ‘gateway towns’ 
or road-junctions from which tanks and mobile artillery could move on major 
population centres. Predicted and observed movements of an enemy force can 
                                                 
183 Craig, 'Delbruck: The Military Historian,' Pg 345. 
184 Van-Creveld, The Transformation of War  Pg 11. 
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determine the location of battle. Exposed communications and supply lines, for 
example are tempting, high-payoff locations for attack. 187  Locations where an 
opponent is unlikely to defend make effective sites for rapid offensive drives. German 
Panzer divisions attacked through the Ardennes because French defences were 
concentrated along the Maginot line further south and France did not believe that an 
attack was possible thought the forest.188
 
  Recall that the battle of Marne in the First 
World War was not ‘caused’ by the economic value of the town, nor even because of 
its physical geography, but because the German line inadvertently split.   
If pitched battles in conventional warfare exhibit no systematic gravity towards areas 
of economic importance we would not expect foreign intervention to correlate with 
fighting over these areas. Foreign states still prefer intervention in decisive battles but 
these battles are likely to occur away from areas of economic importance. In 
conventional warfare, the costs of intervention are higher. Soldiers require both 
defensive capacity to repel attacks from a rival capable of conventional offense and an 
offensive capacity to manoeuvre and destroy that opposition. With higher costs, we 
would expect higher stakes to provoke intervention. Figure 2.6 outlines the strategic 
profile and predictions for conventional warfare. 
 
Figure 2.6 – Strategic Profile and Predictions, Conventional Warfare 
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Guerrilla Strategy, Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare 
 
A bifurcation of strategy occurs in guerrilla warfare. While insurgents adopt a 
guerrilla strategy, the government adopts a counter-insurgency strategy. A guerrilla 
strategy relies on irregular offense and defence to wear down the government and 
either build one’s forces for a conventional challenge or obtain a favorable peace 
agreement. Yoweri Musveni noted, in the early stages of the National Resistance 
Army (NRA) campaign in Uganda, that ‘loss of territory is, at this stage, of no 
consequence. In our case the more important consideration is the preservation and 
expansion of our forces by avoiding unnecessary casualties and destroying the 
enemy’s means of making war’.189 Alfonso Dhlakama, leader of the Mozambique 
National Resistance (RENAMO) stated that ‘we are waging war to demoralise and the 
lower the profile of the enemy... Our aim is not to win the war militarily, but to force 
the Frelimo government to accept our conditions’. 190  The US Army Counter 
Insurgency Field Manual states plainly that ‘a thinking enemy is unlikely to choose to 
fight U.S forces in open battle’ due to its preponderance of offensive military 
strength.191
 
  
Counter-insurgency shares similarities with a ‘strategy of annihilation’ albeit against a 
smaller, weaker and more mobile adversary. Counter-insurgents use territorial 
defence to ‘protect’ villages in the ‘front line’ and sever information, recruitment and 
supply to insurgents.192 As Lockyer writes, ‘counter-guerrilla strategies adopted by 
incumbents may attempt to isolate the guerrillas from their social support base and 
deny them readmission, tempt or force them out of cover and into a direct 
confrontation, or annihilate the social base from which the insurgency operates’.193
                                                 
189As cited in Herbst, 'African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of Threat and Combat 
Effectiveness,' Pg 363. 
 
Forced displacement is a common tactic to achieve this end. British counter-
insurgency strategy made use of, what they labeled, ‘concentration camps’ during the 
190 As cited in Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife since 1945 
(Maryland: Scarecrow, 1998) Pg 93. 
191 Army, The U.S Army/Marine Corps Counter-Insurgency Field Manual  Pg 1-2. 
192  David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Praeger Security 
International 2006) Pg 4-5. 
193 Lockyer, 'Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous resources on the 
course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts'  Pg 62. 
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occupation of Palestine in the 1930s.194 When insurgents are isolated or in the open, 
counter-insurgents use manoeuvre warfare and force concentration (often on a much 
smaller scale than in conventional warfare) to eliminate the guerrilla’s fighting ability. 
These offensive tactics are ‘unusual within a conventional context’ but the high level 
of coordination, manoeuvre and firepower required (often involving helicopters) 
places offensive counter-insurgency operations closer to conventional offense than 
irregular offense.195
 
  
We would not expect a high correlation between economic geography and the 
location of fighting in guerrilla warfare. Governments are substantially stronger and 
can usually defend the majority of the state’s economically valuable areas. Fighting is 
most likely to occur in peripheral communities, areas of rough terrain and border 
regions where insurgents find sanctuary. As Seth Jones argued in relation to 
Afghanistan, ‘the counter-insurgency in Afghanistan will be won or lost in the 
communities of rural Afghanistan, not in urban centres such as Kabul’.196 During 
Nepal’s civil war (1996-2006) rural villages of Western Nepal suffered the highest 
levels of Maoist and government violence.197
 
  
So too, the probability of foreign intervention will not be correlated with the distance 
of fighting from economically valuable areas. Like conventional warfare, the stakes 
must be high for an outside state to either support an insurgency against a government 
with superior military capabilities or support a government that retains a military 
advantage over an insurgency in the first place. There are, however, a number of 
circumstances in which guerrilla warfare might become internationalised. Strong 
rivalries can tempt states into supporting foreign insurgencies as a ‘low cost’ method 
of inflicting costs. US support for the Northern Alliance post September 11, or the 
Rwandan interventions in Zaire/DRC from 1996 are examples.198
                                                 
194 W.F. Abboushi, 'The Road to Rebellion: Arab Palestine in the 1930s,' Journal of Palestine Studies 
6, no. 3 (1977): Pg 35. 
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Chapter Two – Military Strategy in Low-capability Warfare 
 63 
on the side of the rebels can activate a network of inter-state rivalries and induce 
counter-interventions from states seeking to protect their allies, rebuff a rival, or deter 
aggression. US soldiers initially deployed in South Vietnam, for example, to 
communicate resolve to North Vietnam, not the Viet Cong. The Sudan intervened in 
support of President Kabila of the DRC to counter Ugandan intervention, not because 
of any particular amity with the government of the DRC. Foreign states might also 
intervene to close down a border sanctuary in a ‘joint operation’ with a neighbor, such 
as when Malaysia intervened in the Thai civil war and when Namibia assisted the 
Angolan government clearing UNITA rebels from the Namibian border. Either way, 
the timing of intervention in guerrilla warfare is not primarily related to the distance 
from point resources. Figure 2.7 outlines the strategic profile and predictions 
associated with guerilla warfare.  
 
Figure 2.7 – Strategic Profile and Predictions, Guerrilla Warfare 
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter opened by defining economic geography and distinguishing between 
warfare, strategy and tactics. Types of warfare are the empirical consequences of 
military strategies chosen by governments and insurgents in a civil war system. 
Strategies are a ‘recipe for victory’ composed of four tactical ingredients – 
conventional offense, conventional defence, irregular offense and irregular defence –
utilised over particular spatial domains and particular periods of time. Perceptions of 
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relative military capabilities drive the selection of tactical ‘ingredients’. Looking at 
low-capability warfare though through this framework revealed that belligerents have 
low conventional offensive capacity whilst retaining the ability to conduct positional 
defence. A ‘strategy of exhaustion’, focused upon a country’s most economically 
valuable sites, allows belligerents to deny their opponent resources for arms and 
recruitment whilst maximising on the advantages of defence over offense. Three 
predictions were made thereupon. Firstly and secondly: battle is more likely and 
concentrates around point resources in low-capability warfare but not in conventional 
or guerrilla warfare. Thirdly, the probability of foreign intervention is related to the 
distance of fighting from these point resources in low capability warfare. This is not 
the case in conventional and guerrilla warfare. Figure 2.8 summarises the main 
features of military strategy in low-capability, conventional and guerrilla warfare. It is 
to the testing of these hypotheses that the thesis now turns.  
 
Figure 2.8 – Strategic Profiles and Predictions199
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Chapter Three 
Hypotheses and Methods 
 
When small and light arms prevail as the technology of war, Chapter 2 predicted that 
economic geography plays a central role in the military strategies of domestic and 
foreign actors. Fighting over valuable areas is more likely to occur, more likely to 
concentrate and more likely to trigger foreign intervention in low-capability warfare 
when compared with conventional and guerrilla warfare. Testing these predictions is 
not straightforward. Economic geography varies enormously between states. Rural 
Bangladesh is very different to urban and commercial Lebanon. Bangladesh and 
Lebanon are different again to the sparse cities and copper mines of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Moreover, the same types of resources can be differently valued 
across states. Angola and Sierra Leone export diamonds, but they are less important to 
Angola than they are to Sierra Leone. And economic geography is dynamic. Although 
Liberia possesses few diamond deposits of its own, smuggling Sierra Leonean gems 
out of Liberia en-route to the jewelers of Antwerp funded the regime of Charles 
Taylor. How could we possibly make predictions about the location of fighting or the 
triggers of foreign intervention in such diverse states and circumstances? How can the 
economic geography within a sample be kept roughly ‘constant’ while varying the 
type of warfare experienced in that territory? Much of this chapter is devoted to 
answering this question.  
 
Similarities in the economic geography of Sub-Saharan African states create a sample 
of observations within which to test the hypotheses of Chapter 2. Capital cities are 
prime real estate. A norm connecting physical (that is, military) control of the capital 
city with international recognition as a ‘state’ multiplies the economic value of these 
locations. Controlling Kinshasa or Mogadishu is more lucrative to rulers and their 
challengers than controlling whole provinces or regions. Proceeds from economic and 
military aid, the ability to ‘legally’ sell resources and tax trade at the main ports 
eclipse the benefits of, and involve few of the costs and risks associated with, 
garnering revenue from the countryside. We have, therefore, something of a natural 
experiment. Although the incentive structure remains broadly constant over the 1960-
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2008 period, the nature of warfare does not. Africa has experienced conventional, 
guerrilla and low-capability warfare.  
 
This Chapter proceeds as follows. How rules for international recognition morph 
capital cities into ‘point resources’ by conditioning access to the benefits of 
sovereignty upon physical control is first discussed. Norms have a powerful effect in 
Africa because domestic opportunities for acculturation are limited. Specific 
hypotheses about the location and concentration of fighting, in addition to the timing 
and strategy of foreign intervention, conclude the first section section. More technical 
aspects of methodology are then discussed. Overall, the thesis combines quantitative 
analysis of battle location, battle concentration and foreign intervention in African 
civil wars from 1960-2008 with a single case study of the Liberian civil war. Key 
variables such as low-capability warfare, battle location and foreign intervention are 
defined and operationalised along with control variables and the unit of analysis. 
Logistic and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression are justified as appropriate 
techniques for statistical analysis. Their main strengths and limitations are discussed. 
Visual analysis plays an important role in this research and the utility of mapping the 
spatial dimensions of war is discussed. Finally, the utility of a single case study to test 
the plausibility of causal mechanisms is explained.   
 
Sovereignty Norms and Control of the Capital City 
 
In international relations ‘sovereignty’ is a collection of norms or rules for 
recognising actors with supreme authority and the prerogatives and behavioral 
expectations of those actors. 1
                                                 
1  Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) Pg 21. 
 Since the end of the Second World War, ‘states’ 
controlling a parcel of territory, such as ‘Russia’ or ‘China’ or ‘Australia’, are 
recognised as sovereign. Sovereigns have special privileges that ‘non-state’ actors like 
Hezbollah or Microsoft do not. States vote at the United Nations (UN), they make 
trade-deals with other countries and, most importantly, in the eyes of other states, can 
legitimately make laws to govern and control people within their borders. It is, 
however, easy to forget that states did not always monopolise sovereignty and the 
contemporary inter-state configuration emerged from a peculiar set of environmental, 
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commercial and political circumstances present in early modern Europe. 2  Since 
sovereignty is attributed by some to others the answer to, ‘who is to be recognised as 
a sovereign and who is not’, is socially constituted.3 Norms are, to put it crudely, what 
states ‘normally’ do and change depending upon the implicit or explicit consensus 
and behavior of other sovereigns. Sovereignty was functionally divided along 
religious, economic and juridical lines in Europe before the treaty of Westphalia in 
1648 and for some time after. 4  Barons, ecclesiastical authorities and city-states 
exercised various degrees of political control. Non-European peoples have long 
organised political authority in overlapping ways. Sovereignty existed to the extent 
that rulers could establish control of populations or induce vassalage relations in 
much of pre-colonial Africa. A dynamic and fluid collection of allegiances 
characterised sovereignty at the periphery of this system. Sovereignty norms shifted 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s to afford colonies the full set of sovereign 
prerogatives, regardless of their territorial control. 5  Jackson contrasts ‘positive 
sovereignty’ with ‘negative sovereignty’. European rulers recognised as ‘states’ only 
those organisations physically capable of controlling their territories before the 
decolonisation movement. The ‘winds of change’ that swept through Africa, Asia and 
the Middle-East, however, ushered in a ‘negative’ sovereignty regime that de-coupled 
international recognition from effective territorial control.6
 
  
Scholars continue to debate the extent to which norms circumscribe the activities of 
states. Hinsley argues that sovereignty, while it does not have a physical ‘existence’, 
influences the behaviour of actors in the world.7
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
  Philpott argues that changes in the 
‘rules’ of international relations correlate with changes in the behavior of states, often 
in ways contrary to their material interests, and often by re-defining what is in a 
state’s ‘interest’. On the other hand, Krasner argues that sovereignty is an example of 
3  Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,' 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): Pg 891. 
4 Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations. 
5 In general, we actually know very little about the underlying ‘rules’ for recognising sovereignty, how 
they change, and how they influence the calculations of actors. 
6 Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) Pg 1. 
7 F.H Hinsley, Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) Pg 1. 
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‘organised hypocrisy’.8
 
 While all players agree to the rules, none actually abide by 
them, especially the prescription that states refrain from meddling in each other’s 
internal affairs. 
Sovereignty norms influence civil wars by outlining the criteria that an actor, be it a 
government or an insurgency, must fulfil in order to have the best chance at 
international recognition as a ‘state’. These criteria, this guide-book, influences 
strategic behavior because organisations recognised as states can access benefits that 
‘outlaw’ organisations cannot, or have more difficulty with. Sovereignty is a ‘ticket of 
general admission to the international arena’,9 where the full range of international 
relations [is] reserved for those who possess globally recognised sovereignty’.10 As 
RBJ Walker argues, sovereignty is the boundary between being ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, 
the difference between ‘normal’ transactions and ‘criminal’ acts.11
 
  
Sovereignty’s benefits are many and its costs few. Natural resources can be ‘legally’ 
exploited (either by the state or by private enterprise) with lower transaction costs and 
greater security of tenure.12 UNITA rebels in Angola, for example, attracted a UN 
arms embargo in the 1990s to curb the trade of diamonds for weapons while the 
government, using oil revenues to finance its re-armament, did not. Multi-national 
companies prefer to contract and trade with recognised states than insurgencies.13 
Commerce with insurgencies and warlords carries the risk international opprobrium 
and product boycotts. De Beers, a diamond trading company, and Nokia, a mobile 
phone company, both suffered from alleged links to the trade in ‘blood diamonds’ and 
‘coltan’ (tantalum) respectively.14
                                                 
8 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
2000). 
 Duffield writes that recognition ‘confers legitimacy 
in relation to the integration of economies to the global market-place’ and ‘the formal 
9 M.R Fowler and J.M Bunk, Law, Power and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of 
the Concept of Sovereignty (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) Pg 12. 
10 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999) Pg 6, 23. 
11  See, for example, R.B.J Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
12 Crawford Young, 'Zaire: The Unending Crisis,' Foreign Affairs 57, no. 1 (1978): Pg 176. 
13 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy  Pg 16. 
14  See, for example, Nokia’s website: “Origin of Raw Materials”, Nokia, 
http://www.nokia.com/corporate-responsibility/supply-chain/substance-management/origin-of-raw-
materials, accessed 10 July, 2011 
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recognition of sovereignty is an important way in which global markets control and 
exploit natural resources’.15
 
  
The right to make valid agreements with international institutions and other states 
‘offers the possibility for rulers to secure external resources’ generally unavailable to 
rebels.16 Military assistance to an internationally recognised government attracts less 
condemnation than the same support for an insurgency because states can legally 
enter into contracts with other states. In fact, as Reno points out, sovereignty can be 
‘sold’. Numerous countries proclaimed their allegiance to either the communist or 
capitalist blocs (and sometimes both) in exchange for military hardware, military 
training programs, budgetary aid and, sometimes, combat soldiers during the Cold 
War. Sovereignty remains a valuable commodity after the Cold War. Governments 
have contracted private security companies such as Executive Outcomes (EO) or the 
Ghurkha Security Guards (GSG) to prosecute their internal wars.17
 
 Policy positions 
can be exchanged with international institutions and states. Unlike insurgencies, rulers 
can enact (or pretend to enact) democratic reforms or economic liberalisation and 
expect financial assistance from lending organisations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.  
Kranser notes a host of additional benefits such as diplomatic immunity and immunity 
from prosecution by outside states or organisations for acts committed within a 
country’s territorial jurisdiction, although the International Criminal Court (ICC) is 
changing this.18 Recognition may alter the calculations of domestic competitors ‘by 
signaling to constituents that a ruler may have access to international resources, 
including alliances and sovereign lending’.19 Millions in frozen Libyan assets were 
released to the Libyan rebels when states rescinded their recognition of Colonel 
Ghaddafi’s regime in Tripoli.20
                                                 
15 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security 
(New York: Zed Books, 2001) Pg 176-77, 84.  
 Unrecognised actors are not precluded from these 
benefits. Insurgencies trade with multi national companies and attract military aid. 
16 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy  Pg 17. 
17 See Chris Dietrich, 'The Commercialisation of Military Deployment in Africa,' African Security 
Review 9, no. 1 (2000). 
18 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy  Pg 17. 
19 Ibid,  Pg 18. 
20  Daniel Flynn, “France Hands Libya Rebels $259 Million in Unfrozen Funds” Reuters News, 
Monday, August 1, 2011  
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Unrecognised governments, such as Taiwan, can enjoy diplomatic immunity. Hong 
Kong is a member of the World Bank while not being a sovereign country. It is 
generally, however, seen as exceptional or illegitimate for these events to occur and 
on average it is easier for a recognised government to access the benefits of 
sovereignty than an unrecognised entity.  
 
Being accepted into the coterie of states increases the pool of resources available to an 
actor. In a civil war, both insurgencies and governments will look to give themselves 
the best chance of becoming, or remaining, sovereigns. Norms provide guidance on 
how other states will respond to the dynamics of a civil war and, insofar as they do, 
also provide information upon how a domestic rival seeking to obtain sovereignty is 
likely to act. In a universe where only leaders that win elections are recognised as 
heads of state, for example, a different strategy must be developed than in a universe 
where physical control over a symbolic land-area is sufficient. Governments might 
risk large and expensive armed forces to protect and provide social services to the 
majority of the population where controlling, obtaining the support of, or intimidating 
people can deliver electoral victory and the spoils of office. On the other hand, 
knowing that the enemy has only to obtain physical control of a particular piece of 
territory, a leader may adopt a lower-risk, lower-cost, strategy of relying on a smaller 
military force. He or she may restrict military operations to the important site rather 
than risk being outflanked in a defence of peripheral communities. 
 
So what is the norm for recognising sovereigns? Why are some actors attributed the 
status of ‘governments’ while others are ‘non-state actors’, ‘insurgencies’ or 
‘terrorists’? Krasner argues that ‘recognition is extended to entities, states with 
territory, and formal juridical autonomy’.21
                                                 
21 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
2000) Pg 14. 
 But how do we define what is a ‘state’ 
with the quality of sovereignty and what is not? Krasner’s definition begs the 
question. States are sovereign and sovereignty is attributed to states, a tautology that 
is exposed in the context of civil war. When the state has bifurcated, how does the 
international community decide which is the legal government and who is an 
‘outlaw’? How is sovereignty apportioned when an insurgency controls territory and 
‘acts’ as a state by establishing institutions and delivering public services such as the 
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Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), or Hezbollah in Southern 
Lebanon? UNITA controlled much of south-eastern Angola for decades but has never 
held sovereignty. The government of Angola has not, until recently, controlled all of 
its territory, yet has retained international recognition.  
 
Landau-Wells identifies four principles: democratic legitimacy, ‘institutional norms 
and behaviour’, measures of effective control and political interests. 22 Democratic 
legitimacy offers that only the winners of ‘free and fair’ elections should be handed 
sovereign power. 23  Where an ‘institutional norms and behaviour’ norm operates, 
respecting human rights might be a path to sovereignty. Controlling the greatest 
amount of territory affords recognition over and above correct behaviours or 
democratic legitimacy in a world where an ‘effective control’ norm dominates. States 
may simply not recognise governments they oppose and recognise those they favour. 
Krasner argues that no single principle ‘has ever been consistently applied’.24
 
 
Landau-Wells disputes this. She argues that physically controlling the capital city is a 
globally recognised and practiced necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
sovereignty.25 Other factors, such as political expediency, may deny organisations 
that hold capital cities sovereign status (such as Taiwan or Sierra Leone in 1997) but 
these are the exceptions that prove the rule. Capital cities are the locus of international 
recognition because they are ‘usually seen by detached observers as in some sense 
representative of its state and its characteristics’.26 The capture of a foreign capital has 
long been associated with ‘victory’ in war and features in the works of military 
historians such as Friedrich von Bernhardi and Carl von Clausewitz, and practitioners 
such as Antoine-Henri Jomini, general in the armies of both Tsar Alexander I and 
Napoleon.27
 
  
                                                 
22  Marika Landau-Wells, 'Capital Cities in Civil Wars: The Locational Dimension of Sovereign 
Authority,' in Crisis States Occasional Papers (London School of Economics and Political Science: 
Development Studies Institute, 2008), Pg 3. 
23 As appears to have been the case in Cote d’Ivoire when the UN and ECOWAS refused to recognise 
Laurent Gbagbo after losing an election to his rival Alassane Ouattara. 
24 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy  Pg 15. 
25 Landau-Wells, 'Capital Cities in Civil Wars: The Locational Dimension of Sovereign Authority,' Pg 
11. 
26 Sutcliffe, as cited in ibid,  Pg 15. 
27 Ibid. 
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From research by Landau-Wells and Jeffrey Herbst it is fairly clear that this 
‘locational dimension of sovereign authority’ has operated in Africa. It can be 
described as a ‘strong norm’ in Africa, largely because most states have had material 
interests in sustaining it. Delegates at the inaugural Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) conference in 1960 debated among a number of principles for international 
recognition. Criteria such as the ‘will of the majority’ and the extent of effective 
control were genuinely considered but rulers settled on the idea that physical control 
of the capital was sufficient28 because ‘the greatest point in common among those 
who attended the OAU summits [was] that they control the capital cities’.29 Herbst 
writes that the OAU charter implied that ‘if an African government is in control of the 
capital city, then it has the legitimate right to the full protection offered by the modern 
understanding of sovereignty’. 30  Rulers with variable control of their peripheries 
were, at least in the eyes of other states, afforded legal jurisdiction (or a free hand) 
over that territory. Clapham recalls the image of ‘letterbox sovereignty’ whereby the 
person opening official letters in the presidential palace was considered in the eyes 
(and the pocketbooks) of the international community to be the ruler of a sovereign 
state, with all the perks of access to international markets, resources, aid and 
legitimacy, despite the fact he or she rarely controls much beyond that building.31
 
 
This principle has been routinely practiced. During 1975 when the People’s 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), National Liberation Front of 
Angola (FNLA) and UNITA were battling for control the country, James III writes 
that, the ‘MPLA leaders realised that if they could maintain firm control of Luanda 
until independence, the other movements would become ‘outlaws’ rather than 
competing centres of power’.32
                                                 
28  Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) Pg 110. 
 When Charles Taylor, leader of the NPFL, claimed 
that because he controlled 90% of Liberia (but not the capital Monrovia) it was his 
right to assume control of the state, nobody recognised his claim – not even his 
29 Foltz as cited in ibid,  Pg 111. The exception to this was recognition of Biafra in the Nigerian civil 
war. However, it was resolved firmly in favour of the principle identifying control of the capital city as 
the prerequisite for sovereignty after Biafra was defeated by the federal government.  
30 Ibid,  Pg 110. 
31  Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) Pg 20. 
32 W. Martin James, Political History of the Civil War in Angola (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 
2011) Pg 62. 
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foreign backers. 33  Laurent Kabila of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo (ADFL) was only recognised when he and his soldiers entered 
the capital Kinshasa.34 More recently, Human Rights Watch observed that ‘Somalia’s 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which formed in 2004, is recognised by the 
United Nations and almost all key foreign powers as the legitimate government of 
Somalia, but it controls only a small section of southern Mogadishu centred on the 
port, airport, and presidential palace’.35
 
  
Whether this norm is strongest in, or exclusive to, Africa is debated. It may be, as 
Herbst argues, that African states faced particular challenges controlling their 
peripheries at independence. Landau-Wells traces the principle back to ancient China 
and Rome, and it is likely, although unstudied, that it operates in the rest of the world. 
The Mujahadeen were only recognised as the sovereign government of Afghanistan 
once they captured Kabul in 1992, for exmaple. That said, it must be kept in mind that 
norms, as social conventions, are dynamic and change over time as the interests of 
states change. It is entirely possible that the African Union’s campaign to withhold 
recognition from aspiring rulers who come to power through military coups 
(essentially, physical control of the capital) is a deliberate attempt to re-engineer 
sovereignty norms. Many African rulers now have interests in de-coupling 
recognition from physical control of the capital because, in the absence of patronage 
resources available during the Cold War, it is precisely this outcome that rulers and 
their allies are vulnerable to. 
 
Nonetheless, changing perceptions of what is a ‘best chance’ for realising sovereignty 
is a slow process and controlling the capital, has, for the vast majority of Africa’s 
history as a sovereign state system, afforded actors the highest probability of 
assuming sovereignty. In a system where recognition confers substantial payoffs that 
are unavailable or more difficult to procure as a non-recognised entity, any norm that 
territorially affixes international recognition has the profound effect of increasing the 
value of that piece of territory. Capital cities are valuable above and beyond their 
                                                 
33 Mallet, “Family Problems”, West Africa, 6-12 August 1990, 2236 
34 Landau-Wells, 'Capital Cities in Civil Wars: The Locational Dimension of Sovereign Authority,' Pg 
7-8. 
35  Reed M Wood, 'Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians,' Journal of Peace 
Research 47, no. 5 (2010): Pg 14. 
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intrinsic worth for this reason. As Landau-Wells identifies, belligerents in civil wars 
have shown no compunction over physically destroying the capital in order to capture 
it.36
 
 Mogadishu, Monrovia and Beirut are just three examples. Norms make it more 
likely that military strategy will centre on controlling capital cities by raising the 
expected utility of doing so. The extent to which norms influence strategic behaviour, 
however, will vary according to how sovereign benefits compare with domestic 
opportunities for revenue accumulation. Where benefits contingent upon recognition 
eclipse independent revenue sources, norms profoundly influence the strategies of 
belligerents in a civil war. Where there is little else of value, access to the resources of 
the international community is game-changing. The following section argues that 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic geography fits this description well.  
Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Geography 
 
Every incumbent or aspiring ruler wants to be recognised as a head of state. But 
obtaining the benefits concomitant with sovereignty takes on additional proportions 
when those resources make up a high level of available resources. Put another way, 
capturing the ‘market’ for sovereignty is decisive where that market is more lucrative 
than domestic ‘markets’. Snyder and Bhavnani argue that the mere presence of 
resources does not make them an object of fighting. Rather, it is the ‘context of 
institutional and economic constraints on their [the ruler’s] ability to earn revenue’ 
that determines the salience of resources in the calculations of actors.37 Keen writes 
that ‘when the resources actually commanded by either a regime or a rebel leadership 
are small compared with those available in areas of conflict, economically motivated 
violence is particularly likely’.38
                                                 
36 Landau-Wells, 'Capital Cities in Civil Wars: The Locational Dimension of Sovereign Authority,' Pg 
13. 
 The aim of this next section is to show that many of 
Africa’s states rely heavily upon sovereign benefits to stay in power and accumulate 
wealth – a condition created by an inability or unwillingness to tax peasant 
production. Revenues from taxing international trade, exploiting natural resources 
(often with the assistance of multinational companies) and external aid have crowded 
37 Snyder, R and Bhavnani, R, Diamonds, Blood and Taxes: A Revenue Centred Framework for 
Explaining Political Order, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 49, No 4, pp. 563-597 
38 David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Papers (New York: Oxford 
University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998) Pg 41. 
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the treasury of African governments, certainly since the colonial period and perhaps 
earlier.  
 
Pre-Colonial Africa 
 
Taxing trade and selling natural resources were important revenue generators for pre-
colonial African polities. As Duignan and Gann write, Africans lived in: 
 
‘small scale, non-monetised, subsistence societies, with simple technologies, limited division of labour 
and only a few specialised craftsmen… there was no need for an entrepreneurial class, men who could 
mobilise capital, co-ordinate complex methods for production, and supply a wide market’.39
 
  
Directly taxing land or peasant producers, as occurred during the rise of European 
states, was not cost-effective.40 Inter-continental trade, often between Africa, North 
Africa and the Middle East, funded the rise of cities and kingdoms such as Timbuktu 
in modern day Mali and Kano in modern day Nigeria.41 Rulers also made money from 
selling precious metals, and most infamously, from selling slaves. In fact, many pre-
colonial African kingdoms became dependent upon selling these ‘natural’ resources 
as demand for slaves boomed in Europe and North America. Slave trading enabled 
costal kingdoms to monopolise the possession of guns and ‘extract from its peoples 
the slaves they needed to purchase more guns and maintain their standard of living’.42
 
 
Colonial Africa 
 
European colonisation re-structured Africa’s economies to the interests of European 
traders. Capital cities were created as a gateway, often on the coast, for the export of 
raw materials and the import of manufactures. As the majority of international trade 
transitioned through these cities, customs duties offered high returns for relatively low 
levying costs. As Herbst writes ‘rather systematically, Europeans created capitals that 
moved power towards the ocean and away from the interior centres of power that 
                                                 
39 Peter Duignan and L.H Gann, 'The Pre-Colonial Economies of Sub-Saharan Africa,' in Colonialism 
in Africa 1970-1960: Volume 4, The Economics of Colonialism, ed. Peter Duignan and L.H Gann 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), Pg 52. 
40 Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control  Pg 39-40. 
41 Duignan and Gann, 'The Pre-Colonial Economies of Sub-Saharan Africa,' Pg 39. 
42 G.N Uzoigwe, 'Pre-Colonial Military Studies in Africa,' The Journal of Modern African Studies 13, 
no. 3 (1975): Pg 474. 
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Africans had slowly created and that had managed to exert control over parts of their 
surrounding territories’.43 Colonial states imported capital and facilitated trade, but 
did so in ‘foreign-controlled enclave[s] attached to the industrial trading partners, 
bestowing few benefits on the indigenous economy, but adversely affecting traditional 
production, agricultural and industrial, and established social relations’. 44  Selling 
cash-crops and minerals, particularly gold, diamonds, copper and iron ore was the 
mainstay of the colonial state.45 Hut taxes, poll taxes or head taxes (i.e taxes on the 
rural population), ‘while onerous to the individuals... contributed relatively little in 
most colonies’.46 As Kasara writes, European rulers were dependent upon ‘spatially 
concentrated’ cash-crop production and mineral exploitation whose transport and sale 
was ‘relatively easy for the government to monitor’ at the main ports.47  Colonial 
states also became increasingly dependent upon transfers from the metropole, or ‘aid’, 
especially for infrastructure development. Colonial aid was distributed as ‘a direct 
transfer to the capital’.48
 
   
Independent Africa 
 
We can see here how the foundations were set for a collection of independent 
countries dependent upon the benefits of sovereignty. Revenue figures suggest that 
throughout the independence period, African rulers remained dependent upon taxing 
international trade, foreign aid and the selling of natural resources. According to 
Herbst, in 1997, around 45% of government revenue (including grants) in Africa, on 
average, came from indirect forms of taxation, much of it levied at the main ports. 
This compared to 37% for Asia, 34% for Latin America and 19% for Eastern and 
Central Europe.49
                                                 
43 Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control  Pg 16. 
 For example, the Central African Republic drew an average of 47% 
of government revenues from indirect taxation between 1971 and 1978; Chad drew an 
average of 58% and Zaire 52%. Even wealthier states such as Cote d’Ivoire still 
depended heavily upon taxation of imports and exports to fund its regimes. Between 
44 Peter Wickins, Africa 1880-1980: An Economic History (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 
1986) Pg 18. 
45 Ibid,  Pg 28. 
46 Ibid,  Pg 100. 
47  Kimuli Kasara, 'Tax Me if You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy and the Taxation of 
Agriculture,' American Political Science Review 101, no. 1 (2007): Pg 162, 63. 
48 Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control  Pg 116. 
49 Ibid,  Pg 121. 
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1978 and 1986 an average of 39% of revenues derived from indirect taxation and 
around one-quarter from import taxes alone. Ghana, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Guinea-
Bissau, Chad, Burundi, the Central African Republic and Rwanda took between 50% 
and 65% of revenues, on average, from indirect taxation, over the same period.50 
Somalia took an average of 76% between 1978 and 1983 during the war with Ethiopia 
when we might have expected direct taxation receipts to rise.51
 
  
An IMF study of taxation structure in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990-1995 paints a 
similar picture. While South Africa took 10% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
taxation on individuals, of the 40 Sub-Saharan Africa countries surveyed by the IMF, 
80% took between 0% and 2%, representing somewhere between 3% and 10% of 
taxation revenue. States such as the Central African Republic, Zaire, Sudan, Sierra 
Leone, Rwanda and Guinea-Bissau took less than 1% of GDP, and in the extreme 
case of Zaire, only 0.31% of GDP as taxation on individuals.52
 
 Though Angola took a 
respectable 70% of income from direct taxation, a whopping 96% of that was on oil 
companies. African countries tend to have large rural populations and high 
proportions of agriculture to GDP (for example, around 20% in Guinea and Nigeria, 
over 30% in the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Chad, Rwanda and Cote 
d’Ivoire, over 40% in Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Uganda, and 58% in 
Zaire) and the IMF study tells of a profound inability or unwillingness to tax the 
majority of citizens and economic activity.  
Selling natural resources remained a crucial source of foreign exchange for 
independent African states. Foreign exchange allowed rulers with low levels of 
domestic industrialisation to purchase imports capable of placating key constituencies 
(primarily in the capital cities). Reflecting the intimate connection between 
controlling the capital, being recognised as a head of state and selling natural 
resources, Ngaruko and Nkrurnziza observe that in Burundi, coffee production 
                                                 
50 Statistics were compiled from the Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, United Nations, New 
York. Yearbooks from 1960-1989 were consulted.  
51 Based upon the argument that international war stimulates the rise of direct taxation. See Cameron 
Thies, 'The Political Economy of State-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa,' Journal of Politics 69, no. 3 
(2007). 
52 Janet Stosky and Asegedech WoldeMariam, 'Tax Effort in Sub-Saharan Africa,' Working Paper of 
the International Monetary Fund September, no. 107 (1997): Pg 8. 
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accounted for 90% of foreign exchange earnings between 1972 and 1992,53 yet in 
Burundi’s Fifth Five-Year Plan, 98% of gross fixed capital formation was allocated 
‘to a geographical area made up of Bujumbura and its surrounding areas and the 
southern province of Bururi, out of the fifteen provinces of the country’.54
 
 Burundi’s 
leaders used resources from the countryside to shore up control of the capital, which 
allowed it to continue ‘legally’ selling those resources.  
Clapham argues that throughout the independence period, foreign aid was a lucrative 
and ‘robust’ revenue stream that ‘kept many governments solvent’. 55  As Reno 
remarks, ‘sovereign status could be used to attract aid from outsiders that filled in for 
absent domestic political resources’. 56  Robert Jackson argued in 1990 that many 
African states were created and sustained by the international community, not by 
domestic capacity. Power was a function of international factors, especially the 
market for ‘allies’ or policy positions, rather than domestically cultivated authority 
and control.57 Rulers accessed substantial disbursements of economic assistance by 
playing off the superpowers during the Cold War. As Arnold writes, ‘recipients came 
to regard aid as an additional source of finance that gave them considerably more 
political room in which to manoeuvre’. 58 Four percent of Africa’s GDP came in 
foreign aid in 1980. This rose to 10% by 1989.59 Donor states were not too fussy 
about how aid was spent during the Cold War, so long as it maintained a semblance of 
‘stability’.60
                                                 
53 Johnstone Summit Oketch and Tara Polzer, 'Conflict and Coffee in Burundi,' in Scarcity and Surefit, 
ed. Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 2002), Pg 
105. 
 The West lost its appetite for disbursing unfettered aid as the Cold War 
ended, but, as Figure 3.1 shows, substantial amounts were still available into the 
1990s and 2000s. Rulers could sell policy ‘reform’, especially economic and political 
liberalisation, instead of ‘communist’ or ‘capitalist’ alignment. Although the aim of 
financial institutions and foreign affairs departments may have been to promote 
54 Floribert Ngaruko and Janvier Kkurunziza, 'An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in Burundi,' 
Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3 (2000): Pg 382. 
55 Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control  Pg 124. 
56 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States  Pg 19. 
57 See Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. 
58 Guy Arnold, Africa: A Modern History (London: Atlantic Books, 2006) Pg 772. 
59 Martin Meredith, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (London: Free Press, 
2006) Pg 375. 
60 Arnold, Africa: A Modern History  Pg 772. 
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democratisation and economic development, one unforeseen consequence was to 
perpetuate a system of high payoffs for being a recognised head of state.61
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Net Overseas Development Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa,  
1960-2008 
 
 
Aid, natural resources and indirect taxation dominated state treasuries largely because 
of the poverty of peasant agriculture. Rulers in Africa have been unable or unwilling 
to develop and commercialise peasant agriculture to the extent that it creates domestic 
markets and viable sources of revenue independent of recognition as a head of state, 
perhaps because such emphasis was placed on control of the capital. Bratton argues 
that ‘state elites in Africa... succeeded in directing peasant production only within 
bounded and privileged pockets of the countryside’.62 Boone argues that the costs 
associated with coaxing peasants to abandon subsistence crops, of which 60% - 70% 
their time was spent producing, were too high. 63
                                                 
61 David Roodman, 'Net Aid Transfers Dataset (1960-2008),' Centre for Global Development  (2010). 
 Some states were disengaging from 
the rural sector by the 1980s and into the 1990s. Only 5% of government expenditure 
62  Michael Bratton, 'Peasant-State Relations in Postcolonial Africa: Patterns of Engagement and 
Disengagement,' in State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third 
World, ed. Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), Pg 251. 
63 Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1980) Pg 25. 
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was allocated to the rural sector in Ghana in 1977 despite agriculture being the 
mainstay of the economy. 64  In Congo-Brazzaville in 1987, ‘agricultural services 
accounted for just 2% of official expenditures’.65 Bierschenk and de Sardan observed 
in 1997 that ‘the absence of the state in rural areas of the Central African Republic is 
so striking that the position in certain respects has almost reached the level of 
caricature’. 66 Farmers, even farmers cultivating cotton cash-crops, were irregularly 
taxed by village authorities.67 At one village agglomeration in 1994 the state predicted 
369,200 CFA Francs in taxation on market-stalls. They received 14,500. The authors 
concluded that ‘the state is very limited as to what it can do when it comes to 
institutionalised regulation of the local level in rural areas’. 68  Zaire presents the 
extreme case. Earnings from agriculture constituted 61% of government revenue in 
1973, but by 1978 had fallen to 28% and by 1990 just 11%. 69 Where, in 1972, 
spending on agriculture stood at 29.3% of the budget, by 1992 it had fallen to 2%. 
Only 15% of the road network inherited from the Belgians remained intact in 1985.70 
Across Africa agricultural output actually fell by 0.2% per year in the 1960s and 1.4% 
per year in the 1970s.71 Eighty-five percent of Africa’s wealth was produced by just 
5% of its geographical area in 1975.72
 
  
Rural producers, outside areas of cash-crop production, generated little surplus for 
predatory states to appropriate. Africa’s agricultural sector was roughly as 
industrialised in the mid 1990s as it was in 1960,73
                                                 
64 Robert H Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies 
(London: University of California Press, 1984) Pg 18. 
 despite 70% of Africa’s population 
living in rural areas. Africa’s value-added per agricultural worker was the lowest in 
the world at just $277 (compared with $393 for South Asia, $347 for East Asia and 
$1753 for Europe and Central Asia). Cereal production only marginally improved 
65 William Reno, 'The Changing Nature of Warfare and the Absence of State-Building in West Africa,' 
in Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in State Formation, ed. Diane Davis and Anthony Pereira 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Pg 246. 
66 Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, 'Local Powers and a Distant State in Central 
African Republic,' The Journal of Modern African Studies 35, no. 3 (1997): Pg 441. 
67 Ibid,  Pg 460. 
68 Ibid,  Pg 462. 
69 William Reno, 'Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire,' African Studies Quarterly 1, no. 3: Pg 2. 
70 Ibid,  Pg 3. 
71 Arnold, Africa: A Modern History  Pg 744. 
72 Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control  Pg 16. 
73 As measured by the number of tractors per square kilometre. Data is available from the World Bank 
Databank, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2, accessed 10 
November 2010 
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from 1960-1995 and fell way behind other regions at 947kg per hectare. East Asia 
produced 4070kg of cereal per hectare, Europe and Central Asia, 1701kg, and South 
Asia 2125kg. Africa’s fertiliser consumption was the lowest in the world in 2007 at 
just 9kg per hectare compared to 140kg for South Asia, 276kg for East Asia and the 
Pacific and 44kg for Europe and Central Asia.74
 
  
As Herbst summarises ‘the spatial structure of revenue, and thus of the state itself, is 
very much as during the colonial period: concentrated in the capital and the other 
areas of the country where it is easy to tax’.75 Clapham states that ‘since control of 
government provides the opportunity to cream off sums of money vastly greater than 
any that could be gained through economically productive activity, the pressure to 
control the state – and the disincentive to relinquish that control – is overwhelming’.76 
As Williams identifies, in Sierra Leone, ‘exclusion [from the fount of state resources] 
literally meant death by attrition’.77 By linking control of the capital to economic 
value, we can begin to understand the puzzle put by authors such as Jan Angstrom 
who wonder at the fierce fighting over ‘symbols of national power’ in so-called 
‘resource wars’. 78
 
 Sovereignty norms make capitals and presidential palaces 
economically valuable far beyond what can be looted from them. In Africa we would 
expect that controlling the capital city, because of its very high relative economic 
value, will dominate military strategy.  
Final Hypotheses and Conclusions 
 
African states that have experienced civil war from 1960-2008 are ‘capital heavy’. 
Power derives primarily from recognition as a sovereign. We can understand capital 
cities as ‘point resources’ which, due to the poverty and inability to draw revenue 
from peasant production, dominate economic geography. Economic geography varies 
                                                 
74 These figures are actually dragged up by South Africa’s relatively low rural population (around 40-
50%), high fertiliser use (around 500kg per hectare) and industrialisation (over 100 tractors per square 
kilometre although this has been rapidly dropping to around 40 in 2008). South Africa’s cereal yield is 
well over 1000 kg (and from 2000 onwards upward of 2000kg) per hectare.  
75 Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control  Pg 126.  
76 Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival  Pg 70. 
77 Paul Williams, 'Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone,' Contemporary 
Security Policy 22, no. 3 (2001): Pg 143. 
78  Jan Angstrom, 'Introduction,' in Rethinking the Nature of War, ed. Jan Angstrom and Isabelle 
Duyvesteyn (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), Pg 79. 
Chapter Three – Hypotheses and Methods 
 82 
considerably outside of Africa, with states taking far higher proportions of revenue 
from taxation on agriculture (in South Asia for example) or on industry and the 
earnings of individuals (as in Europe). It is difficult to specify the precise importance 
of capital cities in these circumstances, but it is likely that they matter far less. In 
addition, while the norm tying control of the capital city to recognition as a sovereign 
is ‘strong’ in Africa due to the material incentives rulers have had in sustaining it, this 
is not necessarily the case elsewhere. While we can keep the economic geography of 
states experiencing civil war roughly constant (‘capital heavy’) the type of warfare 
can be varied.  
 
Africa is a ‘hard test’ for the theory. All actors have incentives to focus their military 
strategies around controlling the capital city given its economic importance, 
regardless of the technology prevailing in a war-system. Were low-capability warfare 
to show an higher risk of fighting around valuable areas, for example, we could be 
increasingly confident that the technology of rebellion is related to military outcomes. 
Finally, Africa’s distribution of warfare-types differs substantially from the rest of the 
world (see Chapter 4). Just three conflict years were characterised by low-capability 
warfare outside of Africa, in Haiti in 1989, 1991 and 2004, making up less than 1% of 
the sample. Low-capability warfare makes up roughly 20% of the sample within 
Africa. Guerrilla warfare constitutes up 92% of the non-African sample and 58.6% of 
the African sample. Conventional warfare accounts for roughly 8% of the non-
African sample and 20% of the African sample. With the current coding criteria 
(discussed in this chapter) any study of low-capability warfare is essentially a study of 
African civil war. Given Africa’s unique economic geography, statistical results for 
low-capability warfare will reflect the African sample while results for conventional 
or guerrilla warfare will reflect the characteristics of non-African regions. Regional 
correlations rather than differences in warfare may plausibly account for the findings 
in this situation. It may be the case, for example, that while we observe a connection 
between the distance of fighting from capital cities and the chances of military 
intervention in low-capability warfare, this relationship actually holds for all African 
conflicts, but, because Africa makes up such a large proportion of low-capability 
warfare and such a low proportion of guerrilla and conventional warfare this finding 
shines through in the results but does not reflect the causal process described in 
Chapter 2.  
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Hypotheses in Chapter 2 can be re-stated with specific reference to Africa’s economic 
geography. The three hypotheses are detailed below: 
 
H1: Capital cities are at a higher risk of experiencing fighting in low-capability 
warfare than in guerrilla or conventional warfare 
 
H2: Fighting will concentrate around capital cities in low-capability warfare, but not 
in guerrilla or conventional warfare.  
 
H3: The probability of military intervention in low-capability warfare increases as 
the distance of fighting from the capital city decreases. The probability of military 
intervention in conventional and guerrilla warfare is unrelated to the distance of 
fighting from the capital city. 
 
It is to the more technical aspects of how these hypotheses are tested that the chapter 
now turns.   
 
Research Design 
 
Hypotheses 1-3 are tested with a ‘mixed-methods’ approach combining multivariate 
regression analysis of Africa’s civil wars from 1960-2008 with a ‘most likely’ case 
study of the Liberian civil war. A rational choice framework and a positivist 
epistemology underpins the analysis.79
 
  This section looks firstly at the benefits and 
limitations of rational choice theory and quantitative analysis. Logistic and OLS 
regression, specifications of dependent, independent and control variables are then 
discussed in line with the specific analytic methods of Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 7 
is a case study of the Liberian civil war and this research design section concludes 
with a discussion of how single case studies can complement quantitative research.   
  
                                                 
79 Michael Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research 
Process (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 1998) See Chapter 2. 
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Rational Choice Theory 
 
Rational choice theory (RCT) is used heuristically to conceptualise military decision-
making. Embedded within RCT is the principle of Expected Utility (EU). 80  EU 
emerged from microeconomics, was formalised in the 1940s and 1950s by von 
Neumann and Morgensten (1944) as a descriptive and normative theory of human 
decision-making.81 EU theory offers a framework for understanding why one risky 
choice is selected over some other risky choice.82
 
 In essence, decisions makers weigh 
the probability of outcomes occurring, the value of those outcomes, and choose the 
course of action with the highest net ‘expected utility’, or worth.  
A number of assumptions underpin EU. Firstly, decision-makers have stable and 
ordered preferences. Secondly, these preferences are ‘transitive’ - they have value 
such that if there are three preferences A B and C, if A is preferred to B then A is also 
preferred to C. 83  Thirdly, decision-makers weigh up the value of choices by 
multiplying the probability an outcome occurring by its utility and add the net utility 
of outcomes together. That is, the relationship between probabilities and outcomes is 
multiplicative and the relationship between net values is additive.84 Fourthly, in a 
‘lottery’ (any risky choice) all probabilities in the equation must up to 1 (i.e. one of 
the projected outcomes must occur).85 Finally, decision-makers will ‘always select the 
strategy that yields the highest expected utility’.86
 
 
                                                 
80J. D. J. Nakaska, 'Rational Choice Theory: Why Irrationality Makes Sense for Comparative Politics,' 
in Grand Theories and Ideologies in the Social Sciences, ed. H. Wiarda (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), Pg 127.  
81  Paul J. H. Schoemaker, 'The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and 
Limitations,' Journal of Economic Literature 20, no. 2 (1982): Pg 530. 
82 Ibid. 
83  Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, 'The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of 
International Conflict,' Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): Pg 629-30. See also, John 
von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1953) Pg 19. 
84 Grant and Van Zandt, “Expected Utility”, Pg 22-27 
85  Or that it is certain that one of the events specified in the lottery will occur. Neumann and 
Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour  Pg 18.  See also,  Mesquita, 'The 
Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict,' Pg 631. and 
Schoemaker, 'The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations,' Pg 537. 
86 Mesquita, 'The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict,' Pg 
630. See also Schoemaker, 'The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and 
Limitations,' Pg 531. 
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As an example of EU theory, consider a situation where a person has a choice 
between accepting 1 apple (Ua1) for certain (option 1 or EUO1) or a 50% chance of 
receiving 3 apples (Ua2) and a 50% chance of getting no apples (Ua0) (option 2, or 
EUO2). Assuming that three apples is preferred to one apple is preferred to no apples 
(or Ua3 > Ua1 > Ua0) and the utility of 1 apple is one, the utility of 3 apples is three and 
the utility of no apples is 0, then the expected utility equation would be: 
 
EUO1  = 1(Ua1) 
     
  = 1(1) 
 
  = 1 
 
 
 EUO2  = p(Ua2) + (1- p)(Ua0) 
 
  = 0.5(3) + 0.5(0) 
 
  = 1.5 
 
Because EUO1 <  EUO2, according to EU theory, EUO2, the risky option, is chosen.  
 
In most real-world situations, people don’t know the underlying probability of an 
outcome occurring. Unlike a coin-toss or a card-game, most, if not all probabilities in 
military decision-making are shrouded in uncertainty.87 Savage (1954) argued that 
while probabilities may not be objectively known, people make subjective 
estimates.88 Probabilities need not be accurate; they are simply what the decision-
maker believes ‘given what was known’ at the time’.89
                                                 
87 Schoemaker, 'The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations,' Pg 
556. 
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 
88 Colin Camerer and Martin Weber, 'Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and 
Ambiguity,' Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1992): Pg 326. 
89 Mesquita, 'The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict,' Pg 
632. von Neumann and Morgensten stated, different to the above view, that while probability has been 
understood as a ‘subjective concept’ they interpret it be a numerical reflection of ‘frequency in long 
runs’. Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour  Pg 19.  
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argues that decision-makers do not necessarily process information as the formal 
model of EU suggests, but ‘act as if they do’.90
 
  
RCT is a useful heuristic for modeling military decision-making. Firstly, we want to 
know why some leaders choose tactical combinations over other tactical combinations 
in the context of war. That is, we want to know why one risky choice is selected over 
another risky choice, dovetailing nicely with the focus of EU. 91  Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, decisions about where and when to fight are inherently 
strategic, that is, ‘each individual makes her decision based upon the probable 
decisions of others’. 92  Chapter 2, for example, argued that the decision of a 
government to adopt a positional and defensive strategy around the capital city in 
low-capability warfare was based largely on the belief that the most rational strategy 
for an insurgency was to attack the capital. RCT provides a consistent framework to 
ascertain ‘rational’ courses of action for two actors and deduce how knowledge of one 
actor’s utility-maximising choice alters the choices of another. As Levi argues, in 
strategic situations ‘the decision-maker simply assumes common knowledge of 
rationality, that is, the decision-maker assumes that other decision-makers are also 
instrumentally rational and will thus make the same inferences from the same 
information’. 93
                                                 
90 Mesquita, 'The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict,' Pg 
631. 
 If decision-makers believed that rivals were inherently irrational, 
unpredictable or operated according to variable decision-making processes, 
developing testable hypotheses of strategic behavior would be near impossible. 
Thirdly, RCT facilitates the development of causal mechanisms linking dependent 
and independent variables that are explicitly stated and can be falsified. Chapter 7 
tests the casual mechanisms in Chapter 2. Finally, assuming rationality in military 
decision-making is a useful starting point for analysis. Warfare introduces strong 
incentives for actors to be ruthlessly calculating about how best to achieve their goals. 
91 Patrick Regan, 'Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts,' The Journal of 
Politics 60, no. 3 (1998): Pg 39. 
92 Margaret Levi, 'A Model, A Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical 
Analysis,' in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and 
Alan S Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Pg 21. James D Morrow, Game 
Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) Pg 1.  
93 Levi, 'A Model, A Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis,' Pg 
26. 
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The costs for not maximising utility can be terminal, resulting in regime overthrow 
and often death.  
 
RCT has come under criticism. 94  Vertsberger argues that cognitive and cultural 
factors distort the decision-making process in systematic ways. Time pressure, stress, 
ambiguity, vividness, loss-aversion, risk-propensity and cultural identity all trigger 
‘unconscious bias’.95 People tend, for example, to focus on the most-vivid aspects of 
a crisis and those predicted to occur very soon, cordoning off the more abstract or 
long-term causes and factors. According to Verstberger, failure to incorporate longer-
term, less salient aspects of a problem biases military interventions towards narrow, 
incremental and short-term missions that may lower rather than increase the chances 
of realising long-term strategic goals. 96 Robert Jervis has argued that ‘images’  - 
stereotypes or powerful analogies such as the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ or the ‘Mogadishu 
line’ – lead to systematic exclusion of information from the decision-making process 
and can result in sub-optimal choice selection. 97  How ‘framing effects’ 98  - the 
tendency for people to take risks when faced with a potential loss while acting 
conservatively when faced with potential gains – alter the decisions of foreign 
military intervention has been tested in an experimental setting.99
 
  
                                                 
94 See Hasida BenZur and Shlomo Breznitz, 'The Effect of Time Pressure on Risky Choice Behavior,' 
Acta Psychologica 47 (1981), Mats Bjorkman, 'Decision-making, Risk Taking and Psychological 
Time: Review of Empirical Findings and Psychological Theory,' Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 
25 (1984), H.W Brands(Jr), 'Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican 
Republic and Grenada,' Political Science Quarterly 102, no. 4 (1987), Clare Chow and Rakesh Sarin, 
'Known, Unknown, and Unknowable Uncertainties,' Theory and Decision 52 (2002), Daniel Ellsberg, 
'Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms,' The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75, no. 4 (1961), Craig 
Fox and Amos Tversky, 'Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance,' The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 110, no. 3 (1995), Craig Fox and Martin Weber, 'Ambiguity Aversion, Comparative 
Ignorance, and Decision Context,' Organisational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 88, no. 1 
(2002), Jack Levy, 'Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,' International 
Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997), Jack S Levy, 'An Introduction to Prospect Theory,' Political 
Psychology 13, no. 2 (1992). 
95 Yaacov Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision-Making: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) Pg 47. 
96 Ibid,  Pg 50. 
97  Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976) Pg 13-33. 
98 For a discussion of prospect theory and Framing effects, see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 
'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,' Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979), Amos Tversky 
and Daniel Kahneman, 'Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty,' 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, no. 4 (1992). 
99 William Boettcher-III, 'Military Intervention Decisions Regarding Humanitarian Crises: Framing 
Risk Induced Behavior,' The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 3 (2004). 
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Insights from research into socio-cognitive biases have been applied to the study of 
international relations100 and incomplete information, time pressure, ambiguity and 
stress are all features of military decision-making.101
 
 However, the difficulty is in 
distinguishing between competing causal stories. For example, foreign states might 
avoid deploying soldiers while fighting is in the countryside in low-capability warfare 
because there are few pitched battles in which to exploit their advantage in 
conventional offense. It may be the case, however, that foreign states are ‘ambiguity 
averse’ and without knowledge of belligerent’s relative strength the costs for an 
intervention cannot be fixed. Likely the answer is both but we cannot tell from  
statistical results and, as Jack Levy counsels, given the parsimony of RCT it remains 
the superior explanation. Although I do not analyse the potential contribution of 
‘prospect theory’ and ‘bounded rationality’ in the statistical study, I do test the 
plausibility of Chapter 2’s causal mechanisms with a case study of the Liberian civil 
war.  
This thesis makes a number of assumptions in line with RCT. I first assume that the 
leaders of governments and insurgencies have the capability to make and implement 
choices. Initially this might seem questionable as the allegiance of the military elite 
and front-line soldiers can be variable. Nonetheless, most presidents and insurgent 
leaders effectively command sections of a military apparatus (in African conflicts this 
is often an ethnically coterminous ‘presidential guard’ whose fate is tied to the fate of 
the government) and though this level may not correlate perfectly with ‘on paper’ 
military strength, it provides decision-makers with agency on the battlefield. I also 
assume that heads of state wish to both stay in power and physically survive. Military 
strategies are designed in response to these two objectives.  
  
                                                 
100  William Boettcher-III, 'The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of 
International Relations Application of Framing and Loss Aversion,' Political Psychology 25, no. 3 
(2004). 
101 See for example Thomas Waldman, ''Shadows of Uncertainty': Clausewitz's Timeless Analysis of 
Chance in War,' Defence Studies 10, no. 3 (2010). 
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Quantitative Analysis 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 use multivariate regression analysis to test hypotheses 1-3. 
Quantitative analysis offers the researcher leverage in a number of important areas. 
Firstly, the hypotheses make predictions about behaviour regardless of a decision-
maker’s cultural or historical background. That is, the hypotheses are specifically 
cross-national to which a large-N study is well suited. Were the thesis to rely upon a 
small number of more in-depth case studies we could rightly question whether the 
findings were as general as the hypotheses claim. Secondly, in studies of civil war 
onset and foreign intervention, statistical analysis allows the researcher to include the 
full range102 of ‘non-cases’ in their sample, that is, observations where the outcome of 
interest did not occur. Instances of no fighting in the capital, low concentrations of 
fighting in the capital and no foreign intervention are included alongside those cases 
where these events occurred. Provided that the sample is correctly defined, selection 
bias can be minimised.103
 
 Including ‘non-cases’ also allows the researcher, with the 
assistance of statistical analysis techniques, to put numerical values on the confidence 
with which a null hypothesis (usually that there is no relationship between a 
dependent and independent variable) can be rejected. P-values less than 0.05 are 
conventionally held as ‘significant’ enough to reject the null hypothesis, but it must 
be kept in mind that this number is arbitrary. What it reflects is that we can be 95% 
confident that, were we to observe a different universe of cases, we would observe the 
same relationship.  
Statistical analysis allows researchers to quantify the extent to which changes in an 
independent variable induce changes in a dependent variable. This is typically 
expressed as a coefficient indicating how much a single unit increase in the 
independent variable changes the numerical value of the dependent variable 
(discussed further on). The strength of a variable of interest can be compared with 
other, competing, independent variables. Case-study methods have more difficulty in 
quantifying the likelihood that findings will hold in a wider universe of cases and how 
strong a relationship is when compared to competing hypotheses (there are 
                                                 
102 Or very close to the full range, depending upon the specification of the unit of analysis and 
dependent variable.  
103  See, for example, David Collier and James Mahoney, 'Research Note: Insights and Pitfalls: 
Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,' World Politics 49, no. 1 (1996). 
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weaknesses to quantitative research that qualitative methods can improve upon, 
discussed further on in this chapter).  
 
Finally, the ability to control for competing explanations is an important advantage.104
 
 
Hypotheses 1-3 posit specific and independent effects for the role of military 
technology in shaping battle location/concentration on the one hand and the 
relationship between conflict geography and foreign intervention on the other. There 
are, however, many variables that affect the hypothesised outcomes, some of which 
are correlated with the explanatory variable. For example, we would expect that 
smaller states have a higher probability of fighting near to the capital because there is, 
quite simply, less space in which to fight. Quantitative techniques allow for the 
numerical impacts of these variables to be accounted for and the independent impacts 
of a variable of interest to be distilled.  
There are numerous methods of multivariate regression analysis. Selecting the correct 
modelling technique for the data, especially the specification of the dependent 
variable, is essential as an inappropriate statistical method can produce misleading 
results. The selection of specific modelling techniques for Chapters 4 and 5 and 6, 
along with specifications of the dependent, independent and control variables are 
discussed in the following section.  
 
Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 tests whether low-capability warfare places Africa’s capital cities at a 
higher risk of experiencing fighting. Two tests are conducted. Firstly, logistic 
regression analysis is used to estimate the effect of warfare type on the annual risk of 
fighting within 25km of the capital. Secondly, the 2006 study by Buhaug and Rod is 
replicated with their spatially disaggregated data of fighting in African civil wars split 
into conventional, guerrilla and low-capability warfare. This section progresses by 
discussing the unit of analysis and the specification of key dependent, independent 
and control variables. As the dependent variable is modelled dichotomously, logistic 
                                                 
104  Evan Lieberman, 'Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,' 
American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): Pg 438. 
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regression analysis is an appropriate statistical technique and is discussed in detail 
here.  
 
Unit of Analysis 
 
The unit of analysis in Chapter 4 is an annual period of fighting between a 
government and an insurgency in a situation of civil war (referred to hereafter as a 
conflict year). Differentiating ‘civil war’ from other forms of political violence, such 
as riots and protests, is not straightforward and since the definition of what is a ‘civil 
war’ sets the universe of cases, different databases can produce divergent results. 
Existing databases vary along two dimensions: their annual or total death threshold 
and the period of ‘peace’ required before a civil war has ended. In the Correlates of 
War (COW) dataset, 1000 battle-related deaths must occur over a twelve month 
period, the government must be an active military participant and the rebellion must 
be an intra-state group militarily capable of inflicting casualties on the government (at 
least 5% of the total casualties).105 Sambanis relaxes the assumption of 1000 battle 
deaths per year to 1000 battle deaths over the course of the conflict, obviating the 
need to code what are clearly the same civil war as different civil wars. 106  For 
example, the COW data codes the Maoist insurgency in Nepal starting in 2001 before 
a ‘second’ Maoist insurgency starts in 2003. In Sambanis’s data the war begins in 
1996 and escalates. Regan requires just 200 total battle related deaths and at least 100 
per year to qualify as a civil war.107  The PRIO/Uppsala dataset has the lowest death 
threshold (although fairly strict criteria on what counts as a battle-related death) at just 
25 per year. Civil war is defined in this thesis, ala the PRIO/Uppsala dataset, as 
‘fighting between an internationally recognised government and a militarily organised 
party within the borders of that state where the use of armed force between two 
parties results in at least 25 battle-deaths’.108
 
  
                                                 
105 Meredith Reid Sarkess, '"The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997",' Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 18, no. 1 (2000). 
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107  Patrick Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intra-State Conflict 
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108 Nils Gleditsch et al., 'Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,' Journal of Peace Research 39, 
no. 5 (2002): Pg 626. 
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There are two reasons why the Uppsala/PRIO conflict database was selected. Firstly, 
higher death thresholds may exclude some ‘small wars’. For example, the war in the 
Central African Republic from 2001 to 2003 exhibited the hallmarks of low-capability 
warfare - especially the low level of military technology and coordination available to 
the government and insurgents. However, the small numbers, poor organisational and 
logistical capacity and few heavy weapons precluded the belligerents from inflicting a 
high number of casualties, discounting the case from classification as a ‘civil war’ in 
the COW data. Higher death thresholds risk systematically excluding those cases the 
thesis is most interested in.  
 
Secondly, (and more related to Chapter 6) foreign states may intervene before a 
conflict reaches the 1000 or 200 battle-death threshold. Excluding these cases also 
excludes a number of military interventions (including, again, the Central African 
Republic or Lesotho) motivated by the same kinds of processes as interventions in 
larger civil wars. Early interventions, or intervention in low-capability warfare, might 
be more effective than interventions later in a conflict or in higher capability warfare, 
thus excluding these cases though they are examples of both low-capability ‘civil 
war’ and ‘foreign military intervention’. Finally, the Uppsala Armed Conflict 
database has a sensitive dyadic setup, coding numerous simultaneous conflicts 
between the government and different sub-state actors. War between the MPLA 
government of Angola and the Cabinda-based Front for the Liberation of the Enclave 
of Cabinda (FLEC) and war between the MPLA and UNITA rebels are coded 
separately, adding spatial and temporal specificity to the types of warfare 
experienced. Warfare between UNITA and Angola from 1992-1994 was conventional 
while warfare between Angola and FLEC was guerrilla. UCDP/PRIO data also cover 
the post-cold war period to 2008.  
 
The database begins at 1960 when the UN passed resolution 1514 stating that ‘all 
peoples have the right to self determination’ and that ‘inadequacy of political, 
economic, social and educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for 
delaying independence’. 109
                                                 
109 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (X), United Nations Declaration on Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries. As cited in Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: 
How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations  Pg 35. 
 European states rapidly decolonised their African 
Chapter Three – Hypotheses and Methods 
 93 
dependencies and the African state system was born. ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ excludes 
the Arab states of North Africa, (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt) but 
includes the island states of Comoros, Madagascar, Sao Tome and Principe and 
Mauritius.110 As Herbst argues, North African states have a different social, economic 
and political history, largely due to their integration with the European state 
system. 111  Some insurgencies have been collapsed together where they are 
geographically contiguous and have similar aims. These are all low-level insurgencies 
experiencing guerrilla warfare that are highly unlikely to experience fighting near to 
the capital or foreign intervention. Such cases reduce the standard errors by 
multiplying irrelevant observations and have been collapsed to minimise this risk of 
false positives. There are no examples of low-capability or conventional warfare that 
have been collapsed in this way. Coups, as defined in a 2009 study by Halvard 
Buhaug, have been excluded from the sample because they ‘constitute a fight between 
two parts of government and have little to do with geography’. 112  Coups, by 
definition, emerge in the capital city and the location of fighting is linked to the onset 
of war rather than its evolution. There are 402 observations of African conflict years 
from 1960-2008.113
 
  
Dependent Variable 
 
Chapter 4 uses a binary variable denoting whether a conflict year experienced fighting 
within 25km of the capital city. This variable, along with two further binary variables 
denoting fighting within 5km and 50km of the capital (the results of which are not 
reported but used to check robustness) are derived from a ‘minimum distance of 
conflict from the capital city’ dataset developed for this thesis and discussed below.  
 
Research into the geographic dimensions of civil war has enjoyed increased attention 
over recent years (see the introduction to this thesis). Since Buhaug and Gates 2002 
                                                 
110 This includes the states of West Africa, Equatorial Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa. 
111 Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control  Pg 11. 
112 Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Paivi Lujala, 'Geography, Rebel Capability and the Duration of 
Civil Conflict,' Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (2009): Pg 556. 
113 And 940 observations of conflict years outside of Africa. Although these are not included in the 
analysis, they can be observed through the dataset provided in accompaniment to this thesis.  
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study, scholars have investigated where civil wars begin 114  and where they 
concentrate115
 
 and have relied upon three datasets for minimum distance from the 
capital data – Buhaug and Gate’s 2002 study (hereafter referred to as BG), the 
Uppsala/PRIO Geo-Referenced Conflict Dataset and ACLED.  
Existing datasets are not suitable for the present study. While BG and Uppsala/PRIO 
data date back to the end of World War Two, data is aggregated at the individual 
‘civil war’, not the annual dyad. Conflict locations, however, change over time. War 
between Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), for example, is 
coded with a minimum distance of 0km from Addis Ababa in the BG data. For over a 
decade, however, the war was fought hundreds of kilometers away in the north-west. 
The original BG data was also inaccurate for some cases116 and while more recent 
data published by Buhaug, Gates and Lujula improves upon the original, it remains 
time-invariant.117
 
  
Research into conflict geography has been greatly assisted by the development of 
ACLED. ACLED is useful because the unit of analysis is a single battle-event - a 
more accurate basis on which to locate the distance of fighting from a capital city. 
The closest individual battle to the capital can be identified for each year and a dataset 
constructed thereupon. Recently scholars have made use of Geographical Information 
Systems (such as ARCGIS) to analyse the factors that place certain locations at risk of 
fighting. ACLED is discussed in detail further in this chapter as it informs the analysis 
of battle concentration. For the purposes of constructing minimum distance dataset, 
however, ACLED suffers from two problems. Firstly, ACLED includes battle-events 
that result in no casualties. Without intensity figures it is impossible to ascertain the 
battles that indicate an insurgent ‘threat’ to the capital and what battles were 
infiltrations or terrorist attacks. This is a major problem for a thesis seeking to 
understand the circumstances under which capitals are militarily threatened with a 
concentrated rebel assault, not which capitals are more susceptible to terrorist related 
                                                 
114 Halvard Buhaug, 'Dude, Where's My Conflict? LSG, Relative Strength and the Location of Civil 
War,' Conflict Management and Peace Science 27, no. 2 (2010). 
115  Clionadh Raleigh and Havard Hegre, 'Population Size, Concentration, and Civil War: A 
Geographically Disaggregated Analysis,' Political Geography 28, no. 4 (2009).  
116 Largely the product of using circles to model irregularly battle zones, but this practice is no longer 
used.  
117 See Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala, 'Geography, Rebel Capability and the Duration of Civil Conflict.' 
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violence. Secondly, ACLED systematically covers only the years 1997-2009 and 
excludes a number of important cases from the Cold War (such as the Katanga 
secession and ‘Simbas’ rebellion) and the early post Cold War period (Somalia and 
Liberia).  
 
Proximity of battle from the capital city has been measured by taking the minimum 
distance over the civil war year ‘as the crow flies’ between the nearest battle point and 
the central business district of the capital city. A battle point is defined as the location 
where twenty or more deaths were sustained in a confrontation between security 
forces and insurgents. This definition is designed to exclude terrorist attacks and 
massacres which do not necessarily indicate insurgent military strength. The location 
of rebel ‘headquarters’ or ‘base’ is used as the reference point where twenty deaths 
did not occur in a single incident. An ‘as the crow flies’ measurement has the 
advantage of being comparable across different historical periods and states. This 
comes at the expense, however, of distortions resulting from differences in road 
quality, rebel and government capabilities and terrain. Nonetheless, this is one 
advantage of restricting the sample to cases with similar political and economic 
history. Road networks throughout Africa tend to deteriorate the further one travels 
from the political centre. Chad and Angola’s road networks, for example, will be 
more alike than Angola and Colombia’s.  
 
From this raw distance variable three binary variables were constructed denoting 
whether fighting came within 50km, 25km and 5km of the capital city during a 
conflict-year. For the purposes of Chapter 4, it is more appropriate to use a binary 
variable than the raw continuous variable. Conflict distances vary for a number of 
reasons, not all indicative of an insurgent group advancing upon the capital. It may be 
the case, for example, that a mountain range allows insurgents to strike closer than 
would otherwise be the case and conflict location in this instance would have little to 
do with military strategy and everything to do with the idiosyncrasies of geography. A 
binary variable provides a tighter link between the causal mechanism and the 
statistical indicator. If conflict comes within 25km the reason is likely to be either that 
the government has chosen to fight there or the insurgency is strong enough to 
continuously strike. Secondly, a dichotomous specification is unlikely to suffer from 
urban bias. The further one moves from the capital the more likely it is that some 
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battles may not have been recorded. It may be the case, for example, that while a 
battle occurring 600km from the capital was recorded in primary sources, a battle 
500km from the capital actually occurred but was never recorded. It is improbable 
that a battle resulting in 20 deaths occurring within 25km of the capital would be 
overlooked in primary sources.118
 
 The dichotomous specification means we can, with 
a high degree of confidence, say that when a conflict year is recorded with no fighting 
in within 25km of the capital, then it did not occur.  
Data was sourced from Keesings Contemporary Archives, The New York Times, 
Reuters Newswires and various secondary sources. Existing data and publications, 
primarily from Buhaug and Gates’s ‘The Geography of Civil War’ in the Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, and the Uppsala Conflict Site Dataset 119
 
 were used to cross-
check some distances.  
Modeling Technique 
 
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, logistic regression is an appropriate 
technique for multivariate statistical analysis. Logistic regression allows the 
researcher to investigate whether, and by how much, an independent variable or set of 
independent variables affects the probability of a certain outcome occurring. 120
 
 
Regression results quantify the risk of that outcome occurring (in this case, fighting 
near to the capital city) and the contributions of independent variables to that risk.  
While linear regression can be used for binary response data, it sometimes results in 
nonsensical probabilities (above 1) on extreme values of the independent variables.121
 
 
Logistic regression deals with this problem by transforming the linear function into a 
logistic function. The logistic function is specified in Equation 1: 
 
 
                                                 
118 Stathis Kalyvas, 'The Urban Bias in Research on Civil Wars,' Security Studies 13, no. 3 (2004). 
119 'Uppsala Conflict Data Program,' Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research  
(2011/05/03). 
120 Scott Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis (California: Sage, 1995) pp 9 - 12. 
121 Ibid,  pp 6-7. 
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Equation 1 – The Logistic Function 
 
F(z) = 1/(1+e-z) 
 
Where ‘z’ is any range of numbers.122 When z equals - ∞, F(z) equals 0 and when z 
equals ∞, F(z) = 1. The range of the logistic function is therefore between 0 and 1.123   
The logistic function is an ‘S’ shaped curve and incorporates an element of 
nonlinearity into the analysis.124
 
  
In logistic regression, ‘z’ is an approximation of the effect of independent variables 
understood as the cumulative sum of a constant ‘c’ and coefficients (b1 through to bk 
where there are k independent variables) multiplied by the value of the independent 
variable (‘x’).125
 
 The value of ‘z’ in a logistic regression equation can be written as 
Equation 2: 
Equation 2 – ‘z’ in Logistic Regression 
 
z = b1x1 + b2x2 + … bkxk + c 
 
The probability of an outcome occurring, ‘P(X)’ is therefore the logistic function with 
estimates of the sum of the values of k independent variables substituted for ‘z’. More 
formally, the probability function is outlined in Equation 3.126
 
 
Equation 3 – The Logistic Regression Model 
 
P(X) = 1 / 1 + e – (b1x1 + b2x2 + … bkxk + c) 
 
                                                 
122 David Klienbaum and M Klein, Logistic Regression: A Self Learning Text (New York: Springer, 
1992) Pg 5. 
123 Ibid,  Pg 6, Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis  Pg 9. 
124 Klienbaum and Klien argue that this is well-suited to epidemiological research as it implies a 
‘threshold level’.  
125 Klienbaum and Klein, Logistic Regression: A Self Learning Text  Pg 8. 
126 Ibid. 
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If the values of the coefficients (b’s) for the independent variables and the quantities 
of the independent variables (x’s) are known, we can work out the probability (P(X)) 
of the outcome of interest occurring.127
 
   
Studies will often report findings in terms of the ‘odds’ of an event occurring and 
many authors describe the logistic model in its ‘logit’ form, not the probability form 
specified in Equation 3.128 Odds are ‘the ratio of the probability that some event will 
occur over the probability the same event will not occur’. 129  The logit form is 
equation expressed in terms of odds, or more specifically the natural logarithm of the 
odds of the event of interest occurring (log-odds, or just ‘logit’).130
 
  
The logit of (P(X)) is a function of values on a set of independent variables specified 
in equation two as ‘z’. 131
 
 After algebraic transformation, the logistic regression 
equation is as specified in Equation 4. Equation 4 is only a transformation of Equation 
3 expressed in terms of odds. It is not fundamentally different. 
Equation 4 – The Logit Form of the Logistic Regression Equation 
 
ln[P(X)/(1-P(X)] = b1x1 + b2x2 + bkxk + c 
or: 
logit (P(X)) = b1x1 + b2x2 + bkxk + c 
 
The parameters of the independent variables, ‘b’, are estimated using the data-set and 
the maximum likelihood estimation technique (MLE). As Klienbaum and Klien write, 
logistic regression uses ‘the data-set to estimate [the values of] the unknown 
parameters’ or ‘fit’ the model to the data. 132  MLE is used in logistic regression 
because it better handles non-linearity in the functional form and is flexible to 
nominal, ordinal and continuous independent variables.133
 
  
                                                 
127 Ibid,  Pg 10. 
128 Ibid,  Pg 17. 
129 Ibid,  Pg 18. 
130 Ibid,  Pg 19, Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis  Pg 13. 
131 Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis  Pg 13. 
132 Klienbaum and Klein, Logistic Regression: A Self Learning Text  Pg 9, 104. 
133 Ibid,  Pg 105. 
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MLE estimates a value for the independent variables in logit(Y) and then re-estimates 
until the change in the ‘fit’ (measured as the log-likelihood function)134 of the model 
to the data is small. As Menard writes, ‘the solution for the logistic regression model 
is found by beginning with a tentative solution, revising it slightly to see if it can be 
improved, and repeating the process until the change in the likelihood function from 
one step of the process to another is negligible’.135
 
   
Practically, there are two types of MLE estimation – conditional and unconditional. 
Unconditional estimation ‘is preferred if the number of parameters in the model is 
small relative to the number of subjects [cases]’.136
 
 The models in this thesis include 
over 10,000 cases and 15-18 parameters in Chapter 6 and 402 cases with 10-13 
parameters in Chapter 4. Unconditional MLE is preferred and the default technique 
used by STATA 12, the software of choice for this thesis.  
Assumptions and Problems 
 
Logistic regression makes no assumptions about the distribution of errors. 137 
Residuals in logistic regression, however, are used ‘to identify cases for which the 
model works poorly or cases that exert more than their share of influence on the 
estimated parameters of the model’.138
 
  
Logistic regression models assume that independent variables are not correlated with 
one another. Unreliable and erratic coefficients for individual variables and 
misleading estimates of statistical significance can occur when multicollinearity is 
present. 139
                                                 
134 Which is basically a measure of the unexplained portion of variance in the model. Ibid,  Pg 111. 
 While bivariate correlation analysis can identify collinearity between 
single independent variables, it cannot identify this phenomena between groups of 
independent variables. As Allison argues, multicollinearity is best identified by 
running a linear regression with the independent variables in the model and a 
continuous dependent variable (not a variable already in the model). Because the 
linear model calculates the collinearity diagnostics between independent variables 
135 Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis  Pg 114. 
136 Klienbaum and Klein, Logistic Regression: A Self Learning Text  Pg 108. 
137 Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis  Pg 83. 
138 Ibid,  13. 
139 Ibid,  Pg 81. 
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only, it does not matter which dependent variable is used. 140  Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF) and tolerance statistics provide a measure of the extent to which each 
independent variable exhibits multicollinearity problems. 141
 
 VIFs above 2.5 are 
considered problematic for logistic regression. Very small tolerance values are also 
problematic. 
Regression models assume that the probability of an event occurring is a function of 
the coefficients multiplied by their values on the independent variable, all added 
together. It may be the case, however, that a variable has a different effect when in 
one category or another. In this case the relationship is multiplicative. As Menard 
writes ‘non-additivity occurs when the change in the dependent variable depends on 
the value of one of the other independent variables’. 142 Interaction terms can test 
whether the effect of one variable on the probability of an outcome occurring is 
dependent on the value of a second independent variable. However, as Menard writes, 
detecting non-additivity is not ‘straightforward’ and the choice for the researcher is to 
‘assume’ the additive model, test for ‘intuitive’ interaction effects or test for all 
interaction effects.143
 
 Given the relatively small number of outcome observations in 
this thesis, testing for all possible interaction effects is not viable. It would likely 
result in the inclusion of a large number of interactions per model. Each variable 
increases the standard error of other variables and may make statistically significant 
variables appear insignificant.  
While the logistic regression model can handle some non-linearity, the assumption 
remains that the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is 
essentially linear. Some independent variables might affect the dependent variable in 
different ways depending on the value of the independent variable itself.144
                                                 
140 Ibid,  Pg 86. 
 Where we 
expect there to be a non-linear relationship between an independent and dependent 
variable the independent variable can be transformed using mathematical functions 
that suit the hypothesised relationship (such as the natural log to model an effect that 
diminishes with higher values). 
141 S Landau and B Everitt, A Handbook of Statistical Analyses Using SPSS (Florida: Chapman, 2004) 
Pg 244. 
142 Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis  Pg 63. 
143 Ibid,  Pg 65. 
144 Ibid,  Pg 63. 
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Some cases may be influential, and if theoretically exceptional, may bias the 
results.145 We can identify influential cases with two indicators – leverage statistics 
and residuals. Leverage statistics measure the influence that each case has on the 
parameters produced by the model and thus identifies cases that ‘exert more than their 
share of influence on the estimated parameters of the model’.146 Residuals measure 
the difference between the predicted probability and the observed outcome, thus 
identifying cases that the model predicts poorly.147 The larger the distance, the greater 
the value of the residual.148
 
 Removing outlying cases is generally not recommended. 
However, for hypothesis testing, influential cases should be removed and the 
regression re-run to observe whether these cases account for the findings. In Chapters 
4, 5 and 6, outlying observations were identified with a scatter-plot of 
leverage/residual values by the country identification variable.   
Many studies of international behavior assume that the ‘risk’ of an event occurring is 
independent of the time that something has ‘survived’. In studies of civil war, the 
probability of witnessing fighting in the capital may be more or less likely at different 
points in a conflict’s life-span and more or less likely depending upon whether 
fighting occurred near the capital in the preceding year. Beck, Katz and Tucker 
propose two solutions – firstly using a complementary logit link instead of a normal 
logit link and including variables controlling for time dependence. 149 The authors 
argue that for studies where the probability is generally low, as is the case in this 
thesis, then results generated from a normal logit link are no different to those 
generated by a complementary logit link.150
 
 A normal logit is link is therefore used. 
The authors, however, strongly recommend controlling for the effects of time by 
either using count variables, splines, or more recently, the time cubed method (see 
‘Control Variables’ in this chapter).  
                                                 
145 Landau and Everitt, A Handbook of Statistical Analyses Using SPSS  Pg 161. 
146 Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis  Pg 63. 
147 Ibid,  Pg 71. 
148 Ibid,  Pg 80. 
149 Nathaniel Beck, Johnathan N Katz, and Richard Tucker, 'Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-
Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable,' American Journal of Political Science 42, 
no. 4 (1998): Pg 1285. 
150 Ibid,  Pg 1286. 
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Logistic regression analysis assumes that observations are ‘independent’ of one other. 
That is, the value of a variable in observation x does not influence the value of that 
same variable in observation y. However, with cross-sectional panel data this 
assumption is questionable and values within a cluster may be correlated, having the 
effect of inflating standard errors and returning inaccurate estimates of statistical 
significance.151
 
 When this problem is serious, variables may appear to be significant 
when they are not. For example, it may be, for some unobserved reason, that the 
probability of fighting near Mogadishu in Somalia is much higher than in other civil 
wars and that this cluster of observations bias the results. Intra-cluster correlation does 
not affect the coefficient estimates. Using robust standard errors and clustering them 
around the relevant ‘nest’ of observations can minimise the problem of intra-cluster 
correlation. In Chapter 4, robust standard errors were clustered around the 
government-insurgent dyad. Because Chapter 7 is modeling the decision of a foreign 
state to intervene in the civil war of another state, the relevant nest is the foreign 
intervener – civil war dyad. Random-effects and Generalised Estimation Equations 
(GEE) were also run as robustness checks to ensure that intra-cluster collinearity is 
not biasing the results.  
This thesis is more interested in theory-testing rather than prediction, although the 
results from this research increase our predictive capacity. Key statistics for theory-
testing are the significance (p) values of each independent variable and the size of the 
coefficients (B). ‘Fit’ statistics such as r-squared values are not as relevant. As 
Menard writes, models can ‘fit’ the data well, yet be poor at prediction. 152  Fit 
statistics in logistic regression are also less reliable than those in OLS regression.153 
Additionally, stepwise procedures are not well suited to theory-testing as they 
capitalise ‘on random variations in the data and produce results that tend to be 
idiosyncratic and difficult to replicate in any sample other than the sample they 
originally obtained’.154
                                                 
151 See, for example Honghu Liu, 'Robust Standard Error Estimates for Cluster Sampling Data: 
  
A SAS/IML: Macro Procedure for Logistic Regression with Huberization.' 
152 Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis  Pg 32. 
153 NJD Nagelkerke, 'A Note on a General Definition of the Coefficient of Determination,' Biometrika 
78, no. 3 (1991).  
154 Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis  Pg 34. See also Gary King, 'How Not to Lie with 
Statistics: Avioding Common Mistakes in Quantitative Political Science,' American Journal of 
Political Science 30, no. 3 (1986): Pg 669, Footnote 6. 
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P-values reflect the statistical significance of the relationship between an independent 
variable Bk and a dependent variable x. When p values are low (conventionally under 
the critical value of 0.05) the null hypothesis that there is no relationship can be 
rejected with 95% certainty. In other words, we can be 95% certain that x has a 
relationship with Bk.155 It should be noted that statistical significance may indicate a 
mathematical relationship between variables without implying any causal 
relationship.156
 
   
Logistic regression can also indicate how, and by how much variable Bk effects the 
probability of observing X (the outcome). Regression coefficients have negative or 
positive sign that indicate whether a 1 unit increase in Bk increases or decreases the 
log-odds of observing X. The size of the coefficient also reflects the strength of the 
relationship. When this coefficient is exponentiated, it gives a numerical indication of 
how much a one unit increase in the variable Bk will increase the odds of X occurring 
(Exp(B)).  
 
Coefficients can be used to calculate the probability of the event occurring for a given 
case, or to construct an equation to observe how changes in the value of the 
independent variable affect the probability of an outcome occurring. Roneck describes 
this process as follows:  
 
‘finding the predicted probability of being in the category of interest requires choosing a specific value 
of each independent variable, multiplying it by the appropriate coefficient, summing the products and 
the constant, and exponentiating the sum to obtain the numerators which is then divided by the results 
of 1 plus the numerator’.157
 
  
In algebraic terms, the probability of the outcome of interest occurring is specified in 
Equation 5: 
  
                                                 
155 Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis  Pg 37. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Dennis W. Roncek, 'Using Logit Coefficients to Obtain the Effects of Independent Variables on 
Changes in Probabilities,' Social Forces 70, no. 2 (1991): Pg 514. 
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Equation 5 – Equation to Obtain the Probability of an Outcome in a Given Case 
 
P(X) = 1 / 1 + e – (b1x1 + b2x2 + … bkxk + c) 
 
This equation is the same as Equation 3. By using Equation 5 we can manipulate the 
value of the independent variables and observe their effect on the probability of 
military intervention or fighting in the capital. However, to do so, Roneck 
recommends using ‘substantive’158 cases. For a regression equation with continuous 
variables, a useful case is one exhibiting an ‘average’ probability of the outcome 
occurring (of say fighting occurring in the capital). This represents a constant baseline 
against which the effects of variables can be compared as the strength of the effect is 
not going to vary with the shape of the curve as it would if cases were assessed 
starting from different points on the curve.159
 
 In addition to this, STATA estimates the 
average marginal effect of variables of interest, that is, how much, on average, a one 
unit increase in the independent variable changes the probability of an event 
occurring.   
Independent Variable 
 
Whether a conflict year experienced low-capability, guerrilla or conventional warfare 
is the dependent variable. To date, Kalyvas and Balcells (KB) provide the only 
existing dataset and coding procedure on warfare type, which, with caveats, provides 
a reasonable test of the theory presented in Chapter 2. KB base their coding technique 
on what actors are physically capable of doing, that is, on relative military 
capabilities, by recording the ‘technology’ available to each actor. Conventional 
warfare is coded ‘where both incumbents and insurgents used heavy weapons 
(artillery and armour)’.160
                                                 
158 Ibid,  Pg 511. 
 Guerrilla wars were coded where the insurgency utilised 
light weaponry and the government heavy weaponry. Low-capability warfare was 
coded when both the government and the insurgency utilised light weapons (i.e lacked 
159 Ibid,  Pg 515. 
160 Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, 'International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the 
End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,' American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010): 
Pg 423. 
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armour and artillery). The authors looked only at the first year of a conflict.161
 
  Three 
binary variables were constructed from this data denoting whether a conflict year 
experienced low-capability, guerrilla or conventional warfare. A ‘1’ indicates the 
presence of a warfare-type and a ‘0’ the absence. 
Reliance on light weapons (such as AK-47s) captures a core element of low offensive 
capacity discussed in Chapter 2. KB’s coding procedure, however, does not include a 
measurement of coordination or logistical capacity. While this is not a problem for 
conventional and guerrilla warfare, it poses a potential issue for low-capability 
warfare. Governments and insurgents must ‘use’ heavy weapons to be coded as 
conventional or guerrilla warfare, suggesting a commensurate ability to coordinate 
and supply. If both a government and an insurgency rely upon light weapons but the 
government is superior in coordination and logistics, however, its offensive capacity 
will be higher than the ‘technology’ would let on. KB’s data is a useful measure of 
low offensive capacity insofar as a reliance on light weapons also correlates with poor 
logistical and command abilities. Chapter 2 suggested that in African civil wars this 
correlation is high. Chapter 5 visually analyses battle concentrations in low-
capability, guerrilla and conventional warfare (discussed below) and does suggest that 
Guinea and Uganda may be marginal cases in this respect.162
 
  
KB use the Sambanis civil war dataset. For reasons mentioned earlier, this database 
was less appropriate for the thesis than the UCDP/Prio dataset. While most of the 
cases from 1960-2003 cross over, some additional cases needed coding, especially 
from 2004-2008. See the Appendix for a case list. 
 
Only variables indicating whether a conflict year experienced low-capability or 
guerrilla warfare were included in the regression models. Conventional warfare is the 
default category. Guerrilla warfare is asymmetric and likely exhibits a low risk of 
fighting in the capital as the government can keep an insurgency at bay with its 
superior military resources. Both conventional and low-capability warfare are 
symmetric. It is of greater theoretical interest to observe whether the location of 
                                                 
161 Ibid., Appendix, Pg 1 
162 KB do note that Uganda is a marginal case of low-capability warfare.  
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fighting contracts around the capital city as offensive capabilities decline in a 
symmetrical system.  
 
There are a number of problems with the KB data. Warfare types change over time 
within an individual civil war. War between the Western Somali Liberation Front 
(WSLF) and the government of Ethiopia changed from guerrilla in 1976 to 
conventional in 1977 and 1978 and then back to guerrilla by 1979.163 KB obscure this 
temporal dynamism and introduce a degree of measurement error by only coding the 
first year of conflict. Secondly, the KB variable does not distinguish between the 
offensive capabilities of domestic actors and their foreign backers. For example, it is 
possible that Guinea-Bissau is coded as a conventional war due to the intervention of 
Senegal and Guinea. Lockyer shows that foreign intervention often induces changes 
in warfare.164
 
  
Hypotheses in Chapters 4 and 5 were re-tested used an alternative proxy of 
conventional offensive capabilities based upon the imports of heavy weapons. Heavy 
weapons transfers (hereafter ‘arms transfers’) are one measure of the offensive 
capabilities in a war-system. The Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
maintains data on the import of conventional weapons from 1950 to the present.165
 
 
There are a number of advantages to using the SIPRI data as a robustness check. 
Firstly, the values vary annually, incorporating a level of temporal dynamism. 
Secondly, the SIPRI data include only heavy weapons such as armour, heavy artillery, 
jet aircraft, transport aircraft and attack helicopters. Heavy weapons confer offensive 
advantages upon a belligerent with the ability to deploy them in combat. By focusing 
solely on heavy weapons, an ‘arms transfers’ variable captures an important element 
of ‘conventional offensive capacity’.  
SIPRI’s measurement is initially confusing, but well-suited to the purposes of the 
thesis. Arms transfers are measured in constant 1990 $US and do not denote financial 
                                                 
163 See Adam Lockyer, 'Opposing Foreign Intervention's Impact on the Course of Civil Wars: The 
Ethiopian Ogaden Civil War, 1976-1980,' Referred paper presented at the Australasian Political 
Studies Association Conference, University of Newcastle, 25-27 September (2006). 
164 See Adam Lockyer, 'Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous 
resources on the course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts' (University of Sydney, 2009). 
165  For access to the database, see “SPIRI arms transfers Database”, 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers, last accessed, 2 September 2010 
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value but ‘volume’. Recording the financial worth would, according to SIPRI, 
‘underestimate military equipment given away or sold at a discount’ and SIPRI have 
constructed the variable to reflect ‘the military implications of arms transfers’.166
 
  
SIPRI calculates the market value of transferred weapons by using a ‘core index’ of 
weapon-types and can be interpreted to mean that for a transfer of x$ worth of 
military equipment the effect would be y across historical contexts.  
A rolling average variable was constructed to control for reverse causality. Arms may 
be transferred in response to the location of a civil war. Foreign backers may supply 
heavy weapons as the military position of a government falters, for example. Heavy 
weapons may also take time to become operational on the battlefield and their effects 
may not be felt until sometime after the transfer. ‘Arms transfers’ denotes the average 
volume of heavy weapons received by the state facing civil war in the preceding three 
years. So, in the case of Liberia, when the civil war broke out in 1989, the variable 
reflects the value of heavy weapons received in 1986, 1987 and 1988 divided by 
three. In 1990 it reflects the arms transfers of 1987, 1988, and 1989 and so on. The 
rolling average variable was then log-transformed to reflect the fact that small levels 
of conventional weapons are likely to have a disproportionate effect on military 
strategy and warfare than the same injection at higher levels. In a conflict dominated 
by small arms the inclusion of an attack helicopter or heavy artillery can be decisive. 
In a war where the government already possess 100 artillery pieces, one more will not 
have the same effect. In this case the government has probably already chosen a 
‘strategy of annihilation’ or ‘counter-insurgency’.  
 
From the continuous ‘arms transfers’ specification a dichotomous variable was 
constructed denoting ‘low’ arms importers and ‘high’ arms importers. Conflict years 
in which the rolling average took a value of less than $10 million were coded as ‘low-
capability conflicts’ while those years where the government imported $10 million or 
more were coded as ‘high’ capability conflicts.   
 
 
                                                 
166  For a discussion of the coding mechanisms, see “Explanation of the TIV tables”, 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background/explanations2_default, last accessed 2 
September 2010. 
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Control Variables 
 
Variables influencing both the type of warfare that may emerge in a given conflict 
and the probability of seeing fighting near to the capital may confound any 
relationship between these variables. Variables that satisfy these criteria or have been 
included in previous studies of the geography of civil war have been included as 
controls and are described below.  
 
Buhaug and Gates found that the goals of an insurgent movement were ‘the single 
strongest predictor’ of conflict location.167 Wars over control of the state were fought 
substantially closer to the capital city than wars over the separation of territory. 
Kaufmann has also theorised that ‘ethnic’ wars, or wars of secession, are more likely 
to be fought conventionally as ‘victory depends on physical control of the disputed 
territory, not on appeals to members of the other [ethnic] group’. 168
 
 A dummy 
variable sourced from the Uppsala conflict database was included denoting whether 
the war was fought over control of the state apparatus (‘2’) or control of a piece of 
territory (‘1’).  
According to Buhaug and Gates, smaller states will, by definition, fight their wars 
closer to the capital city. 169  Smaller states may also be at a higher risk of low-
capability warfare. Rulers, nervous to the reality that only a small armed force is 
required to seize power, may deliberately strip their military of offensive capacity. In 
Sierra Leone, for example, 1971 riots in Freetown ‘alerted’ President Siaka Stevens to 
the possibility that small groups of dissidents could topple his regime. In response, 
Stevens fragmented the RSLMF and denied them equipment and training. 170  To 
control for this effect, the land area of the state in conflict, measured in square 
kilometers, has been included. Data was taken from the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) World Factbook.171
                                                 
167 Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates, 'The Geography of Civil War,' The Journal of Peace Research 39, 
no. 4 (2002): Pg 429. 
 Very small countries are likely to be at a proportionally 
168 Chaim Kaufmann, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,' International Security 
20, no. 4 (1996): Pg 140. 
169 Buhaug and Gates, 'The Geography of Civil War,' Pg 427. 
170 See Thomas Cox, Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone: A Case Study of African Soldiers in 
Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) Pg 73. 
171 CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/, Last Accessed 
19th January 2009 
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higher risk of fighting in the capital than larger countries and the variable has been 
log-transformed to account for this.  
 
Beck Katz and Tucker counsel researchers to ‘take time seriously’ in multivariate 
statistical analysis. The risk of fighting near a capital city may be more likely early on 
in a conflict, when previous research has shown that insurgencies try to score a quick 
military victory.172 Alternatively, it may be that insurgencies find it easier to strike 
later in a war as the government is ground down. Keen, for example, predicts that 
fighting over domestic resources intensifies over time as rebels and governments 
expend their existing stocks of finance and armament. 173  Katz also notes that 
controlling for time ‘picks up’ the effects of omitted variables and increases statistical 
accuracy, but he counsels caution when interpreting the results of temporal 
variables.174 The ‘time cubed’ method was used to control for non-linear effects of 
time on the probability of fighting within 25km of the capital.175
 
 
Beck, Katz and Tucker also argue that sometimes the risk of an event occurring will 
be related to if and when the event last occurred.176
                                                 
172 Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew Enterline, and Kyle Joyce, 'Third Party Intervention and the Civil 
War Process,' Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 3 (2008). 
 The probability of civil war being 
fought in the capital is likely related to where the last bout of fighting occurred. We 
might expect that one year of fighting in the capital increases the chances of the next 
year experiencing the same event, an effect that may be acute in low-capability 
warfare as fighting stalemates around valuable areas. The natural logarithm of the 
time in years since the last bout of fighting in 25km was included as a robustness 
check. If a ‘sieges’ variable were to explain any increased probability associated with 
low-capability warfare, while it would not falsify hypothesis 1, because stalemates in 
the capital were one predicted effect, we would be required to look in more depth at 
those cases accounting for the result.  
173 Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars  Pg 43. 
174 Nathaniel Beck, 'Time is not a Theoretical Variable,' Political Analysis 18, no. 3 (2010): Pg 294. 
See also David B Carter and Curtis S Signorino, 'Reply to "Time is not a Theoretical Variable",' 
Political Analysis 18, no. 3 (2010). 
175 David Carter and Curtis Signorino, 'Back to the Future: Modelling Time-Dependence in Binary 
Data,' Political Analysis 18, no. 3 (2010): Pg 19-20. The ‘time cubed’ method is as effective as cubic 
splines, easier to interpret, and makes no assumptions about where the ‘knots’ are, that is, on the range 
of time values we would expect patterns to change.   
176 Beck, Katz, and Tucker, 'Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary 
Dependent Variable,' Pg 1271-72. 
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Offensive military capacity is a combination of both the number of soldiers at the 
command of an actor and the ability to arm, train, supply and coordinate those 
soldiers. Separating these aspects allows us to ascertain whether something about the 
technology, logistical and command capabilities induces variation in conflict location 
independent of the number of soldiers. To this end, the number of military personnel 
maintained by the government during a conflict year was included in the model. Data 
were taken from the National Material Capabilities Dataset and log-transformed.177
 
 
Increasing the number of soldiers in the military from 1000 to 10,000 is likely to 
substantially lower the probability of fighting within 25km from the capital. 
Increasing the size of the military from 100,000 to 110,000 will have only a marginal 
impact on an already low probability.  
Years of higher battle intensity are more likely to be fought near the capital but do not 
necessarily reflect the strategic decisions of belligerents to adopt a positional defence 
in these locations. Perhaps low-capability warfare experiences episodic bouts of high-
intensity fighting, as rebels drive for the centre of power, followed by lulls in which 
the rebellion must recuperate and re-gather its strength. Conventional and guerrilla 
warfare may exhibit ‘smoother’ casualty rates and a higher incidence of fighting near 
the capital in low-capability warfare may reflect the requirement for rebels to strike 
hard over short periods of time rather than stalemates engineered by defending forces. 
Kalyvas and Balcells found that, when controlling for the effects of duration, low-
capability warfare is more intense than conventional or guerrilla warfare.178
 
 Intensity 
also allows us to control for years where the probability of fighting in the capital 
might be low because belligerents choose not to engage in major hostilities.  
Lacina et al define ‘battle deaths’ as deaths, civilian and military, resulting from 
violence inflicted in contested combat, differentiated from one sided violence (such as 
genocide and mass-killing) and war-related deaths from disease and 
                                                 
177 Data from the National Material Capabilities Dataset, Meredith Sarkees and Frank Wayman, Resort 
to War: 1816-2007 (CQ Press, 2010). 
178 Kalyvas and Balcells, 'International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the 
Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,' Pg 416. 
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malnourishment.179 The dataset covers the entire post-World War Two period, from 
1946-2005. Data for 2006-2008 was taken from the Uppsala Conflict 
Database.180
 
  The variable was log-transformed.  
The lower costs of defeating a lightly armed government may increase the chances of 
rebels receiving the support of foreign soldiers. Insurgencies capable of garnering 
foreign support stand a much better chance of overthrowing the incumbent than those 
required to rely upon domestic resources. Without controlling for these correlations, 
any association between low-capability warfare and the threat to Africa’s capitals may 
be spurious. When an insurgency received the support of regular soldiers from a 
foreign county the conflict year was coded with a (1) and (0) otherwise. Data were 
taken from the Pearson and Baumann and Kisangani and Pickering Datasets (see 
‘military intervention’ in the section on Chapter 7).   
 
Le Billion, Kaldor and Keen have all suggested that natural resources are more 
important to government and rebel finances since the end of the Cold War.181 As Ross 
notes, ‘there is strong evidence that longstanding rebel groups in Angola and 
Cambodia began to rely on resource looting after the Cold War’s end caused them to 
lose their superpower funding’.182 As domestic resources become more important to 
finance military operations, so their salience in military strategy may increase. In fact, 
Lujala, Gledistch and Gilmore find a stronger link between secondary diamond 
mining and the incidence of civil war from 1985-1999 when compared with 1960-
1984.183
 
 A binary variable was included indicating whether the conflict year occurred 
during the Cold War (0) or afterwards (1).  The post cold war period begins at January 
1, 1989.  
                                                 
179 Bethany Lacina, Nils Gleditsch, and Bruce Russet, 'Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New 
Dataset of Battle Deaths,' European Journal of Population 21, no. 2-3 (2005). For a critical review of 
documenting battle deaths, see,  Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2006 (Geneva: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) "Chapter 9: Behind the Numbers: Small Arms and Conflicy Deaths", Pg 229. 
180 'Uppsala Conflict Data Program.' 
181 See, Phillip Le-Billion, 'Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-
2000,' African Affairs 100, no. 398 (2001), Phillipe Le-Billion, 'The Political Ecology of War: Natural 
Resources and Armed Conflicts,' Political Geography 20, no. 5 (2001). 
182 Michael Ross, 'What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?,' Journal of Peace 
Research 41, no. 3 (2004): Pg 349. 
183 Pavi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore, 'A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a 
Lootable Resource,' Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): Pg 557. 
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Chapter 5 runs five logistic regression models. Model 4.1 is a baseline and includes 
all control variables but the ‘sieges’ control. Model 4.2 is the same as 4.1 but includes 
a control for sieges. Model 4.3 includes a control for the post Cold War period. Model 
4.4 tests the hypothesis without South Africa in the sample. Model 4.5 tests the log-
transformed ‘arms transfers’ variable as an alternative to the dummies for guerrilla 
and low-capability warfare. A number of robustness checks were conducted but not 
reported in Models 4.1 – 4.5. Where appropriate these are discussed in Chapter 4. 
Replication data and script files for STATA can be found in the CD included with this 
thesis.   
 
Replicating Buhaug and Rod  
 
Buhaug and Rod’s (BR) 2006 research is, at the time of writing, the only spatially 
disaggregated study of civil war location covering all countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. While more recent studies have been published by Raleigh and Hegre (2009), 
and Buhaug et al (2011) they either do not cover the entire Sub-Saharan region or 
examine conflict outbreak rather than incidence. Replicating the BR study is an 
important robustness check and provides leverage on a number of important 
questions. Models 4.1 - 4.5 test whether fighting is more likely to occur near capital 
cities when low-capability warfare is compared with conventional warfare. Put 
another way, the models test whether low-capability warfare is a determinant of 
fighting near to the capital. With the BR data we can test whether the distance of an 
area from the capital city is correlated with conflict location. Is fighting more likely to 
occur in locations near to the capital in low-capability warfare when compared with 
locations far from the capital? We can then compare the answer to this question with 
the correlates of conflict location in conventional and guerrilla warfare.  
 
Buhaug and Rod divided the African continent up into 100km x 100km grids and 
tested whether factors such as the distance from diamond deposits, road density, 
population density and the distance from the capital increased the chances of a grid 
square experiencing fighting between 1970 and 2001. They found that wars over 
control of the state were more likely to be fought near capital cities and diamond 
resources. Chapter 5 replicates this study by testing the correlates of conflict location 
in low-capability, conventional and guerrilla warfare over control of the state. 
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Replication data was downloaded from the Uppsala/PRIO Centre for the Study of 
Civil War website. A variable was added indicating whether the grid space (each grid 
space was assigned a country in the original data) experienced low-capability, 
guerrilla or conventional warfare. BR’s logit models of conflict incidence were then 
re-run within these three samples. The following control variables (all log-
transformed in the original study) included in the 2006 study were included in these 
models: distance from the capital, distance from petroleum reserves, distance from 
diamond deposits, distance from an international border, road density and population 
density. A binary variable denoting whether a grid cell was of a different language 
group to those in the capital was also included. Finally, the BR spatial lag, controlling 
for the likelihood that conflict in one cell will induce conflict in neighboring cells was 
included. Robust standard errors were clustered around the country-code. The 
proportion of mountainous terrain and proportion of forested terrain were not included 
due to collinearity issues, but their inclusion does not substantively change the results.  
 
Chapter 5 
 
Chapter 5 tests the hypothesis that, compared to conventional and guerrilla warfare, 
battles concentrate in and around capital cities in low-capability warfare. Independent 
and control variables are the same as Chapter 4 with a modification to the dependent 
variable. OLS regression estimates the effect of warfare on the proportion of battles 
that occur in the capital city during a conflict year. Spatial analysis then compares the 
geographic distribution of fighting in low-capability, conventional and guerrilla 
warfare, with the georgaphic distribution of economic value. Spatial analysis can 
substantially increase our confidence in the statisitcal results and its contribution to 
the thesis is discussed here.   
 
Unit of Analysis 
 
The unit of analysis in this chapter is the same as Chapter 4 – the conflict year.  
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Dependent Variable 
 
During a given year of civil war, governments and insurgents will engage in a certain 
number of military confrontations. The percentage of those battles that occur in the 
capital city forms the dependent variable in the OLS regression models. ACLED 
(discussed earlier) use individual battles as the unit of analysis and record where the 
battle occurred. If a battle occurred in the capital city, as identified by ACLED, it was 
marked with a ‘1’, otherwise a ‘0’ was marked. Dividing the number of battles within 
an annual period marked with a ‘1’ by the total number of battles for that year gives 
the percentage of battles that occurred in the capital city.  
 
Raleigh et al define an individual battle event as ‘a violent interaction between two 
politically organised armed groups at a particular time and location’.184 Typically, 
these events occur between governments and a rebelling sub-state group in the 
context of civil war, but ACLED also includes data for protests, riots and one-sided 
violence against civilians. Battle-intensity criteria are patchy and the ACLED authors 
do not specify how long individual battles last. ACLED codes along a variety of 
criteria, including the ‘type’ of event. Observations coded as ‘headquarters or base 
establishment’, ‘non-violent rebel presence’, ‘rioting/protesting’, ‘violence against 
civilians’ and ‘non-violent transfer of control’ are excluded from the present analysis. 
Observations coded as ‘battle – no change of territory’, ‘battle – rebels control 
location’ and ‘battle – government regains control’ are included. 185
 
 Only battles 
where the government (either the police or the military, including specialist divisions 
such as presidential guards) was a combatant were included. Fighting between 
factions of a rebellion or between warring sub-state groups tell us nothing about the 
interaction of government and insurgent military strategies.    
There are a number of problems with ACLED. Information regarding ‘battles’ are 
mostly sourced from media reports, especially foreign media sources. Yet, as Kalyvas 
argues, foreign media personnel are based primarily in capital cities. Coverage of the 
war in Bosnia, for example, focused on events in Sarajevo because it was here that 
                                                 
184  Clionadh Raleigh et al., 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) Codebook,' 
Available from: http://www.acleddata.com/documents/6.17.09%20-%20Codebook_CR_June2009.pdf  
(2009): Pg 7. 
185 For more detailed definitions, see ibid,  Pg 6-7. 
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most correspondents were located.186
 
 It may be the case that numerous battles have 
occurred in the African countryside that never get reported in Mogadishu or 
Monrovia. ACLED covers some conflicts better than others. Due to the availability of 
information, coverage of the Afghan civil war after 2001 is excellent, while the 
coverage of the war in Congo-Brazzaville is poor. Within Africa, coverage of Uganda 
is better than Congo-Brazzaville and coverage of Somalia is better again. Finally 
ACLED have complete coverage only of the 1997-2009 period and the sample for 
Chapter 5 is thus restricted.  
Urban bias presents the most challenging issue. A systematic relationship may exist 
between the type of warfare and the reporting of fighting in the countryside. 
Conventional warfare involves large, identifiable concentrations of soldiers engaging 
along front lines. In low-capability warfare, where the numbers of soldiers are 
smaller, where there are few artillery pieces or concentrations of armour, it is possible 
that comparatively fewer battles are reported in the countryisde than are reported near 
the capital. While we might observe a higher proportion of battles near to the capital 
city, this could reflect the tendency for journalists to cover events near the political 
centre and not the true spatial distribution of fighting. There is little that can be done 
about this problem when measuring the proportion of battles that occurred in the 
capital city. ACLED remains the most comprehensive dataset and there are very few 
alternative sources of information on battle-events other than media sources (or 
digests of media sources). 187
 
 Quantitative results in Chapter 5 must therefore be 
interpreted with this limitation in mind.  
Visual analysis plays an important role at this point. While it is possible that the 
capital/countryside distribution is skewed by urban bias it is less likely that foreign 
media would fail to report a spatially concentrated series of battles in the countryside, 
regardless of the type of warfare. Thus, if we observe a concentration of battle in the 
capital, but only dispersed battles in the countryside, we can be more confident that 
spatial differentials were not the product of urban bias. If a battle of similar 
                                                 
186 Kalyvas, 'The Urban Bias in Research on Civil Wars.' 
187 There is EDACS, but its coverage includes only Somalia at present. See The Event Data Project on 
Conflict and Security (EDACS), (The Free University of Berlin, [cited 20 February 2011]); available 
from http://www.sfb-governance.de/teilprojekte/projekte_phase_1/projektbereich_c/c4 
The_EDACS/index.html. 
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proportions had occurred in the countryside, it is likely the media would have 
reported it. For these ends, the ACLED data were imported into SpatialKey software 
and mapped to observe battle concentrations. Visual analysis techniques are discussed 
in more detail below.  
 
The problem of cross-case coverage poses less of a problem. Although some cases 
have better coverage than others, the proportions of conflict experienced in the capital 
city remain comparable. Differences in cross case coverage would be a problem if the 
individual battle were used as a unit of analysis.188
 
 Countries with better coverage 
have hundreds more battle observations recorded and drive the statistical results. If 
one country experiencing low capability warfare and a high proportion of fighting in 
the capital city received better coverage of its ‘battles’ we might observe a statistically 
significant relationship but we would be right to question whether the results reflected 
idiosyncrasies of one or two well-documented cases.   
Modelling Technique 
 
The proportion of fighting occuring in the capital city is a continuous variable and 
logistic regression is not an appropriate modelling technique. OLS regression is 
better-suited to estimating the effects of independent variables upon continuous 
dependent variables. There are a number of important differences between logistic 
and linear regression, especially in functional form and assumptions.  
 
OLS regression fits a linear equation to the data189 taking the form of (y = c + b1x1) 
where y is the value of the dependent variable, x is the value of the independent 
variable, b is the coefficient and c the constant.190
                                                 
188 As it is in Raleigh and Hegre, 'Population Size, Concentration, and Civil War: A Geographically 
Disaggregated Analysis.' 
 In linear regression, ‘b’ is the slope 
of the linear equation – larger values indicate that changes in the independent variable 
induce larger changes in the value of the dependent variable. The constant is the 
intercept of the line, or where the line crosses the x-axis when y = 0. Instead of MLE, 
linear regression uses the OLS method to fit data to an equation line. OLS minimises 
189 In logistic regression, a logarithmic equation is fit to the data.  
190 Perry Hinton, Statistics Explained: A Guide for Social Science Students (East Sussex: Routledge, 
2004) Pg 318-19. Logistic regression is a transformed linear regression model. As such the linear 
equation is embedded in a logistic regression model. 
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the value on the sum of the squared values of distances from the fitted line to the 
individual data points and selects that equation as the best ‘fit’ for the model.191
 
  
Assumptions and Problems 
 
Many of the assumptions in logistic regression apply to OLS regression. OLS 
regression has a higher tolerance for multicollinearity when compared to logistic 
regression, but VIF values over 10 are problematic. OLS regression assumes both 
linearity in the relationship between dependent and independent variables and 
additivity between independent variables. Because the ‘fit’ of the model is based upon 
the distances between an equation line and individual observations, outliers can have 
substantial impact on the results. Like logistic regression these should be investigated 
to ensure they do not bias the results.  
 
OLS regression assumes that the error terms are normally distributed, that is, the 
variance is constant across the sample (logistic regression makes no assumptions 
about the distribution of errors).192  As Hinton explains, if residual values are random 
(recalling that the residuals are the distance between the predicted and actual values 
for each data point) then there is no unexplained systematic variation in the model.193 
When a sample violates this assumption it is heteroscedastic. For example, it might be 
that the model ‘fits’ better at low values on the dependent variable (i.e the residual 
variance is lower) but at higher levels the fit is poor (residual variance is high). This is 
systematic variance in the residuals. Heteroscedasticity does not bias the coefficients 
but can, when severe, 194  lead to misleading standard errors and mistaken 
inferences.195
 
  
Beck and Katz observe that time-series cross sectional data (the observation of a 
number of units over periods of time) will likely violate these assumptions. Firstly, 
the error generating processes for different units are likely to vary, thus violating the 
                                                 
191 Ibid,  Pg 325. 
192 Ibid,  Pg 328. 
193 Ibid,  Pg 327. 
194 Paul D Allison, Multiple Regression: A Primer (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1999) Pg 128. 
195 Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz, 'What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-Sectional 
Data,' American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (1995): Pg 636. 
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assumption that the variance of the errors is constant. 196 For example, the errors 
generated by the model for the Liberian civil wars are likely to be correlated and have 
a different variance to the errors generated from the Somalian civil wars. In addition, 
OLS standard errors for panel data can be misleading as within-group observations 
are not independent of one another. For example, the conflict location in Liberia is 
likely related to the conflict location in the year preceding it. Both the assumption of 
error independence and constant variance are violated. Beck and Katz have created an 
adjusted calculation of standard errors for time-series cross sectional data. Beck and 
Katz standard errors are reported to minimise the effects of heteroscedasticity and 
spatial and temporal correlation.197
 
 
Output from OLS regression are easier to interpret than logistic regression. 
Coefficients reflect the increase or decrease in the dependent variable that results 
from a one unit increase in the independent variable. P-values are interpreted in the 
same way as logistic regression.  
 
Independent Variable 
 
‘Warfare type’ is the same as Chapter 4. The country and year of conflict are matched 
with the ‘type’ of warfare experienced during that year and coded accordingly.  
 
Control Variables 
 
Control variables are the same as Chapter 4. 
 
Specific Models 
 
Chapter 5 runs four OLS regressions. Model 5.1 estimates the effects of warfare on 
the proportion of battle within the capital city with all cases and control variables. 
Analysis of the residuals reveals four outliers, Guinea-Bissau in 1998 and 1999, the 
Central African Republic in 1997 and Lesotho in 1998. Chapter 5 discusses these 
cases in greater detail, but for the moment, Model 5.2 re-tests the results with outliers 
                                                 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid. 
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removed from the sample. Model 5.3 tests the log-transformed ‘arms transfers’ 
variable against the proportion of fighting in the capital. Model 5.4 repeats the process 
with the ‘low arms importer’ binary variable in place of the log-transformed ‘arms 
transfer variable’.  
 
Visual Analysis 
 
The second part of Chapter 5 is a bivariate spatial analysis of the correlation between 
concentrations of fighting and concentrations of resources. There are three 
components: battle location data, spatially disaggregated resource data and 
geographic imaging software used to overlay the two datasets on a map of Africa. 
Battle location data was sourced from ACLED, discussed earlier in this chapter. 
ACLED provide latitude and longitude coordinates for the location of individual 
battles allowing us to ‘count’ the number of battles that occurred in particular 
locations within a country.  
 
Spatially disaggregated resource data was sourced from the G-econ project at Yale 
University. G-econ data divides the world into 1° latitude x 1° longitude grid spaces 
and provides estimates of the gross product output by each individual cell.198 ‘Gross 
Cell Product’ (GCP) gives an idea of the economic value of regions and has recently 
been incorporated into the study of civil wars.199 GCP is calculated using data from 
government and industry sources. There is considerable variation in the quality. Data 
from North America and Europe is of higher quality and reliability than data from 
Africa. Much of the data for cells in Africa was calculated using census material and 
tends to reflect population distributions. Mineral resources are the exception. National 
accounts and corporate reporting procedures make these estimations more reliable. In 
Africa, therefore, areas of high economic productivity displayed by G-Econ tend to 
reflect population centres and mineral production.200
                                                 
198 William Nordhaus et al., 'The G-Econ Database on Gridded Output: Methods and Data,' Yale 
University May 12 (2006): Pg 6. 
 Population clusters and mineral 
resource production were predicted to be of high economic value to governments and 
insurgents in the context of civil war, and, although we must show some caution when 
199 See, for example Halvard Buhaug et al., 'It's the Local Economy, Stupid! Geographic Wealth 
Dispersion and Conflict Outbreak Location,' Journal of Conflict Resolution Online First, no. 23 May 
(2011): Pg 11. 
200 Nordhaus et al., 'The G-Econ Database on Gridded Output: Methods and Data,' Pg 12. 
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using G-econ, the higher quality data reflect core concerns of this thesis. Cross-
sectional data is available for 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. I have used the 1990 GCP 
scores to minimise any bias resulting from changes in economic geography resulting 
from civil war or the anticipation of civil war.  
 
Both ACLED and G-econ data were overlayed onto a map of the African continent 
using Spatialkey software, a web-based program for visualising quantitative material. 
Graphics displayed in Chapter 5 were produced with the following method. Firstly, 
the pared ACLED data were imported into Spatialkey. The option to create a 
‘heatmap’ based upon the number of battles in a locality was selected. Black areas 
indicate battle concentrations, that is, areas where a proportionally higher number of 
battles occurred. White and blank areas indicate localities where relatively few 
battles, or no battles, occurred. The G-econ data was then imported into Spatialkey 
and a heat map was constructed based upon the GCP score for a given cell. Red areas 
indicate high economic production. Filters were then used to produce individual maps 
by country and warfare-type to reduce bias resulting from differentials in case 
coverage. For example, if Africa as a continent is mapped, a conflict concentration 
emerges around Bujumbura in Burundi and Goma in eastern DRC,  reflecting the 
excellent coverage of those cases. Pictures of battle concentration and resource 
concentration for each case were exported and collated according to whether the 
conflict was coded as conventional, guerrilla or low capability warfare. Latitude and 
longitude coordinates are more accurate in the ACLED data and the resolution of the 
G-econ data is too high to obtain meaningful and accurate comparisons of battle 
concentration and resource concentration for very small countries. In the following 
cases, only the battle concentrations are shown: Rwanda, Burundi, Lesotho, Guinea-
Bissau and Sierra Leone.   
 
We can ascertain whether fighting in low-capability is more likely to concentrate in 
capital cities by comparing conflict concentrations with conventional and guerrilla 
warfare. Maps displayed in Chapter 5 also allow us to correlate areas of battle 
concentration with areas of high economic value. To the extent that the black and red 
areas of the map cross-over, we can say the correlation is high. If they do not cross 
over at all, we can say the correlation is low. Visual analysis provides insight into a 
number of questions. Does low-capability warfare exhibit concentrations of fighting 
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in the capital when compared to fighting that has occurred in the countryside? Are the 
patterns of battle concentration appreciably different for conventional and guerrilla 
warfare? Visualised data also facilitate the categorisation of differently structured 
cases of low-capability warfare and assist with theory refinement. Do some cases 
exhibit a singular concentration of fighting in the capital city or are there competing 
concentrations in the countryside? If so, do these competing concentrations correlate 
with places of economic importance and support the theory of military strategy in 
low-capability warfare? If they do not, why do governments fight in the countryside if 
not for defending sites of economic importance?  
 
Chapter 6 
 
Chapter 6 tests hypothesis 3 - that the chances of military intervention are inversely 
related to the distance of fighting from the capital city in low-capability warfare. 
Logistic regression is used to estimate the effect of conflict geography on the 
probability of foreign states deploying soldiers in the samples of guerrilla, 
conventional and low-capability warfare. The following section discusses the unit of 
analysis, dependent, independent and control variables for these models.  
 
Unit of Analysis 
 
Potential interveners are added to the conflict year database in Chapter 6, making the 
unit of analysis an annual dyad between a potential intervener and state experiencing 
civil war (referred to hereafter as an ‘intervention dyad’). While dyadic analyses of 
intervention in civil war are a recent addition to literature,201 they have been used 
extensively in studies of interstate war. 202
                                                 
201 Michael G. Findley and Tze Kwang Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An 
Actor Centric Approach,' The Journal of Politics 68, no. 4 (2006), Douglas Lemke and Patrick Regan, 
'Intervention as Influence,' in The Scourge of War: New extensions on an old problem, ed. Paul Diehl 
(University of Michigan Press: Michigan, 2004), Jordan Miller, 'External Military Intervention in Civil 
Wars: A Quanttitative Study of the Initiation and Escalation of Third-Party State Interventions,' in 
Annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association (Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, 
Illinois: All Academic, 2008). Jacob D Kathman, 'Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for 
Intervention,' Journal of Conflict Resolution Published online July 7, 2011 (2011). 
 Findley and Teo recommend a dyadic 
setup, arguing that ‘neither the actor nor the phenomenon-centric approach is 
202 Stuart Bremer, 'Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War,' Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 2 (1992). 
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complete on its own… [an] integration of both facets paints a clearer and more vivid 
picture of the civil war intervention process’.203
 
  
Only ‘politically relevant’ dyads from 1960-2003 are included in the sample. A 
proliferation of irrelevant observations (observations with little or no chance of 
intervention occurring, say Papua New Guinea intervening in the Liberian civil war) 
can bias the standard errors and report misleading p-values. Politically relevant states 
are those: within the ‘region’ as defined by the Uppsala conflict database, contiguous 
to the conflicted state, former colonial powers, superpowers, major powers, and Cold-
War allies. One observation of intervention was excluded by this definition – 
Canada’s deployment of soldiers in Somalia in 1992. Constitutional bans on the 
projection of military force excludes Japan and Germany from the sample. By 
definition, states cannot consider intervening in their own civil wars as they are not 
external actors, and these observations have been removed.  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Hedley Bull defined intervention as ‘dictatorial or coercive interference by an outside 
party or parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more broadly of 
an independent political community’.204 But, as Hoffman argues, this definition is 
‘practically the same as that of international politics in general from the beginning of 
time to the present’.205 Rosenau claimed to overcome this imprecision by defining 
intervention as ‘convention-breaking’ activity directed at the authority structures of a 
target state’. 206
                                                 
203  Findley and Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor Centric 
Approach,' Pg 829. 
 Yet, making convention-breaking a necessary condition for 
intervention risks tautology. One of the main ‘conventions’ in international relations 
is non-intervention, meaning that we record an intervention when it breaks the 
convention of non-intervention. Of course this begs the original question, what is 
intervention? As Little writes, ‘a definition of “intervention” wide enough to take in 
204 Hedley Bull, 'Introduction,' in Intervention in World Politics, ed. Hedley Bull (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984). 
205 Stanley Hoffman, 'The Problem of Intervention,' in Intervention in World Politics, ed. Hedley Bull 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), Pg 7. Goertz would argue that the concept has no negative 
pole. Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) Pg 34. 
206 James Rosenau, 'Intervention as a scientific concept,' The Journal of Conflict Resolution 13, no. 2 
(1969): 355-59. 
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all the meanings attached to the word will be masked by imprecision’.207 Vincent 
simply argues that ‘intervention’ probably has no ‘analytically useful essence’.208
 
  
As a result, empirical studies have operationalised dependent variables differently. 
There has been, for example, a tendency to aggregate economic and military 
intervention209 or to treat the deployment of soldiers and the dispatch of military 
hardware as comparable forms of intervention.210  Miller aggregates all four of these 
categories into a quantitative scale, assuming there is an underlying numerical 
relationship between the sending of weapons to an insurgency to the deployment of 
soldiers in support of that insurgency to the sending of weapons to a government and 
so on. 211  While these definitions might increase observations on the dependent 
variable, it does so at the expense of unrealistically assuming that independent 
variables have constant effects for different types of interventions.212
 
 Because of its 
overt nature, and subsequently the low level of plausible deniability, governments 
consider the deployment of troops as a different category of intervention to the 
provision of finance and arms.  
While acknowledging the conceptual debate, and that perhaps it cannot be resolved, I 
define military intervention in restricted terms to avoid the methodological problems 
mentioned above. Military intervention is defined as ‘the movement of [at least 200] 
regular troops or forces of one country into the territory…of another country, or 
forceful military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another in 
the context of some political issue or dispute’.213
                                                 
207 Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars (London: M. Robertson, 1975) Pg 
2. 
 The definition includes ‘advisors’ 
that take part in, or lead, combat operations, but excludes the use of aerial or naval 
208  R.J Vincent, Non-intervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1974) Pg 3. 
209 Bertil Druner, 'The Many-Pronged Spear: External Military Intervention in Civil Wars in the 1970s,' 
Journal of Peace Research 20, no. 1 (1983). Patrick Regan and Aysegul Aydin, 'Diplomacy and other 
forms of Intervention in Civil Wars,' Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006). 
210 Lemke and Regan, 'Intervention as Influence,' Chapter 3 "The Decision to Intervene", Regan, Civil 
Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intra-State Conflict. 
211 Miller, 'External Military Intervention in Civil Wars: A Quanttitative Study of the Initiation and 
Escalation of Third-Party State Interventions,' "Appendix". 
212 Most analyses do not include neutral intervention. Some state clearly that they have excluded it. See 
for example, Charles Kegley Jr and Margaret Hermann, 'Putting Military Intervention into the 
Democratic Peace: A Research note,' Comparative Political Studies 30, no. 78 (1997): 79. 
213 Frederic S Pearson and Robert A Baumann, 'International Military Intervention, 1945-1988: Coding 
Notes,' in Centre for International Studies (University of St Louis, Ann Arbor, 1992), Pg 1, 5. 
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bombardment that does not entail the same level of cost (in terms of casualties and 
domestic political repercussions) as the deployment of regular soldiers.214 Military 
forces must participate in, interpose between, or use assets to influence the progress or 
outcome of internal conflict. This definition includes a range of actions from direct 
combat to the guarding of infrastructure. UN-interventionism is not included because 
of its unique decision-making process and calculations of costs and benefits.215 The 
thesis is, to the best of my knowledge, the only quantitative study of foreign troop 
deployments in civil wars. Data (including the direction of intervention) was collected 
from databases complied by Pearson and Baumann and Kinsangani and Pickering.216
 
  
Although Findley and Teo argue that ‘distinguishing between interventions for and 
against either the government or opposition forces clarifies important theoretical 
expectations and better mirrors how interventions take place in reality’,217
 
 the theory 
in Chapter 2 makes no claims about the type of intervention expected. Presumably the 
disincentives for intervening when conflict is in the countryside during low-capability 
warfare apply to all actors, regardless of their targeted party, as do the incentives for 
intervention when conflict reaches the capital.  
Only the first intervention in each year was coded. A dichotomous operationalisation 
means that once a state has intervened, until it has withdrawn, it is impossible for it to 
‘intervene’ again. Thus, the observations where the potential intervener has 
                                                 
214  Frederic S Pearson and Robert A Baumann, 'International Military Intervention, 1945-1988 
[computer file],' in Centre for International Studies (University of St Louis, Ann Arbor, 1992), Pg 5. 
According to Pearson and Baumann, advisors ‘are not considered interveners, unless they engage in, 
lead, or direct (at the frontlines) active combat’. Troops stationed in the territory of another state ‘are 
not considered interveners unless they arrive in the midst of a political dispute or unless they leave the 
base to take some forceful action in the case of a dispute’. Pg 5. The deployment of ground troops also 
is overt and more public than air or naval bombardment. Aerial bombardment can also be concealed 
and plausibly denied, raising questions as to whether the universe of military interventions has been 
identified. For example, the Pearson and Baumann database does not record Soviet Bombardment of 
Herat in Afghanistan before troops were deployed to protect Baghram airport in July 1979 (which is 
coded at the intervention onset date) or the invasion in December 1979. It is possible there are a large 
number of aerial operations that have escaped the broad historical record and databases of military 
interventions See Lockyer, 'Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous 
resources on the course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts'. 
215 States contributing troops receive economic benefits for their contributions thus altering the cost-
benefit calculations.  
216  Emizet F Kinsangani and Jeffrey Pickering, 'International Military Intervention, 1989-2005 
[computer file],'  (Kansas State University, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political 
and Social Research [distributor], 2007), Pearson and Baumann, 'International Military Intervention, 
1945-1988: Coding Notes.' 
217  Findley and Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor Centric 
Approach,' Pg 829. 
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undertaken intervention and continues intervention (as the Soviet Union did in 
Afghanistan for example) have been removed. Angola was ‘open’ to Cuban 
intervention in 1975, but not again until 1990. Cases of intervention missed by the 
database were added, such as the Angolan intervention into Congo-Brazzaville in 
1997. Intervention is coded as a dichotomous variable indicating its presence (1) or 
absence (0). Because the outcome variable is dichotomous, logistic regression is 
appropriate. Standard errors were clustered around the potential intervener – civil war 
dyad to minimise the effects intra-cluster correlation.  Random effects and generalised 
estimation equations were also run as alternative means of controlling for intra-cluster 
collinearity.  
 
Independent Variable 
 
For the most part, this variable is the same as that described for Chapter 4. Instead of 
the dichotomous specification, however, the natural log of the continuous variable 
was used. There are two reasons for this choice. Chapter 2 argued that both the 
predicted and actual occurrence of fighting in the capital will trigger intervention. 
Outside states may use the distance of conflict from the capital as a proxy for the 
probability of a pitched battle occurring. Thus, a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether conflict was within 25km or 50km of the capital might obscure interventions 
that occurred at 55km or 60km that were actually triggered by a predicted battle for 
the capital. Secondly, it is probably mistaken to assume that a linear relationship 
exists between the distance of fighting from the capital and the probability of 
intervention. If fighting moves from 500km to 400km from the capital (i.e movement 
in the countryside) we might expect this change to have a lower impact on the 
probability of intervention than if conflict moved from 150km to 50km. Although the 
unit-change is the same, movement in the countryside can be due to many different 
factors (such as the entry or exit of different factions) while a drive close to the capital 
reflects a concentred effort to capture it. Movement from 500km to 400km does not 
necessarily represent an impending conventional battle whereas 150km to 50km is 
more likely to. A non-linear variable is more appropriate for modelling this 
relationship. To that end, the natural log (a logarithm to the base e) of the ‘distance 
from the capital’ was constructed from the linear specification. This relationship is 
shown in figure 3.2. While moving from 1km to about 150km from the capital results 
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in a 5-unit change the same net movement from 500-650km results in less than a 1-
unit change.   
 
Figure 3.2 – The Natural Log of the Distance From the Capital 
 
 
 
There is a subtle difference between measurements in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. While 
the minimum distance of a conflict over an entire year may be very close to the 
capital, it is possible that an intervener deployed soldiers before the fighting reached 
this minimum distance. Reverse causality is a problem in this case. Intervention might 
cause fighting to move closer to the capital (see Chapter 4). To account for this, 
during a year where intervention occurs, the distance is measured as the nearest battle 
within 2 weeks prior to the date of intervention.  
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Control Variables 
 
Mitchell conceptualised intervention decision-making as a combination of ‘push’ and 
‘pull’ factors. 218  Push factors create demand for intervention and are largely 
encompassed by the ‘factors within the disputed state’. Findely and Teo describe 
these as ‘phenomena’ based factors. Pull factors include international linkages and 
characteristics of the potential intervener. Findley and Teo understand these as ‘actor’ 
based factors. More recent scholarship has shown that strategic variables such as 
alliances and rivalries play a role in motivating foreign military intervention. 219
 
 
Control variables in Chapter 6 account for these potentially confounding factors.  
States are not created equal. Some countries have the capabilities to undertake foreign 
military deployments and others do not. Research shows that more powerful states are 
more likely to intervene in civil wars.220 The Composite Index of National Capability 
(CINC) provides one measure of a state’s material capabilities. CINC is produced by 
the COW Project and is an aggregation of six indicators of a state’s material 
capability: military personnel, military expenditures, total population, urban 
population, iron and steel consumption and energy consumption.221
 
 CINC has been 
criticised for extrapolating missing data and overemphasising the military dimensions 
of power (although the database does incorporate aspects of economic power). 
However, most data interpolations were made for cases before 1960 and a focus on 
military power is relevant for this study, as the decision to deploy troops is very much 
a military one.  
Every state is the centre of their own security complex radiating outwards from their 
borders. A dense web of affective and material connections render the actions of 
proximate states central to security considerations. As Gleditsch writes ‘the 
                                                 
218 C.R Mitchell, 'Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties,' International Studies Quarterly 
14, no. 2 (1970): Pg 192-93. 
219 See Kathman, 'Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention.' And Stephen Gent, 
'Strange Bedfellows: The Strategic Dynamics of Major Power Military Intervention,' Journal of 
Politics 69, no. 4 (2007). 
220  Findley and Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor Centric 
Approach.', Lemke and Regan, 'Intervention as Influence.', Frederic Pearson, Robert Baumann, and 
Jeffrey Pickering, 'Military Intervention and Realpolitik,' in Reconstructing Realpolitik, ed. Frank 
Wayman and Paul Diehl (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994), Pg 836. 
221 David Singer, 'Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 
1816-1985,' International Interactions 14 (1987). 
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sensibilities and vulnerabilities of countries to other actors and institutions in the 
global arena are affected by closeness, as proximity shapes actor’s incentives to 
engage in various conflictual and cooperative behaviours’.222 Previous research has 
demonstrated that proximity is an important factor in military intervention.223
 
  
The Gleditsch and Ward Minimum Distance Database was adopted for the thesis.224 
The Minimum Distance Data records ‘the shortest distance between the two closest 
physical locations for every pair of independent polities between 1875 and 1996’.225 
The measurements are capped at 950km reflecting the fact that ‘states that are more 
than 1000km apart can hardly be considered geographically close’.226 In addition, it is 
unlikely that capital-capital distances matter as much as the minimum distance 
between states. Warfare in border regions of a disrupted state may be extremely close 
to the territory of another state, though their capitals may be distant.227
 
  
Croco and Teo argue that geopolitical dimensions, such as alliance behaviour, should 
be incorporated into dyadic models of intervention onset.228 Mitchell observed that 
civil wars often become internationalised ‘through a process by which one external 
party… acts in support of one of the parties to the internal conflict. This often brings 
about a counter-intervention or counter-involvement by another party acting in 
support of the other side’.229 Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce have also argued 
that ‘the impact of third-party interventions on the evolution of intra-state conflicts is 
often a function of the involvement of other third parties’.230
                                                 
222  Kristian Gleditsch and Michael Ward, 'Measuring Space: A Minimum-Distance Database and 
Applications to International Studies,' Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 6 (2001): Pg 739.  
 Recent work by Findley 
223  Frederic S Pearson, 'Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention,' The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 18, no. 3 (1974).  Findley and Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil 
Wars: An Actor Centric Approach,' Pg 836, Alexis Heraclides, 'Secessionist Minorities and External 
Involvement,' International Organization 44, no. 3 (1990), Deepa Khosla, 'Third World States as 
Interveners in Ethnic Conflicts,' Third World Quarterly 20 (1999). 
224  Gleditsch and Ward, 'Measuring Space: A Minimum-Distance Database and Applications to 
International Studies.' 
225 Ibid,  Pg 744. 
226 Ibid,  Pg 745. 
227 Ibid,  Pg 743. A log-transformed variable was used in the model reported in Chapter 6, but it was 
not significant while the linear and capped variable was. 
228 The authors also suggest that alternatives to the dyadic units of analysis be adopted, although none 
are suggested. Sarah Croco and Tze Kwang Teo, 'Assessing the Dyadic Approach to Interstate Conflict 
Processes: A.k.a "Dangerous" Dyad-Years,' Conflict Management and Peace Science 22, no. 1 (2005): 
Pg 15-16. 
229 Mitchell, 'Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties,' Pg 167. 
230 Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, 'Third Party Intervention and the Civil War Process,' Pg 617. 
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and Teo has demonstrated that the presence of one intervener increases the probability 
of further intervention. 231 Examples readily come to mind: Cuban intervention in 
Ethiopia was triggered by a Somali invasion of the Ogaden region in 1977 and Libyan 
intervention in 1979 was designed to help defend Idi Amin against a Tanzanian 
invasion.232
  
  
For each state considering intervention in the dataset, a dummy variable is used to 
indicate whether, during that conflict year, a state with whom the potential intervener 
had an ongoing rivalry assisted the insurgency or government with regular soldiers or 
military hardware. Rivalry data were sourced from Giehl and Goertz. Data for the 
military support provided to governments and insurgents was sourced from Regan’s 
military intervention dataset. 233
 
  
A potential intervener may use civil war as an opportunity to destabilise a rival. On 
the other hand, states may be more likely to militarily support a government with 
whom they have a long record of stable, peaceful relations. Research by Findley and 
Teo show that rivalries decrease the probability of intervention on the side of the 
government, and, where rivalry is low, increase it.234 Peace years were obtained from 
the COW dataset available through EuGene software and based on the Militarised 
Interstate Disputes data (MID).235
 
 MID data records instances where states threaten 
the use of, or deploy, military assets against one another. Years of peace following a 
recent military encounter are more likely to effect the probability of intervention than 
changes between states with a long history of non-violence. The peace years variable 
was log-transformed to account for this.  
                                                 
231  Findley and Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor Centric 
Approach,' Pg 830. 
232 Cuba, for example, refused to directly intervene in the Eritrean conflict because it was an ‘internal’ 
Ethiopian affair Keith Somerville, Foreign Military Intervention in Africa (London: St Martin's Press, 
1990) Pg 178.  
233  James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl, 'The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and 
Patterns,' Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 3 (2006)., Patrick Regan, 'Third Party Intervention and the 
Duration of Intrastate Conflicts,' The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002). As the above 
discussion suggests, ‘economic’ interventions were excluded. Regan provides disaggregated 
intervention data that allow the researcher to filter by intervention types.  
234  Findley and Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor Centric 
Approach,' Pg 831. 
235  Daniel Jones, Stuart Bremer, and David Singer, 'Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: 
Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns,' Conflict Management and Peace Science 15, no. 2 
(1996). 
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Former colonial powers have cited ‘obligation’ as a justification for military 
intervention and existing studies find that colonial ties increase the probability of 
military intervention.236 Colonial powers maintain important economic, political and 
military links that may make intervention more likely. Within Africa, the transfer of 
power to independence-era leaders was comparatively peaceful and many colonies 
chose to maintain strong relations with their former colonisers. A ‘former colony’ has 
been coded where a state was once a dependency or ‘colony’ of the potential 
intervener. Data was sourced primarily from secondary sources, especially Arnold’s 
Africa: A Modern History.237
 
   
Alliance commitments are an important motivation for military intervention. 238 
Findley and Teo’s study estimates that the presence of a defence alliance increases the 
hazard of intervention by 3 times. 239  Defence pacts indicate close political and 
military ties. Foreign powers will be more likely to support an ally facing insurgency 
than another state with whom ties are not as close. Data was sourced from the COW 
Formal Alliance database.240
 
 A defence pact has been coded where what is defined in 
the data as a ‘defence alliance’ (as opposed to a non-aggression treaty or an entente) is 
present between two states. Dates of accession and abrogation are also available. In a 
year where an alliance was partially present, the alliance is coded as present over the 
year. Defence pacts concluded following an intervention were not coded as being 
present. The data covers the period from 1816-2000.  
It is difficult to imagine Cuba intervening in Angola or Ethiopia were they not allies 
in the Cold War. Where the potential intervener and the conflicted country were co-
                                                 
236 As the British and French did as recently as 2000 and 2002 in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire 
respectively. See Alain Rouvez, Michael Coco, and Jean-Paul Paddack, Disconsolate Empires: French, 
British and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa (London: University 
Press of America, 1994) Pg xii. Findley and Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil 
Wars: An Actor Centric Approach,' Pg 836, Lemke and Regan, 'Intervention as Influence.' 
237 See Arnold, Africa: A Modern History. 
238 Lemke and Regan, 'Intervention as Influence.', Miller, 'External Military Intervention in Civil Wars: 
A Quanttitative Study of the Initiation and Escalation of Third-Party State Interventions.', Mitchell, 
'Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties.', Regan, 'Choosing to Intervene: Outside 
Interventions in Internal Conflicts.', Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in 
Intra-State Conflict. Findley and Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor 
Centric Approach,' Pg 831.  
239  Findley and Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor Centric 
Approach,' Pg 832. 
240  Douglas M. Gibler, 'Measureing Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance 
Dataset, 1816-2000,' The Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 2 (2004). 
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members of either the capitalist or Soviet bloc these observations were attributed a 
value of ‘1’ and ‘0’ if they were not. Data were sourced from secondary sources.  
 
Adekeye Adebajo has argued that self-styled identities as regional hegemons make it 
more likely that Nigeria and South Africa will project force abroad. As he writes, 
‘Nigeria’s foreign policy is closely tied to the military’s image of the country as a 
regional giant and its own role in protecting and defending this image’.241
 
 Regional 
hegemons provide ‘public goods’ to neighboring states, making them more likely to 
lead or initiate military interventions in foreign countries. Nigeria and South Africa 
have been coded as ‘regional hegemons’ and this variable is included in the models.   
Authors such as Ross and Morgenthau have argued that resource wealth provides 
incentives to support insurgents or protect incumbents by increasing the payoffs and 
offsetting deployment costs.242 Yoon has used descriptive statistics to suggest that 
resources play a role in motivating intervention in African conflicts. Pearson and 
Baumann have done so with internal conflicts more broadly. 243  Despite much 
attention in the literature on civil war, however, analysis of the systematic role of 
resources in motivating intervention is missing from the quantitative literature. 
Resources, especially diamonds, have been linked to a number of interventions. 
Zimbabwe’s 1998 intervention in the DRC is widely reputed to have been motivated 
by the expectation that military costs would be offset by mining and logging 
concessions.244 Ross cites that Charles Taylor’s support for the RUF was designed to 
access Sierra Leone’s diamond fields. Decision-makers in Uganda and Rwanda 
believed that deployment costs in the DRC could be offset by resource looting.245
 
 
                                                 
241 Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia's Civil War: ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa (London: 
Lynne Rienner, 2002) Pg 46. 
242 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 
1967) 80-88, Ross, 'What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?,' Pg 346. Michael 
Ross, 'How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,' International 
Organization 58, no. 1 (2004): Pg 56-57. 
243 Frederic Pearson and Robert Baumann, 'International Military Intervention in Sub-Saharan African 
Subsystems,' Journal of Political and Military Sociology 17 (1989), Mi Yung Yoon, 'Explaining 
African Military Interventions,' in Annual meeting of the International Studies Association (Le Centre 
Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada: 2004). 
244 Meredith, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence  Pg 540, Jason K Stearns, 
Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2011). 
245 Ross, 'How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,' Pg 57. 
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Buhaug, Gates and Lujula collated a dataset identifying ‘all conflicts that took place 
in areas with secondary gemstone mining’ and a variable that ‘takes the value of 1 in 
all conflict years with significant secondary gemstones production’. Secondary 
diamonds are more easily extracted than kimberlite (industrial) diamonds and are 
those hypothesised to have motivated intervention in Africa’s wars.246 With the same 
methodology the authors constructed a variable denoting the presence of 
hydrocarbons in a conflict zone, a non-lootable resource. 247
 
 Both variables are 
included in the statistical models.  
The length of time that a war has endured affects the probability of military 
intervention. Findley and Teo show that the underlying hazard of intervention (not 
specifically military intervention) is high in the early years of a civil war.248
 
 States 
may avoid conflicts where the cycle of violence and mistrust is firmly entrenched and 
precludes a quick solution. Alternatively, enduring conflicts may impose unacceptable 
security risks for surrounding states. As with Chapter 4 and 5, the ‘time squared’ 
method was preferred to control for temporal dynamics.  
Previous studies have shown that a ‘humanitarian crisis’ increases the probability of 
military intervention. 249  Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) impose 
costs upon neighbouring states and create demand that ‘something be done’. 250  The 
extent of a humanitarian crisis was proxied by the number of IDPs produced by the 
conflict. Data were sourced from the Political Instability Task Force’s ‘Forcibly 
Displaced Populations’ (FDP) dataset251 and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees’s (UNHCR) statistical database.252
                                                 
246 Halvard Buhaug and Paivi Lujala, 'Accounting for Scale: Measuring geography in quantitative 
studies of civil war,' Political Geography, no. 24 (2005): Pg 543. 
 The FDP dataset has a number of 
missing observations, particularly for the years 1975 and 1979. Missing data were 
only filled where other secondary sources or Keesings and the New York Times 
established an approximate number of IDPs, or where the missing observation was 
247 Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala, 'Geography, Rebel Capability and the Duration of Civil Conflict.' 
248  Findley and Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor Centric 
Approach,' Pg 836. 
249 Lemke and Regan, 'Intervention as Influence.' 
250 Regan, 'Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts,' Pg 767. 
251  Monty Marshall, 'Forcibly Displaced Populations, 1964-2006,' Centre For Systemic Peace, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm  (2006). 
252 UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), [cited February 2009]); available from www.unhcr.org/statistics/populationdatabase. 
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bookended by complete observations. In the latter case, the mean of the two 
surrounding observations was imputed. While this reduces precision, the overall 
accuracy of the statistical study is improved due to the inclusion of many observations 
on the dependent variable (1975 and 1979 were popular years for military 
intervention, although none of the observations occur in low-capability warfare). In a 
small number of countries, multiple civil wars occurred over the observed period. 
Where literature did not directly establish the civil war producing the most IDPs, 
intensity was used as a guide. In most cases this was fairly unambiguous as the year 
under question witnessed a very high and a very low intensity war (such as the war in 
Angola where the government was fighting the much stronger UNITA insurgency and 
a low-level guerrilla war in Cabinda). Where the intensity was more equal, the IDPs 
figures were halved.  
 
Stronger rebels are more likely to strike the capital and researchers have converged on 
the expectation that foreign states intervene in civil wars with stronger rebels. States 
do not waste resources in a fight that their favoured party will win anyway, and do not 
waste resources by having to defend a defeated organisation. 253 Empirically these 
studies show that ‘the marginal effect of an increase in capabilities is greatest when 
the two states have similar capabilities than when one side has a great advantage’ and 
that ‘if the targeted party is significantly stronger than the opposing party, there will 
be no intervention’. 254
                                                 
253  Interestingly, studies into decision-making in dynamic systems have also used expected utility 
theory to predict that the optimum moment for intervention is when system deterioration has reached a 
point where it is unlikely to self-correct (i.e the deterioration is not a false alarm) but with enough time 
to adjust the strategy once an intervention had begun. Jose Kerstholt, 'Decision-Making in a Dynamic 
Situation: The Effect of False Alarms and Time Pressure,' Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 8 
(1995), Jose Kerstholt, 'The Effect of information Costs on Strategy Selection in Dynamic Tasks,' Acta 
Psychologica 94 (1996), Jose Kerstholt, 'The Effect of Time Pressure on Decision-Making Behavior in 
a Dynamic Task Environment,' Acts Psychologica 86 (1994), Jose Kerstholt and Jeroen Raaijmakers, 
'Decision Making in Dynamic Task Environments,' in Decision-Making:Cognitive Models and 
Explanations, ed. Rob Ranyard, W.Ray Criozer, and Ola Svenson (London: Routledge, 1997). 
 The balance of power between rebels and the government is 
already incorporated into the definitions of guerrilla, conventional and low-capability 
warfare, but it is worth including a more detailed measurement. A variable reflecting 
the relative strength between the government and insurgency broadly controls for this 
alternative hypothesis regarding the timing of foreign intervention. Data was sourced 
254  Stephen E Gent, 'Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil 
Conflicts,' International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008): Pg 717. Clayton Thyne, 'Third Party Intervention 
and the Duration of Civil Wars: The Role of Unobserved Factors,' International Studies Association 
Conference, San Francisco, March 26-29  (2008). 
Chapter Three – Hypotheses and Methods 
 134 
from Cunningham’s 2008 publication measuring the comparative fighting capacity of 
governments and insurgencies. From this data, I have used the ‘rebstrength’ variable. 
A score of ‘1’ on the index indicates that the insurgency was ‘much weaker’ than the 
government.255 A score of ‘5’ indicates that the rebellion was ‘much stronger’ than 
the government and ‘3’ is parity.256
 
 
Incompatibility and land area are included as control variables. Their specification is 
the same as in Chapter 4.  
 
Initially, three models were run. Model 6.1 tests the effects of changes in the location 
of fighting on the probability of foreign military intervention within the sample of 
low-capability warfare. Models 6.2 and 6.3 repeat this method in the samples of 
guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare respectively. Models 6.4 and 6.5 repeat the 
test within the sample of ‘low arms importers’ and ‘high arms importers’. 
 
Chapter 7 
 
Chapter 7 is a focused case study of the Liberian civil war from 1989-1990. From the 
statistical models, Liberia emerged as a ‘most likely’ case for a relationship between 
low-capability warfare, battle location, concentration and foreign intervention. 
Liberia’s wars are often cited as an archetypal example of the ‘new wars’. Monrovia 
(the capital city) was subject to an extended siege from 1990 onwards and the onset of 
this siege correlated with a Nigerian-led intervention by the Economic Community of 
West African States Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). On a quantitative 
level the Liberian civil war is a good case to test the theory of low-capability warfare 
developed in Chapter 2. 
 
Qualitative Methods 
 
What can a single ‘most likely’ case study tell us that we cannot already deduce from 
the quantitative work? Case studies address two problems with quantitative methods. 
                                                 
255 See David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, 'It Take Two: A Dyadic 
Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome,' Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (2009). 
256 Gent, 'Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts.' 
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While statistical models are capable of controlling for confounding effects, their 
efficacy is only as good as the quality of data used. The ‘garbage in, garbage out’ 
problem is a serious one. This is especially the case when dealing with cross-national 
data from Africa, which can be unreliable and, at times, unavailable. In addition, most 
cross-national data, from GDP to measurements of National Material Capabilities, the 
size of armed forces and battle-related deaths come in, at best, annualised form. 
Control variables can only be as effective as the sensitivity of their measurement. If, 
for example, a foreign intervention occurred in the July of a given year, it might be 
straightforward to identify the closest location of fighting to the capital at this point, 
but how can we know how many people had been killed in battle half-way through 
the year? Considerable ambiguity already exists over measuring the number of battle-
related deaths that have occurred in a year, let alone finer divisions of measurement. 
Perhaps the conflict was not very intense in the early months of the conflict and 
intensified after the intervention. While the relationship imputed by the model might 
show that higher levels of conflict intensity increased the probability of intervention, 
the causality may actually be in reverse. The best a statistical model can do in this 
case is use the aggregate annualised measurement to ‘control’ for intensity.  
 
Case studies allow for a finer ‘unit of analysis’ than one year. Researchers can focus 
in and out of key moments and observe whether a causal relationship is plausible. 
George and Bennett argue that process tracing is a method ‘less prone to some kinds 
of measurement error because it can intensively assess a few variables along several 
qualitative dimensions, rather than having to quantify variables across many cases’.257 
Lieberman argues that ‘given the potential for problems of endogeneity and poor data 
in statistical analyses carried out at the country-level of analysis, statistical results 
alone rarely provide sufficient evidence of the robustness of a theoretical model.’258  
A case study can intensively follow the values of key independent variables over time 
and analyse why changes in their value affect changes in the outcome variable.259
                                                 
257  Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge: Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, 2004) Pg 220. 
 
Mahoney writes that case studies and quantitative analysis do different things: ‘case 
258 Lieberman, 'Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,' Pg 442. 
259 John Gerring, 'What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?,' American Political Science Review 
98, no. 2 (2004): Pg 347. 
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studies seek to tell us why particular outcomes happened in specific cases; statistical 
studies try to estimate the average effects of variables of interest’.260
 
  
Secondly, statistical models have an embedded casual mechanism mediating the 
relationship between variable A and variable B.261 Put another way, most statistical 
analyses provide a large number of ‘data-set observations’ but no ‘causal process 
observations’.262  A causal mechanism is a ‘physical, social or psychological process’ 
that links an independent variable to an outcome.263 It is very rare in political science 
for authors to postulate a relationship between A and B without at least speculating on 
what causes the relationship. Sambanis, for example, sees the quantitative work in 
civil war onset suffering from ‘measurement error, unit heterogeneity, model 
misspecification, and a lack of clarity about causal mechanisms’. 264  He suggests 
specifically that ‘such studies often overlook information about the causal pathways 
that link individual or group behaviour with the outbreak of civil war’. 265  Ross 
criticises the literature linking civil war onset to natural resources when he says that 
‘general, cross-national studies often suggest causal mechanisms but provide little 
evidence to back them up’. 266  Statistical studies can be ‘right for the wrong 
reasons’.267 This thesis posited that the empirical outcomes tested in Chapters 4, 5 and 
6 were the result of conscious military strategies composed by state and rebel leaders. 
While the quantitative analysis might show a correlation between low-capability 
warfare and the probability of fighting near to the capital city, how do we know that 
the outcome is part of an intentional strategy on behalf of military decision-makers? 
Numerous authors have identified a strong correlation between democratic dyads and 
a lower probability of going to war.268
                                                 
260 James Mahoney, 'After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research,' World Politics 62, 
no. 1 (2010): Pg 141. 
 Causality, however, has been located in pacific 
261 Ibid,  Pg 142. 
262 Lieberman, 'Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,' Pg 441. 
263 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences  Pg 117. 
264 Nicholas Sambanis, 'Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies,' Perspectives 
on Politics 2, no. 2 (2004): Pg 259. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ross, 'What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?,' Pg 340. 
267 Sambanis, 'Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies,' Pg 260. 
268  Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organisations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). 
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norms, high volumes of trade, cross-national capitalist elites and high levels of 
economic development.269
 
  
George and Bennett argue that ‘process tracing’ is a potentially ‘powerful’ method 
‘for testing theories about causal mechanisms’.270
 
 As the authors argue: 
‘The process tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal processes – the causal chain 
and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the 
dependent variable’.271
 
 
Lieberman recommends that large-N studies employ a ‘nested’ small-N study into 
their work to dig behind the correlation and ‘test’ the model at the level of causality. 
He argues that the ‘plausibility of observed statistical relationships’ and ‘prospects of 
making valid casual inferences in cross-national and other forms of comparative 
research’ can be improved with an ‘integrated strategy... drawing on the distinct 
strengths of two important approaches’. 272 However, we should not go too far in 
championing the ability of case studies (especially single case studies) to ‘prove’ a 
causal relationship. As George and Bennett argue, ‘process-tracing’ is useful for 
confirming or identifying ‘spurious correlations that may apply from statistical 
comparison’.273
                                                 
269 See, for example, Erik Gartzke, 'The Capitalist Peace,' American Political Science Review 51, no. 1 
(2007).  
 In combination with a supportive statistical relationship a single case 
study can, at best, allow the researcher to say that a posited causal mechanism is 
plausible. It might be the case that our causal mechanism operates only in that one 
case – and especially if it is a ‘most likely’ case. For example, while a strong 
correlation may emerge in the cross-national statistical analysis and we might find 
that fighting in Monrovia was plausibly caused by a decision to pull up and fortify the 
capital, we could not say whether this same casual mechanism was likely to apply in 
Congo-Brazzaville or Chad. We could just say that it was plausible. However, were 
we to find that our causal mechanism was not supported by the ‘most-likely’ case, 
then we could, with confidence, say that out causal mechanism was misspecified. Or 
as George and Bennett write, theories can be ‘disproved’ with a most-likely case 
270 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences  Pg 129. 
271 Ibid,  Pg 206. 
272 Lieberman, 'Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,' Pg 435. 
273 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences  Pg 222. 
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study.274 Those things said, a strong cross-national correlation and a supportive case 
study increases our confidence that the empirical patterns are broad and the casual 
mechanism plausible. For this ‘model testing’ approach ‘on-line’ or cases ‘well 
predicted by the statistical model’ are useful cases to select.275
 
  
The case study seeks to answer two questions: 
 
1. Was the incidence and concentration of fighting in Monrovia in 1990 the 
product of joint decisions by the NPFL and Samuel Doe’s government to 
focus their military strategies on controlling or defending the city? Did 
these actors focus their strategies on Monrovia (a) because of its economic 
value and (b) because of assessments that the enemy lacked of offensive 
capacity? 
2. Did Nigeria intervene when fighting reached Monrovia because they 
perceived that the conventional offensive capability could be exploited in a 
conventional battle for the capital? Did Nigeria refrain from intervening 
when conflict was in Liberia’s countryside because of the perceived high 
costs of counter-insurgency? Was Nigeria’s military strategy primarily 
‘defensive’ and based around taking and holding the capital city?  
To address the questions, the case study looks for two things. Firstly, the composition 
of a military strategies designed to attack/defend Monrovia and exploit advantages in 
defence. Evidence suggesting, for example, that President Samuel Doe did not stage a 
retreat to Monrovia to lure the NPFL into a conventional battle, or that a retreat was 
conducted for reasons other than to exploit a marginal military advantage in 
conventional defense would count contrary to the theory in Chapter 2. Secondly, the 
chapter seeks evidence for how changes in the distance of fighting from the capital 
city affected the decision to intervene. Evidence to suggest that Nigeria chose not to 
intervene when conflict was in the countryside and perceived that a conventional 
strike while insurgents were investing Monrovia was a cost-effective strategy is 
considered supportive evidence. Additionally, if Nigerian soldiers appeared unwilling 
to fight outside of Monrovia this is considered evidence supporting the idea that 
                                                 
274 Ibid,  Pg 122. 
275 Lieberman, 'Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,' Pg 444. 
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military strategy was based heavily around defensively controlling Monrovia.  
Evidence suggesting that Nigeria and ECOMOG had no military strategy, or 
vigorously engaged in counter-insurgency in the Liberian countryside would be 
considered contrary evidence. Evidence was sourced mostly from secondary sources, 
although some primary sources such as the BBC World Service, Reports to the U.S 
Congress, and West Africa magazine were consulted.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined a framework to test hypotheses 1-3. By restricting the 
sample to African civil wars we can, broadly, hold economic geography ‘constant’ 
whilst varying the types of warfare. Sovereignty norms morph capital cities into 
lucrative revenue sources. Sovereign benefits eclipse opportunities for domestic 
revenue accumulation in many African states. Based upon the theory in Chapter 2, it 
was hypothesised Africa’s capital cities are at a higher risk of experiencing fighting in 
low-capability warfare when compared to conventional and guerrilla warfare. So too, 
fighting is predicted to concentrate in Africa’s capitals when the military technology 
available to belligerents is low. Finally, as fighting in Africa’s civil wars moves closer 
to the capital city, it was predicted that, in low-capability civil war, the chances of 
foreign states deploying soldiers will increase. This relationship was not expected in 
conventional or guerrilla warfare. Mixed methods are used to look for both large N 
correlation and small N causation. Within the quantitative chapters, logistic and OLS 
regression are used where appropriate and the models are structured to ensure that 
confounding variables are accounted for and distortions from factors such as intra-
cluster correlation and heteroscedasicity are minimised. Visualisation of where 
fighting has concentrated in African civil wars from 1997-2008 helps to increase our 
confidence in cross-national statistical findings and refine the correlation between 
low-capability warfare and fighting over economic resources. A case study of the first 
Liberian civil war from 1989-1990 complements the weaknesses of quantitative 
analysis, especially measurement error and the difficulties of testing causal 
mechanisms or generating ‘causal process observations’ from cross-national statistical 
data. The remaining chapters of this thesis show the results of this analysis.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Volume II  
Chapter Four – Empirics I 
 141 
Chapter Four 
Empirics I: Low-capability Warfare and the 
Risk of Fighting in Africa’s Capitals 
 
 
We should observe two things if economic geography structures the pattern of fighting in 
low-capability warfare: (1) Africa’s capital cities are at a higher risk of experiencing fighting 
when compared to conventional and guerrilla warfare and (2) the risk of combat is higher in 
regions near to the capital city when compared with regions in the countryside. A quantitative 
analysis of African civil wars from 1960-2008 and replication of Buhaug and Rod’s 2006 
study provide evidence in support of these propositions. Low-capability warfare is more 
common after the Cold War and the opening section of the chapter correlates this change 
with a contraction of fighting around Africa’s capitals. Logistic regression analysis then 
shows that the threat to an African capital is six times higher in low-capability warfare when 
compared to conventional warfare, other things being equal. Replication of Buhaug and Rod 
shows that regions near the capital are more likely to experience fighting in low-capability 
warfare, a pattern less distinct in conventional and guerrilla warfare.  
 
Bivariate Analysis 
 
Figure 4.1 charts the distribution of warfare types in Africa from 1960-2008. Guerrilla 
warfare is the most common empirical pattern of fighting, accounting for over half of 
Africa’s conflict years. Conventional and low-capability warfare each make up roughly 20% 
of the sample. Immediately, this puts paid to the idea that all African states fight ‘new wars’. 
In the majority of Africa’s conflicts the government wielded conventional firepower in excess 
of that available to an insurgency, like the rest of the world. If we jump ahead to Figure 4.2, 
guerrilla warfare still accounts for roughly half of Africa’s conflict years after the Cold War.  
Governments in Mali, Niger, Senegal, Ethiopia, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda have 
all deployed heavy armour, artillery and air support, forcing insurgents to base their strategies 
on irregular tactics. For example, 4500 troops of the Senegalese army, including an armoured 
battalion with air-support, have confronted the Democratic Forces of Casamance Movement 
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(MFDC) in the south-western corner of Senegal.1  The MFDC operate from and along the 
forested and porous border with Guinea-Bissau (often accused of supplying the rebels) armed 
‘largely’ with AK-47 assault rifles and RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade launchers. MFDC 
military operations have consisted of ‘hit and run attacks on Senegalese forces and… of 
armed robberies of shops and vehicles, sometimes in combination’.2
 
 Fighting between the 
government and MFDC was confined largely to the Ziguinchor region in south-west Senegal 
(see Chapter 5). These tactics and empirical patterns are not dramatically different from civil 
wars in Nepal, El Salvador or Guatemala.  
Guerrilla warfare is, however, more common outside of Africa, making up 92.4% of the 
sample.  Africa’s wars are much more likely to be fought ‘symmetrically’ that is, in situation 
where both sides can deploy heavy weapons, or neither can. Conventional warfare is roughly 
three times more likely in Africa when compared to the rest of the world. Most striking is the 
extreme rarity of low-capability warfare outside of Africa. There are just three observations 
from 1960-2008, all from the same country - Haiti in 1989, 1991 and 2004. Haiti exhibits the 
empirical characteristics of low-capability warfare described in Chapter 2. Fighting has 
consistently occurred and concentrated in the capital, Port au Prince, and foreign states have 
preferred intervention when fighting descended upon the capital. For example, military and 
police units in the northern town of Gonnaives mutinied in 2004 and further units from 
central Haiti joined the rebels. President Astride buttressed his rule with paramilitary forces, 
especially the chimeres, prior to the 2004 rebellion. Astride put up very little resistance in the 
countryside. As Carey notes: 
 
‘The one-month-long uprising, the largest in Haiti’s two centuries of independence, involved very little combat. 
It was catalysed by the Cannibal army, which had defected from being an Astride-sanctioned paramilitary of 
several hundred in the country’s third largest city, Gonnaives’.3
 
  
United States Marines along with French and Canadian soldiers deployed in Port au Prince to 
evacuate4 the president and establish a foothold for the UN-mission to follow.5
                                                 
1 Martin Evans, 'Briefing: Senegal: Wade and the Casamance Dossier,' African Affairs 99, no. 397 (2000): Pg 
657. 
 According to 
2 Martin Evans, 'Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de la Casamance (MFDC),' Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Africa Program, Armed Non-State Actors Project, Briefing Paper No. 2  (2004): Pg 8-10. 
3 Henry F. Carey, 'Militarization without Civil War: The Security Dilemma and Regime Consolidation in Haiti,' 
Civil Wars 7, no. 4 (2005): Pg 331. 
4 Whether Astride voluntarily left of was ‘pushed’ is debated.  
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Colin Powell, the US feared a ‘bloodbath’ in Port au Prince as the mutinous paramilitaries 
prepared to face off against Astride’s paramilitaries.6 Economically, Haiti is similar to many 
African states, exhibiting a high proportion of GDP consumed by agriculture and a 
dependence upon foreign aid. Two-thirds of Haitians are engaged in subsistence farming and 
half of the annual budget in 2010 came from outside sources, although this figure may reflect 
earthquake-related assistance.7 That said, Haiti was the recipient of over $4 billion in foreign 
aid from 1990 - 2003 and Buss and Gardner state that ‘since 1944, when the Roosevelt 
administration began its aid program, Haiti has relied heavily upon on-again, off-again 
foreign assistance from the United States and the International Community’.8
 
 Overall, Figure 
4.1 reflects the comparative military weakness of African governments, many of which, like 
Astride, rely upon paramilitary forces for regime security. More African governments do not 
possess (or cannot deploy) heavy weapons in combat and, when they can, are not strong 
enough to monitor and quickly destroy heavy weapons in possession of insurgents. Insurgents 
have a wider strategic window in Africa and can, on more occasions than insurgents in the 
rest of the world, make use of conventional offensive and defensive tactics.  
Figure 4.1 – Frequency and Proportion of Conflict Years by Warfare Type 
 
                                                  Africa                                        Rest of the World 
Warfare Type Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Low Capability 79 19.7% 3 0.3% 
Guerrilla 235 58.6% 846 92.4% 
Conventional 84 20.9% 67 7.3% 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established in June 2004 and primarily 
comprised of soldiers from South American countries, especially Brazil. See MINUSTAH: United Nations 
Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, United Nations, available from: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/, last accessed 21 July, 2011 
6 As cited in Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (New York: Random House, 2007) Pg 497. 
7  CIA World Factbook, Haiti: Economy, available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ha.html. Accessed 21 March 2011 
8 Terry F Buss and Adam Gardner, Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We can Do 
About it (Washington D.C: The Brookings Institute, 2008 ) Pg 5. 
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Figure 4.1 obscures considerable temporal variation in Africa’s experience of warfare. As the 
availability of heavy weapons and external support has changed, so too have the strategies 
employed by combatants. Just 4% of conflict years from 1960-1988 were classified as ‘low-
capability’. From 1989-2008 this figure rose to 32% - an eight-fold increase. Nearly half of 
all conflict years in 2008 were marked by the absence or non-use of heavy weapons. In 
contrast, the incidence of conventional and guerrilla warfare is on the decline. Twenty-three 
percent of conflict years during the Cold War saw governments and insurgents deploy heavy 
weapons in battle. This has fallen to 18% since 1989, a 22% decline. There was not one 
ongoing conventional civil war in Africa in 2005, the first time since 1995 and 1974 before 
that.9 This is a surprising development, and does not simply indicate that fewer states possess 
heavy weapons. Governments and insurgents may be increasingly reluctant to use them. 
Foreign countries, especially France, have taken to restraining the use of heavy weapons in 
combat by domestic actors in civil wars with the potential effect of making a ‘slow burning’ 
strategy of exhaustion more preferable to a strategy of annihilation that runs the risk of 
intense civilian casualties and the determined intervention of foreign powers. The change in 
objective and strategy may reflect increasing pressure to protect civilians from armed attacks, 
on the one hand, and the vulnerability of artillery pieces and tanks to the low-risk strategy of 
using air power instead of ground troops. France, for example, ‘attacked heavy artillery and 
armoured vehicles at Mr. Gbagbo’s residence and presidential offices’ in Cote d’Iviore in 
2011. Indeed, UN Security Council Resolution 1975 called for the United Nations Operation 
in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to protect civilians and specifically to ‘prevent the use of heavy 
weapons against the civilian population’.10 Although outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces in Libya have specifically targeted Colonel 
Gaddafi’s heavy weapons. 11
  
 Guerrilla warfare has experienced the largest proportional 
decline but remains the most frequent form of combat in the post Cold War system. Seventy-
two percent of conflict years from 1960-1988 in Africa experienced guerrilla warfare. This 
has fallen to 50% since 1989, a decline of 30%.  
                                                 
9 See Adam Nossiter, “Strikes By UN and France Corner Ivory Coast Leader”, New York Times, April 4, 2011.  
10 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, 'The New Politics of Protection? Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and the 
Responsibility to Protect,' International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): Pg 834-35. 
11 Ibid,  Pg 845. 
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Figure 4.2 – Warfare Type in Africa, 1960-2008 
 
 
Why were higher capability forms of warfare more prevalent during the Cold War? In 96% of 
conflict years from 1960-1988 the government was able to field heavy weapons. Since 1989 
this has fallen to 68%. Clearly the answer turns on how governments obtain and deploy heavy 
weapons. Tanks, aircraft and artillery were readily available for rulers willing to ally with 
(and manipulate the anxieties of) the communist or capitalist blocs during the Cold War.12 
Coker, in 1981, cited that the West perceived ‘southern Africa as a vast chessboard on which 
the Soviet Union can move its pieces at will’.13 As head of the African Bureau in 1975, 
Nathaniel Davis reminisced, ‘the secretary [of state, Henry Kissinger] would freely 
acknowledge, I believe, that he saw Angola as part of the US-Soviet relationship, and not as 
an African problem’. 14
                                                 
12  Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
 Copson argues that, in Somalia, ‘the U.S security assistance 
program... was motivated by the Cold War and U.S strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, the 
13 Christopher Coker, 'Adventurism and Pragmatism: The Soviet Union, Comecon, and Relations with African 
States,' International Affairs 57, no. 4 (1981): Pg 618. 
14 Nathaniel Davis, 'The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir,' Foreign Affairs 57 (1978-1979): Pg 
124. 
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Persian Gulf, and the approaches to the Suez canal’.15 Lock estimates that by 1979 Africa 
received $5 billion in military assistance per year.16
 
  
Foreign advisors also trained personnel in the operation of conventional weapons and in some 
cases operated the weapons themselves.17 East Germany and the USSR had deployed 1700 
combat advisors in addition to 700 tanks, 600 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and 118 
combat aircraft in Ethiopia by the mid 1980s.18 Buzan writes, ‘superpower security dynamics 
made a substantial impact on Africa even though the resources committed were fairly 
small’.19 US defence analyst William Thom wrote in 1981 that African forces ‘are growing in 
size, sophistication, and combat capability’ and ‘can now sustain warfare for a longer period 
over a larger area’.20 He saw that even the intangible ‘morale, discipline, leadership, and 
levels of training’ were on the improve.21
 
  
Military support usually favored the government, forcing insurgencies to rely upon irregular 
tactics. RENAMO succeeded in isolating Maputo (the capital) from the rest of the country by 
the mid-1980s but were unable to make a conventional drive to capture the capital so long as 
Russian, Cuban and East German weapons and training and Zimbabwean, Tanzanian and at 
                                                 
15 Raymond Copson, Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace (New York: Sharpe, 1994) Pg 140. 
16 Peter Lock, 'Africa, Military Downsizing and the Growth in the Security Industry,' in Peace, Profit of 
Plunder?, ed. Jackie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 1999), Pg 14. 
17 A number of African leaders used foreign assistance and training to co-opt select factions of the military and 
reduce the need to develop an indigenous military capacity. President Sassou-Nguesso of Congo-Brazzzaville, 
for example created a “presidential guard” trained, successively, by Cuban, Moroccan, and Israeli advisors’. 
John Clark, 'Petro-Politics in Congo,' Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997): Pg 63. This was part of a widely 
utilised strategy whereby rulers stripped their military forces of conventional capacity to reduce the probability 
of coups occurring. Rulers had little incentive to develop large, well trained armed forces given the poverty of 
the countryside and the generally low probability of inter-state war. Indeed Wang finds that states that were able 
to attract military aid were also less likely to experience coups. Welch places more emphasis on economic 
variables, but the two are linked. He writes that before the sharp increase in coups from 1965-1967 Africa went 
though a period of economic decline, part of which involved a decrease in primary commodity prices. Urban 
discontent at this economic decline provided the impetus for the military to rebel. T.Y Wang, 'Arms Transfers 
and Coups d'Etat: A Study on Sub-Saharan Africa,' Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 6 (1998). Claude E 
Welch, 'Soldier and State in Africa,' The Journal of Modern African Studies 5, no. 3 (1967): Pg 319-20. See 
Kisangani Emizet, 'Explaining the Rise and Fall of Military Regimes: Civil-Military Relations in the Congo,' 
Armed Forces and Society 26, no. 2 (2000): Pg 214, Michael Mann, 'The autonomous power of the state: its 
origins, mechanisms and results,' The European Journal of Sociology 25 (1984), Charles Tilly, 'War Making and 
State Making as Organised Crime,' in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and 
Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For the argument that Africa’s low incidence 
of inter-state war can account for the atrophy of the domestic state see Jeffrey Herbst, 'War and the State in 
Africa,' International Security 14, no. 4 (1990). 
18 Copson, Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace  Pg 128. 
19 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) Pg 251. 
20 William Thom, 'Sub-Saharan Africa's Changing Military Environment,' Armed Forces and Society 11, no. 1 
(1984): Pg 40. 
21 Ibid,  Pg 38. 
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one point, Malawian soldiers remained in the country. Brogan argues that ‘Frelimo’s army 
[the government] was incapable of defeating RENAMO and sweeping the country clear of 
bandits, but it could defend the capital as long as foreign powers kept it supplied’.22 Some 
insurgents were able to procure heavy weapons, usually from neighbouring states or rivals of 
the governments they threatened. UNITA benefited from South African and US military 
support and challenged the Soviet-backed government, at times, with a ‘strategy of 
annihilation’, most famously at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987-1988 (discussed in 
more detail below).23
  
    
The availability of low-cost heavy weapons diminished with the US-Soviet rivalry. 24 
According to Huband, the end of the Cold War engendered the ‘disappearance of any 
importance most of Africa may have once have had for the United States’.25  Figure 4.3 
shows a sharp fall in heavy weapons transfers from the United States and USSR to Africa 
from 1989.26 Between 1993 and 1997, Africa imported its lowest quantity of arms since 
1960.27
  
  
                                                 
22 Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife since 1945 (Maryland: Scarecrow, 
1998) Pg 92. 
23 Inge Tvedten, 'U.S. Policy Towards Angola Since 1975,' The Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 1 
(1992). 
24 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001) Pg 
xiv. 
25 Mark Huband, The Skull Beneath the Skin: Africa After the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001) Pg 
249. 
26 Lock, 'Africa, Military Downsizing and the Growth in the Security Industry,' Pg 14. 
27 Ibid,  Pg 15. 
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Figure 4.3 - Combined US and USSR/Russian Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-
2008 (constant $1990, millions) 28
 
 
 
Weak and lightly armed insurgent groups that, during the Cold War, fought (or would have 
been required to fight) lengthy guerrilla campaigns were able to match governments cut adrift 
from their Cold War patrons.29 For example, the Somali National Movement (SNM) fought a 
guerrilla war against the US-backed President Siad Barre from 1982-1988. US military aid 
was scaled down then removed completely in 1988 as Barre purged the military and relied 
upon a collection of ‘elite’ and ethnically coterminous paramilitary units to protect his 
regime.30 The SNM launched attacks on Butaro and Hargesia in the north, nearly capturing 
both cities in 1988. Barre obliterated the cities in response and destroyed, according to 
Compagnon, the SNM’s ‘well-trained militia’ who were replaced with thousands of untrained 
volunteers.31 With little time to equip and train them, the SNM organised along clan lines32
                                                 
28  Stockholm Peace Research Institute Arms Transfer Database, available from 
 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers, last accessed 10 November 2010 
29 Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, 'International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the 
Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,' American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010): Pg 422. 
30 Hussein M. Adam, 'Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?,' in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and 
Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. William Zartman (London: Lynne Reinner, 1995). 
31 Daniel Compagnon, 'Somalia Armed Movements,' in African Guerrillas, ed. Christopher Clapham (Oxford: 
James Currey, 1998), Pg 88. See also Daniel Compagnon, 'Political Decay in Somalia: From Personal Rule to 
Warlordism,' Refuge 12, no. 5 (1992). 
32 Martin Van-de-Walle, 'Contemporary African Warfare,' in Restructuring the Global Military Sector: New 
Wars, ed. Mary Kaldor and Basker Vanshee (London: United Nations University, 1998), Pg 302-03., Copson, 
Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace  Pg 50-54. 
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and by 1989 two poorly armed and organised militias were battling for control of Mogadishu, 
the capital.  
 
However, the question remains: does this rise in the incidence of low-capability warfare 
coincide with a rise in the incidence of fighting in Africa’s capitals? Figure 4.4 charts the 
incidence and proportion of fighting within 25km of African capital cities from 1960-2008. 
No African capital experienced fighting during an ongoing civil war from 1967-1974. A 
maximum of two incidents per year occurred from 1960-1988. Since 1989, the figure has 
been consistently higher. The proportion of all conflict years that saw fighting within 25km 
has hovered between about 10% and 40% between 1989 and 2008, with 2008 being the 
highest recorded year (44%), just above 1998 (43%). Indeed the probability of a capital city 
being subject to fighting was just 8% between 1960 and 1988. From 1989-2008 this figure 
jumped to 26%.  
 
Figure 4.4 – Incidence and Proportion of Fighting within 25km of the Capital City, 1960-
2008 
 
 
 
Changes in available military technology and changes in the geography of fighting appear to 
be connected. Figure 4.5 charts a series of descriptive statistics for the samples of low-
capability, conventional and guerrilla warfare. It is rare for fighting to reach the capital in 
conventional and guerrilla warfare. Just 12% and 10% of conflict years respectively 
0 1 
2 3 
4 5 
6 7 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
19
60
 
19
62
 
19
64
 
19
66
 
19
68
 
19
70
 
19
72
 
19
74
 
19
76
 
19
78
 
19
80
 
19
82
 
19
84
 
19
86
 
19
88
 
19
90
 
19
92
 
19
94
 
19
96
 
19
98
 
20
00
 
20
02
 
20
04
 
20
06
 
20
08
 
Pr
po
rti
on
 o
f C
on
fli
ct
 Y
ea
rs
 (%
) 
Proportion 
Incidence 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  N
o.
 o
f I
nc
id
en
ts
 
Chapter Four – Empirics I 
 150 
threatened the capital. Capital cities are at a 47% risk of being attacked every year in low-
capability warfare. It takes nearly twice as long for a conventional conflict to reach the capital 
when compared to low-capability warfare and nearly three times as long for an guerrilla 
conflict. If a capital is assaulted for the first time during low-capability warfare there is nearly 
a two in three chance it will be attacked again in the next year. In many cases fighting does 
not recede to the countryside but stalemates. Brazzaville, Monrovia and Mogadishu were 
partitioned and besieged for years on end. The chances of repeat attacks are lower in 
conventional warfare, just one in three. Insurgents with the capacity challenge the 
government in their seat of power also tend to have the capacity to expel them. For example, 
President Mobutu and the remnants of his army chose to surrender Kinshasa to advancing 
rebels after losing the battle of Kenge. The excoriated Armed Forces of Zaire (FAZ) could 
not match the combined strength of ADFL rebels supported by soldiers, heavy weapons and 
air support from Rwanda, Uganda and Angola. Repeat attacks are comparatively common in 
guerrilla warfare. There is a fifty percent chance that the first attack will be followed a second 
the next year. Burundi’s civil war accounts for much of this increased risk and may reflect the 
idiosyncrasies of Burundi’s physical and social geography. Mountains to the east of 
Bujumbura (the capital) and a substantial Hutu population in the suburb of Kinama may 
explain the ability the National Forces of Liberation (FNL) to consistently shell and occupy 
the capital despite their material weakness when compared to the government.33
 
 
Figure 4.5 – Descriptive Statistics by Warfare Type 
 
 Low-capability Conventional Guerrilla 
Proportion of Fighting in 
Capital 
47% 12% 10% 
Average Time to reach 
Capital (years) 
2.22 4.16 6.5 
Chances of fighting in the 
Capital in consecutive Years 
60% 29% 50% 
 
 
                                                 
33 'The Burundi Rebellion and Ceasefire Negotations,' International Crisis Group, Nairobi/Brussells, no. 6 
August (2002): Pg 5. Floribert Ngaruko and Janvier Kkurunziza, 'An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in 
Burundi,' Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3 (2000): Pg 379. 
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Thus far, it appears that Africa’s capitals are at a higher risk of fighting in low-capability 
warfare. A sustained rise in the incidence of low-capability warfare coincides with a 
sustained rise in the incidence of fighting near capital cities. Low-capability conflicts are 
more likely to be fought near the capital, threaten the capital earlier, and stalemate more often 
when compared to conventional and guerrilla warfare. It may be the case, however, that low-
capability warfare occurs disproportionately in smaller countries or that rebels seeking to 
secede choose guerrilla or conventional military strategies. It may simply be that smaller 
numbers of military personnel, regardless of armament, find it difficult to keep fighting from 
the political centre. As the methodology chapter noted, multiple regression can control for 
these confounding factors. Figure 4.6 displays the results of logistic regression analyses 
detailed in Chapter 3.  
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Figure 4.6 – Models 4.1-4.6, Risk to Africa’s Capital Cities, 1960-2008 
      (4.1 - base)     (4.2 - sieges) (4.3 – post cold war)  (4.4 – South Africa) (4.5 – arms transfers) 
low-capability  1.851 1.617 1.406 1.849  
 (0.674)*** (0.627)*** (0.708)** (0.670)***  
guerrilla  1.275 1.059 1.480 1.275  
 (0.671)* (0.511)** (0.685)** (0.668)*  
incompatibility 1.937 1.490 1.987 1.839 1.760 
 (1.377) (1.223) (1.394) (1.399) (1.314) 
land area (ln) -0.519 -0.375 -0.354 -0.512 -0.339 
 (0.274)* (0.188)** (0.266) (0.273)* (0.248) 
military size (ln) -0.963 -0.636 -1.163 -0.948 -0.720 
 (0.243)*** (0.210)*** (0.309)*** (0.245)*** (0.344)** 
intensity (ln) 0.313 0.279 0.435 0.309 0.357 
 (0.133)** (0.133)** (0.135)*** (0.134)** (0.139)*** 
invasion 2.261 1.775 2.241 2.236 1.548 
 (0.994)** (0.892)** (0.911)** (0.979)** (0.686)** 
time 0.313 0.328 0.295 0.314 0.308 
 (0.249) (0.183)* (0.254) (0.247) (0.215) 
time squared -0.017 -0.014 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) 
time cubed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
time since last fail (ln)  -1.141    
  (0.360)***    
post cold war   1.601   
   (0.622)**   
arms transfers (ln)     -0.600 
     (0.202)*** 
Constant -0.294 -1.079 -3.624 -0.195 -0.934 
 (3.410) (2.923) (3.871) (3.460) (3.119) 
N           397           397           397           367           402 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Robust standard errors clustered by country
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Model 4.1 confirms a number of these suspicions. Secessionist wars are seven times 
less likely to strike the capital in an average year of combat (although the 
‘incompatibility’ variable does not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance). We need to keep in mind, however, that rebellions may tailor their 
objectives to their military capabilities. Buhaug has argued that weaker rebellions are 
more likely to pursue separatist goals.34 Controlling the capital is simply out of reach 
for some insurgents. Small armies and small countries fight closer to the centre of 
power, corroborating earlier research. Years of high intensity are more likely to occur 
near the capital. Insurgents supported by the regular soldiers of a foreign army are 
nine times more likely to strike the capital than those without. Reyntjens, for example, 
wrote that the ADFL march from Goma to Kinshasa in 1997 ‘was possible only with 
exceptional logistics in terms of reconnaissance, communication, transport and supply 
logistics’ provided by Rwanda, Uganda and Angola. 35  Figure 4.7 charts the 
relationship between time and the threat to a capital city. Most conflicts are at a peak 
probability (other things being equal) in the 17th year of war before a plateau and peak 
again in the latter stages of a conflict, although none of the time variables reach 
statistical significance in the base model. 36
                                                 
34 See Halvard Buhaug, 'Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War,' Journal of Peace 
Research 43, no. 6 (2006). 
 Recall that time variables ‘pick up’ 
unexplained variation in the model. The second peak between 28-35 years probably 
reflects the inability of Model 4.1 to explain the late stages of a civil war, say, for 
example, the capture of Addis Ababa in 1991 by the Ethiopian People’s Democratic 
Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) after nearly 30 years of conflict. Perhaps a ‘cumulative 
casualties’ variable would capture the tendency for governments to exhaust their 
military capabilities over time, although it would be very difficult to distinguish 
between government casualties and insurgent casualties. As Figure 4.7 shows, the 
relationship between time and the threat to the capital is not dramatically different 
when run without control variables. The risk stops rising earlier (at about 7 years) and 
35 Filip Reyntijens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) Pg 67. 
36 The base model remains largely unchanged with cubic splines instead of the time squared method. 
The ‘low-capability warfare’ variable remains significant (b = 2.078, p = 0.003). Also, the time 
variables are not significant in a model with no other variables.  
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falls away before rising in unison late in the conflict. This does suggest that there is 
less unexplained variation in the model for periods early in a conflict. 
 
Figure 4.7 – Probability of Fighting Within 25km of the Capital by Time (Years) 
 
 
 
Nonetheless, these confounding factors do not account for the increased risk of 
fighting associated with low-capability warfare, which remains significant at the 0.01 
level. We can be 99% confident when rejecting the null hypothesis that no 
relationship exists between the threat to Africa’s capitals and the ‘type’ of warfare 
experienced. Change from a symmetric but high capability war-system to a symmetric 
but low-capability war-system substantially increases the chances of fighting near the 
centre of power. When compared with conventional warfare the odds of fighting 
within 25km of the capital city are six times higher.  
 
Results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks. Independent variables have VIF 
factors under 2, meaning that multicollinearity should not bias the p-values.37
                                                 
37 Variables controlling for temporal correlation do introduce a high level of collinearity into the 
model, but they only correlate with one another. When these variables are removed low-capability 
warfare remains significant in the model (sig < 0.001).  
 Model 
4.2 includes a ‘stalemate’ control and shows that fighting in Africa’s capitals is 
‘sticky’. Once a capital city has ‘survived’ one or two years the chances of a repeat 
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episode fall. A one year of respite will halve the odds of another attack. While the 
‘stalemate’ variable reduces the coefficient on the low-capability warfare variable 
from 1.851 to 1.617 these conflicts still have odds of fighting within 25km of the 
capital that are five times higher than conventional warfare. Additionally, the p-value 
remains significant at the 0.01 level. Stalemates, such as the siege of Monrovia and 
repeated attacks on the capital followed by retreats to the countryside, such as in 
Sierra Leone, explain the increased risk observed in Model 4.1.  
 
Model 4.3 includes a control for the post Cold War period. Recall that Kaldor and le 
Billion argue that the salience of economic geography in ‘new wars’ is a function of 
economic globalisation, especially after the Cold War. Model 4.3 partially bears this 
hypothesis out. Civil wars from 1989-2008 were roughly five times more likely to 
experience fighting within 25km of the capital. Nonetheless, the coefficient for low 
capability warfare remains statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Both the 
coefficient and statistical significance of ‘low-capability warfare’ are largely 
unaffected if we remove South Africa from the sample due to its higher level of 
economic development and less ‘capital heavy’ economic geography. Indeed the 
results hold if we control for GDP per capita as well (sig = 0.021, b= 1.683).  
 
Further robustness checks were conducted but the results are not reported in Figure 
4.6. Two observations stand out in a residual scatter plot – cases that the model 
predicted very poorly – Mauritania in 1976 and 1977. Model 4.1 predicts that 
secessionist conflicts are fought in the countryside. The Eritrean People’s Liberation 
Front (EPLF), for example, restricted its campaign to northern Ethiopia even when 
the government military effort collapsed in 1991, leaving the capture of Addis Ababa 
to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). 38 Yet, the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Sanguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO), fighting for 
independence of the Western Sahara, staged two attacks on Nouakchott, one in 1976 
and one in 1977. These attacks, in combination with assaults on the ore mining region 
of Zouarte, led Mauritania to withdraw from Western Sahara in August 1979.39
                                                 
38 Brogan, World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife since 1945  Pg 62. 
 It is 
difficult to explain why this case deviates from the pattern but the government of 
Mauritania was weak and the desert terrain facilitated lighting strikes on stationary 
39 In turn, Morocco occupied the area. Ibid,  Pg 84. 
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targets. Removing this case does not substantively change the results (b = 1.195, sig = 
0.009). There was no obvious cluster of cases with very high leverage values, so no 
model was run removing such cases. Findings are robust if a control for the balance of 
power between rebels and the government is included (b = 1.739, sig = 0.009). 
Random effects models and Generalised Estimation Equation (GEE) can minimise 
problems of intra-cluster colinearity. In a random effects model the ‘low-capability 
warfare’ variable remains significant at the 0.10 level, (b = 2.039, sig = 0.074). 
Results are largely unchanged with a binomial logit-link GEE model (b = 1.256, sig = 
0.002).40
 
  
Model 4.5 includes the natural log of conventional arms transfers instead of the 
‘warfare’ variables. Access to heavy weapons is an important explanation of where 
fighting is likely to occur, a result independent of the size of the military. Low levels 
of offensive technology in a war-system are associated with a higher level of threat to 
the capital city. Countries that import nothing in the way of conventional weapons for 
three consecutive years are at the highest risk of fighting within 25km of the capital. 
Small inputs of offensive technology quickly dissolve that threat, however. Just $9 
million over three years (an average of $3 million per year) reduces the threat by 
82%. This result is quite robust. VIF figures are under 2.5 and ‘arms transfers’ 
remains significant at the 0.01 level when controls for sieges are included, when a 
post Cold War control is included and when South Africa is excluded. Random 
effects and GEE models also return results significant at the 0.01 level. Results from 
Model 4.5 substantially increase our confidence in the robustness of a relationship 
between the risk of a threatened capital and the military technology at the disposal of 
belligerents by showing a specific link between offensive technology and the 
geography of conflict.  
 
How strong is the link between low-capability warfare and the threat to Africa’s 
capitals? How does it compare to the effects of control variables? With all values set 
to their means (and binary variables to their modes) the probability of an average 
first-year conventional civil war experiencing conflict within 25km of the capital city 
is about 1.2%. A change to low-capability warfare increases the probability of 
                                                 
40 The results also remain robust if we re-test Model 4.1 in the entire sample of civil wars (b = 1.802, 
sig = 0.007). 
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fighting within 25km to about 7.1%, according to Model 4.1. Comparatively, an 
invasion increases the probability to 10.4% and changing from a secessionist conflict 
to a conflict over control of the state would increase the probability to 7.7%. 
Changing from a conventional to a guerrilla war increases the probability to 4.4%. It 
would take over 30 years of combat in conventional warfare to reach a 7.1% chance 
of fighting near the capital. It is difficult to estimate how the number of military 
personnel and the intensity of conflict compare because changes have differential 
impacts at varying sections of the scale. However, reducing the size of the military 
from 8000 to 1000 soldiers would increase the probability of fighting within 25km of 
the capital to about 7.2%.41 Increasing the number of battle related deaths from the 
minimum of 25 to roughly 10,000 during a conflict year will achieve the same 
effect. 42
 
 Put another way, an 8000 strong army armed with small and light arms 
facing off against a lightly armed insurgency has about the same chances of seeing 
fighting within 25km of the capital as 1000 strong, but heavily armed government 
facing a heavily armed insurgent group.  
The course of Angola’s war is a useful illustration of how changes in offensive 
capacity induce changes in the threat to a capital. Model 4.5 predicts that during 1975 
there was a 60.3% chance of Luanda experiencing fighting. We can observe how 
changes in offensive technology have affected the probability of fighting in Luanda 
by using the average arms imports during this year ($0 million) as a baseline. Note 
that calculations do not take into account changes in the size of the military and 
battle-intensity and are intended only to show the effects of changes in average arms 
transfers. Figure 4.8 charts the level of arms imported by Angola by the probability of 
fighting within 25km of Luanda. 
  
                                                 
41 This is, roughly, a 2-unit change on the logarithmic scale.  
42 Representing, again, roughly, a 6-unit change on the logarithmic scale.  
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Figure 4.8 – Probability of Fighting in Luanda vs Arms Imports, 1975-2002 
 
 
Angola’s civil war began as a rebellion against Portuguese colonial rule. When the 
Portuguese withdrew in April 1974 it was left to the three main factions, the MPLA, 
FNLA and UNITA, to form a transitional government before independence, set for 
November 11, 1975.43 Open warfare erupted in January 1974 despite an accord to this 
effect.44 Fighters from the MPLA and FNLA were armed primarily with rifles and 
lacked heavy weapons until mid 1975.45 Fighting centred on the control of Luanda 
and street battles cost the lives of up to 20,000 people. According to Lockyer, ‘major 
clashes in rural areas were infrequent’.46
 
 It was not until July 1975 that the FNLA 
were expelled from Luanda with the assistance of Katangan gendarmeries (refugees 
from the Katagan province of Zaire).  
Angola’s civil war was internationalized from mid-1975. Zaire sent thousands of 
soldiers to support the FNLA and assist with the (unsuccessful) re-capture of Luanda. 
The FNLA also received military hardware from China, including armoured vehicles. 
South Africa supported UNITA with, at various points, South African soldiers, 
                                                 
43 Copson, Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace  Pg 42. 
44 Adam Lockyer, 'Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous resources 
on the course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts' (University of Sydney, 2009) Pg 132. 
45 Ibid,  Pg 140. 
46 Ibid,  Pg 136. 
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armour and artillery. The MPLA, entrenched in Luanda, received tanks, fighter jets, 
heavy artillery (including multiple rocket launchers, the ‘Stalin Organs’) Soviet and 
Cuban instruction and, by November 1975, Cuban combat troops. The MPLA 
defeated the FNLA in a series of battles for the town of Caxito (where the FNLA 
forces were concentrated) culminating in the battle of the Quifangondo valley, just 30 
kilometres north of Luanda in late November 1975. The 122mm Stalin Organs were 
used to devastating effect against the Zairian and FNLA armour and infantry from the 
high ground overlooking the valley.47  Foreign assistance continued to the MPLA and 
UNITA through the late 1970s and into the 1980s, transforming the offensive 
capabilities of both the government and UNITA. The MPLA created a ‘highly 
mechanised’ army of 150,000 men. 48  Angola’s conflict morphed from a low-
capability conflict centred on Luanda into conventional warfare fought along, with 
some exceptions, discernible front lines in the countryside. As Polish Journalist 
Ryzard Kapuściński observed, the ‘war in Angola has changed in character. Until 
recently it was primarily…fought with light weapons…[but] today it is more and 
more a war of regular armies and heavy equipment.’.49 UNITA received around $15 
million per year from the United States in military assistance during the mid 1980s 
along with South African weapons and air support (amounting to roughly $66 million 
in 1980 and $200 million by the mid-1980s).50
 
 The MPLA received up to $1 billion in 
Soviet military aid per year, including modern conventional weapons, and retained the 
services of up to 50,000 Cuban soldiers as a backstop.  
The battle of Cuito-Cuavanale was a textbook conventional encounter. Government 
soldiers (the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola or FAPLA) attacked 
the town of Mavinga in the far south east with $1 billion worth of Soviet weaponry in 
1987. Mavinga was an important supply route for South African arms and assistance 
to UNITA and just 150 miles north of Jamba, UNITA’s headquarters.51
                                                 
47 Ibid,  Pg 153. 
 FAPLA’s 
offensive, however, was rebuffed by South African intervention and the surviving 
soldiers retreated to Cuito Cuavanale, a small garrison town. As Cuito Cuanvanale 
(and its millions in modern weaponry) was poised to fall, Cuba dispatched 15,000 
48 Van-de-Walle, 'Contemporary African Warfare,' Pg 299. 
49 Ryszard Kapusinski, Another Day of Life (New York: Vintage Books, 2001) Pg 60. 
50 Lockyer, 'Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous resources on the 
course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts'  Pg 175. 
51 Karl Maier, Angola: Promises and Lies (London: Serif, 2007) Pg 25. 
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combat soldiers including the elite 50th division that had defeated the South Africans 
in 1975 and 1976.52 The ensuing battle involved tens of thousands of soldiers on both 
sides, modern artillery and armour (including the use of accurate South African G5 
155mm howitzers and the ‘newly developed’ Oilfant tanks),53 jet aircraft (such as the 
MiG-23) and attack helicopters (such as the Russian-built MI-24).54
 
 The battle had 
descended into a stalemate by 1988, but it is important to note that Cuito held little 
economic or political significance for either side. It was not a major town like Luanda 
or Huambo and its location as the largest African land battle since El Alamein had 
everything to do with the retreat of FAPLA and Cuito Cuanvanale’s role as a garrison. 
Movements of military concentrations structured the location of fighting when both 
UNITA and the MPLA possessed high offensive capabilities, not the economic value 
of those locations. Luanda did not see fighting during this period, reflecting the low 
probability of capitals being the focus of military strategy where offensive capabilities 
are high. Although they may be the final objective, from the perspective of UNITA 
and South Africa, the MPLA’s offensive fighting capacity had to be destroyed first, 
and from the MPLA’s perspective, UNITA’s conventional capacity would equally 
have to be destroyed.  
Cuba, the Soviet Union, South Africa and the US disengaged from Angola in 1989 
and the offensive capabilities of the MPLA government were reduced under the first 
Angolan peace accords (the Biscee accord) signed in May 1991. One-hundred and 
fifty thousand soldiers from UNITA and FAPLA were to be demobilised and folded 
into a new 50,000 strong national army (the Armed Forces of Angola, or FAA). On 
the eve of parliamentary and presidential elections in 1992 between the MPLA, led by 
Eduado dos Santos, and UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, the government had 
demobilised half of its soldiers. UNITA, however, had demobilised just a quarter and 
retained around 60,000 soldiers under arms.55
                                                 
52 Ibid,  Pg 26. 
 Logistic difficulties and a precipitous 
fall in military aid had compounded FAPLA’s offensive problems. The MPLA 
received over a billion dollars worth of conventional weapons in 1987 and a 
comparable amount in 1988. Less than $1 million made their way into the country in 
53 Lockyer, 'Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars: The effect of exogenous resources on the 
course and nature of the Angolan and Afghan conflicts'  Pg 188-89. 
54 Maier, Angola: Promises and Lies  Pg 27. 
55 Ibid,  Pg 58. Van-de-Walle, 'Contemporary African Warfare,' Pg 300. 
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1991 and 1992. 56
 
 Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola 
(UNAVEM) Lieutenant Colonel Mortlock noted in 1992 that:  
‘any conventional force, whether European or African, will collapse if it is confined to assembly points 
and cut off from logistical support... UNITA, as a guerrilla force, can survive much longer because 
they are trained to live off the land’.57
 
  
The MPLA created paramilitary units in place of a mechanised army. Its ‘ninjas’ were 
armed mostly with AK-47s and Uzis and probably numbered 20,000.58
 
 When war 
between the MPLA and UNITA restarted in December 1992, Van de Walle noted 
that: 
‘without the ability to launch massive conventional assaults as it had in the 1980s, the Angolan army 
reverted to military strategies indistinguishable from UNITA’s. Only after expensive re-equipping 
could the army return to conventional offensive action.’59
 
 
UNITA made startling successes in late 1992 and early 1993, holding up to 70% of 
Angola’s territory and directly threatening Luanda by capturing Caxito, just 35 miles 
away.60 According to Maier, at the height of UNITA’s advance in early 1993 the last 
government checkpoint north was at Cacuaco, roughly 15 kilometres from central 
Luanda. The MPLA first concentrated its efforts on holding Luanda (it is estimated 
that 2000 people were killed in the 1992 ‘battle for Luanda’) and, without the capacity 
to conduct sophisticated offensive manoeuvres, besiegement was the offensive 
strategy of choice.61
 
 Van de Walle describes the character of what because know as 
Angola’s ‘war of the cities’:  
‘Across the country, towns and cities have been fought over, pounded to rubble by artillery assault, 
surrounded by land mines and starved into human degradation... The war in Angola is neither guerrilla 
warfare nor mechanised field battles, but an amalgam of the two’.62
 
  
                                                 
56  Data available from the Stockholm Peace Research Institute “International Arms Transfers” 
Database, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php, accessed 16 May 2011 
57 As cited in Maier, Angola: Promises and Lies  Pg 60. 
58 Ibid,  Pg 58. 
59 Van-de-Walle, 'Contemporary African Warfare,' Pg 301. 
60 Maier, Angola: Promises and Lies  Pg 115. 
61 Van-de-Walle, 'Contemporary African Warfare,' Pg 300. 
62 Ibid,  Pg 301. 
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Van de Walle argues that cities were the target of choice for ‘political rather than 
strategic or economic importance’ because ‘for both sides, control of big towns 
represents a claim to legitimacy’.63
 
 As we have seen it is not easy to separate the 
political or symbolic value from the economic value. Insofar as they increased the 
chances of international recognition as sovereigns, either of a united Angola or by 
partition, cities held both a political and an economic value.  
Angola is host alluvial and kimberlite diamond deposits, located mostly in Lunda 
Norte and the Cuango valley. 64  According to Le-Billion, diamonds played an 
important role in the 1992-1994 fighting when UNITA enjoyed a ‘sharp military 
advantage’.65 Pierce observes that the civil war had ‘passed from being primarily a 
political conflict, to being a battle over resources, and in particular, diamonds’ by the 
mid 1990s.66 UNITA was able ‘to gain control over vast mining areas and capture key 
mines’ in 1992 67  and the MPLA, lacking the conventional offensive capacity to 
recapture them, contracted Executive Outcomes (a South African-based private 
security firm) to re-build FAPLA and assist in re-taking the town of N’talatonda 
(190km from Luanda as the crow flies), the oil fields of Soyo and the diamond mining 
areas of Cafunfo in mid July 1994.68 UNITA had lost the Lunda fields by 1997 and by 
2000 the government claimed that UNITA were ‘routed’ from large swathes of 
diamond mining areas.69
 
  
Angola’s civil war is a neat illustration of how a changes in the technology of 
rebellion induce changes in military strategy and the geographic pattern of fighting. 
What was a war fought deep in the Angolan countryside and, at least on the MPLA’s 
behalf, with a strategy of annihilation, morphed into a war of siege where both the 
MPLA and UNITA relied upon a ‘strategy of exhaustion’ to lay claim to Angola’s 
most valuable cities and natural resources. While the belligerents retained a high 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
64 Phillipe Le-Billion, 'Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000,' 
African Affairs 100, no. 398 (2001): Pg 67. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Justin Pearce, 'War, Peace and Diamonds in Angola: Popular Perceptions of the Diamond Industry in 
the Lundas,' African Security Review 13, no. 2 (2004). 
67 Le-Billion, 'Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000,' Pg 68. 
68 Herbert Howe, 'Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes,' The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 36, no. 2 (1998): Pg 312. 
69 Pearce, 'War, Peace and Diamonds in Angola: Popular Perceptions of the Diamond Industry in the 
Lundas.' 
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capacity for conventional offense the threat to Luanda remained low. But as their 
conventional offensive capacity declined, both the MPLA and UNITA focused their 
military strategies on positional defence against an enemy they believed lacked the 
capability to oust them. The threat to Luanda (and to Angola’s major cities) increased, 
as did the threat to high-value to space areas such as the oil fields of Soyo and 
diamond mines in the east.  
 
Replicating Buhaug and Rod 2006 
 
The preceding section has showed that when compared to conventional and guerrilla 
warfare, low-capability warfare is more likely to be fought near to the capital. But we 
might still ask, is low-capability warfare less likely to be fought in the periphery? Do 
governments and insurgents eschew fighting in the countryside in low-capability 
warfare and how does this compare with the spatial determinants of conflict incidence 
in conventional and guerrilla warfare? Is there a systematic relationship between the 
location of an area in proximity to the capital and its chances of experiencing 
fighting? As the methodology chapter argued, replicating  Buhaug and Rod’s spatially 
disaggregated study of African civil wars allows us some leverage on these questions.  
 
While Buhaug and Rod’s data are low-resolution and do not vary temporally, 
replicating their study is an important robustness test for the results already reported 
in this chapter (that do account for temporal variation). Models 4.6 - 4.8 regress the 
onset of fighting in a grid-space against a battery of spatial variables in the sample of 
low-capability warfare. This method is then repeated in the sample of countries 
experiencing guerrilla warfare (Model 4.7) and conventional warfare (Model 4.8). 
Figure 4.9 displays the results.  
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Figure 4.9 – Correlates of Fighting Onset in Low-Capability, Guerrilla and 
Conventional Warfare 
 
 (4.6 – low-cap) (4.7 - guerrilla) (4.8 - conventional) 
distance from diamonds (ln) -1.198 -2.328 -1.597 
 (0.477)** (0.754)*** (0.479)*** 
road density (ln) -0.361 0.412 0.732 
 (0.150)** (0.311) (0.222)*** 
distance from border (ln) 1.493 -0.447 -0.176 
 (0.464)*** (0.138)*** (0.111) 
distance from petroleum (ln) -5.420 -0.557 0.966 
 (2.215)** (0.396) (0.430)** 
distance from capital (ln) -9.399 -0.087 -1.287 
 (4.303)** (0.544) (0.659)* 
population density (ln) 0.095 0.403 -0.644 
 (0.238) (0.177)** (0.325)** 
language difference 5.054 -0.348 -1.371 
 (2.592)* (0.586) (0.494)*** 
spatial lag 56.454 6.487 9.625 
 (22.507)** (2.461)*** (2.713)*** 
Constant 83.606 14.593 9.199 
 (37.732)** (6.207)** (8.392) 
N 219 927 626 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country 
 
Results from models 4.6 – 4.8 suggest that the geographic distribution of conflict 
incidence varies according to warfare type. Put another way, the ‘risk profiles’ for 
low-capability, guerrilla and conventional warfare exhibit substantial differences. 
According to Model 4.1, fighting in low-capability warfare is more likely near the 
capital city, areas of diamond and petroleum production, and language difference. 
Fighting is unlikely close to an international border and in areas of high road 
density.70
                                                 
70 It should be noted that the population density variable and spatial lag variables exhibit VIF factors 
under 3, but over 2.5. The results for the distance from the capital hold, albeit at a lower level of 
statistical significance (sig = 0.081) if just the spatial lag and the distance from the capital are used.  
 The magnetism of capital cities in low-capability warfare is not accounted 
for by high population densities – capitals seem to become targets for reasons other 
than controlling these populations. The standout result, however, is the huge 
coefficient on the spatial lag variable. When one grid cell experiences conflict it 
substantially raises the chances that its neighbours will also experience conflict. Such 
rapid contagion might reflect the government’s inability and unwillingness to fight 
decisive battles outside the capital city and allow free reign to rebels moving in an 
occupying the unprotected space. It may also reflect the smaller number of cases (219 
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grids and 132 conflict onsets). Overall, the results from Model 4.6 provide an 
additional level of confidence in the results of Models 4.1 - 4.5. Africa’s economic 
geography appears to play an important role in structuring where fighting will occur 
in low-capability warfare.   
 
Guerrilla and conventional warfare exhibit different risk profiles. Guerrilla warfare 
gravitates towards areas of diamond production and population centres near an 
international border. Contagion across grid cells is present but this effect is much 
smaller than in low-capability warfare. A picture of combat over peripheral 
communities matches many of the empirical characteristics of guerrilla warfare 
discussed in Chapter 2. Economic geography plays a smaller role in attracting conflict 
in conventional warfare. Fighting gravitates towards diamond deposits, areas of high 
road density and the capital city (although the coefficient is much smaller than in low-
capability warfare and the p-value higher) and is repelled by population centres, areas 
of petroleum production and language difference. Again, these findings reflect the 
picture in Chapter 2. Strategic bottlenecks, like roads, are crucial to the manoeuver 
and supply of a mechanised army. While major cities might be an objective, the actual 
fighting occurs away from these areas.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Analysis in this chapter suggest a strong link between low-capability warfare and the 
incidence of fighting in Africa’s capitals - a relationship not explained by the size of 
armed forces, the intensity of fighting or the smallness of countries. The threat to 
Africa’s capitals increases as heavy weapons and armour are removed from a war-
system. Angola’s civil war served to illustrate this relationship. When transfers of 
conventional weapons to both UNITA and the MPLA declined, the conflict shifted 
from a ‘bush war’ over bases and garrisons in the countryside to a ‘war of the cities’, 
including, at one point, the capital Luanda. Spatially disaggregated data exhibited a 
similar pattern. Capital cities attract fighting in low-capability warfare to an extent 
greater than in guerrilla or conventional warfare. On the whole, fighting in low-
capability warfare gravitates towards areas of economic importance while more 
mixed patterns characterised guerrilla and conventional warfare. We have not 
Chapter Four – Empirics I 
 166 
established causation, just that there is a conspicuous, powerful, and as yet 
unexplained statistical connection between fighting in Africa’s capital cities and the 
presence of low offensive military capacity in a war-system. Evidence in this section 
was supportive of hypothesis 1. The next chapter investigates the evidence for 
hypothesis 2.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
Empirics II: Low-capability Warfare and the 
Concentration of Fighting in Africa’s Capitals 
 
Chapter 2 predicted that if a ‘strategy of exhaustion’ is employed in low-capability warfare 
then we should observe fighting concentrating around Africa’s capital cities and a high 
correlation between areas of economic importance and clusters of fighting. This chapter tests 
these predictions and proceeds as follows. Firstly, a combination of descriptive statistics and 
OLS regression show, with some caveats, that a higher proportion of battles are fought in the 
capital city in low-capability warfare when compared to guerrilla and conventional warfare. 
Although this is the case, the majority of fighting in low-capability warfare still occurs in the 
countryside. Concentrations of fighting are explored visually to ascertain (a) whether fighting 
does indeed concentrate in the capital in low-capability warfare and (b) how the strength of 
this concentration compares with fighting in the countryside. Is fighting in the countryside 
diffuse as Chapter 2 predicted? If there are competing concentrations do they correlate with 
areas of high economic value? Does this pattern vary according to the type of warfare?  
Results from the visual analysis show that 80% of low-capability conflicts exhibit a 
concentration of fighting in the capital. Just 25% of conventional conflicts and 18% of 
guerrilla conflicts exhibit the same pattern. Within the sample of low-capability conflicts a 
division between unipolar and bipolar structures emerges. In half of the bipolar structures, the 
concentration in the countryside corresponds with areas of paramount economic importance. 
Overall, the findings of this chapter support hypothesis 2.  
 
The Proportion of Fighting in the Capital City 
 
Are Africa’s capitals subject to a higher proportion of combat in low-capability warfare? 
According to Figure 5.1 the answer is yes, but only just. Around 18.3% of battles in low-
capability warfare occur in the capital city, only slightly higher than the 13.3% for 
conventional warfare. Guerrilla conflicts exhibit a much lower proportion, just 5%. However, 
one case, Guinea-Bissau, accounts for the similarity between conventional and low-capability 
warfare. Bissau (the capital city) was the site of 86% of fighting during 1998 and 91% in 
1999. This is the only example of conventional warfare with a proportion above 10%. Low-
capability warfare, however, is more evenly distributed with cases between 40% and 60%, 
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61% and 80% and 81% and 100%. The mean concentration of fighting for conventional 
warfare is just 1.7% without Guinea-Bissau. If the two highest values in the sample of low-
capability warfare are removed the mean drops to 13.65%. As is inevitable when working 
with a smaller sample size (recall that the data were only available from 1997-2008, not 
1960-2008) results may reflect a small number of cases. Guinea-Bissau also fits the category 
of a ‘low’ conventional arms importer. Offensive capacity was likely to have been limited by 
the technology at the disposal of President Vieira and General Mane’s followers, even though 
some tanks and heavy artillery may have been deployed at points in the battle for Bissau. The 
average level of battle concentration in the capital for low arms importing conflict years was 
around 17%. For ‘high’ arms importing years the average concentration was 3%.  
 
Figure 5.1 – Battle Concentration by Warfare Type, 1997-2008 
 
Warfare Type Proportion of Battles in 
Capital 
Proportion of Battles in 
Capital (no Guinea Bissau) 
Low-capability 18.4% 18.4% 
Guerrilla 5.4% 5.4% 
Conventional 13.3% 1.7% 
 
Figure 5.4 displays OLS regression results estimating the effect of warfare types on battle 
concentration. Model 5.1 includes all control variables and all cases. Results show that 
shifting from conventional warfare to low-capability warfare adds just over 2.5% to the 
proportion of fighting that occurs in the capital city. A p-value above conventional levels of 
statistical significance (sig = 0.683) means we cannot reject the null hypothesis. On the other 
hand, guerrilla warfare tends to concentrate away from the capital city, although again, the 
variable does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. A change from 
conventional to guerrilla warfare reduces the proportion of fighting in the capital by 4.2% - a 
moderate change considering the average conventional war experiences 13% of fighting in 
the capital.  
 
Numbers of military personnel and land area are significant at conventional levels in model 
5.1. Increasing the government army from 1,000 to 10,000 soldiers reduces the proportion of 
fighting in the capital by about 6%. A small country such as Sierra Leone will experience an 
average of 9% more fighting in Freetown than a large country such as the DRC will in 
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Kinshasa. A significant relationship between time and conflict concentration emerges in 
models 5.1, 5.3 and 5.4. Twenty-six percent of fighting in an average first-year civil war is 
predicted to occur in the capital. According to Model 5.1 the proportion falls thereafter only 
rising again briefly in the 20th year of combat. Rebellions may strike early at the capital but if 
that bid fails they find themselves increasingly confined to the countryside. 
 
While multicollinearity should not bias the results (as all VIF statistics are below or near to 2) 
there are four outliers with high levels of concentration in the capital: the Central African 
Republic in 1997, Lesotho in 1998 and Guinea-Bissau in 1998-1999. Figure 5.2 charts 
residual values against the Correlates of War country number.  
 
Figure 5.2 – Residual Values from Model 5.1 by COW Number 
 
These three outliers share two commonalities – conflict emerged in the capital city rather than 
approached it from the countryside and a foreign power intervened early and decisively to 
contain the fighting. Warfare in Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho and the Central African Republic 
was restricted from evolving and spreading into the countryside in the way a ‘normal’ 
conflict might, thus accounting for the unusually high proportions of fighting in the capital. 
For example, in 1996 and 1997 soldiers of the Military of the Central African Republic 
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mutinied in Bangui and clashed with President Patasse’s Presidential Guard. French soldiers 
deployed in Bangui and the mutiny was suppressed. It is telling that the re-emergence of 
conflict from 2001-2003 in the Central African Republic does not exhibit as high residual 
values. Conflict in these years more closely resembles ‘archetypal’ civil wars as militias and 
soldiers of Francois Bozize attacked Bangui after marching from across the border in Chad. 
A faction in the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) mutinied in mid-September 1998. By the end 
of the month, soldiers from South Africa and Botswana were combating the mutineers in 
Maseru, the capital.1
 
 So too, Senegalese and Guinean troops rapidly intervened to quell a 
rebellion in Guinea-Bissau. In no other cases from 1997-2008 is quite the same pattern 
observed.  
Model 5.2 removes these exceptional cases. The results are striking. 2
 
 Moving from 
conventional to low-capability warfare now adds 10.2% to the concentration of fighting in the 
capital and the p-value falls below the 0.05 mark meaning we can confidently reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no relationship between warfare type and battle concentration. Insofar 
as the Central African Republic, Lesotho and Guinea-Bissau are exceptional and outlying 
cases, low-capability warfare is marked by a higher proportion of fighting in the capital city. 
Model 5.2 demonstrates further important differences from Model 5.1. ‘Army size’ and ‘land 
area’ are now insignificant. Small countries tend to have smaller armed forces and perhaps 
because of the lower costs of suppressing hundreds rather than thousands of rebels, tend to 
attract early foreign intervention (a point taken up in Chapter 6). ‘Time’ is now insignificant. 
High proportions of fighting in the capital associated with the early years of war seem to be 
exclusive to these three cases. In fact, without these three cases, the proportion of fighting in 
the capital increases over time, at least in the short term. Figure 5.3 contrasts the relationship 
between time and the proportion of fighting in the capital city as derived from Model 5.1 and 
5.2, with a starting proportion of 26% (average proportion of fighting in the capital for a first-
year war generated form Model 5.1).   
  
                                                 
1  Fako Likoti, 'The 1998 Military Intervention in Lesotho: SADC Peace Mission or Resource War?,' 
International Peacekeeping 14, no. 2 (2007): Pg 252. 
2 It should be noted that removing these cases does not affect the results reported in  Chapter 4. If model 4.1 is 
re-run excluding these cases the ‘low-capability warfare’ variable remains significant (sig = 0.005).  
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Figure 5.3 – Fighting in the Capital vs Time (Years) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 – Models 5.1 – 5.4, Battle Concentration and Low-capability Warfare,  
1997-2008 
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        (5.1 – base)     (5.2 – outliers) (5.3 – arms transfers) (5.4 – low arms) 
low-capability 2.574 10.079   
 (6.303) (4.853)**   
guerrilla -4.276 5.965   
 (6.012) (3.118)*   
incompatibility 6.350 4.924 7.291 7.426 
 (5.747) (5.472) (5.401) (5.387) 
invasion 5.974 11.555 5.019 6.542 
 (9.781) (11.647) (9.000) (9.286) 
army size (ln) -2.635 -1.374 -2.726 -2.577 
 (1.136)** (1.012) (1.715) (1.629) 
land area (ln) -2.686 -0.371 -2.078 -2.209 
 (1.038)*** (0.900) (0.968)** (1.046)** 
intensity (ln) -0.316 -0.206 0.568 0.471 
 (1.086) (1.216) (0.827) (0.891) 
time -2.404 1.621 -2.912 -3.119 
 (1.120)** (1.296) (0.819)*** (0.887)*** 
time squared 0.122 -0.110 0.159 0.177 
 (0.065)* (0.075) (0.052)*** (0.059)*** 
time cubed -0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001)** (0.001)** 
arms transfers (ln)   -1.476  
   (1.040)  
low arms     5.571 
    (2.943)* 
constant 57.422 -2.429 45.808 41.707 
 (16.859)*** (8.292) (8.989)*** (11.677)*** 
R2 0.28 0.21 0.27 0.27 
N 129 122 129 129 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Beck Katz and Tucker panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses 
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Model 5.3 tests the log-transformed arms transfers variable against conflict 
concentration and Model 5.4 tests the dichotomous specification of the arms transfer 
variable. Only the dichotomous specification is significant at conventional levels (sig 
= 0.058). The logged arms transfers variable is not (sig = 0.156).3
 
 The estimated 
effects of both variables are moderate. Keeping in mind that an average African state 
(from 1997-2008) experienced 10% of conflict in its capital, an increase of 
conventional arms imports from nothing to an average of $10 million over three years 
will reduce the proportion of fighting in the capital by roughly 3.4%. Moving from a 
‘high’ to a ‘low’ level of arms imports increases the proportion of fighting by about 
5.8%.  
Results from Models 5.1 - 5.4 offer mixed support for hypothesis 2. Two out of the 
four models displayed a significant correlation between low-capability warfare and 
the proportion of combat taking place in the capital city. Coefficients in all four 
models were correctly signed and there is a good case for excluding Lesotho, the 
Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau. Insofar as these are exceptional cases, 
Hypothesis 2 received substantial support. Nonetheless, the preceding analysis 
revealed a puzzle. Even in low-capability warfare, the majority of fighting in an 
average conflict occurs in the countryside, about 81.4%. It is entirely possible that 
while low-capability warfare exhibits a higher proportion of fighting in the capital, it 
does not concentrate there. Clusters of fighting in peripheral locations may eclipse 
those in the capital. Visual analysis allows us to compare the proportion of battles that 
occurred in clusters in the countryside with proportions of battle that clustered in the 
capital. Visual analysis also allows for an analysis of the more general correlation 
between battle location and economic geography and it is to this that the chapter now 
turns.  
  
                                                 
3 Specifically we can be about 94% confident when rejecting the null hypothesis in Model 6.4 and 84% 
confident in model 6.3.  
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Visual Analysis 
 
Geographic Imaging Software allows us visualise the spatial pattern of fighting. ‘Heat 
maps’ show locations where governments and insurgents have most frequently 
engaged in battle (for details of how these maps were constructed, see Chapter 3) and 
compares these locations with a country’s most productive regions. Red areas indicate 
areas of high economic value. Black areas indicate concentrations of fighting. Eighty 
percent of low-capability conflicts exhibit an epicentre of fighting on or near the 
capital. Within this sample two structures emerge. Unipolar conflicts show a singular 
epicentre on the capital city with scattered fighting in the countryside. Unipolar 
conflicts correlate well with countries of a unipolar economic geography. Bipolar 
conflicts show an epicentre in the capital and a second aggregation in the countryside. 
In half of these cases the peripheral aggregation correlates with regions of economic 
importance. Two cases of low-capability warfare did not exhibit a concentration of 
fighting in the capital (Uganda and Guinea). Just 25% of conventional conflicts 
showed an epicentre of fighting in the capital and 18% of guerrilla conflicts. Battle 
concentrations and economic geography do not correlate well in conventional and 
guerrilla warfare, with the exception of oil and guerrilla warfare. Concentrations 
around border regions and difficult terrain were more common. 
 
Low-capability Warfare 
 
There are 10 cases of low-capability warfare from 1997-2008. Eight display a 
concentration of fighting in the capital city. Half of this eight were unipolar and half 
bipolar. Figure 5.5 charts unipolar, low capability conflicts. 
 
Figure 5.5 - Unipolar Low-capability Warfare 
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Figure 5.5 and 5.6 (below) show that while the majority of battles in low-capability 
warfare may occur in the countryside they tend to be diffuse and dispersed when 
compared to the fighting in the capital. One concentration occurs in the capital city 
with dispersed fighting in the countryside in Somalia, Congo-Brazzaville, the Central 
African Republic and Lesotho. This tell us that, in these cases, both government and 
insurgent actors have committed to a proportionally higher frequency of battles for 
the capital than for any other land area. Indeed in Somalia, Congo-Brazzaville and the 
Central African Republic, lone clusters of fighting in the capital have occurred in 
states where economic value is concentrated in the capital. The correlation between 
fighting concentration and economic geography is very high in these three countries.  
 
The Republic of Congo (ROC or Congo-Brazzaville) is illustrative. ROC relied 
heavily on the exploitation of offshore oil resources by foreign companies (especially 
French companies) before the outbreak of civil war in 1997.4 Clark describes the 
ROC as a ‘rentier’ state obtaining ‘income directly from foreign clients’. 5  Oil 
revenues have ‘consistently’ accounted for around 90% of Congolese export earnings 
and a ‘large fraction’ of government revenues. 6  Congolese rulers, Denis Sassou-
Nguesso in particular (president from 1979-1992, 1997-present), have used these 
revenues to shore up control of the capital through development projects and the 
provision of public services. Clark writes that, despite windfall revenues from oil 
production, Sassou-Nguesso invested ‘virtually nothing in agriculture’. 7  French 
economic and military aid were also important sources of revenue and regime 
security. 8
                                                 
4 ROC experienced an outbreak of fighting in 1993 as well, but this is not represented in Figure 5.4 
 Foreign companies in the Congo have dealt only with recognised 
governments (that is, organisations that have controlled Brazzaville) and, historically, 
the only way to cash in on Congo’s most lucrative revenue source was to be 
recognised as the sovereign. Englebert and Ron observe that this economic structure 
had profound effects on the spatial distribution of fighting. They argue that ‘the oil 
5 John Clark, The Failure of Democracy in the Republic of Congo (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008) Pg 
93. 
6 John Clark, 'Petroleum Revenues and Political Development in the Congo Republic: The Democratic 
Experiment and Beyond,' in Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Matthias Basedau and 
Andreas Mehler (Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2005), Pg 129. 
7 Clark, The Failure of Democracy in the Republic of Congo  Pg 97. 
8 Ibid,  Pg 100-01. 
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field’s legal and geographic configuration created incentives for militias to struggle 
for Brazzaville, the capital, but to eschew protracted rural warfare... the fighting 
remained centred in the city since it was the only prize worth having’.9 Until the 
intervention of the FAA in October 199710 the fighting in Brazzaville had stalemated 
for four months as fractious militias failed to oust each other from their fortified 
enclaves. Each side was poorly disciplined and trained, and armed mostly with light 
weapons.11 Up to five major factions had emerged by October 1997 with many more 
local ‘self-defence’ groups12 making it ‘difficult to mount any sustained offensive’.13
 
 
Indeed many of the militia members were from the countryside and did not know the 
city well enough to coordinate an assault.  
According to Mehler, the Central African Republic ‘survived mostly on selling 
diamonds and attracting foreign aid’, in an environment of intense ‘zero-sum’ 
competition for the spoils.14 General Kolingba, president from 1981-1992, recruited 
members of the Yakomba ethnic group to staff his presidential guard and senior 
officer positions in the regular army. 15  Felix Patasse emerged victorious from 
elections in 1992 and demoted the Yakomba-based units, creating his own 1,600-
strong ‘special forces’.16 He even sent Yakomba-based units away from Bangui (the 
capital city) and stationed them in the countryside. Patasse’s regime was rocked by a 
series of army mutinies in 1996, 1997 and 2001 that were only put down with the 
assistance of foreign soldiers from France and Libya respectively. 17
                                                 
9 Pierre Englebert and James Ron, 'Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville's Ambivalent 
Resource Curse,' Comparative Politics 37, no. 1 (2004): Pg 62, 70. 
 Patasse 
responded to the unrest by fortifying Bangui with three militia forces known as the 
Karakos, Balawas and Sarawis, numbering roughly 500 each and armed with 
10 John Clark, “Foreign Intervention in the Civil War of the Congo Republic,” Issue: A Journal of 
Opinion XXVI, no. 1 (1998) 
11 John Clark, 'Foreign Intervention in the Civil War of the Congo Republic,' Issue: A Journal of 
Opinion XXVI, no. 1 (1998), 'Militia Bloodbath,' Africa Research Bulletin 34, no. 6 (1997): Pg 12707. 
12 Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga, 'The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville,' African Affairs 
98 (1999): Pg 43. 
13 Ibid.,  Pg 51 
14 Andreas Mehler, 'The Shaky Foundations, Adverse Circumstances and Limited Acheivements of 
Democratic Transition in the Central African Republic,' in The Fate of Africa's Democratic 
Experiments: Elites and Institutions, ed. Leondaro Alfonso Villalon and Peter VonDoepp (Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 2005), Pg 128. 
15 Ibid,  Pg 130. 
16 Ibid,  Pg 138. 
17 Patasse also received assistance from the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) an insurgent 
group based in the Democratic Republic of Congo.   
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Kalashnikov assault rifles. Subsequently, Patasse created two more militias, the 
Societe centrafricaine de protection et de surveillance (SCPS), headed by his 
chaueffeur, and an organisation known only by the name of its leader ‘Abdulaye 
Miskine’. Karakos were based in the ‘Combattant’ district, near the airport. Balawas 
were based in the Boy-Rabe district, on the primary road into Bangui, while the 
Sarawis were stationed between the two in the districts of Malimaka, Miskine, 
Mustapha and Ngouciment.18 François Bozize, Patasse’s former Army Chief of Staff, 
entered the Central African Republic from Chad with rebels, mercenaries and some 
regular Chadian soldiers in 2002. Bozize met virtually no resistance until he reached 
the outskirts of Bangui, over 400km away. The invaders destroyed villages, murdered 
and raped civilians on their approach, but the national armed forces did not leave 
Bangui to meet them in the countryside. Clearly defending the countryside (or the 
citizens of the Central African Republic)19
 
 was not part of Patasse’s military strategy.  
Somalia is a similar case. Mogadishu outstrips the rest of Somalia in terms of 
economic value with no competing centres of importance in the countryside. 
President Siad Barre changed his strategy from fighting in the north to ‘barricading 
himself and his loyal troops’ in Mogadishu following army purges and the withdrawal 
of US military and economic assistance to the regime of in 1988. By 1989, he was 
mocked by the foreign press as the ‘the Mayor of Mogadishu’.20 Barre was expelled 
in 1991 and the insurgency fractured along sub-clan lines into the United Somali 
Congress (USC) led by Ali Mahadi and the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by 
Mohammed Farah Aideed. 21  Duyvesteyn argues that both Aideed and Mahadi 
demonstrated a ‘preoccupation’ with Mogadishu.22
                                                 
18 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War (Geneva: Oxford, 2005) Chapter 11, 
"The Central African Republic: A Case Study of Small Arms and Conflict", Pg 308. 
 The city remained besieged and 
partitioned until the US-led United Task Force (UNITAF) intervention deployed in 
late 1992. Fighting in Mogadishu continued after the UN withdrew in 1995 and 
intensified in 2006 with the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU were 
able to capture Mogadishu in 2006, but Ethiopia sent tens of thousands of soldiers 
19 Thankyou to Professor Richard Bradshaw for his insights on this matter.  
20 Hussein M. Adam, 'Somalia: Militarism, Warlordism or Democracy?,' Review of African Political 
Economy, no. 54 (1992): Pg 21. 
21 Herman Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent (New 
York: St Martin's Press, 2000) Pg 203. 
22 Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Clausewitz and African war: politics and strategy in Liberia and Somalia (New 
York: Frank Cass, 2004) Pg 113. 
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into Somalia to, first, defend the transitional capital of Biadoa and then re-capture 
Mogadishu. An array of insurgent movements (especially Al-Shabaab) have battled 
the TFG for control of Mogadishu’s suburbs since 2006. Human Rights Watch 
observed in 2010 that hostilities raged in strategically important areas, including 
Mogadishu, while much of the rest of Somalia enjoyed relative peace.23 Research into 
the Somali civil war conducted by the Event Data Project on Conflict and Security at 
the Free University of Berlin (EDACS) shows that fighting has continuously centred 
on Mogadishu from 1990 to 2007. Interestingly, EDACS research also shows that 
foreign actors (UNITAF, Ethiopia and AMISOM) have largely restricted their 
operations to Mogadishu (for an analysis of foreign intervention in low-capability 
warfare see Chapter 6).24
 
  
Fighting in Lesotho centred on the capital Maseru. However, Lesotho’s economy 
differs from Somalia, the Central African Republic and ROC, largely because of its 
proximity to Africa’s dominant economic power, South Africa. Lesotho’s government 
depended on taxing remittances from workers in South Africa and customs duties 
before 1998. When a hydroelectric plant was completed during 1998, selling water to 
South Africa became an important source of revenues and royalties.25
                                                 
23  'Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government and 
AMISOM in Somalia,'  (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010), Pg 3. 
 Reflecting this 
dichotomy between remittances and customs duties, Lesotho took 11.6% of revenues 
from taxation on individuals in 1995, higher than many African states, but a further 
54% of revenues came from import duties alone. Interestingly, South Africa collects 
the majority of import duties destined for Lesotho as part of the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), and presumably, would not pass these revenues onto an 
unrecognised government. So too, only recognised governments can deal in Lesotho’s 
natural resources, in this case, water. Maseru is therefore a crucial objective for any 
domestic actor wishing to access these resources. It must be conceded however, that 
South African norms for recognising governments, rather than international norms, 
will feature heavily in the strategic calculations of sub-state actors in Lesotho. Again, 
24 This map is available from the Event Data Project on Conflict and Security, Free University of 
Berlin, 
http://www.sfbgovernance.de/teilprojekte/projekte_phase_1/projektbereich_c/c4/The_EDACS/index.ht
ml, accessed 26 July 2011 
25  CIA World Factbook, Lesotho, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/lt.html, accessed 29 July 2011. 
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it is difficult to say whether the fighting centred on Maseru because conflict started 
there and South African soldiers contained the fighting to Maseru or was the product 
of strategic calculations on behalf of either the rebels or the government not to fight in 
the countryside. Initially, the rebellious faction from the LDF fought in Maseru and 
defended the army barracks and royal palace for two days against Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) forces. Once expelled from Maseru, however, the 
retreating rebels chose not to fight.26
 
  
Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Sudan are more complicated cases. Each displays 
an aggregation of fighting in the countryside and in the capital. In Chad, the Sudan 
and Liberia the capital-based cluster correlates with the high relative economic 
importance of the capital city. Although not displayed on the map, Freetown is also a 
centre of economic power (discussed below) in Sierra Leone. In all four bi-polar 
structures therefore, one concentration correlates with an area of economic centrality 
in the capital. Battle clusters in the countryside also correlate with vital areas of 
government revenue in Sierra Leone. From Figure 5.6 it appears as though Liberia’s 
second battle concentration does not coincide with a ‘red’ area of economic value. As 
the proceeding analysis shows, however, Liberia’s economic geography was 
profoundly influenced by the war in Sierra Leone. For Charles Taylor’s regime, 
clandestine and criminal networks came to play a more important role in sustaining 
his rule than did the ‘formal’ economy. Countryside clusters do not correlate with 
areas of high economic value in Chad and Sudan and it seems that the governments 
were able to keep fractious rebel groups at bay in the periphery until they either united 
or obtained enough foreign support to make a more concerted drive. In the latter 
situation both governments pre-empted a thrust on the capital and pulled back to 
exploit defensive advantages. Indeed these two civil wars are closely linked, with 
Chad accused of supporting the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Sudan and 
Sudan accused of supporting various rebel groups in Chad. Sierra Leone and Liberia 
are discussed first, followed by Chad and the Sudan. 
 
Figure 5.6 – Bipolar Low-Capability Warfare 
                                                 
26 See 'Lesotho: Pretoria Inder Fire for Messy Intervention,' Africa Research Bulletin 35, no. 9 (1998): 
Pg 13239-40. 
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Sierra Leone’s heat map is somewhat misleading. ACLED begins halfway through 
the conflict in 1997 when much of the fighting centred on Freetown. Using an older 
version of ACLED with data from 1991 to 2000, Sierra Leone has a more distinct 
bipolar structure. One concentration occurs around Freetown, the other, a weaker one, 
in the east near the border with Liberia. Civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone were 
deeply interconnected and the political economy of Sierra Leone came to shape the 
political economy of Liberia’s second civil war (2000-2003). Figure 5.7 shows the 
concentrations of fighting in Sierra Leone from 1991-2000.  
 
Figure 5.7 – Battle Concentrations, Sierra Leone, 1991-2000 
 
 
 
 
Sierra Leone’s war commenced when the RUF, supported from across the border by 
Charles Taylor’s NPFL attacked towns in March 1991. Sierra Leone’s territory is host 
to a combination of alluvial and kimberlite diamonds. Alluvial diamonds can often be 
panned from riverbeds while kimberlite diamonds are ensconced in layers of volcanic 
rock and require a higher degree of mechanisation and organised labour to extract. 
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Political leaders, throughout Sierra Leone’s history, depended heavily on exporting 
diamonds to fund their regimes. Reno points out that before the rule of President 
Siaka Stevens (1971-1985) diamond exports made up 30% of national output and 
70% of foreign exchange earnings, worth roughly $200 million.27 Stevens distributed 
mining contracts in exchange for loyalty among the political and military elite 
throughout his rule, effectively privatising the industry and creating a ‘shadow 
state’.28 Steven’s shadow state had a near monopoly in the commerce of diamonds by 
the time his successor, Joseph Momoh, took power in 1985. While official diamond 
exports totalled just $22,000 in 1988, clandestine exports are estimated to have been 
worth $250 million (more than a quarter of GDP).29 Diamonds are located in Kono 
district in the east, which alone accounted for 60% of Sierra Leone’s export earnings 
in the early 1990s.30 Koidu, Kenema and Kailahun are important diamond-trading 
towns. Pujehun district in the South East also became an important mining area as 
diamond stocks in Kono declined.31 Aid was a second important source of revenue. 
Around a quarter of government revenue during the 1970s, and over half during the 
1980s, was provided by the international community.32
 
 As Keen writes, controlling 
sovereignty remained a valuable asset, even though diamond mining offered 
alternative paths to enrichment. He writes that:  
‘control of the state – in wartime and peacetime – was vital for those seeking to set the ‘rules of the 
game’ that determined what was to be considered legal and illegal – in practice as well as in theory. 
Control of the state was also important in securing access to aid (including international loans) and in 
determining which individuals and social groups would be placed in positions of responsibility that 
could allow them to exploit the legal or quasi-legal economy’.33
 
 
Sierra Leone’s economic structure was bi-polar with control of Freetown and the 
diamond mining areas of the east forming the most lucrative ‘point resources’.  
 
                                                 
27  William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999) Pg 116. 
28Alfred B. Zack-Williams, 'Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-1998,' Third 
World Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1999): Pg 144. 
29 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States  Pg 120. 
30  Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone 
(London: Hurst, 2005) Pg 77. 
31 David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (New York: Palgrave, 2005) Pg 119. 
32 William Reno, 'Humanitarian Emergencies and Warlord Economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone,' 
The United Nations University Working Paper Series August, no. 140 (1997): Pg 7. 
33 Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone  Pg 106. 
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There were strong incentives for the Momoh government to defend the east when the 
RUF attacked. 34 Soldiers of the RSLMF were garrisoned in eastern Sierra Leone 
before the invasion as part of an ‘anti-corruption drive’ designed to wrest control of 
diamond production from Steven’s ‘shadow state’.35
 
 Momoh’s attempt to break his 
predecessor’s trading networks had not been especially successful and the war offered 
an opportunity to re-establish physical control. Alluvial diamonds also presented a 
unique threat to the regime because of their fungibility. The NPFL controlled much of 
the border area between Liberia and Sierra Leone and sought to open a second front 
against Nigeria who had soldiers deployed in Liberia. Diamonds were traded from 
Sierra Leone to Liberia in exchange for weapons. Were the rebels able to capture 
these areas, not only would the government lose control of an important revenue 
source but much of this could be appropriated by the RUF and converted into military 
capacity.  
Observers have noted that the Government of Sierra Leone fought decisive battles 
around the diamond-producing areas and Freetown – reflecting the two centres of 
economic power. Although the RSLMF looted towns, abused civilians and shied 
away from battle, ‘fighting with the RUF still sometimes took place, particularly in 
the diamond mining areas’.36
 
 Overall, Keen describes the pattern of fighting during 
the war as follows: 
‘the number of outright battles between properly armed troops remained very low, and the great 
majority of violent acts were against unarmed civilians. Any battles were largely restricted to the areas 
with the richest diamond deposits, to the defence of Daru base, and to repelling attacks against the 
outskirts of Freetown. These were areas the NPRC [National Provisional Ruling Council] top brass and 
the Tigers [the military junta] in particular, appeared determined to keep hold of.’.37
 
  
Instances of collaboration between the RUF and elements of the RSLMF in diamond 
mining areas did occur. Keen writes that ‘despite the obvious strategic and economic 
importance of Koidu as a key town in the diamond economy, government soldiers 
appear once again to have ‘left the door open’ for the rebels – compounding that 
                                                 
34  In 1992 Captain Valentine Strasser took power in a coup, Strasser was deposed in 1996 by 
Mohammed Bio and Bio was replaced by the elected Ahmad Tejan Kabbah during the same year. 
35 Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone  Pg 96. 
36 Ibid,  Pg 110. 
37 Ibid,  Pg 121. 
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failure to secure the area’.38 Kono district, Koidu and Kailahun were re-captured in 
1993, but only after ‘intense’ fighting between the government and the RUF.39
 
 For 
individual soldiers at the front, many of whom were recruited from Freetown’s slums, 
diamonds offered an incentive to defect and although the government’s intent may 
have been to protect these areas, the success of this ‘enclave’ strategy was 
compromised. Even the defence of Freetown came close to collapse in 1995 and was 
rescued by the intervention of Executive Outcomes, a South African mercenary outfit. 
EO’s orders were to implement what the government had tried and failed – relieve 
Freetown, capture the Sierra Rutile mines and flush the diamond-mining areas.  
Outside of Freetown and the diamond mining areas, soldiers appear to have avoided 
battle, or collaborated with the RUF in looting operations (the so-called ‘sobels’ – 
‘soldiers by day, rebels by night’). Keen writes that: 
 
‘A common pattern was for the government forces to leave arms and ammunition in a particular town 
for rebel groups (groups that could include restive or deserting soldiers); the ‘rebels’ would then pick 
up the arms, extract loot from the townspeople (mostly in the form of cash), and then themselves 
retreat, perhaps also capturing some young people; at this point the government forces would then 
reoccupy the town and engage in their own looting, usually of property... as well as engaging in illegal 
mining.’40
 
  
Sierra Leone’s war fits the theory of low-capability warfare well. Although two 
competing centres of gravity emerged, this reflected the bipolar structure of Sierra 
Leone’s political economy.  
 
To an extent, this political economy also explains the structure of Liberia’s second 
war (from 2000-2003, the first war is discussed in detail in Chapter 7). Although 
Liberia has few diamond mining areas of its own (located in west Lofa county near 
the borders of Guinea and Sierra Leone), by 2000, smugglers were conducting a 
booming trade in ‘blood diamonds’ from Sierra Leone into Liberia where they were 
on-sold to European markets. Diamonds had assumed a central place in the survival 
of Charles Taylor’s regime (1997-2003) when the war against LURD commenced in 
                                                 
38 Ibid,  Pg 115. 
39 Ibid,  Pg 116. 
40 Ibid,  Pg 121. 
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1999. According to a Coalition for International Justice report, Taylor received 
around US $105 million per year in revenue. Taylor had so thoroughly ‘personalised’ 
the Liberian state that this figure represented the extent of ‘government revenue’.41 
US $40 million a year was obtained from the sale of Sierra Leonean and Liberian 
diamonds (when subtracting the cuts taken by dealers and smugglers) and constituted 
the single largest source of revenue. Taylor’s second revenue stream was sourced 
from selling the ‘perks’ of sovereignty. He gained approximately $20 million a year 
in taxes on imports of gasoline and rice, charged mostly at the main ports of 
Monrovia and Buchanan.42 On top of this, $18 million was obtained from selling 
passports, the extortion of businesspeople, selling ‘concessions’ for timber or 
diamond extraction and state owned enterprises.43 An additional ‘few million dollars 
a year’ came in aid from Taiwan. 44
 
 In all, diamonds and selling the perks of 
sovereignty accounted for 76% of revenues. The concentrations of fighting displayed 
in Figure 5.6 correlate well with Taylor’s revenue streams. No doubt part of LURD’s 
military strategy was to disrupt Taylor’s revenue from Sierra Leonean and Liberian 
diamonds and Taylor had strong incentives to defend these areas, which he did in the 
early stages of the war.  
Chad exhibits one concentration around Ndjamena (the capital) with a competing 
concentration on the border with Sudan – not of great economic importance. In this 
case it appears as though, when faced with cross border incursions by weak and 
fractious rebel groups, the government of Idris Deby attempted to confront them on 
the frontier with Sudan. Deby abandoned the eastern border region and retreated to 
the capital when large scale attacks were launched (in 2006 and 2008). For example, 
Rebels of the ‘National Alliance’ (an amalgamation of a ‘dizzying succession of 
[rebel] groups’)45 crossed the border into Chad from Hajil in Darfur in 2008.46
                                                 
41 'Following Taylor's Money: A Path of War and Destruction,'  (Washington D.C: Coalition for 
International Justice, 2005), Pg 15. 
 A 
column of government forces left Ndjamena and engaged the rebels but retreated 
nearly 800km across the desert soon after, assuming positions again at al-Massagit, 
42 Ibid,  Pg 17. 
43 Ibid,  Pg 18. 
44 Ibid,  Pg 17. 
45 'Early to War: Child Soldiers in the Chad Conflict,'  (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007), Pg 11. 
46 'Chad: Battle for Ndjamena,' Africa Research Bulletin 45, no. 1 (2008): Pg 17371. 
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just 80km north of the capital.47
 
 Deby’s soldiers ‘took up defensive positions on main 
roads into Ndjamena from the north and east’ and rebels stormed into the capital and 
captured large parts of it at dawn on February 2nd. The National Alliance besieged the 
‘heavily fortified presidential complex’ but were unable to break through and 
retreated back over the border into Sudan. Gerard Prunier wrote that: 
‘The reasons for the rebel failure were military. They were over confident that Deby’s [the president’s] 
regime was crumbling and launched their attack with inadequate forces (too few men, no artillery, few 
anti-tank weapons and no surface to air missiles) so the ANT [the government armed forces] was able 
to take full advantage of their modest military superiority.’48
 
 
Notable is the lack of artillery and armour. A deficiency in heavy weapons limited the 
ability of the National Alliance to capture defended territory, a weakness that the 
Chadian government exploited. In fact, President Deby commenced a project to 
fortify Ndjamena with trenches in 2008.  
 
The Sudan case is similar to Chad, albeit more of a surprise given Sudan’s large and 
relatively well armed and trained (by Sub-Saharan African standards) military forces. 
According to Van de Walle, the government of Sudan utilised a ‘cost-effective’ 
counter-insurgency method of arming and supporting ‘Janjaweed’ militias to attack 
villages in Darfur from 2003 onwards.49 Sudan appears to have chosen not to use 
heavy land-based weapons in its rural counter-insurgency campaign (although aerial 
bombing was routinely used). JEM rebels, however, were able to execute a large 
attack on Khartoum in May 2008. JEM and Sudanese government forces ‘clashed’ in 
western Sudan on May 8th and by the 9th Sudan knew of the planned attack on 
Khartoum.50
                                                 
47 Moumine Nagmbassa, “WRAPUP8 Rebels Surround President’s Palace in Chad Capital”, Reuters 
Newswires, 2 February 2008 
 A military spokesperson stated that ‘forces from the Justice and Equality 
Movement... crossed from Chad through Darfur to Kordofan where they were aiming 
48 Gerard Prunier, 'Chad: Caught in the Darfur Crossfire,' Le Monde Diplomatique March (2008).  
49 Gerard Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008) Pg 103-
09. See also Martin Van-de-Walle, 'Contemporary African Warfare,' in Restructuring the Global 
Military Sector: New Wars, ed. Mary Kaldor and Basker Vanshee (London: United Nations University, 
1998), Pg 300. 
50 'Crackdown in Khartoum: Mass Arrests, Torture, and Disappearances since the May 10 Attack,'  
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008), Pg 9. 
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to cause destruction in Khartoum’.51 Roadblocks were established and bridges into 
the city from Omdurman (Khartoum’s twin city) were closed. JEM rebels attacked on 
May 10th with a column of 130 vehicles and 2000 soldiers. 52  Attempts to push 
towards the presidential palace and the national radio and television building were 
repelled by government soldiers backed by helicopter gunships, tanks and heavy 
artillery.53
 
 The JEM were defeated and retreated across the border into Chad on May 
12.  
Sudan and Chad’s physical geography may raise the utility of a ‘strategy of 
exhaustion’ over counter-insurgency in a situation where, were the terrain different, 
armies of the same size and sophistication may be able to hold rebels in the periphery. 
Eastern Chad and Western Sudan are mostly open plains with large stretches of 
desert. Highly mobile (usually on pick-up trucks) and well organised military forces 
have had success exploiting this tactical mobility. Idris Deby himself, for example, 
led a devastating campaign against the better armed but less mobile Libyan army 
during the 1980s. Deby was a commander in Hissane Habre’s army, and as Pollack 
writes, Habre ‘declined offers for tanks, APCs and heavy artillery and instead 
requested light armoured cars, trucks, automatic weapons, grenade launchers, 
recoilless rifles, mortars, antitank weapons, and antiaircraft weapons’ and relied upon 
‘rapid movement and force concentration... the armoured cars and Toyota trucks 
restored to the Chadians the strategic mobility and tactical manoeuvrability they had 
lost when they adopted modern infantry weapons, organisation and tactics’.54
                                                 
51  “Sudanese army steps up security in the capital”, Sudan Tribune, May 10, 2008, 
 Heavy 
armour and artillery might be relatively ineffective in Chad and the Sudan’s desert 
terrain and both Bashir and Deby may have refrained from using them in rural 
counter-insurgency campaigns for this reason. In a positional, territorial battle, 
however, these forces can be devastating against lightly armed insurgents. Deby and 
Bashir sought to negate the advantages of tactical mobility in the countryside by 
luring insurgents into a ‘battle for the capital’. Moreover they converted the 
http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudanese-army-steps-up-security-in,27069, accessed 27 July, 2011 
52 'Crackdown in Khartoum: Mass Arrests, Torture, and Disappearances since the May 10 Attack,' Pg 
9. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2004) Pg 387. 
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insurgent’s strength into a weakness by exploiting the advantages of defence in 
situations where light weapons dominate. 
 
Figure 5.8 shows two cases that do not fit the theory well. Guinea and Uganda are 
coded as low-capability warfare but display no concentrations of fighting in the 
capital. In addition, fighting occurs at a considerable distance from economically 
valuable areas and, structurally, Guinea and Uganda look much like guerrilla warfare 
(see below). It is unreasonable to expect all cases to fit the theory, but it is worth 
briefly exploring why these cases may have deviated. Uganda is not an example of 
both a low arms importer and low-capability warfare. From 1997-2003 Uganda was 
classed as a ‘high’ conventional arms importer. For example, Uganda imported $55 
million worth of conventional weapons in 1998 including nearly 100 T-55 tanks and 2 
Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters. 55  Jane’s weekly noted that Uganda’s army was 
‘among the most powerful armed forces in Central Africa’ with ‘skills and experience 
almost unrivalled in Africa’. 56  It is possible that Uganda did not deploy heavy 
weapons in its battle against the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) from 1997-2003 
because much of its armour was tied up the DRC.57 Indeed, ‘Operation Iron Fist’, a 
drive to oust the LRA from their northern Ugandan and Southern Sudanese bases 
coincided with the return of Ugandan soldiers from the DRC. 58  The Ugandan 
People’s Defence force (UPDF) also substantially outnumbered the LRA. According 
to the Uppsala Conflict Database the LRA had a maximum of 6000 soldiers (and a 
maximum of 4000 according to Cunningham et al) 59 while the Ugandan government 
commanded the services of at least 30,000 soldiers and potentially double this.60
                                                 
55 'Importer/Exporter Tables,' Stockholm International Peace Research Institute International Arms 
Transfers Database. 
  In 
addition, the LRA clearly utilised irregular tactics, including atrocity and kidnapping. 
The ineffectiveness of Uganda’s conventional drives to ‘finish’ the LRA also attest to 
56  'Armed Forces (Uganda),' Janes Sentinel Country Risk Assessment - Central Africa February 18th 
(2011). 
57 In the Alliance between Rwanda and Uganda, it was Uganda who often supplied the armour and 
heavy artillery.  
58 Frank Van Acker, 'Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army: The New Order No-One Ordered,' 
African Affairs 103, no. 412 (2004): Pg 336. 
59 David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, 'It Take Two: A Dyadic 
Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome,' Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (2009). 
60  'Uppsala Conflict Data Program,' Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research  
(2011/05/03). 
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use of irregular defensive tactics.61 Uganda may represent a marginal case of low-
capability warfare where the capacity to supply, organise and control its army 
imparted a much higher conventional offensive capacity than the technology deployed 
let on.62
 
 In Kalyvas and Balcell’s coding, Uganda is such a ‘marginal’ case and could 
be re-coded as guerrilla warfare.  
Guinea is coded as both a low arms importer and low-capability warfare and does not 
constitute a ‘marginal’ case. Very little is known about the Rally of Democratic 
Forces of Guinea (RFDG). Aside from its aims to overthrow President Lasane Conte, 
its numbers, foreign support and even some its operations are poorly documented. 
The RFDG initially opened two fronts against the Guinean government in 2000, one 
near the Liberian border and one near the Sierra Leonean border. According to the 
Uppsala Conflict Database, RFDG rebels initially posed a threat to the capital city, 
Conakry: 
 
‘RFDG and RUF (Revolutionary United Front) troops had early victories, launching cross-border 
attacks from Sierra Leone. Since the attacks happened relatively close to Conakry, the Guinean 
government troops deployed heavily in the area, eventually managing to push the rebels back across 
the border.’63
 
 
Once this threat was neutralized, the Guinean government moved to repel attacks on 
villages near the Liberian border and by the end of 2001 attacks had ceased. Like 
Uganda the lone concentration of fighting in the countryside – around the town of 
Guekedou near the Liberian border –  probably reflects the government’s superiority 
in numbers and logistical capacity.64 The Guinean government possessed a 15,000 
person security force in 2000 whilst the highest estimate for the RFDG is around 
5000. It is far more likely that the RFDG commanded between 1000-1800 soldiers.65
 
  
Figure 5.8 – Low-Capability Warfare with No Concentration in the Capital 
 
                                                 
61 Acker, 'Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army: The New Order No-One Ordered,' Pg 337. 
62 It should be noted that all the findings reported in these chapters hold if Uganda is removed as a case 
of low-capability conflict.  
63 'Uppsala Conflict Data Program.' 
64 Ibid. 
65 'Guinea-Liberia-Sierra Leone: Victims of Transferred Agression,' Africa Research Bulletin 34, no. 9 
(2000): Pg 14107. 
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Guinea and Uganda provide useful scope conditions for the theory of low-capability 
warfare. Although the technology deployed may be light and in favour of the 
defensive, when insurgents are substantially weaker in organisational capacity, 
logistical capacity or in numbers, the guerrilla/counter-guerrilla bifurcation emerges. 
Belligerents do not choose a strategy of exhaustion at extreme disparities of military 
capacity, regardless of technology. It should be noted that all findings reported in 
Chapters 4 and 5 remain statistically significant if we include a control for the balance 
of power or remove Uganda from the sample.  
 
Conventional Warfare 
 
Although the sample of conventional warfare is much smaller, just four cases, the 
spatial patterns of fighting and their relationship to economic geography are distinctly 
different. Multiple, and sometimes contiguous, concentrations occur in the 
countryside and only one case (Guinea-Bissau) displays a cluster of fighting in the 
capital. Angola and the DRC exhibit multipolar conflict structures with 3 
concentrations in Angola and over 10 in the DRC. Concentrations of fighting are 
separated from areas of economic importance in Angola, the DRC, and Cote d’Ivoire. 
Figure 5.9 displays the spatial distribution of fighting and economic value in Africa’s 
conventional civil wars from 1997-2008.  
 
Figure 5.9 - Battle Concentrations in Conventional Warfare 
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Warfare in the DRC from 1997-2001 is instructive for two reasons. Firstly, conflict 
between the government of President Mobutu and the ADFL in 1996 and 1997 
provides an example of a defensive ‘strategy of exhaustion’ that was abandoned due 
to the superior offensive capabilities of Mobutu’s opponents. Secondly, this case 
shows how, in high capability warfare, fighting is unlikely to concentrate around 
areas of economic importance despite their centrality the objectives of both the 
government and insurgents. Conflict in the DRC has been extensively described as a 
‘resource war’, yet, while resources may have financed the activities of insurgents and 
the government, they have played a much smaller role in structuring the actual 
fighting. 
 
The DRC is Africa’s second largest country, roughly the size of Western Europe. As 
figure 5.9 shows, economically valuable regions are concentrated in Kinshasa and the 
mining province of Katanga (located in the south eastern corner of the map, 
Lubumbashi is the capital of Katanga province). President Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-
1997) was heavily dependent ‘on exploiting natural resources with the help of 
outsiders to accumulate wealth’. 66  As Reno argues ‘global recognition of the 
sovereignty of the Zairian state was central to Mobutu’s political strategy, especially 
as this allowed him to attract diplomatic support and foreign aid’.67 The state-owned 
Gecamines produced 80% of Zaire’s foreign exchange earnings in the 1980s by 
selling cobalt, copper and zinc, primarily form Katanga province.68 Exports of copper, 
cobalt, zinc and diamonds generated $1.15 billion in revenues for Mobutu in 1986. 
Foreign aid provided another $448 million.69 The copper trade still accounted for 
nearly one-third of revenues ($892 million) in the early 1990s, roughly the same 
amount as Overseas Development Assistance ($822 million).70
                                                 
66 William Reno, 'Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire,' African Studies Quarterly 1, no. 3 (1997): 
Pg 42. 
 As foreign aid from 
France, Belgium and the United States declined during the 1990s, Mobutu leveraged 
his recognition as the head of state to attract resources and perpetuate his rule. 
Mobutu struck a deal worth over $1 billion to sell Gecamines to a consortium of 
South African, French, Canadian and American firms when faced with pressure to 
67 Ibid,  Pg 39. 
68 Ibid,  Pg 40. 
69 Ibid,  Pg 41. 
70 Ibid,  Pg 44. 
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privatise.71 Mobutu focused his regime survival strategy on controlling Kinshasa and 
‘sovereignty’, reflecting his dependency on leveraging international recognition for 
revenues. Sixty-one out of 92 investment projects were allocated to the capital in 
1972.72 Young wrote of Zaire that ‘the centralisation of state power in Kinshasa has 
been accompanied by a pathological concentration of economic resources; the capital 
is a giant suction-pump drawing wealth out of the hinterland’. 73  US Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose stated in 1993 that ‘there is, in 
effect, no meaningful extension of government throughout the country’.74
 
 Herman 
Cohen, in a capacity as consultant for the Global Coalition for Africa commented to 
the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa that: 
‘To say Zaire has a government today would be a gross exaggeration. A small group of military and 
civilian associates of President Mobutu, all from the same ethnic group, control the city of Kinshasa by 
virtue of the loyalty of the 5,000-man Presidential Guard known as the DSP. This same group also 
controls the central bank which provides both the foreign and local currency needed to keep the DSP 
loyal. While the ruling group has intelligence information about what is going on in the rest of Zaire, 
there is no real government authority outside the capital city’.75
 
 
Mobutu’s regime fits the picture of a state heavily dependent upon the recognition of 
sovereignty to survive. Controlling Kinshasa and Katanga are clearly two crucial 
revenue-generating zones of the DRC. However, the pattern of warfare is very 
different to low-capability conflicts. Figure 5.10 is a closer view of where government 
soldiers in the DRC have engaged in battle.  
  
                                                 
71 Ibid,  Pg 54. 
72 Crawford Young, 'Zaire: The Unending Crisis,' Foreign Affairs 57, no. 1 (1978). 
73 Ibid,  Pg 176. 
74  Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of 
Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress (Washington: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995) 
Pg 11. 
75 Ibid,  Pg 58. 
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Figure 5.10 – Battle Concentrations, Democratic Republic of Congo, 1997-2001 
 
 
Fighting in the DRC is more complicated than in Sierra Leone, Somalia and Congo-
Brazzaville (to cite just a few examples) and does not correlate well with the 
economically important regions, especially Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. Most of the 
fighting is concentrated along a ‘front line’ stretching from Bangui (in the Central 
African Republic) east towards Goma, near the borders with Rwanda and Burundi, 
and then down to the town of Pweto on the border with Zambia. There is also a weak 
concentration on Kinshasa. Combatants in both wars in the DRC were heavily armed 
with higher logistical and organisational capacity than belligerents in Sierra Leone or 
Somalia. Successive rebellions enjoyed the support of Rwanda and Uganda, including 
regular soldiers, armour, heavy artillery and air support. Although President Mobutu 
found few allies during the first war and was ousted in 1997, his successor, Laurent 
Kabila, obtained the military backing of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. Angola and 
Zimbabwe both supplied and operated heavy weapons in the Congo, including attack 
Kinshasa 
Katanga 
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helicopters, tanks and air support. Fighting near Kinshasa, on the northern and eastern 
fronts, and near Pweto are discussed in turn.  
 
Kinshasa 
 
Fighting near Kinshasa was not the result of a strategic retreat to defend the capital as 
in Sierra Leone and Somalia, but of an ambitious blitzkrieg campaign conducted by 
Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers. What was labeled the ‘Second Congolese War’ 
began with a mutiny of the 10th battalion and 22nd brigade of the Armed Forces of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (FAC) in Bukavu and Goma, in eastern Congo, and 
simultaneous mutinies in Baraka, Kindu, Kisangani and at two army bases in 
Kinshasa.76 Rwanda and Uganda had divorced their erstwhile ally, President Laurent 
Kabila, in the preceding months and moved to quickly support the mutinies. James 
Kabere, a Rwandan officer, hijacked a Congo Airlines plane from Goma and flew 
himself, a few thousand rebels and Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers to Kitona airport 
near Matadi in the west.77 Soldiers of the FAC based at Kitona defected to the rebels 
and the combined Rwandan-Ugandan force advanced on Kinshasa, capturing Aru, 
Lobutu, Fizi near Katange and Matadi by August 16.78 Army Chief of Staff Joseph 
Kabila (Laurent Kabila’s son) based his defensive strategy not on the direct 
fortification of Kinshasa but ‘prepared for a showdown in the strategic corridor 
linking Kinshasa and the south Atlantic’.79 FAC soldiers with air support defended 
the garrison town of Mbanza-Ngungu, 115km from Kinshasa. Mbanza-Ngungu fell 
on August 19.80
                                                 
76  Gerard Prunier, Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a 
Continental Catastrophe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) Pg 181-82. 
  The intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, acting under 
the auspices of the SADC rescued Kabila after the fall of Mbanza-Ngungu. 
Zimbabweans and Angolans outflanked the rebels (now named the Rally for 
Congolese Democracy (RCD)) in late August and early September, attacking from 
Cabinda and Kinshasa with amour, artillery and air support. The SADC intervention 
force had pushed the rebels back into the Congolese countryside by 1999. A surprise 
attack, rather than a strategic retreat accounts for the fighting near Kinshasa.  
77 Ibid,  Pg 182. 
78 Ibid,  Pg 182 - 84. 
79 Francios Ngolet, Crisis in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Laurent Kabila (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011) Pg 24. 
80 Ibid,  Pg 25. 
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This was not the first time that a battle for Kinshasa loomed. The ADFL invaded 
eastern Zaire on October 18, 1996 with Rwandan military assistance.81 Mobutu had 
denied the FAZ pay, equipment and training in preceding years, excoriating its ability 
to coordinate and combat the rebels. The FAZ put up little resistance in the east and 
by December the establishment of a buffer zone 800km long and 100km deep along 
the border of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda was complete.82 The ADFL decided to 
advance on Kinshasa in late 1996 and enjoyed rapid success, capturing Kisangani on 
March 13, 1997. Mbuji Mayi, the diamond capital, was captured on April 4 and it 
appeared that the FAZ were retreating in preparation for the defence of Kinshasa. 
United States Ambassador Simpson went to Kinshasa to convince Mobutu not to 
make a ‘last stand’, fearing a ‘bloodbath’ in Kinshasa.83 Prunier cites a secret memo 
sent to the French government by a retired general Jeannou Lcaze stating that ‘a great 
battle is about to happen [in Kinshasa] because as the FAZ are retreating they get 
more compact and able to resist... Contrary to what has happened in Kisangani or 
Lubumbashi they will not hesitate to oppose a strong resistance to the rebel forces’.84
  
 
No battle for Kinshasa occurred. Unlike Liberia, Sierra Leone or Chad, the rebels 
were not armed primarily with light weapons. Nor were they (comparatively) 
disorganised and logistically deficient. Angola was supporting the ADFL with 
armour, heavy artillery, jet fighters and attack helicopters by late April. The Angolan 
army defeated UNITA (fighting on behalf of Zaire’s government) at Kenge, 100km 
from Kinshasa – the largest battle of the war. President Mobutu fled Zaire soon after 
and his remaining army retreated across the Congo river into the ROC. A defensive 
strategy to defend Kinshasa was simply not viable against the combined offensive 
strength of Angola, Rwanda, Burundi and the rebellion.  
                                                 
81Both Prunier and Reyntjens state that the ‘rebellion’ was firstly a Rwandan operation to deal with 
refugee camps used by Hutu insurgents to launch raids into Rwanda. Filip Reyntijens, The Great 
African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) Pg 48. 
82 Prunier, Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental 
Catastrophe  Pg 130. 
83 Ibid,  Pg 135. 
84 Ibid. 
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Pweto 
 
The primary battle concentration in Figure 5.10 occurs around the town of Pweto, 
near the border with Zambia. Military operations in this region were conducted as part 
of the Second Congolese War (1998-2001). Most engagements took place between 
1999 and 2001 after the Rwandan and Ugandan-backed blitzkrieg on Kinshasa had 
failed. Lubumbashi and the mining riches of Katanga province were, undoubtedly, the 
objective for both the government and the RCD. Roads in the east also opened the 
way to the ‘diamond capital’ of Mbuji Mayi. However, the more proximate objective 
was the Nzofu bridge, a ‘crucial link in the supply chain’. RCD rebels and their 
Rwandan allies advanced into Katanga province in 1999, but found the Nzofu bridge 
protected by Namibian troops. In response, the RCD ‘wheeled’ around to Pweto, 
‘determined to advance’. 85  Pweto fell to the RCD in March 1999 and ‘proved 
devastating for the allied troops since it cut their supply line though the south east’.86
 
  
The FAC and its allies counter-attacked in October 2000. The military strategy 
pursued by the government (and its foreign backers, including Zimbabwe)87 sought to 
confront, outmanouevre and annihilate the concentration of Rwandan/RCD soldiers 
near Pweto, not to statically defend Lubumbashi or the mining areas. So too, RCD 
rebels and Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers could not exploit Lubumbashi’s wealth (or 
even deny it to the government) without first degrading the FAC/Zimbabwean force 
in the area. Pweto had no intrinsic economic value, unlike Kono or Kalihun in Sierra 
Leone. It was a ‘small fishing village’ over 350km or roughly ‘four days by foot’ 
from the regional centre of Lubumbashi.88 President Kabila allocated $20 million in 
funds for a counter-attack designed to ‘break the back’ of 3000 Rwandan and 
Burundian troops entrenched a grassy plain by the town of Mutoto Moya89 where 
FAC troops and their Zimbabwean allies were camped along 8 miles of trenches and 
separated by just one mile of ‘no man’s land’.90
                                                 
85 Ngolet, Crisis in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Laurent Kabila  Pg 30. 
 Kaliba commenced his assault with 
86 Ibid. 
87 Although Zimbabwe had reservations about the operation.  
88 Jason K Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of 
Africa (New York: Public Affairs, 2011) Pg 272. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid,  Pg 273. 
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‘long-range artillery, tanks, aircraft and gunboats’. 91
 
 Stearns describes Kabila’s 
defence of Pwteo as follows: 
‘with the support of armoured cars and Hawker fighter aircraft from the Zimbabwean army, the 
Congolese forces overran the enemy trenches and pushed their rivals back to Pepa, a ranching town in 
the hills some thirty miles away. There, Laurent Kabila’s troops took control of the strategic heights 
overlooking the town. Zimbabwean bombers pursued and bombed the retreating troops, forcing them 
to hide during the day and march at night’.92
 
 
Rwandan and Burundian soldiers counter-attacked by using a ‘light, mobile battalion’ 
to outflank Kabila’s soldiers whilst maintaining a frontal assault as a distraction.93
 
 
The counter-attack succeeded in dislodging the Congolese and pushing them back to 
Pweto, threatening Lubumbashi again. Zimbabwean and Angolan forces reinforced 
between Pweto and Kasenga, stabilising the front-lines. The loss of Pweto on 
December 6 led eventually to the assassination of President Kabila and the ascension 
of his son, Joseph, to the presidency. Fighting around Pweto from 1999-2000 shows 
that while locations of economic value were central objectives to the combatants, in 
conventional warfare, where opponents retain a capacity for conventional offense, 
military strategies, even for defensive objectives, are more likely to be fashioned 
around annihilating the opposition’s offensive strength. As such, the geography of 
warfare correlates more closely with concentrations of enemy soldiers and strategic 
supply bottlenecks, rather than the location of resources.   
The North West 
 
Three, roughly contiguous, clusters of fighting in the north east of Congo do not 
correlate with any economically important areas identified by the G-econ dataset. 
These clusters occur around the towns of Genema, near the border with the Central 
African Republic, Mbandaka further towards Kinsahsa and Bokugu further south. A 
faction of the RCD, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) led by the son 
of a former business associate of President Mobutu, Pierre Bemba, emerged with 
                                                 
91 Christian P. Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence and 
Regional War (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002) Pg 288. 
92 Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa  
Pg 273. 
93 Ibid,  Pg 274. 
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Ugandan backing and attacked towns in Equateur province in November 1998. Unlike 
the south, the north west was not well endowed with natural resources. Bemba’s 
immediate target was Kinshasa – just down the Congo river. President Kabila, the 
FAC, and its diverse array of allies did not conduct a positional defence of Kinshasa, 
but engaged the rebels and Ugandan army in a series of battles over towns in Equateur 
province. According to Prunier, Ugandans and Chadians did most of the fighting 
along this front. Chadian soldiers dispatched to assist Kabila were first sent to 
Gbadolite (Mobutu’s former residence) and then met (and were soundly defeated) by 
the MLC and Ugandans at Aketia, Buta and Bongo.94 President Kabila ‘adopted a 
new strategy’ in January 1999 and flew 1000 FAC soldiers to Bangui in the Central 
African Republic in an attempt to ‘outflank’ the UPDF/MLC.95 The FAC counter-
attacked and re-captured the towns of Genema, Businga and Libenge.96
 
 The MLC and 
UPDF, however, soon recovered and by July 1999 could boast of controlling the 
entire Equateur province. We can see here that the emergence of a battle cluster in 
North West Congo had little to do with its economic importance. Although the 
objective was an economic target, Kinshasa, the MLC and their allies met the FAC 
and their allies in the countryside. Again, the dominant strategy was not one of 
exhaustion and positional defence around valuable sites, but of manoeuvre and 
offense in the hope of striking a decisive blow against the enemy’s concentration of 
force.   
Goma and the East 
 
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda’s security interests account for the concentration of 
fighting near cities in the east. Rwanda’s initial invasion in 1996 targeted refugee 
camps near Goma, especially the Mugunga camp, where former members of the 
Rwandan government and military were organising and conducting raids into 
Rwanda. Burundi was also fighting an insurgency based partly in neighbouring 
Congo while Uganda battled the LRA and West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) in eastern 
                                                 
94 Prunier, Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental 
Catastrophe  Pg 205. 
95 Ngolet, Crisis in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Laurent Kabila  Pg 32. 
96 Prunier, Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental 
Catastrophe  Pg 207. 
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Congo. This concentration is not related to the economic value of Congo’s eastern 
cities but a cross-border counter-insurgency campaign.97
 
  
Guerrilla Warfare 
 
Guerrilla warfare appears to be more straightforward. Two of the 13 cases (15.4%) 
displayed a concentration of fighting in the capital – Djibouti and Burundi. Djibouti 
has only three ‘battles’ meaning anywhere on the map would be a concentration. 
Burundi, however, is not, like Djibouti, a minor outbreak of violence. It is estimated 
that between 200,000 and 250,000 people have been killed since 1993. Hutu 
insurgents attacked Bujumbura for the first time in 1991 and attacks have continued to 
2008, reflected in the concentration of fighting on Bujumbura and comparatively 
dispersed fighting in the countryside - contrary to the expectations for guerrilla 
warfare.98 Burundi is a ‘capital heavy’ state. Ngaruko and Nkrurnziza observe that a 
Tutsi-led government and bureaucracy have systematically favoured the capital with 
public and private investment projects. Rulers have leveraged international 
recognition, obtained by controlling Bujumbura, to appropriate resources from the 
agricultural sector (often with the assistance of the army) and shore up control of the 
capital. Public sector jobs have been a ‘major source of accumulation’.99 Burundi’s 
Hutu majority are largely excluded from education opportunities and access to public 
sector rents.100  There is some evidence to suggest that the Burundian government has 
pursued a defensive strategy focused on Bujumbura. John Balzar of the Los-Angles 
Times described Bujumbura in 1995 as a ‘mono-ethnic urban fortress against the rest 
of the nation’. 101
                                                 
97 See ibid,  Pg 81-85. Timothy Longman, 'The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo,' 
in The African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. John F Clark (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), Pg 
130. 
 Burundi’s physical and social geography, however, are equally 
cogent explanations of the battle-structure in Figure 5.11. Dense forests and hilly 
terrain just 30km from Bujumbura have provided insurgents with cover and bases 
98 Floribert Ngaruko and Janvier Kkurunziza, 'An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in Burundi,' 
Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3 (2000): Pg 380. 
99 Ibid,  Pg 385-88. 
100 Ibid. 
101 John Balzar, “Burundi Falls Victim to its violent history”, Los Angeles Time, 31 March 1995, 
available online from http://articles.latimes.com/1995-03-31/news/mn-49357_1_northern-burundi, 
accessed 17 July 2011 
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from which to stage attacks. 102  FNL insurgents shelled Bujumbura with 16mm 
mortars in August 2002, attacking from the Kabira national forest.103
 
 Hutu-majority 
suburbs in Bujumbura, especially Kinama, have also allowed insurgents to operate 
more freely in the capital than the comparative military technology available to 
insurgents and the government would otherwise allow.  
Concentrations of fighting near an international border are much more common than 
concentrations in the capital. In 62% of cases a fighting concentration overlaps with, 
or occurs in close proximity to, an international border (corroborating the replication 
of Buhaug and Rod reported in Chapter 4). Clandestine, cross-border trade and 
support is crucial to the survival of insurgent movements in many African countries. 
The MFDC in Senegal have received and purchased weapons, including AK-47s, 
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines from Guinea-Bissau. 104
 
 So too the SPLM 
received support from Uganda and Ethiopia. The Army for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(PALIR) received support from and operated freely across the border in the DRC.  
Figure 5.11 - Battle Concentrations in Guerrilla Warfare 
 
                                                 
102 Ngaruko and Kkurunziza, 'An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in Burundi,' Pg 379. 
103 'Burundi: Peace talk, But is it Real?,' Africa Confidential 43, no. 18 (2002): Pg 6. 
104 Ngaruko and Kkurunziza, 'An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in Burundi.' 
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Economic geography and battle location correlate well in only two of the cases where 
data on both variables are available (Angola and Nigeria). A superiority in 
conventional offense has allowed governments to quarantine valuable areas from 
persistent fighting in the majority of cases. Nigeria and Angola are conspicuous 
exceptions and worth investigating further. Nigeria is the world’s 7th largest oil 
producer. Oil and gas are located primarily in the Niger Delta – the red area on 
Nigeria’s conflict map in Figure 5.11 – and provide the federal government with 40% 
of GDP and 70% of revenues.105 Angola is second only to Nigeria in oil production. 
Oil production accounted for 80% of Angolan government revenues during the 1990s, 
the vast majority coming from offshore drilling in the Cabinda enclave.106 Angola has 
used oil wealth as collateral to obtain finance to fund its war effort, including the 
purchase of heavy weapons used to defeat UNITA.107
 
  
Fighting has concentrated around the Niger Delta and Cabinda enclave, despite the 
government’s superiority in conventional force, largely because of the high strategic 
payoffs for attacking pipelines and kidnapping oil workers. If we consider capital 
cities and oil wealth as ‘point resources’ then there are important differences. Unlike 
oil, the flow of ‘sovereignty’ cannot be disrupted. Attacking oil pipelines has offered 
insurgents in Nigeria the dual benefits of striking a blow at the government’s most 
lucrative revenue source – a blow to strengthen an insurgent group’s bargaining 
position – and directly appropriating those revenues to purchase weapons and increase 
the ability to strike again. The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) is 
implicated in ‘bunkering’ (oil theft) and the on-selling of refined products to local 
people at prices below the commercial rate.108
                                                 
105 Augustine Ikelegbe, 'The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,' 
Nordic Journal of African Studies 14, no. 2 (2005): Pg 208. 
 Networks of pipelines can be difficult 
to protect from mobile insurgents as they spread over large, and often inaccessible, 
terrain. FLEC was less successful in actually attacking installations because much of 
106 Phillip Le-Billion, 'Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000,' 
African Affairs 100, no. 398 (2001): Pg 61. 
107  Marcus Power, 'Patrimonialism and Petro-diamond Capitalism: Peace, Geopolitics and the 
Economics of War in Angola,' Review of African Political Economy 28, no. 90 (2001): Pg 497. See 
also Jedrzej George Frynas and Geoffrey Wood, 'Oil and War in Angola,' Review of African Political 
Economy 28, no. 90 (2001): Pg 594-95. 
108 Ikelegbe, 'The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,' Pg 226. 
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Angola’s oil is located offshore. While Angola’s government has been able to protect 
the few onshore enclaves that house foreign nationals working with multi-national 
corporations such as Chevron, FELC has kidnapped workers and attacked company 
vehicles, mostly likely in an attempt to scare off foreign investment and disrupt 
government revenues.109  Oil-rich regions may also have above average chances of 
civil war onset. Knowledge of the disparity between oil profits and local conditions 
produces grievances and demands for a great share of the revenues. The Niger Delta 
is one of the least developed regions in Nigeria, despite the oil wealth.110
 
 So too, 
environmental degradation associated with oil production (and oil theft) can produce 
the grievances to spark armed conflict.  
These exceptions aside, the structure of fighting in guerrilla warfare differs markedly 
from low-capability warfare. Most conflicts are unipolar, reflecting the limited 
military capabilities of insurgents. Unlike low-capability warfare, however, the 
location of these epicentres does not correlate well with areas of economic value and 
tend towards international borders. Governments have been able to protect their most 
valuable regions from insurgents.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Not all African civil wars are ‘resource wars’. In fact, in just 8 of the 21 cases (38%) 
from 1997-2008 where data on both economic geography and conflict location were 
available did a resource concentration overlap with a battle concentration. 
Importantly, six of these cases were also cases of low-capability warfare. Eighty-
precent of low-capability conflicts saw a concentration of fighting in or around the 
capital city. Only 15% of guerrilla conflicts and 25% of conventional conflicts 
exhibited the same pattern. Evidence from this chapter also supports the notion that 
African states are ‘capital heavy’ – economic production is often concentrated in the 
capital - and OLS regression suggested a link between the military technology and the 
proportion of fighting occurring in capital cities. Low-capability warfare experiences 
roughly 10% more of its battles in the capital city when compared to conventional 
                                                 
109 See, for example, “Angolan Offensive May Harm Portuguese Hostages”, Reuters Newswires, 3 
April 2001 
110 Ikelegbe, 'The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,' Pg 214. 
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warfare. If wars in Angola and the DRC had been ‘low capability’ rather than 
conventional, Kinshasa could have expected over 60 more individual battles and 
Luanda over 200 more. Overall, the findings from this chapter suggest that economic 
geography correlates well with the pattern of fighting in low-capability warfare.  
 
 
Chapter Six 
Empirics III: Foreign Intervention in 
Low-capability Warfare 
 
Foreign states hold a trump card in low-capability warfare – the capacity for conventional 
offense – and a crucial dimension of intervention strategy is in the timing of deployment. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that foreign states wait until a ‘battle for the capital’ before deploying 
in Africa’s low-capability conflicts to rout or intimidate their rivals and play kingmaker in 
political negotiations. Deployments are also timed with pitched battles in conventional and 
guerrilla warfare but these battles do not cluster near the capital and foreign intervention was 
predicted to be no more or less likely as conflict approached these cities. The chapter 
proceeds as follows. Africa’s history of military intervention is briefly discussed followed by 
bivariate and logistic regression analysis of the relationship between conflict geography and 
decisions of foreign intervention. A substantial and statistically significant connection 
between the distance of fighting from the capital city and the probability of foreign 
intervention exists within the sample of low-capability warfare, but not conventional or 
guerrilla warfare. Examples from Sierra Leone, Chad and Ethiopia are used to illustrate how 
intervention triggers vary with warfare-types.  
 
Foreign Military Intervention in Africa, 1960-2003 
 
Foreign intervention is common in Africa’s civil wars.1 Of the 179 separate deployments in 
this study, 59% occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa. African states are as frequent interveners as 
non-African states, contrary to the notion that major powers are most prolific.2
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the motivations for intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa during the Cold War, see Keith 
Somerville, Foreign Military Intervention in Africa (London: St Martin's Press, 1990). For a more quantitative 
approach see Frederic Pearson and Robert Baumann, 'International Military Intervention in Sub-Saharan African 
Subsystems,' Journal of Political and Military Sociology 17 (1989). For a discussion of the changing nature of 
military intervention since the end of the Cold War see S. Neil McFarlane, Intervention in Contemporary World 
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 Of the 106 
interventions in Africa, 65% were African states deploying in African civil wars. Even 
comparatively small militaries can have a decisive impact on outcomes in a civil war in a 
2 See the study by Khosla for a similar account of intervention activity. Deepa Khosla, 'Third World States as 
Interveners in Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for regional and International Security,' Third World Quarterly 20, 
no. 6 (1999). 
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security complex of weak states.3 Alternative levers of influence such as economic sanctions 
and the provision of military hardware may also be unavailable to economically poor and 
atomised regional actors.4
 
  
The frequency of intervention in African civil wars has increased over time. Table 6.1 shows 
the number of military interventions in African civil wars per year from 1960-2003. 
 
Figure 6.1 – Military Interventions in African Civil Wars, 1960-2003 
 
 
 
There are four peaks of intervention activity. The first, from 1975-1980, reflects a spate of 
Cold War related interventionism in Angola, Ethiopia and Zaire. South African and Zairian 
support for UNITA and the FNLA in Angola during 1975 and 1976, for example, was 
matched by more than 10,000 Cuban soldiers assisting the MPLA-led government. Somalia 
invaded Ethiopia in 1977, ostensibly in support of the WSLF fighting for the independence of 
the Ogaden region of south-east Ethiopia. Somalia’s invasion was rebuffed by Ethiopia with 
                                                 
3 Raymond Copson, Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace (New York: Sharpe, 1994) Pg 113.. 
4 Most of Africa’s states are more closely integrated with the West and former colonial powers than they are 
with each other. The efficacy of sanctions depends upon one country being able to deny another country some 
commodity that is crucial to the target’s economy. This scenario is more likely to be the case between trading 
partners. See David Baldwin, 'The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,' International Security 24, no. 3 
(2000). 
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assistance from Cuban and South Yemeni soldiers and billions in Soviet military hardware.5 
Two invasions launched from Angola in 1977 and 1978 by Katangan exiles were halted by a 
combination of Moroccan, French and Belgian soldiers. 6  Interestingly, this flurry of 
interventionism seems to have coincided with a period of detente between the United States 
and Soviet Union. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) signed the 
Helsinki accords in 1975, marking a period of reduced tension between the superpowers. The 
Helsinki accords included recognition of ‘Europe’s post war frontiers’ and a range of 
agreements on economic and diplomatic cooperation in addition to declarations on human 
rights and political freedom.7 This period ended in December 1979 with the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan.8
 
  
The second peak occurs between 1990 and 1992 and reflects a very different evolution in 
security dynamics. States experimented with ‘humanitarian intervention’ as political elbow-
room increased at the end of the Cold War.9 Deployment of the US-led UNITAF in Somalia 
during 1992 was the most dramatic and symbolic example of a ‘new interventionism’.10 On 
the other hand, an increasing indifference of the superpowers and their allies (with the 
exception, to an extent, of France)11 allowed African states to play a more prominent role in 
directing security affairs on the continent.12
                                                 
5 See Gebru Tareke, 'The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited,' The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 33, no. 3 (2000). 
 Nigerian intervention in Liberia was a watershed 
in this regard. Liberia is, historically, a close US ally and benefited from US military and 
technical assistance during the Cold War. With their ally President Samuel Doe besieged by 
insurgents and a humanitarian crisis unfolding in July and August 1990, the US refused to 
intervene. President George Bush Senior famously declared that Liberia was ‘not worth the 
6 Africa Research Bulletin, 14, no. 4, April 1-30, 1977, Pg 4399, 4400 
7 J.M Roberts, The Penguin History of Europe (London: Penguin, 1997) Pg 628. 
8 Ibid,  Pg 629. 
9 For a discussion of the history of humanitarian intervention, including the Tanzanian Invasion of Uganda and 
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, see Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). For a history that goes back to early modern 
Europe, see Gary Bass, Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Knopf, 2008). 
More recently the concept of a ‘responsibility to protect’ has emerged, advocating that in cases of mass-killing, 
where the state abdicates upon its responsibility to protect its citizens, the international community has a right to 
step in, with military force if necessary. See Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity 
Crimes Once and for All (Washington D.C: Brookings Institute Press, 2008).   
10 Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,' Foreign Affairs 70 
(1996). 
11 Shaun Gregory, 'The French Military in Africa: Past and Present,' African Affairs 99, no. 396 (2000). 
12 See, for example, Karin Dokken, African Security Politics Redefined (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
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life of a single marine’.13
 
 West African states, led by Nigeria but including Ghana, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea, deployed to Liberia in August 1990.  
By far the highest annual level of interventionism occurred in 1998. Africa’s ‘Great War’ in 
the DRC accounts for most of these observations. Soldiers from Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, 
the Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia deployed in the DRC.14 The peak does not 
reflect this case alone, however. South Africa and Botswana deployed in Lesotho15 while 
Guinea and Senegal deployed in Guinea-Bissau. Non-regional actors are notable absentees 
from this, Africa’s most prolific year of military involvement in civil wars. Shearer, for 
example, writes that the ‘absence of non-African involvement or even interest [in the DRC] 
underscores a break with earlier eras of colonial ambition and Cold War rivalries’.16
 
 
A peak of similar proportions to 1990-1992 occurs between 2002 and 2003 and marks the re-
emergence of non-regional actors. The US, albeit briefly and in small numbers, sent marines 
to Liberia in 2003. 17  France deployed more decisively and in greater numbers in Cote 
d’Ivoire in 2002. The African Union dispatched peacekeeping force to Burundi in 2003 to 
protect members of a transitional government.18 With the exception of Burundi, these cases 
reflect an increasing cooperation between powerful non-regional states, usually former 
colonial powers (or ‘big brothers’ in the case of Liberia) and regional security 
organisations. 19
                                                 
13 Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African 
Civil War (London: C hurst & Co., 1999) Pg 168. 
 France and ECOWAS coordinated their deployment in Cote d’Ivoire. 
14 For a discussion of the varying motivations of these actors see John F Clark, 'Museveni's Adventure in the 
Congo War: Uganda's Vietnam?,' in The African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. John F Clark (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), Timothy Longman, 'The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo,' in 
The African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. John F Clark (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), Filip 
Reyntijens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), Martin Rupiya, 'A Political and Military Review of Zimbabwe's involvement in the 
Second Congo War,' in The African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. John Clark (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002), Thomas Turner, 'Angola's Role in the Congo War,' in The African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. John F 
Clark (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
15 For an argument that South African intervention was motivated primarily by economic concerns see Fako 
Likoti, 'The 1998 Military Intervention in Lesotho: SADC Peace Mission or Resource War?,' International 
Peacekeeping 14, no. 2 (2007). 
16 D. Shearer, 'Africa's Great War,' Survival 41, no. 2 (1999). 
17 For a discussion of military strategy in the US deployment, see Alan J. Kuperman, 'A Small Intervention with 
a Big Payoff: Lessons from Liberia in 2003,' in Stability From the Sea: Challenges for the US Navy, ed. Jim 
Wirtz and Jeff Larsen (London: Routledge, 2008). 
18 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, 'Burundi,' in Dealing With Conflict in Africa, ed. Jane Boulden (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), Pg 239. 
19 Although the AU mission did eventually morph into a UN mission. A similar hybrid UN-AU mission was 
established in Darfur in the Sudan. See Alex de Waal, 'Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect,' 
International Affairs 83, no. 6 (2007). And Paul D Williams, 'Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African 
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ECOWAS benefited from cooperation with the US in Liberia. 20  ECOWAS missions 
morphed into substantial UN missions in both Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire. Over 10,000 UN 
soldiers were mandated for deployment in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire (just under 10,000 
actually deployed under the auspices of UNOCI.21
 
  
Peaks in Figure 6.1 reflect trends in the evolution of military interventionism in Africa. 
Intervention was dominated by non-regional powers acting on global security interests during 
the Cold War. Regional actors were increasingly entangled in security affairs after the Cold 
War but rarely in cooperation with non-regional powers. Africa’s continental war of 1998 
marked the apotheosis of regional interventionism. From (perhaps) September 11 2001, 
regional and non-regional states have acted collectively and in cooperation with greater 
frequency.  
 
Across this great variety of actors and security contexts do states tailor their intervention 
strategies depending upon the types of wars they are facing? More specifically, do we find 
that states are reticent to intervene in low-capability warfare when fighting is in the 
countryside? Do states time their interventions to coincide with a battle for the capital?  
 
Figure 6.2 differentiates by warfare-type the frequency and average distance of fighting from 
the capital city of military interventions. Although guerrilla warfare is by far the most 
frequent form of combat it is the least likely to experience intervention. Just 0.01% of 
intervener dyads resulted in deployment. Roughly 1% of low capability and conventional 
dyads experienced intervention. As Chapter 2 argued, there are substantial deterrents to 
intervening in guerrilla warfare. Irregular tactics are an implicit concession that insurgents 
lack the capacity to fight a conventional war. Potential interveners favouring the government 
will shy away from wasting money and lives in an uncertain and potentially costly counter-
                                                                                                                                                        
Union Mission in Sudan,' International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2 (2006).The EU’s deployment in 2003 in the 
DRC may herald a new tactical relationship between large-scale peacekeeping forces and rapid-reaction combat 
forces. See James Miskel and Richard Norton, 'The Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo,' Civil 
Wars 6, no. 4 (2003). 
20 Coleman argues that rulers undertake military interventions under the auspices of international and regional 
institutions to obtain legitimacy. Katharina Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The 
Politics of International Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).There were a number of 
co-operative efforts between extra-regional and regional actors such as the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the 
implementation of the Bangui Agreements. See Moussounga Itsouhou Mbadinga, 'The Inter-African Mission to 
Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB),' International Peacekeeping 8, no. 4 (2001). 
21 'UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire, Facts and Figures,' United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations  (2011). 
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insurgency campaign where they cannot exploit their advantages in offense and the 
government is likely to win anyway. Interveners favouring the insurgency face high costs to 
overcome the government’s military superiority. As the balance of power between the 
government and insurgents is more even in low-capability and conventional warfare, actors 
favouring the insurgency face lower costs and actors favouring the government can utilise 
advantages in conventional tactics.  
 
Figure 6.2 – Descriptive Statistics: Military Intervention and Warfare Type 
 
Warfare Type Frequency 
Mean Distance 
of fighting from 
the Capital 
       Mean (in25km) 
 
Low-capability 
 
34 
 
79km 
 
           79.4% 
Guerrilla 14 269km            42.8% 
Conventional 51 344km            19.6% 
 
An average intervention in low-capability warfare is deployed 190km closer to the capital 
than in guerrilla warfare and more than 200km closer than in conventional warfare. When 
fighting is deep in the countryside, intervention in low-capability warfare is very rare. Nearly 
80% of intervention occurs within just 25km, substantially higher than the 19.6% for 
conventional warfare and 42.8% for guerrilla warfare. From Figure 6.2 it does seem that 
foreign states intervene at different points in the conflict process depending upon the 
technology of rebellion available to domestic combatants. As with previous chapters, it is 
important to control for confounding variables. Perhaps states prefer the lower costs of 
intervention in smaller countries and low-capability warfare occurs in smaller countries that 
fight their battles closer to the capital. Perhaps, when controlling for these factors, states 
prefer to intervene during a ‘battle for the capital’ regardless of warfare-type. Model 6.1 is a 
logistic regression analysis of the relationship between the distance of fighting from the 
capital and the probability of intervention within the sample of low-capability warfare. Model 
6.2 repeats the process in the sample of conventional conflicts and Model 6.3 in the sample of 
guerrilla warfare. Model 6.4 re-tests for the presence of a relationship between intervention 
and battle location within the sample of ‘low arms importers’. Model 6.5 repeats this test in 
the sample of ‘high’ arms importers.  
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Figure 6.3 –Models 6.1-6.5, Foreign Intervention in Low-capability, Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare 
 (6.1) Low-cap (6.2) Guerrilla (6.3) Conventional (6.4) Low Arms (6.5) High Arms 
rival intervention -15.500 3.145 1.731 2.733 2.368 
 (0.000) (1.133)*** (0.544)*** (0.639)*** (0.832)*** 
regional hegemon 2.142 4.547 1.501 2.154 1.670 
 (0.692)*** (1.061)*** (0.810)* (0.442)*** (1.038) 
balance of power 0.067 1.813 0.555 0.621 1.316 
 (0.295) (0.818)** (0.527) (0.168)*** (0.412)*** 
gems in conflict zone 1.490 0.081 -0.999 -0.002 0.083 
 (0.747)** (1.147) (0.449)** (0.399) (0.443) 
hydros in conflict zone -4.443 0.824 -0.684 -0.380 -0.027 
 (1.641)*** (0.998) (0.512) (0.412) (0.414) 
proximity -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
internally displaced  0.005 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
distance from capital (ln) -0.528 -0.327 -0.051 -0.175 0.063 
 (0.171)*** (0.206) (0.082) (0.077)** (0.109) 
material capabilities 12.090 1.084 -3.303 3.423 -12.540 
 (7.749) (6.364) (4.932) (6.052) (8.583) 
former colony 4.784 4.539 2.511 3.595 2.893 
 (0.707)*** (1.034)*** (0.526)*** (0.447)*** (0.731)*** 
incompatibility 0.364 -0.795 13.608 1.485 0.976 
 (1.252) (1.208) (0.687)*** (0.746)** (0.795) 
land area 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)*** 
peace years (ln) 0.006 -0.998 -0.436 -0.194 -0.495 
 (0.222) (0.350)*** (0.195)** (0.168) (0.265)* 
defence pact 1.744 1.154 1.305 1.356 -0.446 
 (0.645)*** (1.196) (0.515)** (0.360)*** (0.945) 
cold war allies -14.096 5.597 -0.760 0.141 0.642 
 (0.814)*** (1.355)*** (1.096) (1.024) (0.918) 
t1 -4.427 0.495 -0.064 -1.573 -0.323 
 (1.355)*** (0.893) (0.292) (0.567)*** (0.205) 
t2 0.661 -0.084 0.015 0.317 0.028 
 (0.270)** (0.149) (0.048) (0.124)** (0.033) 
t3 -0.030 0.002 -0.001 -0.018 -0.001 
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 (0.017)* (0.004) (0.002) (0.008)** (0.001) 
Constant -0.250 -4.462 -31.128 -5.915 -9.315 
 (3.619) (3.156) (2.972)*** (1.726)*** (2.427)*** 
 2,861 10,743 4,531 6,834 11,523 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Robust standard errors clustered by country 
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Results from Models 6.1 - 6.3 suggest that potential interveners are sensitive to the 
technological capacity of belligerents in a civil war system. The ‘risk profile’ for low-
capability warfare is markedly different from guerrilla and conventional warfare. 
Regional hegemons, proximate countries, former colonies and members of a defence 
alliance are the most likely interveners in low-capability warfare. Interventions tend 
to occur early in a conflict and are triggered by the presence of a humanitarian crisis 
or fighting over gemstones. Overall, intervention in low-capability warfare is driven 
by events domestic to the civil war. Internally displaced persons, for example, are not 
important intervention triggers in guerrilla and conventional warfare. Scholars such as 
Alex de Walle have argued that foreign states are reluctant to incur high costs to 
protect civilians22 and deploying over small areas in circumstances where combatants 
lack the ability for offense might be an attractive prospect for cost-minimising states. 
The European Union’s deployment to the DRC (Operation Artemis) reflects this 
tendency. While feted as a success, Operation Artemis stationed soldiers in a single 
city against ‘poorly disciplined, badly led and unpredictable’ Mai-Mai militias armed 
with automatic weapons and grenades.23 One thousand four-hundred soldiers, eight 
light tanks, Mirage ground attack aircraft, APCs and two ‘Gazelle’ attack helicopters 
were able to successfully deter attacks from six different factions vying for control of 
Bunia.24 As Miskel and Norton conclude, ‘for all its success, the EU effort involved a 
very small number of troops in a small geographic area’.25 Paul Williams notes that 
the initial African Union deployment to Darfur in 2004 was ‘so tiny it could only 
cover a fraction of Darfur and protect only a tiny percentage of the population’ and 
that ‘political preferences played a greater role in this decision than technical 
capability’.26
 
  
As predicted, the distance of fighting from the capital city is significantly related to 
the probability of a foreign state deploying soldiers. As fighting gets closer, the 
chances increase and movements close to the capital have larger effects. A p-value 
less than 0.001 indicates that we can be better than 99% confident that these results 
                                                 
22 Waal, 'Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect,' Pg 1041. 
23 Miskel and Norton, 'The Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo,' Pg 9. 
24 Ibid,  Pg 8. 
25 Ibid,  Pg 11. 
26  Paul Williams, 'Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan,' 
International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2 (2006): Pg 176. 
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are not the product of random error. Results in Model 6.1 are robust to a number of 
sensitivity checks. There are four outlying cases where intervention was not predicted 
but occurred: Tanzania and Uganda’s deployments in Liberia, the United Kingdom’s 
2000 deployment in Sierra Leone and Libya’s 2001 deployment in the Central 
African Republic. Tanzania, Uganda and Libya are outliers because these states 
intervened in conflicts a long way from their borders in wars with which they had 
little connection. Uganda and Tanzania deployed in Liberia after a peace agreement 
between the transitional government and the NPFL stipulating that the Nigerian 
military presence in the country (12,000 soldiers) be diluted with neutral parties. 
Cultivating regional allies with an eye to diamond mining is thought to have 
motivated Libya’s intervention in the Central African Republic. The United 
Kingdom’s mission to Sierra Leone is an outlier because it occurred so late. The 
chances of intervention drop off quickly in low-capability warfare yet Britain 
deployed in the tenth year of conflict. Removing these cases, however, does not affect 
the significance of the ‘distance from the capital’ variable and the coefficient 
increases (sig < 0.001, b = -0.814). Respecifying the dependent variable does not 
change the results. A dichotomous variable indicating whether conflict came within 
25km of the capital during the given conflict year (used in Chapter 4) was significant 
at the 0.001 level (b = 2.427, sig < 0.001). When conflict encroaches upon this zone 
the chances of intervention increase by 11 times. Indeed some governments seem to 
be aware of the potential for fighting in the capital to trigger intervention. According 
to Gerard Prunier the Rwandan government was unhappy with the deployment of 
French and Belgian soldiers in 1990 in a non-combat status against the RPF: 
 
‘so in order dramatise the perceived gravity of the situation, it staged a fake attack on Kigali by ‘enemy 
troops’ during the night of 4-5 October. Beginning at 1am, shooting started in the capital, lasting with 
varying intensity till around 7am. Thousands of shots had been fired, but, miraculously there was not a 
single casualty and there was very little damage to buildings. The international press were deceived and 
the French ambassador Georges Matre duly reported ‘heavy fighting in the capital’, thereby achieving 
the desired effect in Paris’.27
 
  
After the ‘battle for Kigali’ France increased its troop commitment to 600 and Zaire 
intervened to get back in favour with the French and Belgians. A linear specification 
                                                 
27 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst and Company, 1995) Pg 
101-02. 
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of the ‘distance from the capital’ variable is also statistically significant (b = -0.007, 
sig = 0.024). The findings remain robust if the sample is split into low arms importing 
states and high arms importing states. Foreign intervention is significantly and 
inversely related to the distance of fighting from the capital city in low arms 
importing conflict years. The chances of intervention are unrelated to the distance of 
fighting from the capital in higher capability conflict years. Not one of the 29 foreign 
interventions in high arms importing conflict years occurred within 25km of the 
capital. Sixty-four percent of interventions in low arms importing years occurred 
within 25km of the capital.  
 
How strong is the effect of a threatened capital on the chances of intervention and 
how does it compare to other independent variables? A first year low-capability 
conflict at the mean distance of 156km from the capital city (5.01728 on the 
logarithmic scale) has a very low probability of intervention – just 0.4%. With all 
other variables set at their mean values (and dichotomous variables at their mode) 
moving to within 1km of the capital city’s CBD (representing 65% of a 1 standard 
deviation decrease) increases the probability of military intervention to 5.4%. The pull 
of a ‘battle for the capital’ is greater than the obligations ensconced in a defence 
alliance, which raises the probability to 2.1%, the allure of gemstones in the conflict 
zone, which raises the probability to 1.7%, or the self-styled responsibilities of being 
a regional hegemon, which increase the probability to 3.3%. Increasing the level of 
internally displaced persons by the same magnitude (65% of 1 standard deviation) 
raises the probability to 3.5%. Some variables, however, do have a much larger effect. 
Colonial obligations are a powerful motivation to send soldiers abroad, increasing the 
probability to 33%. Intervention is most likely in the first year of war and drops off 
rapidly until a small rise at about 10 years. Figure 6.4 shows the effect of time on the 
probability of intervention in the first 15 years of conflict.  
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Figure 6.4 – Probability of Foreign Intervention in Low-Capability Warfare vs Time 
(Years) 
 
 
There are a number of potential explanations for the pattern in Figure 6.4. Aydin 
argues that ‘the timing of civil war intervention is closely associated with the war’s 
intervention history… States become hesitant and wait for longer periods to take 
action in civil wars in which interventions that have failed to influence combatant 
behaviour have been attempted by other states’.28
                                                 
28 Aysegul Aydin, 'Where do States Go? Strategy in Civil War Intervention,' Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 27, no. 1 (2010): "Abstract". 
 Perhaps the preference for early 
intervention in low-capability warfare reflects the lack of intervention by other states 
and the paucity of information on the likely success of conflict resolution efforts. In 
this case the relationship between time and the chances of intervention in Model 6.1 is 
substantive and reflects learning processes in intervention decision-making. However, 
it is strange that the same relationship is not present in conventional and guerrilla 
warfare. It is possible that the speed at which fighting approaches the capital in low-
capability warfare forces states to intervene earlier than in conventional and guerrilla 
warfare (see Chapter 4). For the present analysis it is sufficient to note that the effect 
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is controlled for in Model 6.1, but the finding is surprising and interesting and is 
further investigated in the case study of the Liberian civil war (Chapter 7).   
 
Sierra Leone’s civil war is a useful illustration of the findings in Model 6.1. If we take 
1991 as a baseline year where the average probability of intervention was 1.6%, we 
can see how changes in the distance of fighting from Freetown affected the 
probability of foreign states deploying. 29
 
 We can compare the effect of conflict 
geography in low-capability warfare with the effect of conflict geography in 
conventional warfare by using the coefficient extracted from Model 6.2.  
Figure 6.5 - Changes in Probability of Military Intervention in Sierra Leone’s Civil 
War, Low-Capability and Conventional Warfare 
 
 
Changes in the distance of fighting from Freetown, especially changes very close to 
Freetown, induce substantial fluctuations in the chances of outside intervention. As 
the fighting comes within 10km, the probability jumps to around 25% in 1997, 1998 
and 1999. If we were to imagine that Sierra Leone’s conflict was fought 
conventionally, the effect predicted by Model 6.2 is much smaller, rising to a 
                                                 
29 The average predicted probability for Sierra Leone in 1991 was obtained by averaging the predicted 
probabilities of military intervention for all potential interveners during that year.  
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maximum of 2.2% in these years. For reference, Figure 6.6 shows the predicted 
probability of Nigerian and Guinean intervention in Sierra Leone with all control 
variables factored in. Patterns in the movements of predicted probabilities are more 
important to observe than the numbers themselves. Logistic regression of ‘rare 
events’ such as military intervention tend to understate the probability of an event 
occurring.30
 
  
Figure 6.6 – Predicted Probability of Intervention in Sierra Leone’s Civil War 
Extracted from Model 6.1 
 
 
As Chapter 5 discussed, war in Sierra Leone started when the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) attacked towns near the Liberian border in 1991. Nigerian soldiers were 
stationed in Sierra Leone before 1991 under the auspices of the ECOMOG mission to 
Liberia (see Chapter 8). Freetown was a garrison for ECOMOG troops and an airbase 
for Nigerian Alpha jets. Nigeria and Guinea acted quickly to prevent conflict 
spreading from Liberia into Sierra Leone. Nigerian soldiers guarded installations in 
Freetown and released soldiers of the RSLMF to fight the RUF. Guinea, also a 
member of ECOMOG, deployed soldiers to combat the RUF in the east of Sierra 
                                                 
30 Gary King and Langche Zeng, 'Explaining Rare Events in International Relations,' International 
Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): Pg 137. 
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Leone.31 While the fighting was far from Freetown in 1991 both the Nigerian and 
Guinean interventions may reflect the preference for states to intervene early to stamp 
out nascent rebellions while the military capacity of insurgents is low. That the early 
fighting focused around the diamond-mining areas of eastern Sierra Leone may also 
have triggered Guinean intervention to protect these crucial sites of government 
revenue. It is, however, very difficult to say for sure. It is unlikely, however, that 
either the Nigerian or Guinean interventions were motivated by the opportunities to 
profit from diamond mining. As Adebajo argues, rent seeking opportunities for 
Nigerians were far more lucrative (and comparatively less dangerous) in Nigeria.32
 
 
Sierra Leone’s east and south were the epicentres of conflict from 1992-1994, over 
100km from Freetown. The RUF made rapid gains in 1995 and threatened the 
gateway villages of Waterloo and Newtown, effectively ‘besieging’ Freetown.33
 
 The 
RUF advance correlates with a spike in the probability of foreign intervention in 
Figures 6.5 and 6.6. No foreign country deployed in 1995 that was not already 
involved in Sierra Leone, although Nigeria and Guinea dispatched reinforcements in 
response to the RUF gains.  
The RUF’s advance on Freetown was halted by the intervention of private security 
companies. The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) contracted Ghurkah 
Security Guards (GSG) to train the RSLMF in counter-insurgency in February 
1995. 34 The GSG went into combat against the RUF but its commander, Robert 
Mackenzie was killed in late February, apparently in cahoots with the RSLMF, and 
GSG withdrew.35
                                                 
31 David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (New York: Palgrave, 2005) Pg 87. 
 The NPRC contracted Executive Outcomes (EO) in May 1995, a 
collection of former South African, Angolan and Namibian soldiers (with combat 
experience in the Angolan civil war) for $15 million to push the RUF out of Freetown 
32 Adekeye Adebajo, 'Mad Dogs and Glory: Nigeria's Interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone,' in 
Gulliver's Troubles, ed. Adekele Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha (Scottsville: University of Kwa-
Zulu-Natal Press, 2008), Pg 192. Michael Nest also argues that profiteering was not a motivation for 
Zimbabwe’s initial intervention although it developed as a reason to continue deploying as the war 
dragged on. Michael Nest, 'Ambitiions, Profits and Loss: Zimbabwean Economic Involvement in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo,' African Affairs 100, no. 400 (2001). 
33  Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone 
(London: Hurst, 2005) Pg 91. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid,  Pg 92. 
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and re-capture the mining districts in the east.36 EO brought with them three attack 
helicopters (two M117’s and one Mi-24 Hind) and with the assistance of Nigerians 
and Guineans, inflicted a series of crushing setbacks on the RUF.37
 
 Newly elected 
president, Tejan Kabbah, could boast of controlling much of Sierra Leone’s territory 
by 1996. EO demonstrated how a small, well armed and organised injection of 
conventional force can have a large impact on military outcomes in low-capability 
warfare. As the fighting moved back into the countryside the demand for foreign 
intervention decreased again. 
A rouge group of officers from the RSLMF attacked the capital in mid-1997 and, in a 
series of battles, expelled the few hundred Nigerian troops still based in Sierra Leone 
under a defence pact. 38 Under the leadership of Major Johnny Paul Komora, the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) invited the RUF into Freetown. RUF 
fighters ‘poured into the seaside capital and took up strategic positions’.39 Nigerian 
soldiers re-grouped at Lungi airport, just to the north,40 and immediately shelled the 
RUF/AFRC positions in Freetown. An attempt to capture positions inside Freetown 
failed on May 31 and 300 Nigerians were captured. 41 By July the Nigerians had 
deployed 3000 soldiers just outside of Freetown and occasionally shelled the city 
from land and sea. 42 Guinea also contributed military contingents and ECOWAS 
eventually endorsed the intervention.43
 
  
ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone based their military strategy heavily around, firstly, 
capturing Freetown and then protecting it from being re-captured by the RUF. 
                                                 
36 Most EO soldiers come from South Africa’s 32nd Battalion which was used to ‘spearhead’ its 
destabilisation program in Southern Africa. Many soldiers saw extensive combat in Angola. Howe 
argues that EO’s military effectiveness comes largely from its ‘force multiplier effect’. EO’s training 
and intelligence gathering services enhance the existing capabilities of the contracting party. See 
Herbert Howe, 'Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes,' The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 36, no. 2 (1998): Pg 311, 16-17. For a less sanguine interpretation 
see David J Francis, 'Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security of 
International Exploitation?,' Third World Quarterly 20, no. 2 (1999), Gberie, A Dirty War in West 
Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone  Pg 92. 
37 Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone  Pg 93. 
38 Ibid,  Pg 95. 
39 Ibid,  Pg 101. 
40 Ibid,  Pg 96, 111. 
41 Ibid,  Pg 111. 
42 Ibid,  Pg 112. 
43 Ghana eventually deployed soldiers in 1999, See Abass Bundu, Democracy by Force?: A Study of 
International Military Intervention in the Conflict in Sierra Leone 1991-2000 (USA: Universal 
Publishers, 2001) Pg 79. 
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‘Operation Sandstorm’ involved 10,000 Nigerian soldiers and members of Sierra 
Leone’s Civil Defence Forces (CDF), local militias initially formed to protect villages 
and communities. 44  ‘Sandstorm’ commenced with CDF attacks on AFRC forces 
throughout the countryside, including the diamond mining areas, to draw the ‘bulk of 
the People’s Army away from the capital’.45
 
 On February 12 1998, after a two week 
battle, ECOMOG ejected the AFRC/RUF from Freetown. One bottleneck along the 
thin strip of land passing through the towns of Newtown, Hastings and Waterloo 
constitutes the only land exit from Freetown. ECOMOG did not close off this exit and 
allowed the RUF/AFRC to escape with many of their weapons intact. One Sierra 
Leonean soldier fighting with ECOMOG noted that: 
‘As we were not fighting against individuals but the idea to restore the democratically elected 
government of President Kabbah, we were not interested in killing them or capturing them alive but to 
force them out of power and out of the seat of power. And about 5pm that day [the day of the retreat] 
we totally abandoned the peninsula road, which was the only route out of the city, and then they 
evacuated with their forces’.46
 
 
Nigerian soldiers avoided counter-insurgency after the capture of Freetown. Hutchful 
argues that ‘the very nature of the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone placed 
conventional armed forces in extremely ambiguous and dangerous situations’. 47 
Gberie noted that ‘Nigerian ECOMOG troops, who completely lacked counter-
insurgency training, failed dismally to pursue the rebels to their hide-outs, preferring 
conventional onslaughts against towns like Makeni and Kabala’. 48  ECOMOG 
appeared to have settled for a military stalemate by 1998 and was ‘largely content for 
the local civil defence force (CDF)... to do most of the fighting.’49
                                                 
44 Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone  Pg 116. 
 ECOMOG did, 
however, defend the diamond-mining regions. RUF commander Isay Sesay noted in 
1998 that ‘I led the troops in the attack on Koidu Town, attacking the enemy at 0600 
hours. They [ECOMOG] put up a strong resistance using their four mechanised 
45 Ibid. 
46 Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone  Pg 218. 
47  Eboe Hutchful, 'The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in West Africa,' Published in 
Monograph No 36: Whither Peacekeeping in Africa? April (1999): Pg 5. 
48 Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone  Pg 122. 
49 As cited in Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone  Pg 224. 
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battalions deployed to defend Kono and its diamonds’. 50  Nigeria suffered a 
substantial defeat in the battle for Kono and abandoned up to 50% of their arms.51
 
 
The RUF/AFRC made rapid advances against the ECOMOG and CDF forces after the 
Kono defeat and the RUF attacked Freetown for a third time in January 1999. 
According to Gberie, ECOMOG knew of the planned RUF attack two weeks in 
advance ‘but chose not to put up resistance’.52 The Nigerian military used its ‘heavy 
artillery, naval guns and aircraft’ to counter-attack the advancing rebels in central 
Freetown and was able expel the RUF. 53  Spokesman for the Nigerian president, 
Mohammed Haruna, stated after the battle for Freetown, that ‘the idea is to fortify the 
place [Freetown], then dialogue... there is no way you can clean up the whole 
country’.54
 
  
It was the possibility of a fourth attack that provoked the United Kingdom to 
intervene in May 2000. A Guardian report authored by Ewen MacAskill and Richard 
Norton-Taylor noted that the British decision to deploy soldiers was taken amidst 
‘confused, chaotic and fast-moving background’. 55  A ‘panic stricken’ UN report 
predicting an impending RUF attack on Freetown ‘galvanised’ the decision-makers to 
take ‘the lead in the defence of Freetown’. 56  Dorman writes that, like Nigerian 
intervention, British intervention in Sierra Leone was triggered by the RUF’s 
movements towards Freetown and the humanitarian catastrophe such an assault 
entailed. He notes that in May 2000, ‘it seemed that the RUF were now marching on 
Freetown and that there was no credible force in their way. It was hardly surprising 
that memories of the indiscriminate massacre of civilians in Freetown by the RUF 
were causing fear and panic to spread amongst the civilian population’.57
                                                 
50 As cited in ibid,  Pg 225. 
 Williams 
argued that ‘while in hindsight certain individual reports may have exaggerated the 
51 Ibid,  Pg 221. 
52 Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone  Pg 126. 
53 Ibid,  Pg 131. 
54 Fatoumata Kaba, 'West African Leaders Favour Talks in Sierra Leone,' Reuters Newswires, 30 
January 1999 1999. 
55  Ewen MacAskill and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Flawed Evidence Led to Mission Creep,' The 
Guardian, 16 May 2000. 
56 Paul Williams, 'Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone,' Contemporary 
Security Policy 22, no. 3 (2001): Pg 153..  
57 Andrew Dorman, Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2009) Pg 69. 
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immediacy and degree of the threat to Freetown, given the RUF’s atrocities in 
January 1999 and its increasingly flagrant breaches of Lome, there is no doubt that a 
significant threat existed’.58
 
 John Kamphner, in his history of ‘Blair’s’ Wars’ writes 
that: 
‘Acting on military intelligence that Freetown was about to be taken again, Geoff Hoon, the new 
defence secretary, and [Robin] Cook persuaded Blair that troops should be sent in... But at the Ministry 
of Defence and Foreign Office nobody was clear on what the actual remit was.’59
 
 
The British intervention was designed to ‘secure key ground around Freetown and the 
airport’ and British soldiers soon engaged the RUF in a battle just outside Lungi 
international airport. 60  Connaughton argues that ‘Operation Palliser’ was an 
application of the ‘Glass of Water Strategy’ that ‘envisages light forces deploying 
rapidly so as to be used metaphorically as a glass of water to douse an early fire, thus 
obviating the need for a massive fire brigade-sized response’.61
 
 It can hardly be said 
that by 2000 the war in Sierra Leone was in its ‘early’ stages, but the application of a 
small conventional force in a strategically crucial area paid large dividends.  
Conventional and guerrilla warfare have different risk profiles. Proximate states, 
former colonies and allies to a defence pact are the most likely interveners, although 
regional hegemons play a smaller role. Intervention triggers are vastly different. 
Battle location plays no appreciable role. As was argued in Chapter 2, the location of 
battle in conventional warfare depends upon the perceptions of a rival commander’s 
likely course of action and is not predictable by recourse to economic geography. As 
pitched battles are distributed at distances near and far from the capital, so foreign 
states intervene at distances near and far to the capital. Moreover, in at least one of the 
cases where intervention does correlate with a battle for the capital the intervening 
state believed it was deploying in a low capability conflict. When the second 
Congolese war began in August 1998, Zimbabwe dispatched 10 senior military 
officers on a fact-finding mission to ‘assess the situation there’62
                                                 
58 Williams, 'Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone,' Pg 153. 
 that did not report 
59 John Kampfner, Blair's Wars (London: Free Press, 2003) Pg 70. 
60 Dorman, Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone  Pg 2. 
61 Richard Connaughton, 'The Mechanics and Nature of British Interventions into Sierra Leone (2000) 
and Afghanistan (2001-2002),' Civil Wars 5, no. 2 (2002): Pg 84. 
62 “Zimbabwean troops in DRC to help Kabila –report” Associated Press 6 August 1998 
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back before alarming predictions were made that Kinshasa was days from capture.63 
Zimbabwe dispatched soldiers to Kinshasa as rebels were investing the outer suburbs 
of the capital. Zimbabwean decision-makers believed that ‘the force threatening 
Kinshasa was only a rag-tag group of dissidents’ and ‘it was widely assumed that this 
would be a temporary military expedition lasting no more than three weeks’.64 Only 
600 soldiers were initially deployed to protect Kinshasa, the ‘embodi[ment of] the 
legal and sovereign government of the DRC in strategic terms’ and by relieving 
Kinshasa from the rebel threat, Zimbabwe believed it held the ‘political trump card’ 
in any future negotiations.65
 
 As it emerged that the force threatening Kinshasa was 
not a ‘rag-tag’ group of rebels but a 10,000 strong force backed by regular Rwandan 
and Ugandan soldiers, Zimbabwe reinforced and by 1999 its commitment had 
ballooned to nearly 12,000 soldiers deployed deep in the Congolese countryside.  
International rivalries and alliance patterns are more closely correlated with 
intervention than the geography of civil war. States with a recent history of military 
posturing or combat are more likely to dispatch soldiers to support a rebellion in a 
conflicted state than dyads with a history of peace. Neighbouring states use dissent in 
a rival country as a low-cost method of realising geopolitical goals. Rwanda twice 
exploited (and orchestrated) mutinies in the DRC as cover for an invasion force. Such 
intervention, however, often activates a network of alliances and rivalries (which can 
include non-state actors), triggering counter-intervention. Angola rebuffed Rwanda’s 
second invasion of the DRC in 1998, in part, because of a perceived closeness 
between UNITA (the Angolan government’s arch rival) and Rwanda. 66
                                                 
63 A.W. Tapfumaneyi, 'Some Reflections on the Curent Conflict in the DRC: Explaining Zimbabwe's 
Military Intervention,' in Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ed. Mwesiga Baregu (Harare: 
Sapes Books, 1999), Pg 114. 
 Ugandan 
support for RCD rebels in the same conflict provoked Sudanese support for the 
Congolese government. Uganda and Sudan shared an enduring rivalry over cross 
border support for insurgent movements in their respective countries. Cuba’s decision 
to rebuff South Africa’s invasion of Angola is another good example. Although 
Angola was a Cold War ally of Cuba, according to Fidel Castro, it was South Africa’s 
dispatch of 3000 soldiers and armour to overthrow the MPLA government that 
64 Rupiya, 'A Political and Military Review of Zimbabwe's involvement in the Second Congo War,' Pg 
94. 
65 Ibid,  Pg 98. 
66 See Turner, 'Angola's Role in the Congo War.' 
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provoked intervention. He commented that ‘when the invasion of Angola by regular 
South African troops started on 23 October, we could not sit idle. And when the 
MPLA asked us for help, we offered the necessary aid to prevent Apartheid from 
making itself comfortable in Angola’. 67
 
 Results from Model 6.2 suggest that the 
stakes must be high to trigger intervention in conventional warfare. An opportunity to 
destabilise a rival, to overthrow an enemy, to protect an ally, or preserve a friendly 
regime are causes for which states are willing to endure the substantial costs of 
sending soldiers to fight in a conventional conflict.   
Chad’s civil war from 1982-1990 is a useful illustration of the findings in Model 
6.2. 68
 
 Table 6.7 charts the predicted probabilities of French intervention in the 
Chadian civil war alongside the distance of fighting from Ndjamena. Peaks in the 
probability of intervention are not related to the location of battle relative to 
Ndjamena. If anything, as the conflict moves further from Ndjamena, the more likely 
intervention seems to become.  
  
                                                 
67 As cited in Issac Saney, 'African Stalingrad: The Cuban Revolution, Internationalism and the End of 
Apartheid,' Latin American Perspectives 33, no. 5 (2006): Pg 94. 
68 In the BK coding Chad’s war had evolved from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare by 1980. 
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Figure 6.7 - Predicted Probability of French Intervention in the Chadian Civil War 
Extracted from Model 6.3, 1982-1990 
 
 
Hissene Habre fought his way to power in Ndjamena in 1982, ousting the Transitional 
Government of National Unity (GNUT). Figure 6.7 shows two peaks of relatively 
high intervention probability during Habre’s reign, in 1983 and 1986. France 
deployed soldiers to Chad in support of Habre in both these years and the 
interventions are worth examining to illustrate some of the differences between 
intervention triggers and strategy in conventional civil wars as compared to low-
capability civil wars. 
 
French intervention was designed to protect Ndjamena from rebel capture on both 
occasions. However, France could not wait until the fighting directly threatened the 
capital due to the military capabilities at the disposal of their rivals, especially Libya. 
Operation Manta, as the 1983 intervention was codenamed, was triggered by the 
capture of Faya Largeau in the far north of Chad (over 700km from Ndjamena) by the 
GNUT in late July 1983. From 1982, the GNUT benefited from substantial Libyan 
military assistance including multiple rocket launchers (Stalin Organs), SAM-7 
ground to air missiles and tons of light weapons. This support included 3000 Libyan 
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regulars backed by heavy artillery, T-55 tanks, and air support by 1983. Faya-Largeau 
fell to the GNUT forces on June 24th. President Mobutu of Zaire was the first to 
deploy soldiers on July 3. Mobutu’s army, however, lacked the offensive capacity to 
confront the Libya-GNUT alliance and the 2000 Zairian paratroopers were used to 
defend the capital, freeing up Chadian soldiers to move to the front line.69 The GNUT 
captured Abeche on July 6th, over 600km from Ndjamena. Habre’s forces (led by the 
president personally) counter-attacked and had re-captured Abeche and Faya-Largeau 
by the end of July.70 Libya then committed 11,000 soldiers, hundreds of T-55 tanks 
and 80 combat aircraft to the re-capture of Faya-Largeau. The GNUT were able to 
muster another 5000 infantry for the assault. Roughly 5000 of Habre’s soldiers 
remained in Faya-Largeau to resist the advance.71 Habre’s soldiers retreated from 
Faya on August 10th, unable to withstand the onslaught of Libya’s armour and air-
strikes. France announced that it would assist the Chadian government a day prior to 
the fall of Faya and deployed 3500 soldiers and Jaguar jets in ‘Operation Manta’ – the 
largest French deployment since the Algerian war.72
 
 
France intervened during the decisive battle for the strategic town of Faya Largeau 
and based their strategy on minimising French exposure to battle while targeting 
where the GNUT-Libyan forces were strongest (their air power) and Habre’s National 
Army of Chad (FANT) were weakest (their vulnerability to air power). While a small 
town (less than 10,000 inhabitants) and a long way from Ndjamena, Faya-Largeau 
was a government stronghold and a ‘gateway’ to roads accessing south of Chad and 
Ndjamena. As such it was a pressure point for any mechanised army aiming to attack 
Ndjamena (again, this correlates well with the replication of Buhaug and Rod’s study 
in Chapter 4). France intervened before the fall of Faya-Largeau to deter Libyan and 
GNUT forces from rapidly pushing south on Ndjamena. Any intervention needed to 
be early as Libyan amour, with air support, would rapidly descend upon Ndjamena 
once the roads were opened from Faya-Largeau. Large, pitched battles in the Chadian 
countryside also communicated important information to France about the GNUT’s 
                                                 
69 Zairian soldiers are reported to have engaged in more looting than battle. 
70 Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife since 1945 (Maryland: 
Scarecrow, 1998) Pg 40. 
71 Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2004) Pg 383. 
72 Ibid., Mario Joaquim Azevedo, Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad (London: Routledge, 
1998) Pg 179. 
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military capabilities and foreign backers. The battles for Faya-Largeau and Abeche 
involved 20,000 soldiers and modern weaponry. Harbre alone lost 700 dead.73 Libya 
showed its hand by supporting GNUT insurgents with armour, soldiers and air strikes 
(the United States were conducting air surveillance over Chad during the 1980s and 
were heavily involved in convincing the French to intervene). As Pollack argues ‘the 
size and firepower of the Libyan intervention caused Habre to recognise that the 
FANT could not hold Ndjamena without assistance’. 74  Indeed, in a very similar 
situation in 1986 ‘Habre used the size and power of the... Libyan thrusts to convince 
the French to re-deploy 2000 troops and several squadrons of Jaguars to Chad’.75 
According to Burr and Collins, ‘Mitterrand [the French President] could not disregard 
this persistent and unwelcome Libyan invasion… Further, France could not abandon 
Francophone Africa which had called out for French intervention – it was impossible 
to abandon France-Afrique, the mystique of General de Gaulle, and most important, 
the strong and enduring cultural ties between France and Africa’.76
 
  
France was able to construct what it believed to be a low-cost military strategy with a 
good look at Libyan military capabilities. France wished to avoid provoking a land 
war with Libya that would incur domestically unpopular casualties in the ‘wastelands’ 
of Chad. To this end, Operation Manta partitioned Chad along the 16th parallel, or 
‘red line’. France did not fortify the line, choosing instead to punish transgressions 
with offensive action, as it did in 1986.77 French soldiers also deployed to defend 
Abeche in the east and supported FANT units with air-support during counter-attacks 
in 1983 and 1984.78 The location of the ‘red line’ was chosen specifically to keep 
French forces, FANT forces and Ndjamena outside of Libya’s air range.79 Had the 
line been established further south (and France intervened later) their forces and the 
capital were exposed and vulnerable to Libyan Mirage fighters, Su-22 fighter-
bombers and Tu-16 bombers.80
                                                 
73 Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991  Pg 383. 
 In a conventional civil war, foreign states have the 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid,  Pg 389. 
76 Millard Burr and Robert Collins, Africa's Thirty Years War: Libya, Chad and the Sudan, 1963-1993 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1999) Pg 172. 
77 Azevedo, Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad  Pg 142. 
78 Brogan, World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife since 1945  Pg 40. 
79 William Smith, Thomas Sancton, and John Borrell, 'Chad: France Draws the Line,' Time Magazine 
August 29 (1983). 
80 Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991  Pg 303. 
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incentive and information to deploy while fighting remains in the countryside. It was 
France’s rivalry with Libya and the outcome of large battles over small but strategic 
towns that triggered French intervention, not the proximity of fighting to Ndjamena. 
France also deployed substantial offensive capacity to re-buff any continued assault 
by a military force with a level of conventional offensive capacity much higher than 
the FANT they were supporting. Indeed France’s intervention ‘evened’ the playing 
field by neutralising an important part of the GNUT-Libyan conventional offensive 
capacity – air power. Operation Manta was not so much physical defence of the 
capital city, Ndjamena, but the deployment of offensive capacity in a game of 
‘chicken’.  
 
Like conventional warfare, intervention in guerrilla warfare is largely unrelated to the 
distance of conflict from the capital. The risk profile for guerrilla warfare is similar to 
conventional warfare. Proximate states, former colonial powers, regional hegemons 
and states with a recent history of military confrontation are likely interveners. 
Foreign military intervention by a rival raises the chances of counter-intervention (in 
this case by over thirty times) and especially if the target state is a Cold-War ally.81
 
  
Interveners tend not to deploy when the government has a substantial military 
advantage. Any state considering military support for an insurgency must consider the 
additional costs of overcoming the government’s military superiority. As an 
insurgency increases in strength, the differential between government and insurgent 
military capabilities decreases, lowering the costs of intervention for foreign states 
and increasing the chances of success. Often foreign states support an insurgency with 
weapons first, then send in soldiers when the government actor is weak. For states 
considering support for the government, it cost-ineffective to risk casualties in a fight 
the government looks like winning anyway. It is only as insurgents pose a grave threat 
to the survival of a regime that foreign states send soldiers to fight alongside the 
government.  
Offsetting Somali/Cuban interventions in Ethiopia during 1977 are a typical example 
of the dynamics in Model 6.3. However, this case also alerts us to the possibility that 
                                                 
81 Findings that corroborate with previous work in military intervention. See Michael G. Findley and 
Tze Kwang Teo, 'Rethinking Third Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor Centric Approach,' 
The Journal of Politics 68, no. 4 (2006). 
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foreign intervention can change the type of warfare, in this case from guerrilla to 
conventional. Obviously there is an extent of measurement error in the KB coding of 
warfare-type. This is unlikely to affect the results for low-capability warfare as it is 
difficult to imagine foreign interventions causing low capability warfare, but it may 
affect the results for conventional and guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, the basic 
insights remain. Foreign states are likely to wait for opportunities to utilise their 
advantage in conventional offense even in guerrilla warfare, opportunities that often 
correlate with the entry of another foreign power. Figure 6.8 charts the average 
probability of military intervention in Ethiopia’s war with WSLF extracted from 
Model 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.8 – Probability of Military Intervention in Ethiopia’s War with the WSLF, 
Extracted from Model 6.282
 
 
 
Ethiopia and Somalia fought border wars in 1961 and 1964 and, although they 
refrained from hostilities until 1977, the two countries remained rivals. 83
                                                 
82  The average probability of intervention was calculated by taking the mean value of all predicted 
probabilities produced by Model 6.3 for the Ethiopian war with the WSLF during the given year. 
 Somalia 
claimed the south-western horn of Ethiopia, the Ogaden region, as its own territory. 
Arnold writes that ‘the Somalis referred to the Ogaden as Western Somalia, regarded 
83 Brogan, World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife since 1945  Pg 98. 
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it as a Somali region under foreign (Ethiopian) domination and demanded self-
determination for it’. 84  WSLF insurgents had conducted a low-level guerrilla 
campaign from the early 1960s for the independence of the Ogaden. Somalia had 
sponsored Ogadeni insurgents since 1963, but from 1976 the WSLF enjoyed higher 
levels military support from President Siad Barre.85
Mengistu Haile Mariam. Insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray had dragged military 
resources away from the southern frontier with Somalia. Consequently the WSLF 
found success in 1977 conducting raids on police stations, railways and roads. 
Although the main garrison towns of Dire Dawa, Harar and Jigija could not be 
captured, by mid 1977 it was estimated that the WSLF controlled 60% of the Ogdaen 
region.86  
 Somalia initially provided the 
WSLF with light weapons and logistical support at a time when Ethiopia was reeling 
from a bloody revolution that overthrew the monarchy of Haile Selassie and installed 
the Communist Party (popularly known as the Derg) led (eventually) by Major 
 
 
Inspired by the WSLF’s success, Somalia launched a full-scale invasion of the 
Ogaden region in July 1977, complete with Soviet tanks, aircraft and artillery. 
Roughly 35,000 soldiers from the Somali National Army (SNA), 250 tanks, 300 
APCs, 200 pieces of mobile artillery and the Somali Air Force supported an estimated 
15,000 WSLF troops.87 The invasion force moved to attack the less well defended 
south and east. Ethiopia’s military were concentrated in the Dire Dawa, Harar, Jijiga 
‘triangle’ and ‘gateway to the major urban and industrial centres of Eastern 
Ethiopia’. 88  The invaders were initially successful in capturing 350,000 square 
kilometres with an ‘offensive strategy based on seizing the initiative and exploiting 
the surprise factor’.89
                                                 
84 Guy Arnold, Africa: A Modern History (London: Atlantic Books, 2006) Pg 481. 
 Only the garrison towns of Dire Dawa, Harar and Jijiga stood in 
the way of full control of the Ogaden region by August 8th 1977. Until the Ethiopian 
garrisons in these cities could be destroyed, however, the Somalis were vulnerable as 
their rapid advance had stretched their supply lines. The Somalis attacked Dire Dawa 
85 Tareke, 'The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited,' Pg 639. 
86 Adam Lockyer, 'Opposing Foreign Intervention's Impact on the Course of Civil Wars: The Ethiopian 
Ogaden Civil War, 1976-1980,' Referred paper presented at the Australasian Political Studies 
Association Conference, University of Newcastle, 25-27 September (2006): Pg 6-9. 
87 Ibid,  Pg 9. 
88 Tareke, 'The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited,' Pg 643. 
89 Ibid,  Pg 644. 
Chapter Six – Empirics III 
 238 
but were repelled with heavy casualties on August 17th.90 Somalia attacked Jijiga in 
August and throughout September the city changed hands twice before being captured 
on September 12th.91
 
  
In late September, following the defeat at Jijiga, the USSR commenced its  mammoth 
sea and airlift of supplies to Ethiopia. Two South Yemeni armoured battalions were 
deployed and ‘considerably boosted Ethiopia’s firepower’ at the same time.92 Before 
the Somali invasion, the USSR had agreed to supply the Derg with military assistance 
(and by February 1978 the US declared it would supply Somalia with arms). 93 
Hitherto, the Ethiopian monarchy was a close ally of the United States and Somalia a 
recipient of Soviet weapons and advice.94 Supplies to the Derg included, eventually, 
1500 Soviet advisors, 17,000 Cuban soldiers (that took active part in fighting against 
the SNA), 300 T-54 battle tanks and 300 artillery pieces.95 The first Cuban soldiers 
arrived in December 1977, increasing to 18,000 by February with ‘their own full gear 
including armoured cars and T-62 tanks’. 96  Soviet and Cuban military assistance 
arrived after the Ethiopian army had looked increasingly able to defend the cities of 
Dire Dawa and Harar, but unable to expel the invaders. It was during the Ethiopian 
counter-offensive that Cuban soldiers and Soviet equipment proved invaluable – 
especially at the re-capture of Jijiga, which is estimated to have involved 75,000 
Ethiopian soldiers and 7000 Cubans.97
 
 Cuba’s military strategy was fundamentally 
offensive and designed to push the Somali forces back over the border and out of 
Ethiopia.  
This brief example shows a couple of things. Firstly, guerrilla warfare is more likely 
to experience intervention when enmeshed in a web of regional and international 
rivalries. Otherwise, intervention is very rare. Somalia used the intensifying rebellions 
within Ethiopia and the success of the WSLF’s guerrilla campaign as an opportunity 
                                                 
90 Ibid,  Pg 646. 
91 Ibid,  Pg 647. 
92 Ibid,  Pg 652. 
93 Arnold, Africa: A Modern History  Pg 482. 
94  A US Congressional Inquiry into aid to the Sealssie regime estimated that by the 1970s this 
amounted to more than $250 million per year. Ibid,  Pg 479. 
95 Lockyer, 'Opposing Foreign Intervention's Impact on the Course of Civil Wars: The Ethiopian 
Ogaden Civil War, 1976-1980,' Pg 9. 
96 Tareke, 'The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited,' Pg 656. 
97 Lockyer, 'Opposing Foreign Intervention's Impact on the Course of Civil Wars: The Ethiopian 
Ogaden Civil War, 1976-1980.' 
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to strike at a long-term rival and obtain the Ogaden territory it had so coveted. 
However, Ethiopia was a key piece on the Cold War chessboard and the intervention 
of Somalia led the USSR, South Yemen and Cuba to support their ally. However, the 
example also shows that the motivations for intervention in guerrilla and conventional 
warfare may be quite similar. War in the Ogaden morphed from a guerrilla to a 
conventional conflict that opened a window for foreign states to utilise their 
conventional offensive capabilities. The trigger for Cuban and South Yemeni 
intervention in this conventional phase of the war was, like the example of Chad 
discussed earlier, a major battle over a strategic garrison town in the countryside. This 
helps us explain other interventions in guerrilla warfare such as the French 
intervention in Chad during 1978. Collins and Burr stated that: 
 
‘Hitherto the fighting had been between mobile columns moving through the Sahara and Sahel with 
small arms. The government forces at Faya were now confronted by sophisticated  heavy weapons – 
including anti-aircraft artillery and Libyan air cover and logistical support... The French could not 
ignore Malloum’s pleas for help after such a dramatic defeat. Over 2000 troops of the Force 
d’Intervention, accompanied by helicopters, Jaguar Jets, and Bruget reconnaissance planes, were 
rushed to Ndjamena. The French established a defensive perimeter from Moussoro to Ati to protect 
Malloum and the heartland of Chad’.98
 
 
In Ethiopia, as in Chad, large battles for Harar and Jijiga communicated important 
information both to the Ethiopian regime and its foreign backers about the demand for 
intervention and the possibility of exploiting advantages in conventional offense.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Foreign intervention in low-capability warfare is triggered by factors domestic to the 
conflicted state. When belligerents lack the ability to use heavy weapons, 
humanitarian crises, fighting over natural resources and, importantly, the distance of 
fighting from the capital are systematically related to the chances of intervention. 
Low-capability warfare offers outside states the opportunity to deploy a small number 
of soldiers in strategically important areas to capture and defend the ‘trump card’ in 
any future negotiations. In Africa this ‘trump card’ is often the capital city. Conflict 
                                                 
98 Burr and Collins, Africa's Thirty Years War: Libya, Chad and the Sudan, 1963-1993  Pg 119. 
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geography plays a marginal role in explaining the timing of intervention in higher 
capability civil wars. Deployment costs associated with combating a militarily 
sophisticated opponent means the stakes must be commensurately higher. ‘High 
politics’, including rivalries, geopolitics and the activation of regional and global 
alliance networks are the more likely triggers of intervention in conventional and 
guerrilla warfare.  
 
 
Chapter Seven 
Empirics IV: The Liberian Civil War 
 
This chapter tests the plausibility of two casual mechanisms. Does fighting occur and 
concentrate in Africa’s capital cities because military actors adopt a ‘strategy of 
exhaustion’ in low-capability warfare to exploit the advantages of conventional 
defence around the country’s most valuable areas? Do foreign actors intervene when 
governments and insurgents commit to decisive battles over resources with the belief 
that advantages in conventional offense can be exploited against belligerents armed 
primarily with light weapons, and that by controlling the most valuable areas, play 
‘kingmaker’ in future negotiations?  
 
Liberia’s civil war from 1989-1990 is a ‘most likely’ case for testing the links 
between low-capability warfare, fighting in the capital and foreign intervention. Both 
the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) were lightly armed and poorly organised.1
 
 Liberia was a ‘capital heavy’ state 
before the outbreak of war, and relied upon leveraging its sovereignty to obtain 
revenues. Fighting between the AFL and the NPFL concentrated and focused on the 
capital city, Monrovia, and the siege of Monrovia provoked Nigerian intervention in 
August 1990. Liberia is a useful case to test for links between the technology of 
rebellion, fighting in Monrovia and the reasons for Nigerian deployment.  
The first section of this chapter describes Liberia’s economic geography and argues 
that Liberia was an archetypal ‘capital heavy state’.2
                                                 
1 Acronyms used in this chapter have been re-stated in full for clarity.  
 The causal link between fighting 
in Monrovia and the strategies of the NPFL and AFL is investigated over the period 
between December 1989 and August 1990. Results suggest that President Samuel 
Doe sought to exploit the advantages of conventional defence in a positional battle for 
Monrovia, knowing that Charles Taylor, leader of the NPFL, coveted the city and 
would have difficulty ousting the AFL. The second casual mechanism linking fighting 
in Monrovia with Nigeria’s intervention is then examined over the same time period. 
2 As Chapter 5 discussed the war in Sierra Leone changed Liberia’s economic geography. As diamonds 
were increasingly traded between the NPFL and RUF insurgents, over the border between Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, they came to play an important role in sustaining Charles Taylor’s regime.  
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Results suggest that Nigeria avoided intervention whilst fighting was in the 
countryside, despite the motive and opportunity to deploy. Nigeria dispatched soldiers 
during the siege of Monrovia to exploit an advantage in conventional offense against 
the NPFL who lacked the defensive capability to resist and the offensive capability to 
recapture the city. Like Doe before them, Nigeria relied upon a ‘strategy of 
exhaustion’ to hold Monrovia - the ‘trump card’ in future negotiations. Both causal 
mechanisms are judged to be plausible. There are, however, a number of competing 
and intersecting mechanisms that, while they do not falsify the causal mechanisms of 
Chapter 2, help explain Nigeria’s intervention and may apply to other cases. What 
explains the correlation between fighting in Africa’s capitals and the deployments of 
foreign states can only be resolved with further case-study research.  
 
Liberia’s Economic Geography 
 
Liberia was an archetypal ‘capital heavy’ state before the NPFL invaded from Cote 
d’Ivoire in December 1989. Liberia’s political and economic history, from its 
‘settlement’ to its civil war, is largely a history of Monrovia. Successive leaders 
compensated for a lack of domestic support by dealing international recognition, 
obtained by controlling Monrovia, on the global market to attract foreign 
corporations, tax trade from the main ports and procure loans and aid from the 
international community. Taxing the incomes and activities of the Liberian population 
was less important to the state coffers. What follows is a brief political history of 
Liberia followed by a more detailed history of Liberia’s economic geography.  
 
Liberia’s physical geography can be divided into three belts. The coastal belt is low-
lying, flat and stretches about 40km inland where it rises into rolling hills and dense 
rainforest then ‘abrupt’ low mountains and plateaus. 3 No single ethnic group has 
dominated Liberian society. The Keppelle constitute around 20% of the population 
with significant minorities of Bassa, Dei, Gbandi, Geo, Glebo, Gola, Kissi, Krahn, 
Kuwaa, Loma, Mano, Mandingo, Mende and Vai.4
                                                 
3 Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Clausewitz and African war: politics and strategy in Liberia and Somalia (New 
York: Frank Cass, 2004) Pg 21. 
 Mende and Mandingo also reside 
4 Ibid. 
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in Sierra Leone and Guinea. Indigenous Liberia comprised of ‘small chiefdoms’, 
‘segmentary lineage systems’ and other ‘small chiefdoms based on ruling families’.5
 
  
Figure 7.1 – Liberia6
 
 
 
 
 
Liberia was never a European colony, unlike most African states. It was, however, 
‘settled’ by freed American slaves with the assistance of the American Colonization 
Society. These freed slaves, or ‘Americo-Liberians’, unified to form the Republic of 
Liberia in 1847 with its capital in Monrovia (founded in 1822).7
                                                 
5  Christopher Clapham, Liberia and Sierra Leone: an essay in comparative politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976) Pg 8-11. 
  The True Whig 
Party (TWP), a coalition of Americo-Liberians, ruled from 1870 until 1980 as a ‘de-
facto one party state’ distributing the benefits of office to a select group of family and 
6 Map obtained from  United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/liberia.pdf, accessed 11 July 2010 
7 George Dalton, 'History, Politics and Economic Development in Liberia,' The Journal of Economic 
History 25, no. 4 (1965): Pg 583. 
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political allies.8 For the most part, they ruled in their own narrow interests and over a 
small portion of territory limited to Monrovia and other coastal enclaves. The TWP 
exercised little control over the hinterland until the 1940s. Taxation was irregular and 
punitive,9 administered by an army designed to extract resources and quash domestic 
opposition.10 The ‘majority of the indigenous population remained outside the settler 
economy, unaffected by decisions in Monrovia’. 11
  
 
                                                 
8 In the early history of Liberia, indigenous Liberians remained outside the state in Monrovia. Chiefs 
were charged with some taxation duties, but these contributed little to government revenues. Generally, 
chiefs were given the opportunity to tax their populations, and, so long as they returned a sum to the 
central government and kept their populations in check, could not expect any harassment from the 
government. President Edwin James Barclay, for example, declared that chiefs could retain 10% of the 
taxation they collected from their villages. William Reno, 'Humanitarian Emergencies and Warlord 
Economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone,' United Nations World Institute for Development Economics 
Research Working Papers August, no. 140 (1997): Pg 4. Dalton, 'History, Politics and Economic 
Development in Liberia,' Pg 581-82. 
9 As cited in Quentin Outram, ''Its Terminal Either Way': An Analysis of Armed Conflict in Liberia 
1989-1996,' Review of African Political Economy 24, no. 73 (1997): Pg 367. 
10 Dalton, 'History, Politics and Economic Development in Liberia,' Pg 588. 
11 Kadallah Khafre, 'Towards a Political Economy of Liberia,' Review of African Political Economy 12, 
no. May-August (1978): Pg 109. 
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Figure 7.2 – Monrovia12
 
 
 
Under President William Tubman (1944-1971), the TWP extended their patrimonial 
system and governed the interior through a system of administrative divisions run by 
superintendents (county level), paramount chiefs (tribe level) and clan chiefs (clan 
level).13 Local-level administrative units were kept in check with a collection of perks 
and sanctions (including the use of violence) but retained a large degree of 
autonomy. 14  As Reno writes, President Tubman created a ‘political alliance of 
strongmen with himself personally distributing access to state office that clients could 
convert into private gain in return for loyalty’.15
                                                 
12 Map obtained from Google Maps Online, accessed 10 July 2010 
 Tubman and his successor, William 
13 Clapham, Liberia and Sierra Leone: an essay in comparative politics  Pg 73. 
14 Ibid,  Pg 82. 
15 Reno, 'Humanitarian Emergencies and Warlord Economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone,' Pg 5. 
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Tolbert (1971-1980), personalised the state around a network of elites bound by 
family ties and patronage. 16
 
 TWP policies had created a small but powerful class of 
Americo-Liberian and indigenous land-owners, civil servants and armed forces 
personnel by the 1970s whilst excluding the majority of Liberians from access to 
power and wealth.  
Tolbert was overthrown by a military coup in 1980 led by Master Sergeant Samuel 
Doe, an indigenous Liberian from the Krahn ethnic group. Tolbert’s administration 
faced a number of crises in the late 1970s, including the deployment of Guinean 
troops in Monrovia to put down food riots in 1979. Doe promised a departure from 
the corruption of Americo-Liberian rule and, initially, he enjoyed widespread support. 
By 1984, however, a popular slogan in Liberia was ‘same taxi, new driver’.17
 
 Doe 
ruled until the outbreak of war on Christmas Eve, 1989. Three sources of revenue, all 
dependent upon controlling Monrovia, have sustained Liberia’s state: taxing trade, 
concessions to foreign corporations, and international aid.  
Taxing Trade 
 
Liberia’s declaration of sovereignty in 1847 was partly motivated by the need to 
legitimise Monrovia’s taxation of goods moving across their borders.18 Early Liberia 
relied on ‘customs duties and port and harbour charges’ to remain solvent. 19  J.J 
Roberts, the first president of Liberia, appealed to the American Colonisation Society 
that ‘we may give up all hopes of conducting the government successfully – as it can 
only be sustained by a revenue obtained from imposts’. 20
                                                 
16 Morten Boas, 'Liberia and Sierra Leone - dead ringers? The logic of neopatrimonial rule,' Third 
World Quarterly 22, no. 5 (2001): Pg 704. 
 Reverend Gurley, 
dispatched by the United States on a data collection mission in 1850, recorded that 
‘the annual revenue of the government derived mainly from a six percent ad valorem 
17 Outram, ''Its Terminal Either Way': An Analysis of Armed Conflict in Liberia 1989-1996,' Pg 360. 
18 Clapham, Liberia and Sierra Leone: an essay in comparative politics  Pg 7. 
19 Wayne Taylor, The Firestone Operations in Liberia (Washington: National Planning Association, 
1976) Pg 8. 
20 J.J Roberts, 'Message of President Roberts,' African Repository: Published Monthly by the American 
Colonisation Society XXVI (1850): Pg 204. 
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duty on imports, amounted from eight to ten thousand dollars’ or between 57% and 
71% of revenues.21
 
  
Taxing trade sustained governments into the 20th century. US $15million was sourced 
from ‘customs and external trade taxes’ in 1960, accounting for around 45% of 
government receipts. Import duties alone accounted for 34% of revenue in 1967, 
27.7% in 1969 and 28.2% in 1971.22 The majority of these goods arrived at, and 
departed from, the Free Port of Monrovia. In total, indirect taxes accounted for 
between 43% and 49% of revenues between 1967 and 1971.23 It was during the 1950s 
that Liberia’s ability as a sovereign state to register shipping under a ‘flag of 
convenience’ became ‘an important source of government revenue’, a practice that 
continued under the rule of Samuel Doe.24 Clapham argues that governments survived 
by ‘taxing the movement of goods across their frontiers’ and that money was ‘derived 
from national sovereignty and control of the state apparatus’.25 He goes on to say that, 
‘almost every sector of the economy, apart from subsistence agriculture, depends 
directly or indirectly on foreign trade and the revenues which it provides’.26
 
  
In contrast, taxation of the domestic population made up a tiny slice of government 
revenue, reflecting the impoverishment of most Liberians and the substantial up-front 
costs of extending state-infrastructure and modern agricultural methods to the 
hinterland. For example, ‘hut’ and ‘development’ taxes levied on the rural population 
accounted for just US$700,000, or 2% of revenues, in 1960.27
 
  
Foreign Corporations 
 
Foreign companies stimulated the imports and exports that generated taxation revenue 
at the ports and provided direct concessions and rents to Liberian governments. A 
concession deal with American multinational Firestone Rubber in 1927 was a 
                                                 
21 R.R Gurley, 'Report of the Secretary of State, communicating The Report of the Rev. R.R Gurley ' 
Harvard College Library  (1850): Pg 19.  
22 Clapham, Liberia and Sierra Leone: an essay in comparative politics  Pg 135. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ellen Sirleaf, 'The Liberian Economy on April 12, 1980: Some Reflections,' Liberian Studies Journal 
XIV, no. 2 (1989): Pg 5. 
25 Clapham, Liberia and Sierra Leone: an essay in comparative politics  Pg 102. 
26 Ibid,  Pg 101. 
27 Dalton, 'History, Politics and Economic Development in Liberia,' Pg 576. 
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watershed moment. 28 Firestone became Liberia’s ‘largest employer, taxpayer, and 
importer-exporter’29 and ‘opened a ‘new phase in Liberian history in which national 
prosperity would increasingly depend on the success of foreign owned private 
enterprises’.30 Rubber-related industries accounted for 46% of revenues by the mid 
1950s.31
 
  
The importance of mining increased from the 1950s through to the 1980s and 
Liberia’s economy grew rapidly in the 1960s and early 1970s on the back of an iron 
ore boom.32 A team of American economists described Liberia as a ‘dual economy’ in 
1960, consisting of a large but poor sector of subsistence agriculturalists and an 
‘enclave economy’ dominated by foreign corporations.33 Iron ore accounted for over 
70% of exports in 1970, and along with rubber and diamonds, constituted 90% of the 
export sector. 34 Mining and quarrying made up between 20% and 35% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) between 1970 and 1982. Rubber concessions and taxes on 
iron ore profits comprised 36% of revenues in 1967, 33% in 1969 and 28% in 1971. 
Firestone and the Liberian Iron Mining Company (LIMCO) were providing 52% of 
government revenues in 1979.35 Taxes on iron ore and rubber made up between 68% 
and 90% of all direct taxation revenue between 1970 and 1982, demonstrating both 
the relative value of foreign corporations to government revenues, and the relative 
poverty of other forms of direct taxation, such as income tax. Exports of primary 
commodities made up 52% of GDP in 1980, comparable to Angola, Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia.36
 
  
                                                 
28 Taylor, The Firestone Operations in Liberia  Pg 14. 
29 In the original 1927 deal, Firestone was awarded a 6 year moratorium on tax and rent to the 
government. However, even after this period, revenues remained depressed and the Liberian 
government gained little until the Second World War when demand increased for rubber. Arthur Knoll, 
'Harvey S Firestone's Liberian Investment (1922-1932),' Liberian Studies Journal XIV, no. 1 (1989): 
Pg 13. 
30 Taylor, The Firestone Operations in Liberia  Pg 13. 
31 Sirleaf, 'The Liberian Economy on April 12, 1980: Some Reflections,' Pg 4. 
32 J.Mills Jones, 'Economic Adjustment Programs Under Stand-by Arrangements With the International 
Monetary Fund: Liberia's Experience,' Liberian Studies Journal XIII, no. 2 (1988): Pg 154. 
33 Dalton, 'History, Politics and Economic Development in Liberia.' 
34 Louis Beleky, 'The Development of Liberia,' The Journal of Modern African Studies 11, no. 1 
(1973): Pg 59. 
35 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999) Pg 84. 
36 Importantly these states export high-value petroleum related products, which Liberia did not.  
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President Samuel Doe, like his predecessors, relied upon foreign corporations for 
revenue.37 The Bong Mine venture generated $11.3 million in government revenue 
from royalties and taxes in 1988 despite being ‘a deficit year with a big loss’.38 Doe’s 
‘corruption… [and] chaotic tax and investment policies’ resulted in steady economic 
decline. Iron exports were below 1980 levels by 1985 and companies were 
repatriating capital, particularly US dollars. 39  LIMCO shut down in 1989, the 
National Iron Ore Company in 1985 and Bong Mining in 1988.40 In lieu of the big 
corporations, Doe contracted smaller organisations to exploit natural resources and 
pay concessions directly to him. Clandestine commerce in portable resources such as 
diamonds, gold and logs increased.41 Israel housed and trained paramilitary squads 
and operated the largest logging concession in West Africa42 in return for ‘reducing 
Israel’s diplomatic isolation’ and easing some of their concerns about illicit diamond 
links with Lebanon. 43 US and British firms were also attracted to Doe’s offer of 
logging concessions in exchange for cash and military training.44
 
  
International Aid 
 
Government spending was regularly buttressed by international aid. Americo-Liberian 
settlers were adroit at manipulating fears of slave trading in return for finance to 
purchase land from indigenous Liberians and ‘pacify’ tribes of the interior.45 Liberia 
faced revenue crises in 1871, 1906 and 1912, each of which was obviated by an 
international bail-out package.46
                                                 
37 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States  Pg 84. 
 The 1912 loan of $1.7 million was remarkable in that 
it placed the Liberian government in receivership and turned over ‘collection of 
Liberia’s custom revenues, rubber taxes and head moneys’ to a consortium of 
38 Eugen Plotzki, 'The Bong Mine Venture,' Liberian Studies Journal XVII, no. 1 (1992). 
39  Jones, 'Economic Adjustment Programs Under Stand-by Arrangements With the International 
Monetary Fund: Liberia's Experience,' Pg 166. Toagba-Nah Tipoteh, 'Crisis in the Liberian Economy 
1980-1985: The Role of Endogenous Variables,' Liberian Studies Journal XI, no. 2 (1986): Pg 191. 
40 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States  Pg 86. 
41 Ibid,  Pg 87. 
42 William Reno, 'Humanitarian Emergencies and Warlord Economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone,' 
The United Nations University Working Paper Series August, no. 140 (1997): Pg 11. 
43 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States  Pg 88. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Roberts, 'Message of President Roberts,' Pg 200, Taylor, The Firestone Operations in Liberia  Pg 6. 
46 Sirleaf, 'The Liberian Economy on April 12, 1980: Some Reflections,' Pg 17,18. 
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American and European administrators. 47
 
 Initially this deal covered 91% of 
government revenues.  
Most of Liberia’s major infrastructure was financed with grants or loans from the 
United States after the Second World War. Liberia’s international airport, 
Robertsfield, near Harbel, was built with US money. US grants also financed roads 
from Monrovia to the airport and into the interior, first to Ganta and then to 
Saniquelle in Nimba county.48 The US funded further road developments into the 
interior in 1951 and 1955 worth around $20 million. 49  The Monrovia Free Port, 
Liberia’s second main piece of public infrastructure, was constructed with the 
assistance of lend-lease funds.50 Foreign borrowing did not decrease as the economy 
developed from the 1950s to 1980s. Liberia borrowed $90 million51 between 1950 
and 1961 and debt repayments amounted to 90% of government revenue by 1962.52 
Over $650 million in additional debt was accumulated in the 1970s for growing 
public spending, primarily concentrated in Monrovia.53 According to one estimate, up 
to 50% of the budget went to ‘the compensation of employees’ or the maintenance of 
allegiances through an ‘over bureaucratic’ public sector between 1964 and 1970.54 
‘General administration’ was the biggest ticket budget-item in the late 1960s and 
1970s, outstripping spending on health, education and transportation and accounting 
for over one-third of expenditures.55
 
  
Doe found he could combine anti-Libyan and anti-communist rhetoric with the 
promise of democratic reform to secure US aid.56
                                                 
47 Frank Chalk, 'The Anatomy of an Investment: Firestone's 1927 Loan to Liberia,' Canadian Journal 
of African Studies March, no. 1 (1967): Pg 18. 
 Liberia was the largest per-capita 
recipient of US assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa by the mid-1980s. The United States 
contributed half a billion dollars in economic and military aid from 1980 to 1986, 
48 Taylor, The Firestone Operations in Liberia. 
49 Ibid,  Pg 15. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Sirleaf, 'The Liberian Economy on April 12, 1980: Some Reflections,' Pg 5. 
52 Ibid,  Pg 18. 
53 Dalton, 'History, Politics and Economic Development in Liberia,' Pg 573. 
54  Jones, 'Economic Adjustment Programs Under Stand-by Arrangements With the International 
Monetary Fund: Liberia's Experience,' Pg 156. 
55 Clapham, Liberia and Sierra Leone: an essay in comparative politics  Pg 135. 
56 Tipoteh, 'Crisis in the Liberian Economy 1980-1985: The Role of Endogenous Variables,' Pg 136. 
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including up to 4000 M-16 rifles,57 and is reputed to have constituted around one third 
of the annual budget. 58 Doe used a substantial proportion creating the ‘Executive 
Mansion Guard’ and the ‘Special Anti-Terrorist Unit’. 59 James Bishop, American 
Ambassador to Monrovia, noted that ‘we were basically subsidising the government. 
Each month we would be running around trying to pay for Liberia’s fuel imports and 
arranging bridging loans’.60
 
  
United States support declined as news of Doe’s economic malfeasance, electoral 
fraud and human rights abuses spread. US aid had fallen precipitously by 1987 and 
had disappeared by 1988. Doe could no longer access loans from the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund or the Asian Development Bank.61 The collapse of US 
aid ‘abruptly and fundamentally weakened Doe’s regime’.62
 
 
Figure 7.3 – US Economic and Military Assistance to Liberia, 1946-1989 
 
 
                                                 
57 Mark Huband, The Liberian Civil War (New York: Frank Cass, 1998) Pg 30, Reno, 'Humanitarian 
Emergencies and Warlord Economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone,' Pg 6. 
58 'U.S House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, One 
Hundred and First Congress, 2nd session, Hearing on U.S Policy and the Crisis in Liberia, 19 June 
1990,' in Regional Peacekeeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian  Crisis, ed. Mark 
Weller (London: Grotius, 1994), Pg 50. 
59 Reno, 'Humanitarian Emergencies and Warlord Economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone,' Pg 11. 
60 As cited in Huband, The Liberian Civil War  Pg 30. 
61 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States  Pg 88. 
62 Ibid. 
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Sovereignty is Liberia’s most valuable asset. Rulers have leveraged international 
recognition to legitimise the taxation of trade, contract foreign corporations, and 
garner international aid. Insofar as sovereignty was tied up with control of the capital 
Monrovia, controlling the capital city was Liberia’s most lucrative ‘point resource’.   
 
Causal Mechanism 1: Low-Capability Warfare and Fighting in 
Monrovia  
 
Can the fighting that reached Monrovia in 1990 be explained by a strategic decision 
to pull back and exploit the advantages of conventional defence? If so, was this 
decision based upon a perception of the NPFL’s inability to conduct conventional 
offensive manoeuvres and the economic value of the capital? Perhaps the fighting in 
Monrovia can be explained by alternative causal mechanisms. Rather than a strategic 
decision, it is possible that the location of fighting Monrovia can be explained by a 
rout of government soldiers in the countryside followed by some sporadic fighting in 
the capital. Perhaps the AFL were defeated and the NPFL fractured over how the 
spoils of office would be distributed. In both the latter cases, the location of fighting 
would have little to do with the strategic decisions of military actors, and more to do 
with intra-insurgency politics or a ‘mopping up’ operation.  This section proceeds by 
detailing military events in Liberia from 1989-1990 followed by an analysis of 
Samuel Doe and the NPFL’s military strategies.  
 
Liberia’s Civil War, December 1989 – August 1990 
 
Charles Taylor and roughly 100 soldiers of the NPFL attacked a border post at Butaro 
in Nimba county on Christmas Eve, 1989, with the stated aims of removing Doe and 
restoring democracy to Liberia.63 Taylor was familiar with the perks of office from 
his time as the head of the General Services Agency 64
                                                 
63 Herman Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent (New 
York: St Martin's Press, 2000) Pg 133. 
 when was  accused of 
embezzling $900,000 in 1983. Taylor fled to the United States and was imprisoned 
awaiting extradition. After escaping and frequenting various prisons in West Africa 
he trained a small group of insurgents in Libya and Burkina Faso. Blaise Comparore, 
64 Huband, The Liberian Civil War  Pg 16. 
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President of Burkina Faso, supplied the NPFL with weapons, rear bases, mercenaries 
and regular soldiers to settle an old score with Doe.65
 
 Cote d’Ivoire also supported the 
NPFL to repay Doe for the murder of his son-in-law.  
The NPFL attacked Kharnplay and Loguato near the border with Cote d’Ivoire on 
January 1 and 2, 1990.66 Government police and immigration officials were killed and 
some weapons were smuggled over the border. 67 Blehwalley, Yorpea, Kpbali and 
Djukorway, all small towns in Nimba county, were attacked on the 14th and 15th.68 
Kharnplay exchanged hands on January 14-2669
 
  and US rangers were reported to be 
directing the AFL.  
Two battalions of the AFL were belatedly sent to Nimba in a poorly disciplined 
attempt at counter insurgency. AFL soldiers lashed out at the civilian population, 
particularly Mano and Gio. 70  Villagers were murdered and raped, their houses 
destroyed, their goats, rice and money stolen.71 Fighting in the bush suited the small, 
mobile NPFL as they raided villages, stole weapons, traversed the hilly and forested 
areas and provoked the AFL into retaliations against the civilian population. One AFL 
spokesperson commented - ‘let’s be realistic, you can’t always tell a rebel’.72
 
 The 1st 
battalion, dominated by Doe’s Krahn, were not large enough, not well trained enough 
in counter-insurgency, and too poorly disciplined to contain the conflict.  
Taylors ‘army’ of 127 had grown to ‘thousands’ within a few weeks.73
                                                 
65 Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent  Pg 132. 
 Gio and Mano 
were armed and undertook reprisals against members of the Krahn and Mandingo 
66 “Curfew and Coup Fever in Nimba”, West Africa, 15-21 January 1990, Pg 44 
67 Huband, The Liberian Civil War  Pg 41., 'Liberia: Failed Coup,' Africa Research Bulletin 27, no. 1 
(1990): Pg 9557. 
68 Africa Watch, 'Liberia: Flight from Terror: Testimony of Abuses in Nimba County,'  (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 1990). 
69 'Liberia: Failed Coup,' Pg 9558., It is unclear whether these rangers were directly involved in the 
fighting, although the US embassy in Monrovia denied any combat role. 'Nimba Fighting Continues,' 
Africa Research Bulletin 27, no. 2 (1990): Pg 1596. 
70 Everest Ekong, “Pressure on Doe”, West Africa, 29 Jan – 4 Feb 1990, Pg 125 
71 Huband, The Liberian Civil War  Pg 11., Watch, 'Liberia: Flight from Terror: Testimony of Abuses 
in Nimba County.' 
72 'Liberia: Failed Coup,' Pg 9558. 
73  Ademola Adeleke, 'The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Ecowas 
Operation in Liberia,' Journal of Modern African Studies 33, no. 4 (1995): Pg 575. 
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tribes. 74  Memories of the AFL’s brutal repression in 1985 were fresh for many 
Nimbians. Doe held a general election in 1985 at the urging of the United States and 
although he claimed 51% of the vote, the elections were widely acknowledged to 
have been rigged. Thomas Quiwonkpa, a former army officer in the AFL, led a coup 
attempt that was suppressed with great violence in the capital and in Nimba county. 
Tensions increased after 1985 between the Krahn dominated army and the Gio and 
Mano, perceived to be behind the coup plot. 75 Doe cut Gio and Mano off from 
employment and economic opportunity and Nimba county was actively persecuted.76
 
  
Jim Bishop, member of the US Africa Desk, characterised the war on March 26th 
1990 as ‘a low-intensity conflict, but it is one the government is currently losing’.77 
Doe replaced the army commander, Moses Craig, with his deputy Col. Hezekiah 
Bowen in mid March.78 The trading town of Bahn fell on March 28th, about 240km 
north east of Monrovia.79 Doe recruited another 2000 soldiers to the AFL and ‘sucked 
in thousands of unscreened youths, prison graduates, drug dealers, and previously 
expelled military delinquents’.80 The NPFL began ‘large-scale attacks’, ‘designed to 
inflict maximum casualties on the AFL’ by the end of March. 81  Sixty-thousand 
refugees had crossed into Cote d’Ivoire and 84,000 to Guinea. One-thousand were 
crossing these borders per week.82 By early April, fighting centred around Saniquelle 
(the regional capital) and Ganta (the largest town in Nimba)83 and had broken out of 
Nimba into Tapeta, Grand Bassa, Bong and Riveresse counties by late April. 84 
Liberia’s war had become ‘full-blown guerrilla warfare’85 around the regional capital 
of Saniquelle. The road from Grand-Gedeh to Monrovia was cut and the Yepeka to 
Buchanan iron-ore train was attacked.86
                                                 
74 Stephen Ellis, 'Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence,' African Affairs 94 
(1995): Pg 167. 
 A ‘senior western diplomat’ commented on 
April 29 that Liberia was ‘divided in two’ and that the NPFL were marching on 
75 Outram, ''Its Terminal Either Way': An Analysis of Armed Conflict in Liberia 1989-1996,' Pg 360. 
76 Ibid. 
77 As cited in Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent  Pg 132. 
78 “'Nimba Unrest Continues,' Africa Research Bulletin 27, no. 3 (1990): Pg 9633. 
79 'President Doe's Death,' Africa Research Bulletin 27, no. 9 (1990): Pg 9841. 
80 Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent  Pg 131. 
81 Ibid,  Pg 134. 
82 “A Double-Edged Sword”, West Africa, 12-18 March 1990, Pg 407 
83 “Liberia: Nimba Conflict Continues”, West Africa, 9-15 April 1990, Pg 600 
84 James Butty, “Fragile Realignments”, West Africa, 7-13 May, Pg 781 
85 James Butty, “Fragile Realignments”, West Africa, 23-29 April 1990, Pg 665 
86 James Butty, “Fragile Realignments”, West Africa, 23-29 April 1990, Pg 655 
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Monrovia.87 Doe replaced the AFL commander for the third time with Charles Julu - 
notorious for his brutal reprisals against Nimbians in 1985.88  Doe informed the press 
in April that he would not negotiate with Taylor and stated that the AFL was 
‘adequately trained and equipped to contain the situation’.89
 
  
Liberia’s civil war was dominated by the use of irregular tactics by the NPFL and an 
ill-fated and poorly executed counter-insurgency campaign in Nimba country until the 
end of April. Warfare changed in May as the AFL staged a retreat back to 
Monrovia. 90 Saniquelle, Palala and Yepeka were captured by the NPFL in quick 
succession and the NPFL were attacking the port of Buchanan, just under 100km 
south east of Monrovia, by May 19th. Doe conceded that Buchannan had fallen to the 
rebels on May 22nd.91 Fighting was reported at Robertsfield international airport and 
the Firestone rubber plantation, just under 50km from central Monrovia, on May 
29th.92 Shooting was reported at Kakata, just 35 miles from Monrovia, by the end of 
May.93
 
 The NPFL advanced hundreds of kilometres from Nimba to the coast and 
were threatening Monrovia in just over a month.  
War quickly degenerated into a siege of Monrovia by early June. Firestone was 
attacked on June 4th and on June 6-7 Robertsfield airport was attacked, just 50km 
from central Monrovia.94 Doe claimed that the AFL had recaptured the airport and 
plantation on June 8th and the NPFL confirmed they had withdrawn when government 
soldiers ‘backed by heavy artillery’ approached.95 Fighting was reported at Mount 
Barclay, 10 miles from Monrovia, on June 29th. 96  Robertsfield airport and the 
Firestone rubber plantation changed hands several times.97 Doe claimed he was ready 
for any battle for Monrovia and ‘adamant about not resigning, now or later’. 98
                                                 
87 As cited in 'Divided Country?,' Africa Research Bulletin 27, no. 4 (1990): Pg 9664. 
 
Western military experts agued that Taylor would have little trouble overrunning 
88 “Liberia: The Nimba County War”, Africa Confidential, 20 April 1990, Vol 31, No 8, Pg 5 
89 “Liberia: Nimba Conflict Continues”, West Africa, 9-15 April 1990, Pg 600 
90 Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent  Pg 137. 
91 Huband, The Liberian Civil War  Pg 121. “Liberia: Crisis Continues”, West Africa, 28 May- 3 June 
1990, Pg 914,  'President Doe's Death,' Pg 9841. 
92 Ibid. 
93 'Rebels Advance on Monrovia,' Africa Research Bulletin 27, no. 9 (1990): Pg 9698. 
94 Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent  Pg 145. 
95 'Massive Exodus,' Africa Research Bulletin 27, no. 6 (1990): Pg 9734. 
96 This may have been either the NPFL or INPFL. Ibid,  Pg 9735. 
97 “Liberia: Hope for Ceasefire”, West Africa, 18-24 June 1990, Pg 1047 
98 Gerald Bourke, “Taylor Talks”, West Africa, 28 May -3 June, 1990 pg 880 
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Monrovia. Around 1000 AFL were left in the city facing at least 4000 NPFL 
soldiers.99
 
  
Monrovia was assaulted for the first time on July 2nd, cutting power and water 
supplies.100 Taylor lost control of Robertsfield airport in early July101 but on a second 
front the NPFL reached Paynesville in the eastern suburbs of Monrovia, 10km from 
the city centre.102 ‘Heavy fighting’ was still taking place around Paynesville on July 
16th – nearly two weeks later.103 It was not until 20 July that Spriggs-Payne airport 
(the domestic airport 4km from the executive mansion) was captured and the NPFL 
was capable of bombarding Doe’s mansion with rockets.104 Doe and the remaining 
AFL were fortified around the Defence Ministry and the Executive Mansion protected 
by the ‘Executive Mansion Guard’ and the ‘Special Anti-Terrorist Unit’.105 Taylor is 
reported to have pulled back from his offensive on Monrovia towards the end of July 
in part because he knew ‘the limitations of his men’.106
 
  
The Independent Patriotic Front of Liberia, (INPFL) burst through central Monrovia 
to within a few kilometres of the Executive Mansion on July 23rd.107 Led by Prince 
Yormie Johnson, the INPFL allegedly split with Taylor early in the war, taking the 
‘elite Libyan-trained commandos’ along a western route to Monrovia via, Duala, 
Bong, White Plains, Caldwell, and Bushrod Island.108 Johnson proclaimed Taylor a 
Libyan-trained communist, a ‘criminal and a rouge’.109 The Freeport of Monrovia was 
taken by the INPFL on 25 July.110 The NPFL bombarded the presidential mansion 
with hijacked gunboats on the same day, but were repelled by rockets and machine 
gun fire.111  Doe’s AFL and INPFL formed an alliance to resist Taylor’s advance.112
                                                 
99 'Massive Exodus,' Pg 9735. 
 
100 Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent  Pg 146-47. 
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104 Ibid,  Pg 164. 
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Doe ‘was a virtual prisoner in his seafront mansion’.113 Half of his Krahn soldiers 
were holding him hostage as their last bargaining chip to escape Monrovia safely, 
while the other half were said to be admonishing Doe to resign for the same reason.114
 
 
Taylor ‘dissolved’ the Doe government and proclaimed himself president. No-one 
recognised his claim.  
Atrocities across Liberia, but particularly in Monrovia, were horrendous. The AFL 
murdered 600 civilians inside the Lutheran church in Monrovia on July 30 and it was 
becoming clear that the NPFL had murdered Mandingos and Krahn on their advance. 
Lloyds of London refused to insure shipping to Liberia and aid deliveries ceased. 
People flooded from the countryside to seek shelter in Monrovia.115 Taylor had taken 
3000 Nigerians and other West African nationals hostage.116 Nearly 375,000 people 
had fled to neighbouring countries.117
 
  
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established a Sub-
Committee on Defence Matters ‘to consider issues relating to the military arm of the 
proposed ECOWAS Monitoring Group’ and formulated a ‘blueprint’ for military 
intervention in Liberia between July 18th and 20th. Nigerian President Ibrahim 
Babangida urged that the war in Liberia be brought to a ‘speedy’ and ‘peaceful’ 
end.118 The Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) adopted Decision A/DEC.1/1/90 - 
a peace plan involving deployment of West African soldiers to supervise a cease fire 
(which did not exist) on August 7th in Banjul (the capital of Gambia)119 Two thousand 
five-hundred troops with contingents from Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Sierra Leone and 
the Gambia would be deployed in Liberia ‘for the purpose of keeping the peace, 
restoring law and order and ensuring the cease-fire is respected’.120
 
  
                                                                                                                                           
112 Adeleke, 'The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Ecowas Operation in 
Liberia,' Pg 575-756. 
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18, no. 3 (1997): Pg 474. 
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Taylor launched a ‘final’ assault on central Monrovia on August 9121 to ‘reach the 
executive mansion before the peace-keeping force arrived in order to present [the 
intervention force]… with a fait accompli’.122 He was repulsed by the entrenched 
AFL and allied INPFL. The INPFL and AFL announced another ceasefire on August 
18th, allowing the AFL to concentrate on repelling Taylor until the intervention force 
arrived.123 The INPFL defended the port of Monrovia from the NPFL so Economic 
Community of West African States Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) could 
land there. According to Williams this was the decisive battle of the war.124
 
  
Negotiations took place between 7 and 24 August, but the old sticking points 
remained. Taylor wanted to lead any interim government and ECOMOG states 
wanted a civilian. The talks were abandoned. 125  Contingents of the 3000 strong 
ECOMOG force arrived in Monrovia on August 24th under the command of General 
Arnold Quainoo, a Ghanaian. Ghana and Nigeria provided the largest number of 
troops, nearly 1000 each. Smaller contingents came from Guinea, Sierra Leone and 
the Gambia. ECOMOG secured central Monrovia and the Freeport under fire from the 
NPFL.126 Taylor launched another assault on the executive mansion in September, but 
was beaten back by ECOMOG and the INPFL.127 Taylor continually claimed that ‘I 
am the president of Liberia now’, but was dismissed as ‘the ravings of a man whose 
drive to the seat of power has lost all semblance of a game plan’. 128 An interim 
government, to be headed by Dr. Amos Sawyer, was established at an ECOWAS 
sponsored ‘All-Liberia’ conference between August 27th and September 1st.129
                                                 
121 'President Doe's Death,' Pg 9841. 
 Once 
established in Monrovia, Sawyer’s government was recognised by most West African 
states, and the US made moves to recognise it too. ECOMOG was reinforced to 9000 
soldiers by October and the Monrovia perimeter was expanded to take it out of 
122 Henry Mallet, ‘Liberia: Race Against Time’, West Africa, 1990, Pg 2329 
123 'President Doe's Death,' Pg 9841. 
124  Gabriel Williams, Liberia: The Heart of Darkness: Accounts of Liberia's Civil War and its 
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125  Y Gershoni, 'From ECOWAS to ECOMOG: the Liberian crisis and the struggle for political 
hegemony in West Africa,' Liberian Studies Journal 21, no. 1 (1993): Pg 30. 
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127 Peter da Costa, “Life After Doe”, West Africa, 24-30 September, 1990, Pg 2510 
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artillery range. 130  Humanitarian relief was able to reach Monrovia and reports 
emerged late in the year that Taylor’s forces were deserting and surrendering to 
ECOMOG.131
 
 Reports also emerged of Taylor’s major backers, Burkina Faso and 
Libya, drawing down their involvement. After numerous negotiations, a cease-fire 
was arranged on November 28th, 1990 – the first of many to 1997, when Taylor was 
elected president. 
Military Strategy in Liberia’s Civil War 
 
Fighting in Monrovia was not the consequence of a ‘mopping up’ operation. While 
the AFL suffered heavy casualties in the war over Nimba county, they were not 
defeated in a pitched battle in the countryside. We can observe this by visualising 
where the NPFL and INPFL fought the AFL between December 1989 and August 
1990. Figure 7.4 is a ‘heat map’ showing areas of intense fighting around Monrovia 
and dispersed fighting from Nimba county to the capital. The NPFL did not do much 
fighting in the countryside, relative to the battles fought in Monrovia. Nor was 
fighting in Monrovia purely the product of a fractious insurgency. It is true the NPFL/ 
INPFL split weakened the NPFL’s assault on Monrovia, but President Doe’s forces 
were a major player in the siege and singularly held the NPFL in pitched battles for 
the eastern suburbs of Monrovia. What, then, accounts for incidence and 
concentration of fighting in Monrovia?  
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Figure 7.4 - Spatial Distribution of Battles between AFL, NPFL and INPFL, 
December 1989 – August 1990 
 
 
A number of observes note that Doe retreated back to Monrovia in April/May 1990. A 
West Africa correspondent commented in August 1990:  
 
‘the tormented President Samuel Doe deliberately changed the strategy of fighting in the countryside to 
draw the guerrillas into the open by encouraging them to march on Monrovia and attack the executive 
mansion. This, he hoped, would be better suited to his forces who are untrained in guerrilla warfare’.132
 
  
Doe himself, in clear frustration at the NPFL’s use of guerrilla tactics during the first 
stages of the war, said that ‘I would have loved the rebels to come into the city and 
fight so we can settle this matter once and for all’.133
                                                 
132 “Killing Fields”, West Africa, 20-26 August 1990, pg 2314 
 Williams has questioned why 
Doe would stage a retreat, she writes – ‘for some weird reason, Doe and most of his 
loyal forces were convinced of being able to pull off what would have been one of the 
133 As cited in James Butty, “Mending Fences?”, West Africa, 14-20 May 1990, Pg 796 
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greatest surprises in world military history: defeat the rebels in Monrovia and from 
there retake the entire country’.134
 
  
Doe’s strategy was rational, although callous to the extreme, when one considers the 
capabilities at his disposal, those of the NPFL, and Doe’s knowledge of Taylor’s 
intentions. The AFL was trained to defend Monrovia and would be defeated if it 
continued to face the NPFL in the hilly, forested and inaccessible parts of Nimba 
county. Doe stacked the army and police with trusted Krahn tribesmen during the 
1980s as he became increasingly paranoid about real and imagined rivals (Doe 
claimed to have survived over 30 coup attempts). He expelled experienced officers 
and fragmented the AFL into nine paramilitary groups ‘none effective enough to 
challenge him but all capable of interfering with rivals’. 135  Doe relied on his 
paramilitaries for security, 136
 
 particularly the Israeli-trained ‘Executive Mansion 
Guard’ and, clearly, by the name of this premiere paramilitary group, when push 
came to shove, Doe intended on defending the capital.  
Doe had reason to believe that, despite the AFL’s deficiencies, it could hold out 
against the NPFL in a positional battle. Although the NPFL’s numbers ballooned 
from January to August 1990, recruits were too poorly trained, too poorly armed and 
too logistically restricted to conduct the conventional military operations required to 
oust the AFL from central Monrovia.137 Howe notes that the NPFL’s ‘poor command-
and-control system failed to keep its soldiers attention on fighting and away from the 
more attractive looting’. 138   Ellis argues that the Nimba recruits underwent only 
‘rudimentary training’ and that the AFL were an ‘infinitely more experienced fighting 
unit’.139 Ellis also notes, however, that, ‘in conventional military terms, none of the 
various armies in Liberia was very formidable’.140
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barely, if at all disciplined’. 141  Most recruits had ‘little more than a few weeks 
military training... show little coordination and fire[d] wildly from the hip’.142 By the 
time the NPFL reached Monrovia, it probably numbered 10,000 men and women with 
30% under 17. 143 NPFL recruits were armed mostly AK-47s and 1944 and 1945 
vintage Beretta sub-machine guns.144
 
  
Doe also believed that Taylor could be successfully ‘lured’ into a fight for Monrovia. 
Liberia’s economic geography and dependence upon leveraging sovereignty for 
revenues created huge incentives for Taylor to direct his forces to capture Monrovia. 
It was clear from the outset that the NPFL’s strategy focused on controlling 
Monrovia. Taylor’s first actions after the December 1989 invasion was to send a 
small squad of NFPL to infiltrate Monrovia – a move that he announced on radio.145  
Samuel Dokie, spokesperson for the NPFL during the early parts of the war, clearly 
identified the zero-sum nature of Liberia’s war when he said, ‘the problem in Africa is 
that, because of underdevelopment in the regions and the centralisation of power, the 
only way to make money is in politics’.146 A West Africa correspondent wrote that, 
‘Taylor himself believes that Monrovia is everything’.147 Duyvesteyn argues that ‘the 
legitimacy that occupation of Monrovia could confer made an attack on the capital 
necessary’ and that ‘the capital was of primary focus in the direct military 
confrontations’.148 There was also material incentive to attack Monrovia. Ellis argues 
that many NPFL ‘flooded’ to Monrovia in mid-1990 ‘to be in at the climax’ for ‘the 
chance of a lifetime to acquire something valuable’. 149
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empty ventures… We are going to take Monrovia’.150 Again in June, this time in 
response to ECOWAS demands that Doe step down and elections be held, Taylor 
asserted that ‘I will take Monrovia in 12 hours. We are not going to talk forever’.151 
Taylor claimed in July that he controlled 90% of Liberia and it was his right to 
assume power, asserting that ‘we’re going right ahead to flush Doe out of the 
executive mansion’.152
 
 
The correlation between Liberia’s economic geography and the spatial pattern of 
fighting in Liberia’s first civil war was the product of a strategic decision by President 
Samuel Doe to fall back and exploit the advantages of conventional defence against a 
poorly organised and lightly armed adversary. Doe rightly predicted that Monrovia 
would be the focus of Taylor’s strategy, making it a useful location to fortify and 
defend.  
 
The evidence in this section suggests that the NPFL’s lack of heavy weapons and 
poor logistic and command capabilities increased the utility of a ‘strategy of 
exhaustion’. The causal mechanism presented in Chapter 2 is a convincing and 
parsimonious explanation of Liberia’s geographic war-structure from January to 
August 1990. As events played out, it appeared as though Doe’s strategy had paid off. 
Herman Cohen commented to a US House of Representatives panel that ‘despite 
many weeks of combat, it was clear that Samuel Doe’s dwindling military could not 
be defeated in central Monrovia’.153 In an apt depiction, Butty and Ekong of West 
Africa Magazine wrote that the Liberian civil war had become ‘that of three spent 
dwarves, whose thirst for power has left too many suffering too much for too long’.154
                                                 
150 'Massive Exodus,' Pg 9734. 
 
It appeared that Doe had successfully used his status as the leader of an 
internationally recognised country to contract foreign military support when 
ECOMOG troops landed in August 1990, although Doe was killed by the INPFL in 
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September. How the Nigerian-led intervention force is linked to the battle for 
Monrovia is the subject of the following section.  
 
Casual Mechanism 2: Nigerian Intervention in Liberia 
 
Nigeria initiated and led a military intervention during the siege of Monrovia. Were 
the reasons for Nigeria’s deployment, however, those predicted by Chapter 2? Did 
Nigeria intervene during the siege of Monrovia to exploit an advantage in 
conventional offense during a pitched battle over a key objective? Did the irregular 
tactics and lack of set-piece battles in Liberia’s countryside deter earlier intervention? 
Did Nigeria believe that with a small injection of conventional force it could play 
‘kingmaker’ in the negotiations over Liberia’s future? A number of alternative 
hypotheses may explain the timing and strategy of Nigeria’s intervention. Perhaps 
Liberia’s war degenerated so quickly that Nigeria was not ready for any deployment 
until the siege of Monrovia, a causal mechanism that dovetails nicely with 
experimental research into ‘dynamic task environments’. Decision-makers 
systematically seek information before taking action in a degenerating system (in 
experimental settings, usually the fitness of an athlete) and continue to do so in 
rapidly collapsing task environments when intervention is more cost effective. 155 
Perhaps Nigeria delayed its deployment to garner sub-regional support from 
ECOWAS members. Finally, it has been proposed that Nigeria wished to protect its 
foreign nationals under attack from the NPFL, or deployed in purely in response to 
the humanitarian situation. I do not deal with the last two causes in detail as they have 
been discussed and disputed elsewhere.156 Ultimately, multiple causal mechanisms 
operate at once. As Walraven argues ‘several motives may exist [for intervention] 
without being mutually exclusive’.157
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unobtainable. Evidence to support the arguments made in this section come from 
public documents, previous interviews and reflections of actors involved, journalistic 
accounts and reports from diplomats.158
 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Nigeria’s stakes in the conflict are outlined and 
revolved primarily around opposing the NPFL rather than protecting the regime of 
President Samuel Doe. I then make the case that Nigeria waited for a pitched battle 
before deploying soldiers to capitalise on its conventional war-fighting advantage. 
Most external states, including Nigeria, believed that Doe would crush the rebellion 
early on and refrained from intervening. As the threat became more serious, Doe flew 
to Lagos to request Nigerian troops and weapons. Nigeria provided the weapons, but 
refrained from deploying soldiers. Nigeria attempted to garner regional support for 
any intervention and realise its interests diplomatically from May to late July. As the 
battle for Monrovia reached a crescendo, however, Nigeria deployed to thwart the 
NPFL, capture Monrovia, and play kingmaker in Liberia. While this chapter makes a 
case for the plausibility of causal mechanisms described in Chapter 2, this section 
concludes with reflections on how other causal processes led to the intervention, 
especially how the goals of Nigeria shaped the timing of its deployment and the links 
between Nigeria’s Liberian deployment and its wider strategic goals as regional 
hegemon in a post Cold War world.  
 
Nigeria’s Stakes in the Conflict 
 
Nigeria’s primary aim was to deter the NPFL from taking power by force. There is a 
subtle distinction here between directly supporting the presidency of Samuel Doe and 
opposing those who opposed him. Liberia and Nigeria were allies in West Africa. 
When Ibrahim Babangida came to power in 1983, Doe worked assiduously to curry 
favour with the new regime. Babangida donated $1 million for the self-titled Graduate 
School of International Studies at the University of Liberia, invested $25 million in 
iron ore and $4.5 million in the Liberia National Oil Corporation, funded Liberia’s 
section of the trans-African highway and covered $50 million of Liberia’s debt at the 
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Asian Development Bank.159 Doe also received Nigeria’s highest medal, ‘the Grand 
Commander of the Federal Republic’, an honour not even bestowed on Nelson 
Mandela.160
 
 However, according to Adebajo, Doe was an ‘embarrassment’ to Nigeria 
by 1990. Protecting Doe was not the primary motivation for intervention, an idea 
supported by the inclusion of Doe’s resignation in the peace plan and a lack of 
attention to Doe’s security once ECOMOG soldiers were on the ground.  
Nigeria’s interests lay with opposing the NPFL, or controlling the means by which it 
came to power. Tuck writes that ‘Nigerian policy towards ECOMOG - its methods 
and objectives - were... coloured by its fundamental antipathy toward Taylor`s 
NPFL’.161 According to Mayes, Nigeria saw ECOMOG as ‘a tool to prevent Taylor 
from seizing total control of Liberia’. 162  Eco argues that ‘the whole story of 
ECOMOG in Liberia is bound by the open desire of Nigeria to challenge, dominate 
and dictate the outcome of the conflict, but more importantly to prevent Taylor from 
seizing power’.163
 
  
Nigeria was aware of the NPFL’s links to Burkina Faso, Libya, Cote d’Ivorie and, 
indirectly, France. Nigeria had historically resisted Libyan advances in West Africa, 
most overtly in Chad.164 Gershoni argues that Ghaddafi saw an opportunity with the 
end of the Cold War to fill a political vacuum in Liberia. 165 Nigeria, competing for 
the same influence, ‘could not turn a blind eye to the military achievements of Charles 
Taylor, backed by Tripoli, especially when Libya’s expansionist policy was well-
known in Lagos’. 166
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d’Ivoire recognised and supported the separatist region. The NPFL received support 
from Cote d’Ivorie and Burkina Faso. Any NPFL victory would come at the expense 
of Nigerian influence in the region.  
 
Dissidents from Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Togo were 
fighting alongside the NPFL. Walraven argues that ‘there seems little doubt that some 
West Africa leaders feared that, with socio-economic and political conditions 
comparable to those in Liberia and a Taylor-led regime ready to aid rebellions 
elsewhere, their own countries could become the target of a similar type of 
insurrection’. 167  Vice President of Nigeria, Augustus Aikhomu, claimed that the 
intervention was motivated by concern that the war in Liberia ‘had developed a 
potential for ‘massive… interference and destabilisation in the sub-region’. 168 
Babangida warned at an ECOWAS summit before the intervention, ‘today it is 
Liberia, tomorrow it could be any one of you’. 169  The Nigerian Ambassador to 
Liberia stated that ‘the Nigerian perception was that Taylor was a rebel. Once you use 
the vocabulary of government and rebels you cannot be even handed’.170
 
 ECOWAS’s 
Executive Secretary noted, after the intervention, that :  
‘I think that if there was one principle that united the entire West African leadership it was the one that 
said that West Africa, as a region, should not accept anyone who sought to shoot his way to power, 
especially if that person is actively aided and abetted by outside forces’.171
 
 
Nigeria (and other West African states) were concerned primarily with opposing the 
NPFL from taking power in Liberia, not necessarily supporting Samuel Doe.  
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Fighting in the Countryside – December 1989 to March 1990 
 
Doe was expected to crush the Nimba uprising quickly. President Momoh of Sierra 
Leone stated that intervention did not occur earlier than August 1990 because ‘just 
like ECOWAS at the initial stages, we all saw the Liberian situation as purely an 
internal affair’. As ‘developments degenerated’ Momoh, and ECOWAS, considered it 
‘mandatory’ to ‘come in and help’.172 Vogt argues that Nigeria deliberately acted to 
play down the crisis and portray it as ‘strictly in the internal affairs of Liberia’ to 
avoid creating the impression that Doe had lost control of the situation.173 Mayes 
notes that it ‘was not until April/May 1990 when Lagos realised the danger Doe’s 
government faced from the NPFL’.174
 
 While the information is scant on how foreign 
states perceived the early phases of the war, it is likely that the use of guerrilla tactics 
by the NPFL and the confinement of the war to Nimba county created the impression 
that the AFL could contain the insurgency, and as such, remained a strictly ‘internal 
affair’.   
As Doe’s battlefield situation deteriorated in early May, he flew to Lagos and 
requested weapons, ammunition and 2000 Nigerian soldiers. Nigeria obliged with the 
weapons and ammunition, but denied the troop deployment. Indeed, Nigeria is 
reputed to have been ‘willing of offer troops’ and, according to Nigeria’s ambassador 
to Liberia, ‘Doe was beaming at the press conference on his way out. He was a very 
happy man. I felt there must have been a promise of assistance’. 175
 
 According to 
Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Nigeria was resolved on some form of intervention by May 1990 but 
not the how and when.  
The readiness of Nigeria to contemplate deploying soldiers in May 1990 suggests that 
the intervention nearly three months later was not the result of Nigerian ignorance to 
the threat posed by the NPFL and consequently a rushed and delayed deployment. 
Indeed, when intervention was decided upon in late July and early August 1990, it 
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took less than a month to organise and deploy soldiers from five West African states. 
It is likely that Nigeria had the capability to deploy soldiers in Liberia by early June 
or July.  
 
Why then did Nigeria refuse Doe’s request for 2000 soldiers, but grant the request for 
weapons? Like many armed forces around the world, Nigeria’s military, while 
capable of fighting a conventional land war (which they had over the Bakassi 
peninsula on the border with Cameroon) were ill-equipped to fight a counter-
insurgency campaign in the forested Liberian countryside, even against a poorly 
trained and armed insurgency like the NPFL. A former U.S special operations officer 
noted that ‘they [Nigeria] had no counter-insurgency doctrine, preferred conventional 
assault, and flew aerial reconnaissance at 5000 feet’.176 One Western military analyst 
noted that ‘it’s good ambush country, almost anywhere outside of Monrovia’. 177 
Liberia’s interior roads were poor, making helicopters a must for any intervention 
force,178 but Nigeria’s 15 armed helicopters had not been flown in years and were 
poorly maintained. 179  General Maxwell Khobe, Nigerian force commander of 
ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, lamented that Nigeria was not well-equipped with combat 
helicopters, even in 1999.180 Nigeria had no jungle warfare training facilities in 1990 
and had never fought in terrain similar to Liberia’s. Battle-tanks and infantry 
formations that made up the majority of Nigeria’s military were ‘ill suited for 
Liberia’s heavily forested interior’.181
 
  
Nigeria’s reticence to fight in the Liberian countryside once ECOMOG deployed 
suggests that counter-insurgency was perceived as a high-cost option. Howe argues 
that Nigeria actively avoided a ‘Vietnam like-quagmire’ by not venturing into the 
Liberian countryside. 182
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chances for a negotiated settlement were significantly improved’. 183
 
 Khobe 
commented that, in Sierra Leone (with a war-structure, political history, and terrain 
closely resembling Liberia): 
 ‘the groups which it [ECOMOG] are fighting are not conventional armies… carrying out extensive 
ambush operations on commercial vehicles in order to render roads unsafe... In order to checkmate this 
strategy of terror, ECOMOG has had to deploy over wide areas, but in most cases it has not had 
adequate troops and logistics to do so. It is usually at this critical stage that ECOMOG suffers 
operational reverses [emphasis mine]’.184
 
 
Nigeria co-opted warlords from the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for 
Democracy (ULIMO – an insurgent group based around former soldiers for Doe’s 
army) and the Liberia Peace Council (LPC – also comprised of Krahn and former 
AFL soldiers) to fight in the countryside. As Howe argues, ‘Liberian factions knew 
the countryside better, cost less to operate, and if killed did not cause political 
problems back home in ECOMOG countries’.185  High ambiguity from January to 
May 1990 compounded Nigeria’s lack of counter-insurgency capability. The United 
States had the best intelligence networks in Liberia at the time, 186  and Cohen 
described the situation in April and May as ‘so fluid and confused that we could not 
say we had taken charge of conflict resolution’.187 He compared the decision-making 
process in Liberia to that of the Sudan and Angola where years of experience enabled 
strategies and tactics to be developed, reviewed and re-developed. The Liberian civil 
war was so ‘fast-breaking’ and ‘fluid’ that it constituted an ‘emergency’ without ‘the 
luxury of spending time to analyse core issues and develop strategy’.188
 
 Nigeria’s 
intelligence capabilities in Liberia were less developed than the United States and 
would have confronted the same ambiguity.   
Conventional armed forces are effective when insurgents fight in the open. As the 
NPFL battled the AFL in Nimba county, it fought on numerous fronts at once, 
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combining guerrilla tactics and small-scale confrontations from which the AFL would 
usually retreat. The fortunes of the INPFL, advancing from the west, were largely 
unknown. Nigeria perceived a low demand for intervention when it appeared as 
though Doe would be able to contain the nascent rebellion. As the NPFL gathered 
strength, Nigeria opted out deployment, despite the motive and diplomatic cover to do 
so, because it perceived high, and potentially uncertain costs for a counter-insurgency 
campaign in Liberia’s countryside for which it was ill-equipped to fight. Instead, 
sending weapons was a low-risk, low-cost form of influencing the outcome of the 
war. When Nigeria realised that Doe could not win, and sending him weapons was 
not going to help, they ‘quickly withdrew military support’. 189
 
 Any military 
deployment would have been a high-risk, potentially humiliating and financially 
burdensome decision.  
 Negotiations - May – July 1990 
 
Perhaps the timing of Nigeria’s deployment has more to do with its search for 
regional allies and a cease-fire agreement that would lower the costs of any 
intervention. President of Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida, followed precisely this course 
after rejecting Doe’s request for troops in May 1990 by taking the issue to the 13th 
ECOWAS summit in Banjul on May 30. He proposed establishing a standing 
mediation committee (SMC) to ‘settle disputes and conflict situations within the 
community’ 190 and ‘intervene in a timely fashion, whenever such disputes arise’.191 
Doe was not in attendance, citing ‘pressing state matters’ and sent his planning 
minister.192 Guinea and Sierra Leone, both dealing with influxes of refugees, also 
pushed for a resolution to the conflict. 193 The SMC proposal was accepted, with 
Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Togo as initial members and Guinea and Sierra 
Leone as observers. The SMC called for an immediate cease-fire and was mandated 
to mediate the conflict.194
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flagging US-led peace talks through the SMC.195 Dr Abbas Bundu, Secretary General 
of ECOWAS, established the possibility of Doe going into exile and general 
elections. The NPFL would only accept the immediate resignation of Doe. Taylor had 
hardened his negotiation position by July and would only agree to a cease-fire if Doe 
resigned and he personally assumed the presidency. 196  Taylor’s demands were 
rejected by ECOWAS on the basis that any presidency should reflect the public’s will 
through an election and that no belligerents to the current conflict could be a part of 
the interim government. 197 Taylor was suspicious of the motives of West African 
states, particularly Nigeria and Guinea, and resented the equal status afforded to 
Prince Johnson (discussed below)198, and considered it unlikely that ECOWAS would 
intervene without his consent. 199  By July, with military victory literally in sight 
Taylor repeated his demands that Doe resign and he immediately assume the mantle 
of presidency. According to a ‘Liberia veteran’ cited in West Africa Magazine, Taylor 
had ‘everything to lose by stopping the fighting’.200 The incentives for him to accept a 
negotiated settlement, on the terms ECOWAS was proposing, were very low and the 
ECOWAS negotiation process was badly timed.201
 
 By mid-July successive attempts 
at negotiation had failed. Nigeria demanded an interim government and elections, 
Taylor demanded that he be the next president regardless.  
Nigeria had considerable incentives to delay any deployment and try the diplomatic 
path. ECOWAS negotiations held out the possibility of Taylor accepting disarmament 
and  peacefully contesting elections. Nigerian troops may not have been required, or if 
they were, deployed with the consent of warring parties, lowering the probability of 
facing combat and costs. Nigeria’s demands for an interim government without the 
warring parties was part of a strategy to deny Taylor the immediate spoils of office 
and buy Nigeria time to influence the outcome. Many scholars have pointed to the 
irony of dictators such as Babangida demanding democracy in Liberia. But a 
democratic Liberia, bound by civil society groups, political parties and elections 
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would be more transparent and constrained in its foreign policy than an autocratic, 
unpredictable, Taylor-led government. Democracy was a means of lowering the 
probability that post-war Liberia would destabilise the region.  
 
Secondly, if the time came for military intervention without consent, cultivating 
support in ECOWAS would provide valuable international cover for a controversial 
mission. Coleman concludes that ECOWAS states would have been ‘outraged if 
Nigeria intervened in Liberia alone’. 202  As one Sierra Leonean diplomat put it, 
ECOWAS was consulted so the mission would not look ‘like an invasion’. 203 
ECOWAS’s aegis made it ‘easier for Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone to 
accede to Nigeria’s request for their participation’.204 The United States became an 
important financial backer of the mission, averaging $10 million per year, along with 
various non-government humanitarian organisations. 205  Coleman argues that 
legitimacy helped cultivate the perception of Nigeria as a ‘good international citizen’ 
when the Babangida regime was politically ostracised. At the very least, going 
through ECOWAS framed the intervention as a regional response, making it difficult 
for the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), United Nations (UN) and international 
community to criticise the deployment and easier for Nigeria to diplomatically isolate 
the NPFL’s supporters. Nigeria was also cognizant of the sunk costs in establishing 
ECOWAS as a institutional conduit for its influence in West Africa. Nigeria had 
absorbed up to 70% of the running costs for ECOWAS over 15 years and was its 
‘finest foreign policy achievement’. 206  In the end, Nigeria walked the tightrope 
between dividing ECOWAS and seeing its interests realised. Nigeria technically acted 
outside ECOWAS rules for establishing a military intervention, even under the 
clauses of the 1981 Mutual Defence Pact, but was crafty enough to present the rest of 
the forum with a fait accompli though the SMC which the region, including Nigeria’s 
francophone rivals, eventually acceded to.207
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While the pursuit of multilateral sanction and a diplomatic solution offered lower 
deployment costs, it is not convincing to argue that Nigerian diplomacy explains the 
timing of deployment. Both Nigeria and Guinea were prepared to intervene without 
the blessing of ECOWAS, and ultimately, the mission was endorsed retrospectively. 
According to West Africa magazine sources, ECOMOG was a ‘fait accompli’ before 
the August 7 Banjul conference and the adoption of Decision A/DEC.1/1/90. Military 
experts, including force commander Arnold Quainoo had been in Gambia a week 
before the conference208 and the decision to deploy troops was made over a short 
period between the end of July and the beginning of August. Adebajo writes that, on 
August 6, before the meeting of ECOWAS leaders where intervention decided upon, 
‘Nigerian troops were on their way to Monrovia by sea… such was the determination 
of Nigeria to halt the war, stamp Taylor out and rescue up to 3000 Nigerians trapped 
in Liberia’.209
 
 Clearly sub-regional endorsement was not a deal-breaker for Nigeria. It 
is more likely that Nigeria used the relatively short period from May to July to 
galvanise support for a mission to which they were already committed.  
The Battle For Monrovia – July – August 1990 
 
If diplomacy and negotiation are not convincing explanations of why Nigeria delayed 
its deployment until the siege of Monrovia, then why did it wait? One important 
reason was that the more Taylor concentrated his NPFL in the city the more they were 
vulnerable to Nigeria’s conventional military capacity.  
 
Before discussing the military dimensions of Nigeria’s intervention, it is worth noting 
that fighting in Monrovia heightened the demand for a humanitarian intervention and 
provided additional legal cover. The extent of human abuse and suffering became 
apparent to West Africa’s, and to a lesser extent, the world’s media as the fighting 
approached Monrovia. Babangida justified ECOMOG on precisely these grounds: 
 
 ‘We are in Liberia because events in the country have led to massive destruction of property, the 
massacre by all the parties of thousands of innocent civilians including foreign nationals, women and 
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children, some of whom had sought sanctuary in churches mosques, diplomatic missions, hospitals, 
and under Red Cross protection, contrary to all recognised standards of civilised behaviour’.210
 
  
Liberia’s collapsed government allowed ECOMOG to claim that there was ‘no 
government’ in Liberia and in these circumstances regional states had the right to 
intervene, an argument that would be re-hashed in UN Security Council debates over 
Somalia two years later. The August 7 SMC communiqué justifying intervention 
stated that Liberia was ‘in a state of anarchy and total breakdown of law and order... 
presently, there is a government in Liberia that cannot govern’.211
 
 OAU president 
Salim Salim and ‘elder statesmen’ such as Robert Mugabe, president of Zimbabwe, 
supported ECOMOG on these grounds.  
As the atrocities in Monrovia worsened the viability of a military mission increased. 
Taylor threw his NPFL into a pitched battle for the capital and as he did, the NPFL 
were increasingly vulnerable to expulsion by a military force with even modest 
offensive capacity. The entry of the INFPL in the western suburbs of Monrovia left 
Taylor with only one bottleneck to the Executive Mansion – via Paynesville, 
Congotown and Spriggs-Payne airport in the east. Nigeria saw an opportunity to use 
its strength in conventional warfare to capture Monrovia and drive the NPFL to the 
negotiating table. As Howe states: 
 
 ‘ECOMOG’s overall strategy was for its conventional military force to intimidate the three factions 
while an interim government tried to resolve political differences and prepare Liberia for peaceful 
elections’.212
 
  
Restricting military operations to Monrovia is clearly what Nigeria, and ECOMOG, 
had in mind when they decided upon intervention. As the first Chief of Staff of the 
ECOMOG mission, Nigerian Major General C.C Iweze recalls, ECOMOG had no 
plans beyond establishing a Monrovia as a ‘bridgehead’ to open the political ‘space’ 
for negotiations. 213
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around the St Paul’s river bridge and pursue ‘negotiation for the surrender of the 
NPFL forces’.214 Mayes argues that Nigeria ‘envisioned ECOMOG as a means to 
secure the capital and its environs’.215 Iweze recalls that three options for deployment 
were being considered in Freetown before the intervention. One involved a move ‘by 
land across Sierra Leone to the east and move into Monrovia from west Liberia’ but 
was rejected by military planners because ‘the logistic support would be more than we 
could handle and the condition of the roads would incapacitate our transport and 
compound our problems from the onset’. 216  ECOMOG entered Liberia without 
transport helicopters 217  and during the planning phase, the unit responsible for 
logistics had no officers actually trained in logistics, indicating that only a small 
operation was predicted.218 The force that landed in Monrovia ‘was large enough to 
stop the warring factions from fighting in Monrovia but not big enough to impose a 
permanent truce for the entire country’.219
 
  
Nigeria believed the battle for Monrovia allowed it to leverage its offensive capacity, 
especially is organisational capacity and heavy weapons, against the lightly army and 
poorly organised rebel soldiers. Adebajo says that Nigeria ‘dismissed [the NPFL] as a 
‘rag-tag’ arm[y] packed with ill-trained, drug induced child soldiers who would be 
intimidated at the sight of professional armies’.220 Officers interviewed by Herbert 
Howe ‘initially assumed that the superior firepower of their conventional, 
professional force would a priori intimidate the ragtag NPFL’.221 Arnold Quainoo, the 
first Force Commander of ECOMOG ‘believed the NPFL would lay down it arms 
once ECOMOG made clear both its determination and its armed capability’.222
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intervention] there was a perception that the rebels would abandon their guns the 
moment the peace enforcement mission arrived in Liberia’.223
 
 He recalls: 
‘in one of my discussions with one of the officials of ECOWAS, he had the impression that with the 
calibre of soldiers all the warring factions had, the sight of tanks, armoured vehicles and aircraft would 
scare the living daylight out of them and we would just walk over the area’.224
 
 
According to a ‘top Ghanaian Foreign Ministry official’ the intervention was 
predicted to last an ‘absolute maximum of six months’.225 Proponents of intervention 
argued in Banjul in late July that ‘a surprise move into Monrovia would bring a 
quick... end to the carnage there’.226
 
   
We can see here the logic behind ECOMOG’s deployment. Liberia’s civil war had 
degenerated into a zero-sum struggle for Monrovia and the spoils of office. The 
commitment of both the AFL, INPFL and NPFL to the ‘battle for the capital’ 
indicated to outside actors that controlling Monrovia offered high political payoffs. 
As Liberia’s factions fought inconclusively over the ruins of Monrovia it was clear 
that a conventional military force could capture and then defend the capital with a 
minimum of force. If Taylor had difficulty ousting remnants of the AFL from central 
Monrovia, they would not stand a chance of ousting Nigeria. Nigeria and ECOMOG 
believed they were holding what Taylor coveted above all else – Monrovia and the 
mantle of sovereignty.  
 
Nigeria’s intervention has come under much criticism. The deployment was, in 
Walraven’s opinion, a ‘serious miscalculation’. 227  ECOMOG’s ‘preparations for 
intervention as well as its military capabilities were grossly insufficient… its strategy 
was seriously flawed and its tactics were short-sighted.’ 228
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Liberian presidency.’ 229  Nigeria’s intervention may have prolonged the war and 
transformed it from a political conflict into an economic one. It was only later in the 
war, after Monrovia was occupied by ECOMOG, that factions ‘soon lost sight of why 
they were fighting and any end to the war… and became embroiled in the warlord 
political economy… [fighting for control of] diamonds, gold, rubber, hardwood, palm 
oil, marijuana and looted goods of all sorts’.230 Howe argues that ‘by not carrying the 
war outside Monrovia, except when attacked in late 1992, ECOMOG allowed Taylor 
to recover from his two defeats and to loot much of the countryside’.231
 
 
If anything, however, Nigeria overestimated Taylor’s desire to capture Monrovia in 
the short term. By controlling Monrovia ECOMOG believed that it was controlling 
not only Taylor’s access to the Liberian state, but his prospects to garner revenue. 
What ECOMOG underestimated was the willingness of actors in the international 
political economy to deal with a non-sovereign entity in natural resources and 
weapons.232
 
 And to be fair, the strategy almost worked. By November 1990, with few 
casualties, the humanitarian situation in Monrovia had been stabilised, Taylor was 
dealt a decisive military blow and had signed a cease-fire, thus fulfilling all of 
Nigeria’s original objectives. That it could achieve this by deploying a military 
contingent in Monrovia demonstrates how important African capital cities are in 
economic and strategic terms. In the end, the fact that Taylor continued to receive 
resources from logging, diamonds, and gold gave him incentive to abandon 
negotiations and pursue a military option. It is important to note however, that the 
destructive and sub-optimal economic dimensions of the Liberian civil war studied in 
the literature are a consequence of rational, cost-effective, Nigerian military strategy.  
Causal Mechanism 2: Conclusions 
 
The casual mechanism linking fighting in the capital to the chances of military 
intervention appears plausible from the preceding analysis. When combat between 
Doe’s army and the NPFL centred on Liberia’s countryside, irregular tactics and 
counter-insurgency dominated. Intervention was an unattractive prospect for a 
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Nigerian military apparatus designed to fight conventional wars. Evidence suggests 
that Nigeria associated guerrilla warfare with high costs and low payoffs. As the 
fighting concentrated in Monrovia and the factions committed to open warfare for the 
city, Nigeria exploited an opportunity to leverage its conventional war fighting ability 
and influence the outcome of Liberia’s war. Indeed, existing statistical models suggest 
that Nigeria’s deployment occurred at a sub-optimal point in the conflict as Nigeria’s 
favoured, party, the government of Samuel Doe, was on the precipice of defeat. Yet, 
Nigeria perceived low rather than high costs despite the substantial increase in the 
NPFL’s numbers and territorial control since May 1990 when Babaginda rejected 
Doe’s request for troops. ECOMOG strategists planned for a conventional assault and 
defence of Monrovia to hold the conflict’s singular bargaining chip and play 
kingmaker in Sub-Saharan Africa’s first crisis of the post Cold War period. Not all 
civil wars are equal. Some forms of warfare offer more opportunities for foreign 
states to do what they do best – fight conventional wars – and in different forms of 
warfare these opportunities arise at different points in the war-process.  
 
That said, statistical models rarely consider how the goals of foreign states influence 
the chances and timing of foreign deployment, and in this case, Nigeria’s objectives 
weighed heavily in the decision-making process. Recall that Nigeria’s primary 
objective was to stop the NPFL from taking power in Liberia, not necessarily to 
ensure the survival of Doe’s regime. Any intervention in April and May 1990 could 
only have come in the form of direct support for Doe and the AFL. It would be 
extremely difficult for Nigeria to claim that it was not supporting one of Africa’s less 
endearing despots but opposing insurrection and destabilisation in West Africa as 
Nigerian soldiers fought alongside the AFL in Nimba county. Moreover, given the 
low political importance of Samuel Doe in Nigeria’s wider strategic vision, it is 
unlikely that enduring the high costs of a counter-insurgency campaign would be 
worth the payoff.  
 
If Nigeria wished to stop the NPFL from taking power by force then it had to be 
sensitive to precisely what needed to be ‘taken’ before the NPFL could claim power. 
A norm affixing sovereignty to control of the capital city meant that Monrovia was 
central to Nigerian objectives. Since the historical precedent was to recognise African 
governments who controlled, or took control of, their capital cities, Nigeria would 
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have to impede this path for its objectives to be realised. Nigerian interests were 
directly threatened as the NPFL approached Monrovia and looked increasingly likely 
to capture the capital. With a conventional military force Nigeria fortified and blocked 
the historical route to sovereignty to increase the incentives for Taylor to pursue a 
different path – in this case, democratic elections.  
 
In practice, the majority of this thesis has assumed that norms are ‘static’ and that 
states are norm ‘receivers’. However, it is difficult to divorce Nigeria’s intervention in 
the Liberian civil war from a wider strategic project to re-engineer sovereignty norms 
in West Africa. Many states had an interest in perpetuating the norm that controlling 
the capital was sufficient to claim sovereignty during the Cold War. Rulers could 
reliably accumulate military and economic assistance, keeping them and their allies 
generally secure from the threat of small-scale insurrection. However, the effect of the 
end of the Cold War may have been change the impact of a sovereignty-capital norm 
from providing regime security to undermining it. A capital-sovereignty norm has the 
effect of incentivising the use of violence by sub-state groups. Insofar as the perks of 
sovereignty can only be claimed by physically controlling a limited land area, sub-
state actors will focus their strategies to access power on physical, that is military, 
control. While this may have been acceptable when military and economic aid was 
widely available, as this aid dried up, it left a number of West African states 
vulnerable to even small-scale insurrections. In order to disincentivise the pursuit of 
power by force, West African states had to disconnect the association of controlling 
Africa’s capitals with international recognition. That is, sovereignty norms in West 
Africa needed re-engineering. The best and – as discussed above – the most cost-
effective way of achieving this was to control West Africa’s capital cities when they 
were threatened. Thus, Nigeria focused its military strategy on controlling Freetown 
in Sierra Leone and did not recognise the rebels when it controlled the city. Senegal 
and Guinea acted to oppose the capture of Bissau by a fractious group of the military 
in 1998. Winning elections rather than capturing capitals is the norm that West 
African states seem increasingly willing to promote. Individuals that hold capitals but 
lose elections are increasingly likely to remain unrecognised, as Johnny Paul Komora 
discovered in Sierra Leone in 1997. Indeed the African Union now refuses to 
recognise governments that capture capitals by force. In 2008, Guinea’s military junta 
was not recognised nor was Laurent Gbagbo’s attempt to physically hold power in 
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Cote d’Ivoire by controlling Yamoussoukro and Abidjan. Promoting a democracy-
sovereignty norm over a capital-sovereignty norm does offer benefits to incumbent 
rulers. Although losing elections is a risk, most governments are in a stronger position 
than domestic rivals in their ability to disburse sanctions and rewards in exchange for 
electoral support.  
 
Normative engineering can only be successful if its practiced and the limited military 
capabilities of many West African states, combined with internal problems, may limit 
the extent to which norms can be changed. In Cote d’Ivoire, for example, Nigeria 
threatened to invade and physically oust Laurent Gbagbo if he did not accept election 
results that deemed his rival, Alassane Ouattara, as the legitimate president. Gbagbo, 
however, called Nigeria’s bluff and the regional giant looked ill-prepared and 
motivated to fight Gbagbo’s backers who, unlike Charles Taylor, were relatively well 
organised with heavy weapons. In the end it was UN and French soldiers that 
followed through, but this raises questions about the extent to which norms can be 
changed in West Africa.  
 
Much of the preceding is speculative and more research is needed to examine whether 
normative change is occurring in West Africa and the extent to which this is possible 
given the capabilities at the disposal of present rulers. Nonetheless it does point us 
towards the close integration of objectives and strategy in military intervention. While 
the causal mechanisms discussed in Chapter 2 are plausible by the analysis in this 
chapter, we need to keep in mind that Nigeria’s military capabilities also dovetailed 
well with its political objectives.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the causal mechanisms linking economic geography with 
the location of fighting and foreign intervention are plausible. The overwhelming 
political and economic importance of controlling Monrovia in a situation where both 
Samuel Doe’s AFL and Charles Taylor’s NPFL lacked the ability to coordinate 
conventional offensives increased the utility of a ‘strategy of exhaustion’. President 
Samuel Doe abandoned an ill-fated counter-insurgency campaign in place of a close 
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positional defence of Monrovia. His decision was based on the knowledge that 
Monrovia was where the NPFL would gain the highest utility in capturing, and that 
the NPFL lacked the offensive the capacity to do so. Secondly, most regular, standing 
military forces have an advantage in conventional warfare. Conventional offense is 
most effective when belligerents commit to a pitched battle, regardless of the balance 
of power between the rebels and a government. Neither the AFL, nor the NPFL 
committed to face-to-face battles until they were in close proximity to the capital. 
This geographic conflict structure created disincentives for Nigeria, determined to 
avoid an NPFL take-over of Liberia, to intervene whilst fighting was in the 
countryside. As the fighting reached Monrovia, Nigeria believed it was embarking 
upon a low-cost mission to capture the capital from militias lacking the capacity to re-
take it. This section has shown a clear link between the geography of civil war and the 
timing of foreign intervention. In low-capability warfare, foreign states are more 
likely to hold off on deployment until their rival engages in the open and design 
military strategies around taking and holding areas of vital economic importance.  
 
 
Chapter Eight 
Conclusions 
 
Whether by the AK-47 or the aircraft carrier, strategy is apprehensible within existing 
theoretical frameworks. This thesis has articulated a theory of military strategy in 
low-capability warfare capable of explaining existing empirical puzzles and 
generating novel hypotheses. On the shoulders of Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, 
low-capability warfare was distinguished from ‘conventional’ and ‘guerrilla’ warfare 
by the poor material and organisational capabilities available to both government and 
insurgent actors. Light and small weapons, especially Kalashnikov assault rifles and 
RPG-7 grenade launchers, prevail in a military environment lacking the mobile armor 
and artillery we associate with conventional warfare. My main contention was that 
low-capability warfare is defensive. Small and light weapons have devastating 
defensive advantages when belligerents lack the ability to organise and supply their 
soldiers. Capturing territory in low-capability warfare is vastly more costly than 
defending it.  
 
Chapter 2 predicted that a ‘strategy of exhaustion’ is cost-effective in low-capability 
warfare. The attritional advantages of defense can be exploited by concentrating one’s 
forces in areas where a rival is likely to attack. Even if an opponent’s military force 
cannot be destroyed, holding strategically important sites preserves bargaining power 
for future negotiations. Conventional warfare, on the other hand, demands that a 
rival’s offensive capacity be degraded and a ‘strategy of annihilation’ sees both the 
government and insurgency striving to destroy their opponent’s offensive capabilities 
through a combination of conventional offensive and defensive tactics. Manoeuvre 
and judicious force concentration directed at supply lines, communications and 
strategic bottlenecks are common derivatives of this strategy. Guerilla strategy is the 
inverse of a ‘strategy of annihilation’. Small and mobile units disperse, often into 
rough terrain where the government has difficulty concentrating its armed forces, to 
harass soldiers, officials and infrastructure. Anything but the smallest and sharpest of 
force concentrations are avoided to prevent being obliterated in open battle. Counter-
insurgency is a variant of the ‘strategy of annihilation’ relying on a combination of 
Chapter Eight - Conclusions 
 284 
territorial defence in peripheral communities combined with mobile ‘search and 
destroy’ operations to eliminate the threat posed by guerrillas.  
 
Economic geography structures the location and concentration of fighting in low-
capability warfare, in addition to the chances and timing of foreign intervention. 
Domestic combatants have incentives to concentrate in positional defence of lucrative 
regions. It is here that the enemy has high incentives to attack and it is here that 
casualties can be inflicted in a fight where the odds are stacked in favour of the 
defender. Holding these areas denies resources to rivals and limits their ability to 
recruit soldiers and purchase weapons. Upon these insights, fighting was predicted to 
be more likely to occur and cluster around a country’s most valuable areas. Conflict 
geography in conventional warfare is structured by the location of a rival’s force-
concentration and the weak points there-located, not economic geography. Indeed it is 
the very predictability of positional defence in valuable regions that renders such a 
strategy dangerous. Governments can protect valuable sites and confine an insurgency 
to the periphery in guerrilla warfare, thus lowering the incidence and concentration of 
fighting around these locations.  
 
Conflict geography in low-capability warfare, structured as it is by the economic 
geography of a conflicted state, was also predicted to influence whether and when 
foreign states choose to intervene. No studies have yet considered that the strategic 
decisions of belligerents at the domestic level influence the strategies of actors at the 
international level. Military forces are not usually designed to fight counter-
insurgency. Rather, they are assembled to fight conventional wars against other states. 
Potential interveners prefer to deploy during ongoing or predicted pitched battles 
because it is at this point that conventional war-fighting ability can be best leveraged 
for impact upon the outcome of a civil war. Conventional battles are communicative, 
especially in low-capability warfare. Where a belligerent is prepared to assault a fixed 
position when defence has the advantage, foreign states can infer that the object of 
combat is of high value. Conventional battles gravitate towards areas of high 
economic value in low-capability warfare and, as they do, the probability of foreign 
states intervening increases. Fighting in conventional warfare is not related to 
economic geography and the chances of foreign intervention are unrelated to the 
distance of fighting from these areas. Intervention in guerrilla warfare was predicted 
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to be rare, but as open warfare exhibits no tendency towards areas of high economic 
value, no relationship between the distance of fighting from these zones and the 
chances of intervention was predicted.   
 
Sovereignty norms connecting control of the capital city to international recognition, 
in a context where the opportunities for domestic accumulation are low have 
transformed Africa’s capitals into lucrative point resources. Sovereignty offers 
benefits with few risks. The ability to legitimately tax trade, exchange policy 
positions for military aid, economic aid and loans from international financial 
institutions, and contract foreign firms to exploit and legally sell natural resources 
increase the payoffs for international recognition. Physical (that is, military) control of 
these cities has, historically, offered the best chance for domestic actors to realise 
these benefits. As the epicenter of economic geography, capital cities were predicted 
to be at a higher risk of experiencing any fighting, experiencing a higher proportion of 
fighting, and triggering foreign military intervention in Africa’s low-capability 
conflicts when compared to conventional and guerrilla conflicts.  
 
Taken together, the theory and hypotheses in this thesis advance our extant 
knowledge by developing a theory of military strategy in low-capability warfare and 
articulating a plausible logic behind observed, but undertheorised, links between 
economics and violence in contemporary civil war.  
 
Summary of Findings 
 
Chapter 4 found that the odds of an African capital experiencing fighting during a 
civil war were more than six times higher in low-capability warfare when compared 
to conventional warfare - a finding independent of confounding variables such as the 
number of soldiers at the disposal of a government, the battle intensity and the size of 
the country. Conflicts dominated by light weapons and, insofar as they correlate, by 
belligerents with a poor capacity to organise and supply their soldiers, are more likely 
to battle it out over the capital city. A statistically significant link between the level of 
conventional arms imports and the probability of fighting in Africa’s capitals 
increased our confidence in the presence of a relationship between low offensive 
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capacity and defensive military strategies structured around valuable regions. The 
lower the level of conventional weapons in a war-system, the higher the utility of a 
defensive ‘strategy of exhaustion’, as the example of Angola in the early 1990s 
demonstrated. Chapter 4 also showed fighting in low-capability warfare becomes less 
likely as one moved further from the capital. Fighting was more evenly dispersed, in 
conventional and guerrilla warfare, gravitating towards choke points for mechanised 
armies and international borders.  
 
OLS regression analysis in Chapter 5 showed that Africa’s capitals were subjected to 
a higher proportion of battles when combatants were unable to access or wield heavy 
weapons, although these results were dependent upon removing outlying cases. 
Visual analysis ascertained that 80% of low-capability conflicts exhibited a 
concentration of fighting in the capital city. Put another way, in 80% of low-capability 
conflicts the number of battles that occurred around or within the capital city eclipsed 
the number of battles that occurred in any similarly-sized land area in the countryside. 
Just 25% of conventional conflicts and 11% of irregular conflicts showed the same 
pattern. Correlation between concentrations of fighting and areas of high economic 
value was comparatively high in the sample of low-capability warfare. The overlap 
was near perfect in Somalia, the Central African Republic and Congo-Brazzaville. Bi-
polar conflict structures correlated with bi-polar economic geographies in Sierra 
Leone (1991-2000) and Liberia (2000-2003). Concentrations of fighting and locations 
of high economic value did not correlate well in conventional and guerrilla warfare 
with the exception of insurgencies operating in regions of high oil production in 
Nigeria and Angola.  This finding might be explained by both the increased risk of 
rebellions emerging in areas of high oil production and the attractiveness of disrupting 
oil revenues where government actors are heavily dependent upon hydrocarbon 
exports.  
 
Chapter 6 showed that foreign states show a preference for intervention when conflict 
approaches capital cities in low-capability warfare – a pattern absent in both 
conventional and guerrilla warfare. A pitched battle within 25km of the capital 
increased the odds of a foreign state intervening by 11 times, a finding comparable to 
the obligations of a defence pact or a humanitarian crisis. In contrast, international 
alliance networks and rivalries tended to trigger intervention in conventional and 
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guerrilla warfare. Any country deploying in these higher-capability forms of warfare 
must bear the additional costs of confronting a rival with substantial offensive 
capabilities or a protracted counter-insurgency campaign. Either way the stakes need 
to be higher to justify the costs.  
 
While the statistical analyses of Chapters 4-6 showed conspicuous and systematic 
cross-national links between low-capability warfare, economic geography, conflict 
geography and foreign intervention, the regression analysis did not demonstrate the 
plausibility of causal mechanisms described in Chapter 2. Chapter 7 tested two casual 
mechanisms with a case study of the Liberian civil war between 1989 and 1990: (1) 
the link between economic geography, a strategy of exhaustion and civil war location 
and (2) the link between fighting in the capital and a preference for intervention when 
conventional tactics are deployed. Analysis suggests that both mechanisms were 
plausible. President Samuel Doe changed his strategy from counter-insurgency to 
positional defence of the capital Monrovia. Doe and the AFL had knowledge of the 
NPFL’s low offensive capacity and Charles Taylors intention to attack Monrovia. 
Although Doe was killed in September 1990, his strategy very nearly worked as 
forces from ECOWAS, led by Nigeria, deployed in the capital and pushed the NPFL 
to the outskirts of the city. Luring ill-equipped insurgents into a battle for the capital 
has succeeded in other contexts, most notably in Chad in 2006 and 2008 but also in 
2011, in Mogadishu, Somalia.  
 
Nigerian intervention was intimately linked to Doe’s decision to pull back and defend 
Monrovia. Luring the NPFL into a conventional battle for Monrovia created the very 
conditions that made Nigerian intervention likely. Nigeria deployed in Liberia with a 
belief that it was embarking upon a low-cost, high payoff, mission to secure Monrovia 
and hold the key bargaining chip in future negotiations. Nigeria opted out of a 
military intervention in May 1990, despite a request from President Doe and a 
willingness to deploy, as the AFL and NPFL fought a guerrilla war in Liberia’s 
countryside. Nigeria’s military was ill suited to a counter-insurgency campaign and 
perceived deployment in a military situation dominated by irregular tactics as risky 
and costly. A preference for intervention in conventional battles led Nigeria to 
intervene at an apparently sub-optimal point when its rival, the NPFL, were far 
stronger than when Nigeria opted out of intervention in May 1990.  
Chapter Eight - Conclusions 
 288 
 
Evidence presented in Chapters 4-7 consistently supports the notion that economic 
geography and military outcomes in low-capability warfare are connected. From this 
thesis, we understand, if only modestly, more about why civil wars are fought where 
they are, the triggers of foreign military intervention and the logic, or strategy, that 
produces these outcomes. On a more practical level, the list of cities upon which the 
devastation of war was unleashed between 1989 and 2008 in Africa is long. From 
north to south they include: Bissau, Freetown, Monrovia, Ndjamena, Khartoum, 
Mogadishu, Bangui, Brazzaville, Kigali, Bujumbura, Kinshasa and Maseru. We now 
understand more about why this spate of besiegement has occurred. The destruction 
rent upon Africa’s most populous and, usually, most productive, cities is the product 
of design, not of chaos and irrationality. Indeed it is precisely their population and 
productivity that, in part, makes them an attractive fulcrum for the strategies of 
insurgents, governments and foreign soldiers. Domestic and international actors  have 
designed their military strategies around the defence of these cities to maximize 
bargaining power in a context where violence is the primary means though which 
ends are realised. This points us to a second important contribution of the present 
research. Norms stipulating criteria for international recognition have enormous 
bearing on the military strategies of actors in low-capability warfare. Put bluntly, 
sovereignty norms influence which locations will be subjected to the depredations of 
war, and which locations will not. Nowhere are norms more important than in Africa 
where the opportunities for domestic revenue extraction are low. So long as 
controlling Africa’s capitals offers the best chance for sub-state groups to access the 
material benefits of statehood, they will continue to be the focus of military strategy. 
So too, insofar as physical control of a territory is tied to the benefits of sovereignty, 
violence will remain an attractive means of taking power. Indeed, as long as small and 
symbolic land areas are coupled with international recognition, rulers may have little 
incentive to construct the organised, coherent military apparatus required to defend 
the populations they pledge to serve.   
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
Cases of Low-Capability Warfare 
 
Cameroon vs UPC      1960-1961 
 
Central African Republic vs Mutineers   1996-1997 
 
Central African Republic vs Kolingba/Bozize  2001-2002 
 
Central African Republic vs UDFR    2006 
 
Chad vs Various      2005-2008 
 
Comoros vs Presidential Guard    1989 
 
Comoros vs Anjouan      1997 
 
Congo-Brazzaville vs Cobras, Ninjas, Cocoyes  1993-2002 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo vs Katanga/Kasai,   1960-1965 
 
Guinea vs RFDG      2000-2001 
 
Lesotho vs Military Faction     1998 
 
Liberia vs NPFL, INPFL     1989-1995 
 
Liberia vs LURD, MODEL     2000-2003 
 
Sierra Leone vs RUF, AFRC     1991-2000 
 
Somalia vs Various      1990-1996 
 
Somalia vs SRRC      2001-2002 
 
Somalia vs ICU, Al-Shabaab     2006-2008 
 
Sudan vs JEM       2003-2008 
 
Uganda vs ADF, LRA, WBNF    1990-2003 
 
 
Cases of Conventional Warfare 
 
Angola vs UNITA      1975-2002 
 
Chad vs Various      1980-1994 
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Cote d’Ivoire vs MJP, MPIGO, Forces Nouvelles  2002-2004 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo vs Opposition Militias 1967 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo vs FLNC   1977-1978 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo vs ADFL, RCD, MLC 1996-2001 
 
Djibouti vs FRUD      1991-1994 
 
Guinea-Bissau vs Military Junta    1998 
 
Mozambique vs RENAMO     1977-1992 
 
Nigeria vs Biafra      1967-1970 
 
Rwanda vs RPF      1990-1994 
 
Uganda vs UNLA      1978-1980 
 
 
Cases of Guerrilla Warfare 
 
Angola vs FLEC      1991-2004 
 
Burundi vs Hutu Insurgents     1965 
 
Burundi vs CNDD, Palipehutu, FDD    1991-2008 
 
Chad vs Various      1966-1979 
 
Chad vs MJDT      1997-2002 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo vs CNDP, BDK  2006-2008 
 
Djibouti vs FRUD - D     1999 
 
Eritrea vs EIJM – AS      1997-2003 
 
Ethiopia vs Eritrea      1964-1991 
 
Ethiopia vs TPLF      1976-1991 
 
Ethiopia vs WSLF      1977-1983 
 
Ethiopia vs Various      1996-2008 
 
Mali vs Tuaregs      1990-1994 
 
Mali vs ATNMC      2007-2008 
Appendix 
291  
 
Mauritania vs POLISARIO     1975-1978 
 
Niger vs Tuaregs      1992-1997 
 
Niger vs FARS      1997 
 
Niger vs MNJ       2007-2008 
 
Nigeria vs NDPVF      2004 
 
Nigeria vs Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa    2004 
 
Rwanda vs PALIR      1997-2002 
 
Senegal vs MFDC      1990-2003 
 
Somalia vs SNM      1982-1989 
 
South Africa vs SWAPO     1966-1988 
 
Sudan vs Anya Nya      1963-1972 
 
Sudan vs SPLM      1983-2002 
 
Uganda vs NRA, HSM, LRA     1981-1989 
 
Uganda vs LRA, UDCA     2004-2007 
 
Zimbabwe vs ZANU, ZAPU     1973-1979 
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